MCKINLEY, TRAVONTAE, PEOPLE v ( 2012 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1371
    KA 09-01307
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
    V                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    TRAVONTAE MCKINLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PIOTR BANASIAK OF
    COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (SUSAN C.
    AZZARELLI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F.
    Aloi, J.), rendered June 18, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant,
    upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the
    second degree.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed.
    Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
    upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second
    degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Contrary to defendant’s contention,
    County Court properly refused to suppress a handgun discarded by
    defendant while he was being pursued by a police officer, a controlled
    substance seized from his person following his arrest, and a
    postarrest showup identification. The officer who pursued defendant
    testified at the suppression hearing that the police received a 911
    call reporting that shots had been fired near the intersection of East
    Fayette Street and Columbus Avenue in Syracuse. The information
    transmitted to the police indicated that four black males, at least
    one of whom was dressed in dark clothing, were reportedly involved in
    the incident. Within a minute and a half of the dispatch, the
    pursuing officer and two other police officers in an unmarked vehicle
    approached a group of four black males, one of whom was defendant,
    walking approximately one block from the scene of the alleged
    shooting. The police vehicle pulled up to the four individuals and,
    as the officers were exiting the vehicle, defendant and another male
    dressed in dark clothing fled in different directions. The officer
    who pursued defendant testified that he repeatedly yelled, “stop,
    police” while he was pursuing defendant. During the course of the
    pursuit, defendant discarded a handgun. The police thereafter
    apprehended defendant and, during a search incident to his arrest,
    discovered a bag containing cocaine. The witness who placed the 911
    -2-                          1371
    KA 09-01307
    call then identified defendant as the shooter in a postarrest showup
    identification.
    We conclude that, based upon defendant’s physical and temporal
    proximity to the scene of the reported incident and the fact that the
    group of males matched the description of the individuals involved in
    the shooting, the officers had a founded suspicion that criminal
    activity was afoot, justifying their initial common-law inquiry of
    defendant (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223; People v Brown, 67
    AD3d 1439, 1439-1440, lv denied 14 NY3d 798; People v Williams, 39
    AD3d 1269, 1270, lv denied 9 NY3d 871). We further conclude that
    defendant’s flight as the officers began to exit their vehicle and his
    continued flight in defiance of orders to stop furnished the requisite
    reasonable suspicion to justify a greater level of police intrusion
    (see Williams, 39 AD3d at 1270), i.e., police pursuit (see People v
    Pines, 99 NY2d 525, 526-527; People v Sierra, 83 NY2d 928, 929).
    Defendant contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion
    justifying pursuit because the record does not establish that
    defendant knew that the approaching individuals were police officers,
    citing People v Riddick (70 AD3d 1421, 1424, lv denied 14 NY3d 844).
    Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention is preserved for
    our review, we conclude that it is without merit. Here, unlike in
    Riddick, the police were responding to a reported crime, and the
    police therefore had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was
    afoot before approaching defendant (see id. at 1422). Thus, under the
    circumstances of this case, including the report of shots fired and
    the fact that the four individuals matched the description of the
    individuals involved in the shooting incident, we conclude that
    defendant’s flight from the officers and his refusal to stop after the
    officers explicitly identified themselves as police and he was
    directed to stop justified the pursuit of defendant (see generally
    People v Bachiller, 93 AD3d 1196, 1197, lv dismissed 19 NY3d 861;
    Brown, 67 AD3d at 1439-1440; People v Martinez, 59 AD3d 1071, 1072, lv
    denied 12 NY3d 856).
    Because the record supports the determination of the suppression
    court that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant,
    defendant’s abandonment of a handgun during the pursuit was not
    precipitated by illegal conduct and, thus, denial of suppression was
    proper (see Sierra, 83 NY2d at 930). The search of defendant’s
    person, resulting in the seizure of the controlled substance sought to
    be suppressed, was incident to defendant’s lawful arrest (see
    Williams, 39 AD3d at 1270), as was the postarrest identification of
    defendant.
    Entered:   December 28, 2012                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: KA 09-01307

Filed Date: 12/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016