State v. McFarland (Slip Opinion) , 2020 Ohio 3343 ( 2020 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    v. McFarland, Slip Opinion No. 
    2020-Ohio-3343
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2020-OHIO-3343
    THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCFARLAND, APPELLANT.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State v. McFarland, Slip Opinion No. 
    2020-Ohio-3343
    .]
    Criminal law—Complicity—Conspiracy—Aggravated murder—Sufficiency of the
    evidence—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.
    (No. 2018-1116—Submitted December 10, 2019—Decided June 18, 2020.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
    No. 105570, 
    2018-Ohio-2067
    .
    _________________
    KENNEDY, J.
    {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District Court of Appeals,
    we are asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
    convictions of the appellant, Sheila McFarland, on charges relating to the murder
    of Robert Williams. The Eighth District Court of Appeals held that there was
    sufficient evidence to support the convictions. We agree and therefore affirm the
    judgment of the appellate court.
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    {¶ 2} Robert Williams was gunned down in the hallway outside his
    apartment on November 14, 2015. McFarland did not pull the trigger and was not
    at the scene of the murder. The issue in this case is whether there was sufficient
    evidence produced at trial to support the jury’s verdicts that McFarland had
    conspired to murder Williams and had been complicit in the acts leading to his
    death.
    {¶ 3} There is no dispute as to why Williams was killed and who killed him.
    Williams was a drug dealer whose cooperation with police had led to the arrest and
    jailing of his supplier, Eddie “Mann” Brownlee. McFarland was Brownlee’s
    girlfriend, and she, too, had been arrested on drug charges due to Williams’s
    cooperation with police. Ryan Motley, an associate of Brownlee, killed Williams,
    with encouragement from Brownlee to, at the very least, harm Williams. This case
    is about McFarland’s involvement in the murder.
    The arrest of Brownlee and McFarland
    {¶ 4} Williams was 64 years old at the time of his death and was living in
    Euclid with his girlfriend, Korri Henderson, in the Indian Hills Senior Community
    Apartments. He also sold drugs there. After police caught Williams drug dealing
    in and around the Indian Hills complex, they searched his apartment and recovered
    crack cocaine. They arrested both Williams and Henderson; the pair then agreed
    to become confidential informants against their supplier, Brownlee.
    {¶ 5} Police used Williams to conduct three controlled drug buys from
    Brownlee. In two of those buys, Brownlee handled the transaction with Williams.
    In the third, the purchase was made from McFarland. Police arrested Brownlee and
    McFarland directly after the third transaction. Both were taken to the Euclid Police
    Department; McFarland was released, but Brownlee was kept in jail. It was
    October 25, 2015.
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    January Term, 2020
    Calls from jail
    {¶ 6} Brownlee and McFarland almost immediately suspected that it was
    Williams who was responsible for their arrests. Brownlee called McFarland
    numerous times from jail; those calls were recorded, and portions were later played
    to the jury. Brownlee called his own cellphone, which McFarland possessed. On
    Brownlee’s first call to McFarland from jail, on October 25, 2015, McFarland
    suggested to Brownlee that it was Williams who had set him up, and Brownlee said
    that he was going to “get him.” Motley, the eventual triggerman, was with
    McFarland when Brownlee called, and he also talked to Brownlee on that call.
    Brownlee told Motley, “I need you to handle this. * * * Get Rob.” On that same
    call, Brownlee asked McFarland what had happened to his “hammer,” in other
    words, his gun. She reported that Motley had retrieved it from the hotel room that
    she and Brownlee had been staying in and had then given it to Brownlee’s brother,
    Chris. Motley testified that he got the gun back from Chris within two days of
    giving it to him and that that gun was the murder weapon.
    {¶ 7} On subsequent calls from jail, Brownlee, incensed about his
    predicament, discussed his suspicions about Williams and Henderson working with
    police and McFarland agreed. He told McFarland that he was going to “beat
    [Williams’s] ass,” that he was going to “get him,” and that Williams was not going
    to get away with what he had done. He asked McFarland whether Motley knew
    that Williams had been the informant. McFarland had talked to Motley about it,
    and McFarland reported to Brownlee that Motley said that Williams would “have
    to be handled.” McFarland reported that many of their associates thought it was
    Williams who had informed on Brownlee and that “something got to be done.” On
    another call, McFarland reported that she had talked to Williams and Henderson
    and they had denied setting up Brownlee, but McFarland said she knew the couple
    had been involved by the way they were acting. During a call just before Brownlee
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    was released, when the subject of Williams came up, McFarland urged Brownlee
    not to talk about it, saying, “You never know about this phone.”
    McFarland’s activities while Brownlee was jailed
    {¶ 8} McFarland maintained some contact with Williams and Henderson
    even after her arrest. On October 27, 2015, McFarland called Henderson from
    Brownlee’s cellphone and left two messages in which she accused Henderson and
    Williams of working with detectives and being snitches. But she also met with
    Williams and Henderson and got a ride from them to the county jail to add money
    to Brownlee’s commissary account.
    {¶ 9} With Brownlee in jail, McFarland sought help from Motley; she
    suggested that they sell drugs together to raise money to post Brownlee’s bond.
    McFarland saw Motley every day while Brownlee was in jail and together they
    raised money for Brownlee by selling drugs.
    {¶ 10} Motley later testified at McFarland’s trial; although he was the
    state’s witness, the state confronted him at points with prior testimony and with a
    previous written statement he had prepared about the events concerning Williams’s
    death. Motley testified that McFarland would vent to him about Brownlee being in
    jail. In discussions about the informants, McFarland told Motley that “they” needed
    to be “f[—-]ed up.” And she communicated with Motley about the gun that would
    become the murder weapon.
    Events after Brownlee’s release
    {¶ 11} On November 10, 2015, Brownlee was released from county jail. He
    and McFarland almost immediately went back to selling drugs together. On or
    around November 12, Brownlee and McFarland delivered crack to one of
    Brownlee’s customers, Dwayne Jackson. Jackson testified that McFarland told
    him, “Watch out for Rob, they’re snitching.”
    {¶ 12} Sometime between Brownlee’s release from jail on November 10
    and Williams’s murder on November 14, Brownlee and Motley met in a hotel room
    4
    January Term, 2020
    in Willoughby and discussed what to do about Williams; McFarland was also in
    the hotel room. Motley testified that Brownlee told him to “go rough the dude up,
    beat him up” and that Brownlee offered to pay Motley’s accomplices.
    {¶ 13} Henderson testified at McFarland’s trial. She stated that the night
    before the murder, Williams received a threatening call from Brownlee saying that
    he was out of jail and would be coming for him and that Henderson and Williams
    were going to see their graves. According to Henderson, other threatening calls
    followed. A truck appeared at Williams’s apartment complex that evening, and
    four people got out and started staring up at Williams’s apartment window, where
    he was standing. Henderson called police to the apartment and filed a police report.
    After the police left, Henderson called a friend who also lived in the complex and
    she and Williams went there to stay until morning.
    {¶ 14} In the early hours of November 14, while at the friend’s apartment,
    Henderson got a call from McFarland. Henderson testified that the call came
    between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., but telephone records revealed that no calls had come
    from Brownlee’s phone after 3:11 a.m. Henderson told McFarland they had been
    getting threatening calls, and McFarland laughed it off. When Henderson told
    McFarland that the calls had come from Brownlee, McFarland denied Brownlee
    had made the calls and claimed she had been with him all night. Henderson
    testified:
    When she called, she just asked, she was like, How you-all
    doing? And I was like, What you mean? I’m like, How do you
    think we're doing? We’ve been getting threatening calls all night.
    And she was like, What you mean?           And I was like, Mann
    [Brownlee’s nickname] been calling Rob phone threatening us. And
    she was like saying what and whatever, and I was like talking about
    we going to die and he out of jail now, he coming to see us,
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    whatever, whatever. And she was like, You sure that was Mann?
    And I said, Yeah, it was his phone. I said, It came from you-all
    phone. And she was like, He ain’t made no calls like that. But she
    was like, I’ve been with him the whole time. And I said, Well, they
    came from you-all phone unless somebody else had you-all phone.
    {¶ 15} Henderson testified that McFarland said she had to end the call
    because Brownlee was coming. After that call, Henderson and Williams returned
    to their own apartment. Henderson testified that they didn’t sleep much and at
    around 10:00 a.m., Williams went out to take a walk down the hallway.
    The shooting
    {¶ 16} Williams was shot as he walked down the hallway outside his
    apartment. Motley was the shooter. He had two other people with him, his brother
    Raymond and another acquaintance, Rahkee Young. All three snuck into the
    apartment complex and put on masks and gloves after they got inside. Motley
    testified that he had placed tape over the door peepholes of the apartments near
    Williams’s apartment (although DNA tests revealed his brother’s DNA on the tape)
    so that those neighbors could not see what was going on in the hallway. The three
    hid in the stairwell at the end of the hall behind a door. Surveillance video shows
    that when Williams left his apartment and was walking down the hallway, Motley
    and Young emerged from behind the door and approached Williams. Williams
    stopped and turned, and after a brief confrontation, Motley quickly fired one shot
    from close distance. The three then fled. Motley called Brownlee later that evening
    and told him, “It’s done.”
    {¶ 17} Motley testified that later that night or the next day, Brownlee met
    him and paid him with drugs that were worth around $4,000 and that the three
    assailants, Brownlee, and McFarland met at a hotel.
    6
    January Term, 2020
    {¶ 18} Henderson was able to identify Motley from the apartment
    building’s surveillance footage. Henderson told a responding officer that she had
    been threatened by people she knew as Mann and Sheila and that she and Williams
    had been working with the narcotics department.
    Trial and appellate proceedings
    {¶ 19} Ryan Motley, Raymond Motley, Young, Brownlee, and McFarland
    were all indicted on ten counts, as follows: Count 1, aggravated murder under R.C.
    2903.01(A) (committed with prior calculation and design); Count 2, aggravated
    murder under R.C. 2903.01(B) (committed in the course of committing felonious
    assault); Count 3, conspiracy to commit aggravated murder or murder under R.C.
    2923.01(A)(1); Count 4, murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) (committed while
    committing aggravated burglary); Count 5, murder under R.C. 2903.02(B)
    (committed while committing felonious assault); Count 6, felonious assault under
    R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) (knowingly causing serious physical harm); Count 7, felonious
    assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) (committed with a deadly weapon); Count 8,
    aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) (inflicted physical harm on the
    victim); Count 9, aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) (committed with
    a deadly weapon); and Count 10, kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(3). All ten
    counts included a firearm specification.
    {¶ 20} McFarland’s case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the state’s
    case, McFarland’s counsel moved for dismissal under Crim.R. 29, arguing that the
    state had failed to meet its burden to present sufficient evidence to establish the
    elements of the charges in the ten-count indictment. The trial judge denied the
    motion, and the jury found McFarland guilty on all ten counts. For purposes of
    sentencing, the trial court merged Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 (the aggravated-murder,
    murder, and felonious-assault counts), Counts 8 and 9 (the aggravated-burglary
    counts), and all the gun specifications. The trial court sentenced McFarland to life
    in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a concurrent 11 years on
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Count 3, a concurrent 11 years on Count 8, and a concurrent 11 years on Count 10.
    The judge merged all the gun specifications and added three years to her sentence
    for the gun specification on Count 1, to be served prior to the life sentence, and a
    $20,000 fine on that count.
    {¶ 21} McFarland appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, and that
    court affirmed the convictions. In the appellate court, the state conceded that the
    kidnapping and aggravated murder convictions should have merged for sentencing.
    The court “remanded for resentencing for the sole purpose of merging the
    kidnapping count with the aggravated murder count and allowing the state to
    determine on which count to proceed to sentencing.” State v. McFarland, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 105570, 
    2018-Ohio-2067
    , ¶ 67. This court accepted one proposition
    of law for review: “A criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when
    she is found guilty based on insufficient evidence.”
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    {¶ 22} McFarland’s proposition of law is axiomatic—“a conviction based
    on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process. Tibbs v. Florida
    (1982), 
    457 U.S. 31
    , 45, 
    102 S.Ct. 2211
    , 2220, 
    72 L.Ed.2d 652
    , 663, citing Jackson
    v. Virginia (1979), 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
    .” State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386-387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). Therefore, the
    question we face does not concern the effect of a conviction based upon insufficient
    evidence. Instead, we address a question appellate courts deal with regularly—
    whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdicts in this case against
    this defendant. We conclude that the verdicts were based upon sufficient evidence.
    Sufficiency of the evidence
    {¶ 23} McFarland argues that the evidence presented by the state was
    insufficient to support a conviction on any of the crimes with which she was
    charged. “Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine
    whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as
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    January Term, 2020
    a matter of law to support the jury verdict.” State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 113,
    
    684 N.E.2d 668
     (1997). Retrial is barred if a reversal is based upon a finding that
    the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. “ ‘A verdict of not
    guilty, whether rendered by the jury or directed by the trial judge, absolutely shields
    the defendant from retrial. A reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence
    has the same effect because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to
    convict the defendant.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs at 41.
    {¶ 24} This court has set forth the standard appellate courts should employ
    in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction:
    An appellate court’s function when reviewing the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to
    examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such
    evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry
    is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    (Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
    (1979), followed.)
    State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph two of the
    syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in
    State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    684 N.E.2d 668
     (1997). The trier of fact has the
    responsibility “fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
    and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson at
    319.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 25} The trial court sentenced McFarland on four counts only—Count 1
    (aggravated murder committed with prior calculation and design), Count 3
    (conspiracy to commit aggravated murder or murder), Count 8 (aggravated
    burglary while inflicting physical harm on the victim), and Count 10 (kidnapping),
    so we consider the sufficiency of the evidence on those convictions only.1 State v.
    Whitfield, 
    124 Ohio St.3d 319
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2
    , 
    922 N.E.2d 182
    , ¶ 24 (“a ‘conviction’
    consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty” [emphasis
    sic]); State v. Myers, 
    154 Ohio St.3d 405
    , 
    2018-Ohio-1903
    , 
    114 N.E.3d 1138
    , ¶ 138
    (merger of kidnapping count with aggravated-robbery and aggravated-burglary
    counts moots sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim regarding kidnapping count).
    Complicity
    {¶ 26} The major consideration in determining the sufficiency of the
    evidence in this case is not whether the individual crimes were committed but
    whether the evidence of McFarland’s involvement in them was sufficient to find
    her guilty of the crimes. There is no suggestion that McFarland was present at the
    scene of the shooting. For the bulk of the charges, the central issue is whether the
    state proved that McFarland was complicit in the commission of the crimes. R.C.
    2923.03 is Ohio’s complicity statute. It states:
    (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required
    for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
    (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
    (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
    1. Pursuant to the judgment of the court of appeals, after remand to the trial court McFarland will
    be sentenced on only three counts due to the merger of the kidnapping and aggravated murder
    convictions. At this point, we do not know whether the state will choose sentencing for aggravated
    murder or kidnapping, so we review all four convictions for sufficiency.
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    January Term, 2020
    (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation
    of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code;
    (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the
    offense.
    {¶ 27} The statute does not define “aid or abet,” but this court has stated
    that to aid or abet is “ ‘[t]o assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to
    promote its accomplishment,’ ” State v. Johnson, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 240
    , 243, 
    754 N.E.2d 796
     (2001), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 69 (7th Ed.Rev.1999).
    {¶ 28} R.C. 2923.03(F) provides that anyone who violates the complicity
    statute “shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender” and
    that an offender need not be charged under R.C. 2923.03, but instead may be
    charged with complicity in terms of the principal offense. Therefore, the state was
    not required to explicitly allege complicity. State v. Skatzes, 
    104 Ohio St.3d 195
    ,
    
    2004-Ohio-6391
    , 
    819 N.E.2d 215
    , ¶ 32.           McFarland was not charged with
    complicity under the statute but was charged with the principal offenses.
    {¶ 29} “To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting
    pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant
    supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal
    in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of
    the principal.” Johnson at syllabus. “ ‘Participation in criminal intent may be
    inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is
    committed.’ ” Id. at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 
    28 Ohio App.2d 29
    , 34, 
    273 N.E.2d 884
     (4th Dist.1971). “The court must view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution and defer to the trier of fact on questions of credibility
    and the weight assigned to the evidence. State v. Fry, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 163
    , 2010-
    Ohio-1017, 
    926 N.E.2d 1239
    , ¶ 146.” State v. Kirkland, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 73
    , 2014-
    Ohio-1966, 
    15 N.E.3d 818
    , ¶ 132.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 30} As explained in detail below, the evidence at trial was sufficient to
    prove that McFarland was complicit in the crimes associated with the killing of
    Williams.
    Aggravated murder
    {¶ 31} In Count 1, McFarland was charged with aggravated murder
    pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A). Under that statute, “[n]o person shall purposely, and
    with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another.” The element of prior
    calculation and design “require[s] a scheme designed to implement the calculated
    decision to kill.” State v. Cotton, 
    56 Ohio St.2d 8
    , 11, 
    381 N.E.2d 190
     (1978). The
    evidence was sufficient to support a conviction based on McFarland’s participation
    and complicity in the scheme to kill Williams.
    {¶ 32} McFarland was at the center of the series of events that led to the
    killing of Williams. From the spark of the idea that revenge would be had against
    Williams and Henderson in Brownlee’s call from jail on October 25, to the
    telephone call she made to Henderson hours before the murder to assure Henderson
    that Brownlee was not threatening her and Williams, McFarland helped move the
    plan forward.
    {¶ 33} In one of the first calls from jail, McFarland and Brownlee identified
    Williams as a snitch and Brownlee said that he was going to “get him.” McFarland
    brought Motley in on the call.       She made it clear that she had had prior
    conversations with Motley about the “hammer,” the gun that Motley would
    eventually use to shoot Williams. Motley testified that he had received a text from
    McFarland regarding “their” gun, meaning Brownlee and McFarland’s gun.
    {¶ 34} While Brownlee was in jail, McFarland worked with Motley to sell
    drugs to finance Brownlee’s bail. During her time with Motley, McFarland made
    clear to him that Williams and Henderson had to be dealt with. McFarland let the
    two know in a voicemail on October 27 that she considered them to be snitches.
    McFarland told Motley that they needed to be harmed. In another telephone call
    12
    January Term, 2020
    with Brownlee, McFarland made clear to him that she had talked to Motley about
    what to do about Williams and Henderson and that Williams would “have to be
    handled.” She had talked to other people about Williams and Henderson and told
    Brownlee that everybody knew about their role in McFarland’s and Brownlee’s
    arrests and that “something got to be done.” In a November 9 telephone call closer
    to Brownlee’s release from jail, she was more circumspect: after Brownlee said, “I
    could kick they ass,” McFarland responded that they should not talk about it on the
    phone.
    {¶ 35} Once Brownlee got out of jail, things moved quickly. McFarland
    was in the hotel room when Motley and Brownlee agreed that Motley would harm
    Williams. Although Motley testified that the plan was only to “rough up” Williams,
    the presence and quick use of the gun are evidence that murder was the plan, as was
    Brownlee’s phone-call threat to Williams and Henderson that they were going to
    see their graves. The night before the murder, threatening phone calls—including
    the “see your graves” call—were made to Williams and four men arrived in the
    apartment parking lot in a truck and seemed to threaten Williams and Henderson.
    Williams and Henderson were frightened enough to stay with someone else in the
    apartment complex. In the early morning of November 14, hours before the
    murder, McFarland called Henderson and she attempted to assure her that it could
    not have been Brownlee making the calls, because she had been with him the entire
    night. A reasonable juror could determine from this evidence that McFarland was
    trying to minimize the imminent threat that Williams and Henderson faced. After
    the call, they did return to their own apartment.
    {¶ 36} Later that morning, a planned attack was executed. At some point,
    tape was placed over Williams’s neighbors’ peepholes. Three people lay in wait in
    a stairwell until Williams emerged from his apartment. As Williams walked down
    the hallway outside his apartment, Motley and Young approached from behind.
    After Williams stopped and turned, there was a brief altercation before Motley fired
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    the gun. Less than ten seconds after Motley emerged from the stairwell, Williams
    was shot. Motley testified that he called Brownlee and told him, “It’s done.” Not
    that the plan had spun out of control or that there had been an accident; he merely
    reported, “It’s done.”
    {¶ 37} When Motley and his associates met with Brownlee after the murder
    of Williams, McFarland was present again. In his testimony, Motley tried to
    diminish McFarland’s involvement, and when faced with prior testimony or prior
    written statements, he tried to back off from those that implicated McFarland. For
    instance, regarding McFarland’s statement that “they” needed to be “f[—-]ed up,”
    Motley explained at trial that he understood that “they” really meant Henderson
    only, but the state pointed out that Motley had written “they” in his earlier
    statement. Motley also testified that he had been in contact with McFarland about
    the location of one of Brownlee’s firearms; however, in his written statement, he
    had referred to it as one of “their” firearms. Motley eventually admitted in his trial
    testimony that he had received a text message from McFarland about “their”
    firearm. A juror could have easily interpreted parts of Motley’s testimony as trying
    to save McFarland from prosecution. The jury “may believe or disbelieve any
    witness or accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest. In reaching its
    verdict, the jury should consider the demeanor of the witness and the manner in
    which he testifies, his connection or relationship with the prosecution or the
    defendant, and his interest, if any, in the outcome.” State v. Antill, 
    176 Ohio St. 61
    ,
    67, 
    197 N.E.2d 548
     (1964).
    {¶ 38} The meetings before and after the murder, the use of Brownlee and
    McFarland’s gun, the lying in wait, the inclusion of Young and Raymond Motley
    as backup, the tape over peepholes, how quickly Motley fired the shot after
    emerging from the stairwell, and the phone call reporting, “It’s done,” all indicate
    prior calculation and design and that the assailants planned to cause the death of
    Williams.
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    January Term, 2020
    {¶ 39} “ ‘Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
    companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” Johnson,
    93 Ohio St.3d at 245, 
    754 N.E.2d 796
    , quoting Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d at 34, 
    273 N.E.2d 884
    . McFarland was a constant presence as Williams and Henderson were
    identified as targets and as it was decided that something had to be done. She
    discussed with Motley that Williams would “have to be handled” and incited him
    to harm the informants. She did not seek to have Motley return the murder weapon
    before the murder, advised Brownlee not to discuss Williams over the jail
    telephone, and was present at the planning meeting and the post-murder meeting.
    McFarland assisted in the plan by attempting to assuage Henderson’s fears that she
    faced imminent danger from Brownlee. Finally, the drug-selling business she
    engaged in with Brownlee produced the payout to Motley.
    {¶ 40} We determine that after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that the
    essential elements of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A) had been proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt—McFarland purposely and with prior calculation and
    design caused the death of Williams or aided or abetted those who did by
    facilitating the commission of aggravated murder or by actively promoting it. She
    supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, and incited Brownlee
    and Motley in the planning and commission of the crime.
    {¶ 41} A rational trier of fact could have also found McFarland guilty of
    aggravated murder through complicity by virtue of R.C. 2923.03(A)(1), by
    “solicit[ing] or procur[ing] another to commit the offense.” During her time selling
    drugs with Motley while Brownlee was in jail, she discussed with Motley the role
    of Henderson and Williams in Brownlee’s incarceration, and told him that “they”
    should be “f[—-]ed up.” She told Brownlee that she had discussed the matter with
    Motley and that Motley said that Williams would “have to be handled.” She never
    sought from Motley a return of the gun that she shared with Brownlee. She was
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    present when the planning meeting occurred and was present for the postmortem
    meeting. A rational trier of fact could have found that through her complicity in
    soliciting Motley to commit aggravated murder, she was guilty of the purposeful
    killing of Williams with prior calculation and design.
    {¶ 42} A rational trier of fact also could have found McFarland guilty of
    being complicit in aggravated murder through R.C. 2923.03(A)(3), which
    references the conspiracy statute, considering a person complicit who conspires
    with another to commit an offense in violation of R.C. 2923.01. Since conspiracy
    is a separate count, we discuss it separately, below.
    Conspiracy
    {¶ 43} McFarland was charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated
    murder or murder under R.C. 2923.01. The act of conspiring to commit a crime is
    a crime in and of itself; “it is no defense to a charge under this section that no
    offense that was the object of the conspiracy was committed.” R.C. 2923.01(E).
    The conspiracy statute provides:
    (A) No person, with purpose to commit or to promote or
    facilitate the commission of aggravated murder [or] murder, * * *
    shall do either of the following:
    (1) With another person or persons, plan or aid in planning
    the commission of any of the specified offenses;
    (2) Agree with another person or persons that one or more of
    them will engage in conduct that facilitates the commission of any
    of the specified offenses.
    (B) No person shall be convicted of conspiracy unless a
    substantial overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is alleged and
    proved to have been done by the accused or a person with whom the
    accused conspired, subsequent to the accused’s entrance into the
    16
    January Term, 2020
    conspiracy. For purposes of this section, an overt act is substantial
    when it is of a character that manifests a purpose on the part of the
    actor that the object of the conspiracy should be completed.
    {¶ 44} Having determined above that the evidence was sufficient to prove
    that McFarland aided in planning or agreed that Motley would murder Williams,
    satisfying R.C. 2923.01(A), the key portion of the statute for purposes of this part
    of our analysis is R.C. 2923.01(B), the requirement of a substantial overt act in
    furtherance of the conspiracy. “An indictment for conspiracy * * * must allege
    some specific, substantial, overt act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
    State v. Childs, 
    88 Ohio St.3d 194
    , 
    724 N.E.2d 781
     (2000), syllabus.
    {¶ 45} The state alleged three overt acts in the indictment supporting the
    conspiracy count: (1) solicitation of Motley for murder, (2) providing or assisting
    Motley in procuring the firearm, and (3) threatening Williams and/or Henderson
    via a telecommunications system.
    {¶ 46} As discussed above in regard to the first alleged overt act, a juror
    could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that McFarland solicited Motley
    to commit murder. McFarland was the conduit for information between Brownlee
    and Motley, but she also was often with Motley while Brownlee was in jail, and
    when she and Motley were discussing Henderson and Williams she told him that
    they needed to be harmed. McFarland told Brownlee in one jail call that she had
    spoken with Motley and that Motley said that Williams “had to be handled.”
    McFarland knew that Motley had the gun that belonged to her and Brownlee and
    texted Motley concerning its whereabouts. She was at the meeting in which the
    determination was made to harm Williams, and she was there when the assailants
    and Brownlee met after the killing. The fact that Brownlee solicited Motley for the
    murder does not mean that McFarland was not part of requesting and paying for
    Motley’s murder of Williams.
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 47} Regarding the second alleged overt act, there is sufficient evidence
    to demonstrate that McFarland provided or assisted Motley in procuring the gun.
    Motley referred to the murder weapon as “their” gun, meaning Brownlee and
    McFarland’s gun. McFarland knew that Motley had retrieved the gun from the
    hotel Brownlee and McFarland had been staying in when they were arrested.
    Motley left it with Brownlee’s brother, Chris, but retrieved it later. McFarland did
    not seek its return. There is no doubt that Brownlee and McFarland’s gun was the
    murder weapon. A rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the essential elements of the
    conspiracy had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, with the overt act being
    the provision of the gun to Motley.
    {¶ 48} The third alleged overt act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    At trial, evidence was introduced of voicemail messages left by McFarland on
    Henderson’s phone after Brownlee’s arrest. On the voicemails, McFarland can be
    heard cursing at Henderson, telling her she knew what Williams and Henderson
    had done and using an accusatory tone. McFarland’s words were slurred, but the
    clear implication of the voicemails was that McFarland wanted to hold Williams
    and Henderson responsible for Brownlee’s incarceration. She called them snitches.
    Given what was said and the circumstances surrounding the calls, there would be
    no reason for the voicemails other than to threaten Henderson and Williams. A
    reasonable juror could find that the voicemails were threatening.         The calls
    “manifest[] a purpose on the part of the actor that the object of the conspiracy
    should be completed,” R.C. 2923.01(B). The statute requires that the overt act
    occur after the accused entered into the conspiracy. The calls in question were
    placed in the early morning hours of October 27, 2015. A juror could conclude that
    the conspiracy was formed at the time of the October 25, 2015 jail call involving
    Brownlee, Motley, and McFarland, when they first identified Williams and
    Henderson as the people responsible for their arrests.
    18
    January Term, 2020
    {¶ 49} A rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the essential elements of the
    conspiracy had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, with the overt act being
    the provision of the threatening voicemails.
    The other charges
    {¶ 50} McFarland was convicted of aggravated burglary under R.C.
    2911.11(A)(1), which provides:
    (A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass
    in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately
    occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person
    other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to
    commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately
    occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, if any of the
    following apply:
    (1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict
    physical harm on another * * *.
    A trespass under R.C. 2911.21(A) occurs when a person, without privilege to do
    so, “[k]nowingly enter[s] or remain[s] on the premises of another.” It is no defense
    to a charge of trespass “that the land or premises involved was owned, controlled,
    or in custody of a public agency.” R.C. 2911.21(B). There was sufficient evidence
    that McFarland violated R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) through her complicity with the
    Motley brothers and Young. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of
    aggravated burglary had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt—specifically, that
    through stealth or deception, the three assailants entered Williams’s apartment
    building and put on masks and gloves in order to harm Williams and laid in wait
    19
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    for him to emerge from his apartment, and when Williams did emerge, Motley
    inflicted physical harm on Williams. McFarland was complicit in the endeavor and
    therefore can be prosecuted under the aggravated-robbery statute even though she
    was not in the apartment building when the murder occurred.
    {¶ 51} The remaining conviction was for kidnapping under R.C.
    2905.01(A)(3), which states that “[n]o person by force [or] threat * * * shall * * *
    restrain the liberty of [another] person” for the purpose of “inflict[ing] serious
    physical harm on the victim.” The jury had before it video surveillance footage
    from the hallway outside Williams’s apartment. The footage reveals Williams
    walking down the hallway and Motley and Young emerging from behind the
    stairwell door. Williams turns to see them walking toward him. He stops, and there
    is a confrontation before the shooting. A reasonable juror could have determined
    that Williams’s movements back toward his own apartment were restrained by
    either threat of force or use of force by Motley and Young, for the purpose of
    inflicting bodily harm upon Williams. Viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence
    proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McFarland was guilty of committing
    kidnapping due to her complicity with Motley and Young.
    CONCLUSION
    {¶ 52} Our duty in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case is to determine
    whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
    any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime
    had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. McFarland was a central figure in the
    killing of Robert Williams and a constant presence as Williams was targeted for
    revenge, as plans to kill him were made, and as the assailants met after his killing.
    She was in regular contact with Brownlee while he was in jail, reporting her
    suspicions about the role Williams and Henderson played in her and Brownlee’s
    arrests. She told Brownlee that Motley and others she had talked to thought
    20
    January Term, 2020
    something had to be done about Williams and Henderson. She was in frequent
    contact with Motley while Brownlee was in jail and knew that he had the gun she
    shared with Brownlee, which would become the murder weapon. When Brownlee
    got out of jail, she was present in the hotel room where the details of the plan against
    Williams were hatched. And hours before the murder, she called Henderson and
    attempted to mislead her about the imminent threat posed by Brownlee. After the
    deed was done, Brownlee paid off Motley in drugs that were the product of the
    criminal enterprise he participated in with McFarland, and McFarland was present
    again in the hotel room where all the participants in Williams’s murder gathered
    after-the-fact.
    {¶ 53} The record establishes that there was sufficient evidence on the four
    counts for which McFarland was sentenced—aggravated murder, conspiracy,
    aggravated burglary, and kidnapping—for a rational trier of fact to have determined
    that the elements of those crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
    Judgment affirmed.
    DEWINE, J., concurs.
    DORRIAN, J., concurs as to the convictions for aggravated murder,
    aggravated burglary, and kidnapping.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur in judgment only.
    DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined as to the conspiracy
    conviction by DORRIAN, J.
    JULIA L. DORRIAN, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for
    STEWART, J.
    _________________
    DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 54} When the United States Supreme Court set forth the sufficiency-of-
    the-evidence analysis requiring reviewing courts to view the evidence “in the light
    21
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    most favorable to the prosecution” when determining whether the evidence
    presented is legally sufficient to support the conviction, Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-319, 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979), I do not believe the court
    meant a searchlight should be used to uphold a criminal conviction. Yet, despite
    the lead opinion’s attempt to find evidence to sustain appellant Sheila McFarland’s
    convictions, they have come up empty-handed. For the reasons that follow, I
    respectfully dissent.
    TRIAL EVIDENCE
    {¶ 55} The lead opinion acknowledges that McFarland was not present
    when Robert Williams was shot and killed as he exited his apartment on November
    14, 2015. It nevertheless maintains that there was sufficient evidence to support
    her convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and complicity in the associated
    crimes. To support affirming these convictions, the lead opinion relies on particular
    pieces of the state’s evidence while disregarding the uncontroverted testimony of
    the state’s key witness. As I explain below, I do not believe that the evidence
    establishes that McFarland had any participatory role in the crimes unquestionably
    perpetrated by Eddie Brownlee, Ryan Motley, and Motley’s accomplices.
    {¶ 56} I will start with the evidence that the lead opinion barely
    acknowledges: the trial testimony of Ryan Motley. As the lead opinion notes,
    Motley, known also by the nickname “Chop,” went to Williams’s apartment
    building with two confederates on the morning of November 14, 2015, and shot
    Williams in the hallway of his apartment complex. Motley was indicted on all the
    same charges that were brought against the other defendants, including McFarland.
    {¶ 57} Rather than face trial, however, Motley agreed on October 5, 2016,
    to plead guilty to amended Count 1, which reduced the charge of aggravated murder
    to murder, with the three-year gun specification for that charge retained, and Count
    3, which charged conspiracy to commit murder, with the three-year gun
    specification for that charge deleted; all remaining counts were dismissed. Further,
    22
    January Term, 2020
    Motley was immediately required to give a proffer statement in which he detailed
    what his testimony would be at the trials of Brownlee and McFarland. If Motley’s
    testimony was not truthful and was not consistent with other known facts, the state
    reserved the right to rescind the plea agreement and prosecute Motley on the
    offenses as charged. Motley thereafter entered guilty pleas as described and was
    sentenced to serve 18 years to life in prison.
    {¶ 58} Immediately after accepting Motley’s guilty pleas, the trial court
    asked Motley what happened on November 14, 2015. In open court, Motley
    admitted that he had approached Williams with his gun drawn and had shot
    Williams as Williams appeared to be reaching for the gun. Motley disclosed that
    Brownlee told him to “rough [Williams] up” because of Williams’s role in
    Brownlee’s then-recent arrest on drug charges. Motley acknowledged that he had
    initially obtained the gun from a hotel room that Brownlee had occupied, although
    Brownlee was not present at the time.
    {¶ 59} Motley stated in his proffer that McFarland did not play any role in
    Motley’s retrieval of “the hammer,” i.e., the gun. Motley stated that he did not talk
    to McFarland about roughing up Williams or getting the gun. Motley said he had
    no contact with McFarland prior to the commission of the November 14, 2015
    crimes.
    {¶ 60} Brownlee was convicted in October 2016 on all but Counts 1, 7, and
    9. When McFarland’s case came on for jury trial in February 2017, Motley was
    called as a state’s witness and admitted to his role in murdering Robert Williams.
    Motley testified that the day after Brownlee and McFarland’s October 25, 2015
    arrest on drug charges, he went without their knowledge to the Willoughby, Ohio,
    hotel that Brownlee had occupied in order to remove any drug-related evidence
    before the police discovered it, so as to protect Brownlee and McFarland from
    additional charges. Motley did not find any drugs but did find a gun under the
    mattress. Motley took the gun from the hotel and gave it to Brownlee’s brother,
    23
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    but he retrieved it from him 48 hours later and thereafter kept it until the day of the
    murder.
    {¶ 61} Motley testified that following Brownlee’s release from jail on
    November 10, 2015, and prior to the November 14, 2015 shooting, he and Brownlee
    met at the Willoughby hotel and Brownlee told him what he wanted him to do.
    Motley described the hotel room as being a suite that had a living area, a kitchen
    area, a bedroom, and a bathroom. Motley testified that McFarland was not in the
    area where the conversation between Brownlee and Motley occurred but instead
    was in a different part of the hotel room.
    {¶ 62} Motley testified that it was his decision to go to Williams’s
    apartment complex on the morning of November 14, 2015, with the gun. Later that
    day, Motley told Brownlee, “It’s done.” At some point on the evening of the murder
    or the next day, Motley met with Brownlee at the Willoughby hotel, while
    McFarland was in the hotel suite’s bedroom with the door closed. Brownlee gave
    Motley drugs valued at approximately $4,000 as an apparent reward.
    {¶ 63} Motley testified that he acted at only Brownlee’s direction. He
    testified that McFarland did not play any role in the plan to retaliate against
    Williams. And he testified that McFarland did not play any role in his obtaining
    possession of the gun that he used to kill Williams.
    {¶ 64} I note here that despite having expressly reserved the right to rescind
    Motley’s plea agreement if his testimony was not truthful or consistent with other
    known facts, the state of Ohio did not rescind the plea agreement after Motley
    provided his proffer statement and trial testimony.
    {¶ 65} Given that Motley’s testimony appears to exculpate McFarland from
    the charges brought against her in this case, the lead opinion looks to other evidence
    that supposedly establishes McFarland’s complicity and conspiratorial involvement
    in these crimes. But even that other evidence does not demonstrate McFarland’s
    participation in the charged crimes.
    24
    January Term, 2020
    {¶ 66} In particular, the lead opinion relies on portions of the October 25,
    2015 jail call from Brownlee to McFarland in which they discussed their belief that
    Williams was a snitch and Brownlee ranted that he was going to “get him.” That
    hardly establishes McFarland’s complicity or conspiratorial involvement in plans
    to commit murder.
    {¶ 67} The lead opinion says that during that same call, “McFarland
    brought Motley in on the call.” Lead opinion at ¶ 33. Specifically, the evidence
    reflects that McFarland received the call while she was with Motley as a passenger
    in his truck. After Brownlee learned that McFarland was with Motley, McFarland
    handed the phone to Motley, at which time Brownlee told Motley, “Chop, I need
    you to handle this.” Motley replied, “I already know.” Brownlee added, “Chop,
    get [Williams], get those mother fuckers.” When their private conversation was
    concluded, Motley handed the phone back to McFarland. There is no evidence that
    McFarland heard anything that Brownlee said to Motley.
    {¶ 68} Later in that same call, Brownlee asked McFarland about “the
    hammer.” McFarland told Brownlee that Motley had already retrieved the gun and
    had given it to Brownlee’s brother. From this evidence, the lead opinion says that
    McFarland “made it clear that she had had prior conversations with Motley” about
    the gun. Lead opinion at ¶ 33. So what? Does an inquiry concerning the
    whereabouts of a gun establish a conspiracy or complicity to commit murder? I
    would not have thought so before today’s decision.
    {¶ 69} Toward the end of that same call, Brownlee told McFarland: “Tell
    Chop when I get out I’m going to handle this.” Taken at face value, the implication
    was that no one should do anything until Brownlee was released from jail—at
    which time Brownlee, perhaps with Motley’s assistance, intended to handle the
    matter himself. That hardly inculpates McFarland in conspiracy or complicity to
    commit murder.
    25
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 70} The lead opinion gives undue if not talismanic significance to the
    fact that Motley, in the seven-page statement he wrote on October 16, 2015,
    referred to the gun as “their” gun. His trial testimony sought to correct that
    statement to reflect that the gun in fact was “his,” i.e., Brownlee’s, gun and not
    “their” gun. In any case, is the offhand use of a personal pronoun in an unsworn
    witness statement—with no showing of foundational knowledge to even make such
    a declaration—conclusive proof of conspiracy or complicity to commit murder?
    {¶ 71} The lead opinion says that while McFarland worked with Motley to
    sell drugs to finance Brownlee’s bail, “McFarland made clear to [Motley] that
    Williams and Henderson had to be dealt with.” Lead opinion at ¶ 34.2 Regardless
    of whether McFarland was angry with Williams and Henderson, the lead opinion
    cannot point to any evidence indicating that she acted on that anger to cause harm
    to them. Motley flatly stated that he did not talk to McFarland about roughing up
    anyone and that she did not play any role in the planning of the events that occurred
    on November 14, 2015.
    {¶ 72} The lead opinion further relies on a jail call between Brownlee and
    McFarland in which McFarland said that Motley had said that Williams would
    “have to be handled.” Putting hearsay analysis aside, I fail to see how that statement
    could inculpate McFarland in conspiracy and complicity to commit murder. The
    evidence was that Motley was the one who said that they would “have to be
    handled” and that McFarland merely relayed what Motley said to Brownlee. Nor
    do I interpret McFarland’s passive submission to Brownlee’s voluble rantings as
    some form of silent incitement or encouragement to act.
    {¶ 73} Noting that “things moved quickly” once Brownlee was released
    from jail on November 10, 2015, the lead opinion says, “McFarland was in the hotel
    2. The lead opinion makes repeated references to McFarland’s involvement in drug dealings but
    neglects to acknowledge that McFarland was acquitted of all charges she faced in the drug
    trafficking case. See State v. McFarland, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-601477-B (May 22, 2017).
    26
    January Term, 2020
    room when Motley and Brownlee agreed that Motley would harm Williams.” Lead
    opinion at ¶ 35. But as noted previously, Motley testified that the hotel room was
    a suite with different areas and that McFarland was not in the area where Brownlee
    and Motley had their conversation. In any case, proximity is not necessarily equal
    to presence.
    {¶ 74} There was no evidence to suggest that McFarland had any
    knowledge of Brownlee’s November 13, 2015 calls to Williams stating that
    Brownlee was out of jail and would be coming for Williams and Henderson and
    that they were going to “see their graves.” Henderson testified that McFarland was
    not one of the four unidentified people who stood by their truck in the apartment’s
    parking lot looking up at Williams’ window as he started cussing them out.
    {¶ 75} Henderson testified that she received a telephone call from
    McFarland early on the morning of November 14, 2015, inquiring how they were
    doing. Henderson testified that McFarland had denied that Brownlee had made any
    threatening calls to Henderson and Williams but that McFarland had ended the call
    when she saw Brownlee approaching. There is no evidence that either Brownlee
    or Motley were aware of McFarland’s call to Henderson or that it had any effect on
    Motley’s actions. To infer that that phone call proves McFarland’s complicity in
    the murder scheme requires pure speculation and conjecture. I fail to see how this
    evidence substantiates McFarland’s supposed involvement when no other evidence
    establishes her participatory role in any plan.
    {¶ 76} As to the facts of the actual killing on November 14, 2015, the lead
    opinion does not identify any evidence that shows McFarland’s involvement in the
    crime.
    {¶ 77} With regard to what it calls the postmortem meeting at the
    Willoughby hotel, the lead opinion says “McFarland was present again,” lead
    opinion at ¶ 37; however, the lead opinion once again ignores Motley’s
    uncontroverted testimony that McFarland was in a different area—behind a closed
    27
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    bedroom door—while Brownlee and Motley completed their business. Indeed, the
    lead opinion takes liberties with the record when it describes a meeting with all the
    confederates taking place after the murder. In truth, the testimony on this was
    ambiguous at best. What is not ambiguous, however, is that the state’s star witness
    once again exculpated McFarland. While Motley was being questioned about
    previous testimony elicited during a prior trial, the following exchange occurred:
    Q: All right. And do you remember testifying about the
    meeting where you met with Mr. Brownlee and Miss McFarland
    after the murder?
    A: Can you repeat the question?
    Q: Do you remember the meeting with Mr. Brownlee and
    Miss McFarland after the murder?
    A: Do I remember talking to them?
    Q: Well, do you remember that meeting, first of all?
    A: Yes.
    Q: And was Eddie Brownlee and Sheila McFarland both
    present?
    A: When I had the meeting?
    Q: Yes.
    A: See, that’s why I want you to be more specific, because
    you’re saying having a meeting, like me and everybody is in here
    right now, we’re talking, everybody can hear, it’s basically like
    we’re having a meeting. So basically I’m talking to you and I’m
    talking to everybody else in the courtroom. If she’s behind that door
    right there, I don’t know if she can hear me or not. So she’s not
    present to the meeting.
    28
    January Term, 2020
    Q: Well, how about this. Why don’t you tell me what you
    meant by this testimony:
    ***
    Question: “Okay. And who was there when you met up with
    him now the second time after the hotel room?”
    Your answer was: “Who was with him?”
    Question: “Right. Who was with him.”
    Answer: “Sheila.”
    Question: “All right. Him and Sheila in tandem. And who
    was with you?”
    Answer: “The same two parties, Rahkee and my brother
    Raymond.”
    Okay, Is that all true or not?
    A: Yes. But you’re still missing what I’m trying to say. She
    can be there, but listening to the conversation is different.
    Motley appears fixated on clarifying that McFarland was not present. No follow-
    up clarifying questions were asked about the meeting or, in particular, the presence
    of the other assailants. So regardless of what Motley said about the accomplices’
    presence in prior testimony—for which we have no context or understanding of the
    line of questioning—his testimony in McFarland’s trial did not expressly say that
    they were present at a meeting after the murder.
    {¶ 78} The lead opinion says this was sufficient evidence to convict
    McFarland of aggravated murder based on her aiding or abetting another in
    committing the offense, R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), or soliciting or procuring another to
    commit the offense, R.C. 2923.03(A)(1). I cannot agree.
    {¶ 79} The lead opinion says McFarland “incited [Motley] to harm the
    informants.” Lead opinion at ¶ 39. How? I do not see how McFarland did anything
    29
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    to cause Williams’s murder, either by aiding or abetting or by soliciting or
    procuring.
    {¶ 80} The lead opinion says McFarland did not ask Motley to return the
    gun to her before the murder. Is that now proof of conspiracy and complicity to
    commit murder?
    {¶ 81} The lead opinion says McFarland discouraged the irate Brownlee
    from discussing Williams on the jail telephone. Is that also proof of conspiracy and
    complicity to commit murder?
    {¶ 82} Faced with Motley’s uncontroverted trial testimony that McFarland
    had no involvement whatsoever in the plan of retaliation that Brownlee directed
    Motley to execute against Williams, the lead opinion says that the jury could
    disbelieve his testimony and conclude that McFarland was involved. But under
    State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), superseded by
    constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 
    684 N.E.2d 668
     (1997), an appellate court’s duty is to examine the
    evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
    convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    at paragraph two of the syllabus. Today’s lead opinion turns Jenks on its head by
    determining whether the evidence if disbelieved, would convince the average mind
    of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    {¶ 83} In my view, there must first be evidence to substantiate the elements
    of the offense before adverse inferences can be drawn from other evidence. Here,
    the evidence utterly failed to establish McFarland’s participatory role in the crimes
    committed against Williams. Indeed, as to the specific charge of conspiracy, the
    evidence failed to show any overt act by McFarland to promote or facilitate the
    commission of aggravated murder or murder.
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    January Term, 2020
    CONCLUSION
    {¶ 84} It is surprising to me that this court accepted discretionary
    jurisdiction in this case only to end up affirming McFarland’s conviction. This case
    presents no novel issue of law. We are not establishing new law or resolving
    conflicts in old law. Instead, the lead opinion acknowledges that the question here
    is one routinely addressed by appellate courts across the state. In that respect, this
    case is unremarkable.
    {¶ 85} At the same time, I do believe that the case presents an issue of great
    public interest that the lead opinion ignores.      Contrary to the lead opinion’s
    assertion that “the question we face does not concern the effect of a conviction
    based upon insufficient evidence,” (emphasis sic) lead opinion at ¶ 22, I do not see
    how we can justly ignore the effect of such a conviction here—a sentence of life in
    prison without the possibility of parole.
    {¶ 86} This is a serious case involving the death of a man and the just
    punishment of those responsible for the crime. The significant issues presented
    concern the proper use of circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences
    that can be drawn from the testimony of witnesses in order to determine whether
    the evidence is legally sufficient to obtain a conviction such that its corresponding
    sentence is commensurate with the defendant’s criminal culpability for the crime.
    {¶ 87} The legitimacy of the administration of criminal justice is under
    scrutiny now perhaps more than ever. I believe that some of the biggest threats to
    the public’s confidence in the justice system are wrongful convictions, disparate
    treatment, and sentences that are inconsistent with criminal culpability.
    {¶ 88} McFarland, believing there was no compelling evidence that
    supported the state’s indictments, chose to exercise her constitutional right to trial.
    Despite a paucity of evidence, McFarland was convicted. By exercising her
    constitutional right to trial, McFarland turned down a plea agreement that could
    have resulted in a three-year prison sentence. While the jury was deliberating, the
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    state again offered McFarland a plea deal, which she also turned down. In my
    experience, this is a highly unusual step for the state to take after a case has been
    submitted to the jury. After her convictions, she ended up with the most severe
    sentence short of the death penalty, while the individual who actually pulled the
    trigger and killed the victim in this case has the opportunity to be released in 18
    years.
    {¶ 89} At sentencing the trial court stated:
    And when there was a plea bargain offer just before trial, you rejected it.
    When there was a plea bargain offer when the jury was deliberating you
    rejected it because, apparently, your attorneys told me that you, quote, made
    your peace with God, closed quote. Well, now you have to make your peace
    with the state of Ohio. Okay?
    The court proceeded to sentence her to a life sentence without the possibility of
    parole.
    {¶ 90} Sheila McFarland chose to place her trust in the criminal justice
    system, and it failed her, allowing a conviction to stand based not on evidence but
    on innuendo, speculation, and conjecture. This court—provided with a final
    opportunity to remedy this injustice—perpetuates the failure. I dissent.
    DORRIAN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion as to the conspiracy
    conviction.
    _________________
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel
    T. Van and Callista Plemel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
    Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jeffrey M.
    Gamso and Paul Kuzmins, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
    _________________
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