G. D. v. Swampscott Public Schools ( 2022 )


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  •            United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 20-2114
    G.D., by and through her Parents and Next Friends, JEFFREY and
    MELISSA D.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    SWAMPSCOTT PUBLIC SCHOOLS; BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Barron, Circuit Judge,
    and Singal, District Judge.
    Robert E. Curtis, Jr., with whom Melissa S. Dragon was on
    brief for appellants.
    Felicia S. Vasudevan, with whom Doris R. MacKenzie Ehrens and
    Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP were on brief for appellees.
    February 7, 2022
       Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
    BARRON, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey and Melissa D., on behalf
    of   their    child   ("G.D."),   sought    a   determination      from   the
    Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") that
    G.D.'s public school district failed to provide her with a free
    appropriate     public   school   education     as     required   under   the
    Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1400
     et seq.       They also sought reimbursement from the school
    district for tuition expenses associated with their unilateral
    placement of G.D. at a nearby private school.              After a hearing,
    the BSEA denied their claims, and they filed suit against the
    school district and the BSEA in the United States District Court
    for the District of Massachusetts.           The District Court granted
    judgment to the defendants.       We affirm.
    I.
    A.
    The IDEA requires states that receive federal financial
    assistance under the statute to offer eligible children with
    disabilities a "free appropriate public education," or, as it is
    often called, a "FAPE."     See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas
    Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 
    137 S. Ct. 988
    , 993 (2017); see also 
    20 U.S.C. § 1412
    (a)(1). "'The primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE'
    is   an   Individualized   Education     Program     ('IEP')."    Johnson v.
    Boston Pub. Schs., 
    906 F.3d 182
    , 185 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting D.B.
    ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 
    675 F.3d 26
    , 34 (1st Cir. 2012)).
    - 2 -
    An IEP is the primary "means by which special education
    and related services" are provided to an eligible child, see Endrew
    F., 
    137 S. Ct. at 994
    , and it is composed of "a written statement
    for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and
    revised in accordance with" federal law and regulations. 
    20 U.S.C. § 1414
    (d)(1)(A)(i); see also 
    34 C.F.R. § 300.324
    ; 
    603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.05
    .       That written statement must include "the child's
    present level of educational attainment, the short- and long-term
    goals for his or her education, objective criteria with which to
    measure progress toward those goals, and the specific services to
    be offered."   Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 
    518 F.3d 18
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 
    603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.05
    (4).
    In Massachusetts, school districts are responsible for
    the development and administration of IEPs.             See 
    603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.10
    .       A school district must take care to ensure, in
    satisfying   the    IDEA's   requirement    that   eligible   children   be
    provided with a FAPE, that the IEP is "reasonably calculated to
    enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's
    circumstances."     Endrew F., 
    137 S. Ct. at 999
    .
    If, upon issuance of the IEP by the relevant school
    district, the parents of the child receiving the IEP believe that
    the IEP is not "reasonably calculated to enable [their] child to
    make   progress      appropriate    in     light   of    [their]   child's
    - 3 -
    circumstances,"        
    id.,
         or    believe      that     the   development       and
    administration      of        the    IEP    otherwise       violates      the    IDEA's
    requirements, the parents may file a complaint with the school
    district to challenge the IEP.                See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (b)(6); see
    also D.B., 
    675 F.3d at 35
    .            The filing of a complaint kicks off an
    informal dispute resolution procedure conducted by the school
    district.     See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (f)(1)(B).                If the school district
    fails to "resolve[] the complaint to the satisfaction of the
    parents within 30 days of the receipt of the complaint," the
    parents    are    entitled      to    an    "impartial      due   process       hearing"
    conducted by either the school district or the relevant state
    educational       agency.              
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1415
    (f)(1)(B)(ii),
    1415(f)(1)(A).
    In Massachusetts, in accord with the IDEA's established
    framework for considering parent complaints, the "impartial due
    process"     hearing     is    conducted      by   the    BSEA.     See     
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (f)(1)(A); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2A(a); 
    603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.08
    (3)-(6).           Further, parents who are dissatisfied with
    the IEP provided to their child may "unilaterally" place their
    child   at    a   private       school      "during   the    pendency      of    review
    proceedings."      Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 
    471 U.S. 359
    , 373-74 (1985).             But, the parents make that decision "at
    their own financial risk."             
    Id. at 374
    .        The parents may request
    that the state educational agency order the school district to
    - 4 -
    reimburse     them    for    expenses    resulting       from    the   unilateral
    placement of their child, but the state educational agency is not
    required to do so unless it finds that the school district "had
    not made a free appropriate public education available to the child
    in a timely manner" prior to the unilateral placement.                  
    20 U.S.C. § 1412
    (a)(10)(C)(ii).
    Under the IDEA, if the state educational agency renders
    a decision adverse to either the parents or the school district,
    either party may "bring a civil action challenging the outcome of
    the   due   process    hearing    in    either   state    or    federal      court."
    Johnson, 906 F.3d at 186; see 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(2)(A); 603 Mass
    Code Regs. 28.08(6).         In conducting its review, the court in that
    civil action must consider the "records of the administrative
    proceedings," as well as "additional evidence at the request of a
    party."     
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1415
    (i)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
    We have described a district court's review of the state
    administrative ruling as entailing "involved oversight" of the
    agency's factual findings and conclusions.                    S. Kingstown Sch.
    Comm. v. Joanna S., 
    773 F.3d 344
    , 349 (1st Cir. 2014).                           The
    district     court,     in    demonstrating      respect        for    the     state
    administrative        agency's    expertise      as      to     educational      and
    pedagogical matters, must accord "due weight" to the agency's
    administrative proceedings.        Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 
    998 F.2d 1083
    , 1087 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson
    - 5 -
    Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 206 (1982)); see 
    id.
    ("Although the exact quantum of weight is subject to the district
    judge's exercise of informed discretion, the judge is not at
    liberty to [ignore] administrative findings or to discard them
    without sound reason.").           Then, "basing its decision on the
    preponderance of the evidence," the district court "shall grant
    such relief as [it] determines [is] appropriate."               
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(2)(C)(iii).1 The court tasked with reviewing the outcome
    of a due process hearing may order that the school district
    reimburse   the   parents    for    expenses   arising   from   unilateral
    placement of their child at a private school, but the federal court
    may do so only if it "concludes both that the public placement
    violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper
    under the Act."   Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 
    510 U.S. 7
    , 15 (1993).
    B.
    We now "set forth the background facts" for the case at
    hand "as supportably found by the [D]istrict [C]ourt."           Sebastian
    M., 685 F.3d at 82.         We then describe the relevant procedural
    history.
    1    In civil actions of this sort, a motion for summary
    judgment is "'simply a vehicle' for providing review of the
    underlying administrative ruling."   Joanna S., 773 F.3d at 349
    (quoting Sebastian M. v. King Phillip Reg'l Sch. Dist., 
    685 F.3d 79
    , 84 (1st Cir. 2012)).
    - 6 -
    1.
    G.D. is an eleven-year-old child and a resident of
    Swampscott, Massachusetts.      She is eligible to receive special
    education services from her school district, Swampscott Public
    Schools, on account of her learning disabilities, which include
    severe   dyslexia,    dysgraphia,   and   a   phonological   processing
    disorder.    G.D. attended a local private school for kindergarten
    and first grade.     She did not receive any specialized services at
    the private school.
    G.D.'s parents grew concerned during her first-grade
    year about her lack of early reading and writing skills.          As a
    result, in April 2017, G.D's parents referred their child to her
    school district for an evaluation to determine whether she was
    eligible for special education services.
    With the consent of G.D.'s parents, and while she was
    still attending private school, the school district conducted
    psychological and academic assessments of G.D. The school district
    determined that G.D. was eligible to receive special education
    services due to a learning disability that affects her reading,
    writing, and mathematics abilities.
    The school district convened a meeting to discuss the
    result of the evaluations between G.D.'s parents, teachers who
    would provide the special education services set forth in the
    proposed IEP, and representatives from the school district.          At
    - 7 -
    that June 7, 2017 meeting, the parents asserted that an appropriate
    response to the disabilities identified in the school district's
    assessment would involve a "science-based academic program for
    dyslexic students."    They also asserted that "neither [G.D.'s
    current] private school nor [the school district] was equipped to
    provide appropriate services for" their daughter.     Accordingly,
    the parents requested that G.D. be placed at a "substantially-
    separate school" for children with language-based disabilities.
    The school district rejected this request, and proposed an IEP for
    her second-grade year on June 20, 2017.
    The proposed IEP offered G.D. special education services
    that would be provided to her five times a week during the school
    year and four times a week during the preceding summer.2   The June
    2017 IEP indicated that, during the school year, G.D. would receive
    the designated services in a partial inclusion placement at an
    elementary school within the school district, meaning that she
    would receive some specialized instruction in a "language-based
    classroom," and "inclusion support in other subjects in the general
    2 The proposed IEP established various goals for G.D. to
    accomplish during her second-grade year, such as her "decoding and
    encoding [of] closed one-syllable words and identification of
    sight words; a reading goal focusing on fluency and comprehension;
    a written language goal to teach [G.D. how] to write a simple story
    with   complete   sentences   and   correct    capitalization   and
    punctuation; and a math goal addressing addition/subtraction
    facts, telling time, identifying money, use of graphs and charts,
    and solving word problems."
    - 8 -
    education setting."        The IEP also provided that G.D. would receive
    an "extended evaluation" during the first eight weeks of her
    second-grade year.
    Later that month, G.D.'s parents sent a letter to the
    school district that indicated their intention to "conditionally
    accept" the proposed IEP and the placement corresponding to it,
    despite their view that the IEP was not sufficient to allow G.D.
    to make effective progress.        The parents also indicated that they
    would arrange to have a private specialist, Dr. Robert Kemper,
    evaluate G.D. during the summer, and they requested that the
    results of the specialist's evaluation be discussed at the next
    convened meeting in October.
    During the summer, G.D. received the "extended year"
    reading instruction services that were provided for in the IEP.
    Those services consisted of two forty-five-minute sessions each
    week of reading instruction from special education teachers.                 And
    after   G.D.   had   completed    her   summer    instruction,      Dr.   Kemper
    conducted his planned evaluation of G.D.            The evaluation involved
    Dr. Kemper's administration of tests designed to assess oral and
    written language skills.           Based on      this testing,      Dr. Kemper
    determined that G.D. met the criteria for diagnoses of dyslexia,
    "double deficit" phonological processing disorder, dysgraphia, and
    a language impairment that impacted G.D.'s ability to convey her
    thoughts   orally    and    in   writing.     Dr.   Kemper   also    "strongly
    - 9 -
    recommended" that G.D.'s "special education services be provided
    within . . .          a          substantially         separate            educational
    program . . . housed            within . . .     a   school     that      is    designed
    specially    to     meet    the    needs   of   students      such   as    [G.D.]      who
    demonstrate severe language-based learning disabilities."
    G.D.'s second-grade year began in late-August 2017.
    Pursuant to the IEP, G.D. "participated in a general education
    class at [the school district] with support for science, social
    studies     and   non-academic       activities,"      and    separated         from   the
    general education class for a part of the school day "to work on
    [reading, writing, and math] skills in individual or small group
    sessions with a special education teacher."                   G.D. ex rel. Jeffrey
    D. v. Swampscott Public Schools, No. 19-cv-10431, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    ,
    at *2 (D. Mass. June 23, 2020).            In November, Dr. Kemper conducted
    a re-evaluation of G.D. to measure progress in her reading and
    writing skills using several of the same assessments that he had
    administered to G.D. in August.
    Some    of    G.D.'s    assessment      scores    did     not      increase;
    others increased somewhat, but Dr. Kemper opined that the increase
    was   not    enough        to     demonstrate    "statistically           significant"
    improvement.        Dr. Kemper concluded that G.D.'s assessment scores
    provided "no evidence of effective progress" resulting from the
    three months of instruction and special education services that
    G.D. received from Swampscott as a result of the IEP.                          He further
    - 10 -
    concluded that it was "extremely critical that [G.D.] be placed in
    an alternative education setting as soon as possible."
    The    school    district       then     held    another   meeting      on
    November   21,    2017     to    discuss    the     results    of   Dr.   Kemper's
    evaluation.      At that meeting, the school district proposed an
    amendment to the IEP that would place G.D. in "a substantially
    separate   language-based         classroom"       instead     of   the   previous
    placement, under which G.D. had received instruction in a general
    education class for the bulk of the school day but also received
    "specialized, pull-out individual or small group instruction" from
    special education teachers.              G.D.'s parents initially rejected
    this proposed amendment to the IEP.              In January 2018, however, the
    parents accepted the amendment after Swampscott proposed it as
    part of an eight-week "extended evaluation" of G.D.
    In    March    2018,    at    the     conclusion   of    the   "extended
    evaluation"     period,    the    school    district       administered    to    G.D.
    several formal and informal assessments to measure her progress
    since the beginning of the school year.3               According to the school
    district, those assessments demonstrated that G.D. was "improving
    her oral reading fluency," and "making progress in writing using
    graphic organizers, templates, and word processing programs."                      A
    quarterly progress report, issued by G.D.'s teachers at her public
    3    The school district previously administered                           these
    assessments to G.D. at different points in 2017.
    - 11 -
    school in the school district in the same month, noted that G.D.
    was "making progress" on the goals identified in her IEP.
    Around   the   time   of    this   evaluation,      G.D.'s    parents
    submitted    an   application     for    their     daughter's    admission    to
    Landmark School ("Landmark"), a private school that specializes in
    the instruction of, and exclusively teaches, schoolchildren with
    learning    disabilities.       As   part     of   the   application     process,
    Landmark administered standardized tests to G.D. to measure her
    reading and writing abilities, as well as her learning aptitude.
    Landmark accepted the application shortly thereafter.
    Later in the month, the school district convened another
    meeting with G.D.'s parents to discuss the results of its "extended
    evaluation" of G.D., a report from Dr. Kemper concerning G.D.'s
    progress, and progress reports from G.D.'s teachers at her local
    public school.       At the meeting, the school district shared its
    view that G.D. was making progress due to the services that she
    received in her new placement and proposed that the placement
    continue beyond the "extended evaluation" period on which the
    school district and the parents had earlier agreed.
    G.D.'s parents expressed their view that G.D. was not
    making "effective progress [in the placement], that she in fact
    had regressed, and needed an outside placement."                G.D.'s parents
    also informed the school district of G.D.'s acceptance at Landmark
    and stated their intention to "unilaterally place" G.D. at Landmark
    - 12 -
    for the upcoming school year.       In addition, they informed the
    school district that they would seek reimbursement from the school
    district for expenses associated with G.D.'s placement at Landmark
    and would seek a due process hearing before the BSEA to secure
    such reimbursement.4
    Three days after the meeting, G.D.'s parents sent to the
    school   district   a   letter   that     stated   their   intention   to
    unilaterally place G.D. at Landmark and to seek "full reimbursement
    of all costs related to [G.D.'s] enrollment at Landmark."              One
    week after sending that letter, G.D.'s parents submitted a hearing
    request to the BSEA.
    2.
    The hearing request alleged, among other things, that
    the school district had denied G.D. a FAPE because it had "failed
    to deliver to [G.D.] the services set forth in her 2017-2018 IEP;"
    that the IEP had "caused regression for [G.D.] and has not resulted
    in effective progress;" that "the proposed IEP and placement fails
    to promote [G.D.'s] development in all areas of need;" and that
    the IEP was not "appropriately ambitious and lack[ed] measurable
    goals related to [r]eading." The parents requested "an appropriate
    4    As to the school district's newly proposed IEP, the
    parents rejected it in part on the view that it was inappropriate
    and insufficient given G.D.'s needs, but accepted it for the
    purpose of implementation only for the remainder of the school
    year.
    - 13 -
    placement for [G.D.] within the least restrictive environment to
    address [G.D.'s] unique needs, by providing the consistent out-
    of-district placement at a school that parents deem appropriate
    for   [G.D.]   (which   parents     and   child's   providers     maintain    is
    appropriate for [G.D.] like Landmark School)." They also requested
    that the school district "be required to fund [G.D.'s] out of
    district tuition, transportation, mandatory fees and activity
    expenses, and mandatory hardware expenses."
    The BSEA hearing took place over an eight-day period
    between June and October 2018.            In the interim, G.D.'s parents
    enrolled their daughter at Landmark for summer instruction and for
    the subsequent school year.         At the conclusion of the BSEA hearing
    in October, G.D. had received 24 days of instruction in Landmark's
    summer   program,   and   approximately      one    month   of    schooling   in
    Landmark's academic year program.
    The   BSEA     hearing    officer   issued       her   decision    on
    December 10, 2018.      The hearing officer viewed the record before
    her as presenting a "close case" but concluded that G.D.'s parents
    failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEPs
    provided by the school district were not reasonably calculated to
    provide G.D. with a free appropriate public education, and that,
    as a consequence, the school district was not required to reimburse
    G.D.'s parents for the cost of their unilateral placement of G.D.
    at Landmark.
    - 14 -
    After receiving the BSEA hearing officer's decision,
    G.D.'s parents, on March 8, 2019, filed a pro se complaint in the
    United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts as
    permitted under the IDEA.     See 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(2)(A).     The
    complaint named the school district and the BSEA as defendants and
    sought a declaration from the District Court that the BSEA erred
    in its determination that G.D.'s IEP was reasonably calculated to
    provide her with a FAPE.    The parents also sought an order from
    the District Court directing the school district to reimburse them
    for the costs of sending G.D. to Landmark.       The District Court
    thereafter denied the parents' motion for summary judgment and
    entered judgment in favor of the defendants.    See Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    .   This appeal followed.
    II.
    G.D.'s parents    first challenge    the District Court's
    reliance in granting judgment to the defendants on the BSEA's
    finding that G.D. had made "slow gains" under the IEP.   The parents
    do not suggest that a finding of "slow gains" is categorically
    incapable of supporting the rejection of a challenge to an IEP
    under the IDEA for failing to provide a child with a FAPE.     They
    instead press a more limited contention based on the Supreme
    Court's recent decision in Endrew F., 
    137 S. Ct. at 999
    , which
    they contend permits a "slow gains" finding to provide a basis for
    - 15 -
    rejecting such a challenge only when the rejection based on that
    finding is tied to the child's "particular circumstances."
    The argument by G.D.'s parents based on Endrew F. appears
    to be in part that the District Court mistakenly held that the
    BSEA was not required to make findings about G.D's individual
    circumstances in relying on her IEP-based "slow gains" to reject
    the parents' IDEA claims.    But, even assuming we must review this
    determination de novo as a question of law, it is without merit,
    as the record shows that the District Court did not make the
    claimed mistake.   Rather, it explained that "the [BSEA] Hearing
    Officer concluded that the goals included in the IEPs for G.D. and
    the progress that G.D. made towards achieving those goals were
    appropriate in light of G.D.'s circumstances."         Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    , at *5 (emphasis added); see also C.D. ex rel. M.D. v.
    Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 
    924 F.3d 621
    , 629 (1st Cir. 2019) ("Under
    both Endrew F. and our precedent, a court evaluating whether [the]
    IEP offers a FAPE must determine whether the IEP was reasonably
    calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit in light of
    the child's circumstances.").
    G.D.'s   parents   also   appear   to   be   arguing,   in   the
    alternative, that the District Court erred in light of Endrew F.
    because the BSEA did not in fact premise its finding regarding the
    import of G.D'S "slow gains" on her individual circumstances. But,
    this contention also lacks merit.
    - 16 -
    The BSEA explained that:
    [A]fter arriving in Swampscott as a non-
    reader . . . [G.D.] acquired some phonemic
    awareness skills . . . progressed from being
    unable to blend syllables or recognize vowels,
    to being able to identify some syllable types
    and digraphs, and from being able to read only
    at a mid-kindergarten level when she entered
    SPS in August 2017 to being able to read a
    Grade 1-level text by January 2018.     During
    2017-2018 [G.D.] acquired knowledge of word
    sounds and recognized increasing numbers of
    sight words. . . . There is no dispute that
    with support, [G.D.] acquired new math skills.
    With accommodations for her reading and
    writing deficits, there was no evidence that
    [G.D.] could not absorb second-grade content
    in science and social studies.
    This passage leads us to conclude that the BSEA impliedly tied its
    consideration of G.D's "slow gains" to its discussion of the goals
    set out for G.D. in her IEPs, see Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    ,
    at *5, and that it did so by assessing those gains with reference
    to her not having had the benefit of any special education services
    in kindergarten and first grade, when she had attended a private
    school.   
    Id.
        We thus do not see how the parents' assertion that
    the BSEA failed to account for G.D.'s individual circumstances
    holds, notwithstanding that the BSEA did not state expressly the
    need to account for her individual circumstances in making the
    requisite tie.
    - 17 -
    III.
    The parents next contend that the District Court erred
    by relying on "informal" evidence of G.D.'s "slow gains" under the
    IEP to reject their IDEA claims that the BSEA erred in finding
    that   G.D.    received   a   FAPE   when     "uncontroverted   standardized
    testing" showed that G.D. failed to improve her performance on
    such tests while receiving the services prescribed by her IEP.
    The parents' argument proceeds as follows:           the IDEA requires that
    a school district must "meet the standards of the State educational
    agency" in providing a FAPE to an eligible student, 
    20 U.S.C. § 1401
    (9)(B); Massachusetts relies on standardized testing -- the
    Massachusetts      Comprehensive       Assessment     System    exams -- in
    measuring educational progress, see 
    603 Mass. Code Regs. 30.02
    ,
    30.03; such testing in Massachusetts constitutes "the standards of
    the State educational agency;" in determining whether the school
    district provided G.D. with a FAPE, the BSEA and the District Court
    were required to rely on her progress based on her performance on
    what the parents refer to as "standardized tests" rather than on
    the more qualitative assessments of her progress under the IEP
    that the school district administered and on which the BSEA and
    the District Court in fact relied; and, finally, those standardized
    tests revealed that G.D.'s performance on them had not improved.
    As this question concerns the proper interpretation of 20 U.S.C.
    - 18 -
    § 1401(9)(B), a provision of the IDEA, our review is de novo.            See
    Lenn, 
    998 F.2d at 1087
    .
    The District Court noted, however, that the parents
    offered no authority to support the proposition that an IEP -- for
    purposes of determining whether she received a FAPE -- "only must
    be   measurable   through    standardized     testing   evidence   to    be
    considered appropriate."     Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    , at *5.         Nor
    have they done so on appeal.           Moreover, the parents do not
    challenge   the   BSEA's   finding,   which   the   District   Court    also
    invoked, that "there is no credible, reliable information in the
    record about how much growth in standardized test scores during
    the time period in question would be required to demonstrate
    'effective progress' for [G.D.]."      
    Id.
        Instead, they contend only
    that because standardized testing is relied on by Massachusetts as
    a general matter, evidence that a child has made no progress on
    those tests while receiving the services provided for in her IEP
    must suffice to show that she has not received the kind of progress
    necessary to show that she is receiving a FAPE, regardless of the
    other evidence of her having made "effective progress" under the
    IEP that is in the record.
    But, a child receives a FAPE if a school district offers
    her "an IEP that is reasonably calculated to enable [her] to make
    progress appropriate in light of [her] circumstances."         Endrew F.,
    
    137 S. Ct. at 999
    . A standardized test is, by definition, designed
    - 19 -
    to measure a child's progress without regard to her individual
    circumstances,   let   alone   with     regard   to   the   individual
    circumstances for that child identified in her IEP.         See, e.g.,
    Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. E.M.D.H., 
    960 F.3d 1073
    , 1082 (8th
    Cir. 2020); William V. ex rel. W.V. v. Copperas Cove Indep. Sch.
    Dist., 826 Fed. App'x 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020); F.L. v. Bd. of
    Educ. of Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 735 Fed. App'x 38, 40
    (2d Cir. 2018); cf. Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 
    832 F.3d 69
    ,
    81 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that a child's "generalized academic
    performance," such as performance reflected on a standardized
    assessment, may "contradict[] the results of" assessments that are
    specifically tailored for a child).     Thus, absent some evidence -
    - which the BSEA found to be lacking and which the parents do not
    identify as being present in the record -- as to "how much growth
    in standardized test scores during the time period in question
    would be required to demonstrate 'effective progress' for [G.D.],"
    Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    , at *5, it is not evident to us how
    the BSEA erred in relying on the informal assessments showing G.D.
    to have made "slow gains" under her IEP to arrive at its finding
    that the parents failed to meet their burden to show that she had
    not received a FAPE, at least given that, as we have explained,
    that "slow gains" finding was based on a consideration of G.D.'s
    individual circumstances.
    - 20 -
    IV.
    G.D.'s parents also argue that the District Court erred
    along a number of distinct dimensions with respect to its treatment
    of evidence that concerned G.D.'s progress at Landmark.               Here,
    too, we disagree.
    A.
    The parents' first contention on this score is that the
    District Court erred in not permitting the introduction of evidence
    about G.D.'s progress at Landmark that arose after the BSEA hearing
    concluded. The parents contend that the District Court's allowance
    of   the   introduction   of   the    earlier   Landmark-related   evidence
    renders arbitrary the exclusion of that later Landmark-related
    evidence. Our review is for abuse of discretion.          See Roland M. v.
    Concord Sch. Comm., 
    910 F.2d 983
    , 997 (1st Cir. 1990).
    The District Court's differing treatment of pre- and
    post-hearing    Landmark-related       evidence   reflects   a   reasonable
    assessment of the different nature of those two categories of
    evidence.    The former category of Landmark-related evidence arose
    before the conclusion of the BSEA hearing in October 2018 and so
    constituted evidence that the District Court could have reasonably
    determined that the BSEA itself was obliged to consider. The post-
    hearing evidence, by contrast, arose only after the BSEA had
    concluded its proceedings and so is not evidence of that kind.
    Thus, the mere fact that the District Court treated these two
    - 21 -
    tranches of Landmark-related evidence differently does not show
    that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the
    admission of the Landmark-related evidence that arose after the
    conclusion of the BSEA hearing.
    The    parents    do    also   contend     that   the   post-hearing,
    Landmark-related evidence that was excluded by the District Court
    could   still    have   been      admissible,    despite     its   late-arising
    character, because it could show how the school district's actions
    in formulating and administering the IEP at issue "were objectively
    unreasonable from the outset," such that they had denied her the
    FAPE to which the IDEA entitled her.             But, even assuming that is
    so, the District Court held here that the Landmark-related evidence
    could not show that the school district's actions with respect to
    the IEP for G.D. were objectively unreasonable.
    As the District Court explained, insofar as G.D. did
    make progress at Landmark, she did so in an educational environment
    specifically     tailored      exclusively      for   students     with   special
    education needs, whereas, at her local public school, G.D., while
    receiving the services under her IEP, also "participated in a
    general education class for certain subjects."                Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    , at *7.          We understand the District Court to have
    reasoned in this regard that, given the IDEA's preference for
    "educating      students    with     disabilities       in   general-education
    settings," 
    id.
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
    - 22 -
    a comparison between the progress that G.D. made at Landmark with
    her progress at her local public school would not reveal that she
    had not received a FAPE, see C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty.
    Sch. Dist., 
    513 F.3d 279
    , 284-85 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that "[i]t
    is   common    ground   that   the   IDEA     manifests   a   preference   for
    mainstreaming" students with special needs); Roland M., 
    910 F.2d at 992-93
     ("Mainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill
    substantive educational criteria."). As the parents do not develop
    any argument as to how the District Court erred in so determining,
    we cannot say that the record compels the conclusion that it
    clearly erred in making that determination.5
    B.
    The parents further contend that the Landmark-related
    evidence presented to the District Court demonstrates that G.D.
    made "swift, significant, and quantifiable progress" there and
    thus, per C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special School District No. 1,
    Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
    636 F.3d 981
     (8th Cir. 2011), that the IEP
    instituted by the school district was not reasonably calculated to
    5   On this basis, we also reject the parents' argument that
    the District Court abused its discretion in denying them an
    evidentiary hearing as to the admissibility of the pre-hearing,
    Landmark-related evidence. For, as the District Court noted in
    its memorandum opinion, even if that evidence was deemed to be
    "admissible and could be said to support Plaintiffs' contention
    that G.D. made progress at Landmark," it still would not support
    the conclusion that the school district's IEP was inadequate and
    that the school district failed to provide G.D. with a FAPE.
    Swampscott, 
    2020 WL 3453172
    , at *7.
    - 23 -
    enable G.D. to make appropriate progress in that school setting.
    But, in C.B. ex rel. B.B., the school district was put on notice
    that the child's reading abilities improved due to the use of an
    alternative teaching method and nonetheless declined to consider
    or implement that alternative teaching method in a successive IEP.
    See 
    636 F.3d at 984
    .       Here, by contrast, the school district
    correctly points out that it did not have access to information
    concerning   G.D.'s   progress    at    Landmark    at   the   time   that   it
    formulated the March 2018 IEP that is at issue, because the
    progress itself post-dated the formulation of that IEP. See Roland
    M., 
    910 F.2d at 992
     ("An IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective.
    In striving for 'appropriateness,' an IEP must take into account
    what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot
    was taken, that is, at the time the IEP was promulgated.").              Thus,
    we are not persuaded by the parents' attempt to challenge based on
    C.B. ex rel. B.B. the conclusion that the IEP was not reasonably
    calculated to provide G.D. with a FAPE.
    V.
    For   the   foregoing    reasons,    we    affirm    the    District
    Court's grant of judgment to the defendants.
    - 24 -