Scott Gurney, in his capacity as the Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust v. Josh P. McCoy ( 2022 )


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  •                                  STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    AQ.-
    ri                                FIRST CIRCUIT
    2021 CA 0696
    SCOTT GURNEY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE
    GURNEY FAMILY TRUST
    VERSUS
    JOSH P. MCCOY
    JUDGMENT RENDERED:       APR 0 4 2022
    Appealed from
    The Nineteenth Judicial District Court
    Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
    Docket Number C670818 • Section 24
    The Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Presiding Judge
    Kyle M. Keegan                                       COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
    David A. Lowe                                        DEFENDANT—     Josh P. McCoy
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    Carroll Devillier, Jr.                               COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
    Danielle Borel                                       PLAINTIFF—   Scott Gurney,
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                               in his Capacity as the Trustee of
    the Gurney Family Trust
    BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ.
    VM G
    WELCH, J.
    In this suit on a promissory note, the defendant, Josh P. McCoy, appeals a
    summary judgment granted in favor of the plaintiff, Scott Gurney, in his capacity
    as the Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust, entering judgment against Mr. McCoy
    for principal, interest, and late fees, as well as a subsequent judgment rendered in
    furtherance of that judgment for attorney fees, costs,            and judicial interest.      For
    reasons that follow,      we reverse the summary judgment,            vacate the subsequent
    judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Mr. Gurney is the trustee of the Gurney Family Trust, a trust established
    under the laws of the State of California ( hereinafter           collectively referred to as
    Gurney").    Mr. McCoy is an individual of the full age of majority domiciled in
    East Baton Rouge Parish.        On October 25, 2015, Mr. McCoy signed a promissory
    note in favor of Gurney ("      the note").   The note was for the principal amount of
    750, 000. 00, and had an interest rate of 12% per year, the annual interest each year
    being $ 90, 000. 00,   payable at $ 22, 500. 00   per quarter year, totaling $ 180, 000. 00   for
    the entirety of the note. Pursuant to the note, Mr. McCoy was obligated to make
    payments to Gurney of $22, 500. 00 in quarterly interest, with the first of eight
    interest payments due by February 1,          2016, with principal payable in part or in
    whole.    The payment of any unpaid principal was due on or before the maturity
    date of October 25, 2017.        Additionally, the note provided that Mr. McCoy was
    obligated to pay attorney fees and costs of the holder of the note in the event it was
    necessary to employ an attorney to collect the promissory note.
    On June 25, 2018, Gurney instituted this proceeding, asserting that Gurney
    was the holder of the note, that Mr.              McCoy had failed to make all required
    payments due under the note, and that Mr. McCoy was in default. Gurney sought
    judgment for the principal amount of $711, 275. 00, accrued and unpaid interest in
    2
    the amount of $90, 000. 00,    late fees in the amount of at least $ 40, 063. 35, legal
    interest until paid, attorney fees, and all costs for the proceeding.
    Mr. McCoy filed an answer with affirmative defenses and a reconventional
    demand.     Essentially, Mr. McCoy asserted that the note was executed in favor of
    Gurney as part of a larger agreement between the parties entered into on October
    151 2015,   which involved other related transactions and their shared ownership
    interests in other entities, i.e., Blackwater Farms, Inc.,    Deer Dynasty Properties,
    LLC,   and Deer Dynasty Ranch,       LLC, and which concerned the ownership of
    immovable property used for hunting and a lodge that was constructed on that
    property (" the October 15, 2015 agreement").       Mr. McCoy further asserted that,
    pursuant to the October 15, 2015 agreement, he sold his membership interests in
    these other entities to Gurney in consideration for ( 1)   a lifetime personal servitude
    over the immovable property owned by the entities, along with the ability to stay
    on that immovable property any day that Gurney was not present on the property,
    and ( 2) Gurney' s loan to him, as represented by the note.
    According to Mr. McCoy, Gurney began to breach the October 15,              2015
    agreement around November 2016 by failing to honor the lifetime personal
    servitude it granted to Mr.     McCoy.      Thereafter, Mr.    McCoy ceased making
    payments on the note due to this breach, as the servitude provided a portion of the
    consideration for the note.   Mr. McCoy also asserted that Gurney failed to disburse
    the entire principal sum of the note and that it failed to pay him the sum of
    300, 000. 00, which was due to him under one of the related transactions between
    the parties and their ownership interests in Deer Dynasty Properties,             LLC.
    Therefore, Mr. McCoy sought damages for Gurney' s breach of the note, his breach
    of the October 15,    2015 agreement by failing to honor the lifetime personal
    servitude, and Gurney' s failure to pay Mr. McCoy all sums owed to him pursuant
    to the October 15, 2015 agreement and the note.
    3
    Thereafter, Gurney filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment
    against Mr. McCoy for the amounts owed pursuant to the note.                             Specifically,
    Gurney      sought judgment          against     Mr.   McCoy in        the   principal    amount     of
    711, 274. 97, accrued and unpaid interest in the amount of $90, 000. 00, and late
    fees in the amount of $40, 063. 35.         In addition, Gurney sought attorney fees in the
    amount      of $59,463.   95,    expenses and costs of this proceeding in the amount of
    1, 844.95, and costs and judicial interest from June 25, 2018 ( the date of filing of
    this suit on the note) through satisfaction of judgment.                Mr. McCoy opposed the
    motion,      asserting    that    there   were    issues   of   fact   as    to   its   defenses   and
    reconventional demand, i.e. Gurney' s breach of the note, its breach of the October
    15, 2015 agreement, and failure and/ or want of consideration, which precluded
    summary judgment.
    After a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on April 1, 2020, granting
    the motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of Gurney and
    against Mr. McCoy in the principal amount of $ 711, 274. 97,                      plus   accrued   and
    unpaid interest in the amount of $ 90, 000. 00, and late fees in the amount of
    401063. 35.     The judgment further provided that the parties were to contact the
    trial court to have a hearing to determine whether attorney fees and costs would be
    awarded, and if so, the amounts.'
    Thereafter, Gurney filed a motion to tax attorney fees,                    costs, and judicial
    interest.    After a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on March 2, 2021 in
    favor of Gurney and against Mr. McCoy, granting the motion and entering
    judgment against Mr. McCoy for attorney fees in the amount of $73, 015. 00, court
    costs and fees in the amount of $3, 983. 48, and deposition costs in the amount of
    Mr. McCoy filed an application for supervisory writs seeking review of this judgment.            This
    Court denied the writ application on the basis that once a judgment containing proper decretal
    language was rendered on the remaining issue of attorney fees and costs, the judgment would
    constitute a final appealable judgment, and that Mr. McCoy would be entitled to file a motion for
    appeal therefrom.See Scott Gurney, in his capacity as Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust
    v. Josh P. McCoy, 2020- 1129 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 18/ 21)( unpublished writ action).
    4
    2, 102. 10, plus judicial interest from October 25, 2017 until satisfaction of the
    April 1, 2020 judgment.
    Mr. McCoy has appealed, challenging both the judgment granting summary
    judgment and the judgment granting the motion to tax attorney fees, costs, and,
    judicial interest.   With respect to the summary judgment, Mr. McCoy asserts that
    the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were genuine
    issues of material fact regarding Gurney' s breach of the October 15,               2015
    agreement, which resulted in a failure of consideration on the note, and Gurney' s
    failure to disburse the entire principal amount of the loan, which resulted in a want
    or lack of consideration.    Mr. McCoy also asserts that Gurney failed to establish
    there were no genuine issues of material fact relating to the amount of principal,
    interest, and late fees to which it claimed it was entitled.
    As to the judgment awarding attorney fees, costs, and judicial interest, Mr.
    McCoy asserts that since summary judgment was inappropriately granted, the trial
    court also erred in awarding any attorney fees,           costs,   and judicial interest.
    Alternatively, Mr. McCoy asserts that the award of attorney fees was unreasonable
    and improperly included attorney fees incurred by Gurney in defense of the
    reconventional demand.      He also asserts that the award of costs included costs to
    which Gurney was not entitled, and that the judicial interest awarded was
    inappropriate, as contractual interest had already been awarded.
    LAW AND DISCUSSION
    A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full
    scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Evan Hall
    Sugar Cooperative, Inc.,     2001- 2956 ( La. App.   1St Cir. 12/ 30/ 02), 
    836 So. 2d 484
    ,
    486.   After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment
    shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that
    there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 3).
    In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts
    review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court' s
    determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.              In re Succession of
    Beard, 2013- 1717 ( La. App.         Pt Cir. 6/ 6/ 14), 
    147 So. 3d 753
    , 759- 760. The initial
    burden on a motion for summary judgment is on the mover to show that no
    genuine issue of material fact exists and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3) and ( D)( 1).     The burden then shifts to the
    adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a
    genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. 
    Id.
          If the adverse party fails to do so, then summary judgment shall
    be granted. 
    Id.
    Summary judgment is an appropriate procedural device to enforce a
    promissory note when the defendant establishes no defense against enforcement.
    See American Bank v. Saxena, 
    553 So. 2d 836
    , 845- 846 ( La. 1989).               In a suit to
    collect on a promissory note, once the plaintiff, as holder of a promissory note,
    proves the maker' s signature, or the maker admits it, the holder has made out his
    prima facie case by mere production of the note;             the burden then shifts to the
    defendant to prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact and/ or any
    affirmative defenses. American Bank, 533 So. 2d at 842; see also Hancock Bank
    of Louisiana v. C &       O Enterprises, LLC, 2014- 0542 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 12/ 23/ 14),
    
    168 So. 3d 595
    , 598- 599, writ denied, 2015- 0621 ( La. 5/ 22/ 15),         
    171 So. 3d 251
    .
    Failure of consideration is an affirmative defense that may be asserted by the
    11t
    defendant.        See La. C. C. P. art. 1005; Winston v. Hall, 2017- 1097 (     La. App.
    Cir. 4/ 6/ 18)(   unpublished),   
    2018 WL 1663020
     at * 3.
    on
    Additionally, in a suit on a promissory note by the payee against the maker,
    the payee is entitled to the presumption that the instrument was given for value
    received.   However, the presumption is rebutted if the maker casts doubt upon the
    consideration.   Once the maker casts doubt upon the issue of consideration, the
    burden shifts to the payee to prove consideration by a preponderance of the
    evidence.   Sonnier v. Gordon, 50, 513 (    La. App.   2nd Cir. 4/ 13/ 16), 
    194 So. 3d 47
    ,
    54.   Notably, however, there is a difference between the affirmative defense of
    failure of consideration and the defense of want or lack of consideration.            The
    former concedes that there was consideration for the instrument in its inception,
    but alleges that the consideration has wholly or partially ceased to exist.      
    Id.
     The
    latter defense, however, asserts that consideration was not given for the note.
    Thus,   the defendant is merely producing evidence which rebuts the plaintiff' s
    contention that consideration was given for the note. 
    Id.
     An affirmative defense or
    special plea is not necessary to permit the introduction of evidence which tends to
    rebut evidence introduced by the plaintiff in the proof of his case.    
    Id.
    Gurney, in support of his motion for summary judgment, submitted: a copy
    of the petition with the affidavit of verification of Gurney and the October 25, 2015
    note attached thereto;   Mr. McCoy' s answer to the petition; excerpts from Mr.
    McCoy' s deposition with attachments; and an affidavit of correctness executed by
    Gurney.
    The factual allegations of the petition were set forth above. The October 25,
    2015 note attached thereto set forth the following terms: (    1)   Mr. McCoy promised
    to pay Gurney the principal sum of $750, 000. 00; ( 2)   the note would bear interest at
    a rate of 12% per year based on $ 750, 000. 00, thus the annual interest each year
    would be $ 90, 000. 00, at $ 22, 500. 00 per quarter year, and would total $ 180, 000. 00
    for the entirety of the note; ( 3) commencing on the first day of the month after the
    third month/first quarter after the note' s date, and every successive quarter for two
    7
    years,   Mr.   McCoy would pay $ 22, 500. 00 in quarterly interest and could pay
    principal in part or in whole, and any unpaid principal would be paid on or before
    the maturity date; ( 4) the maturity date was October 25, 2017 and on that date, Mr.
    McCoy would pay any and all unpaid principal on the note, together with the
    eighth of eight interest payments; ( 5)               late fees of 5%       of the    entire   amount
    outstanding would be owed by Mr. McCoy if any payment was not paid within
    thirty days of the due date; ( 6) the proceeds of the loan were not to be used by Mr.
    McCoy for personal, family,            or     household         purposes,   but   instead      for   the
    development      of   residential   real    estate; (    7)     Mr.   McCoy   could     prepay       any
    obligations under the note without penalty by making payment in full of the then -
    remaining unpaid principal, but such payment would not affect his obligation to
    pay the interest totaling $ 180, 000. 00; ( 8) Mr. McCoy waived presentment, protest,
    demand, and notice; ( 9)     if it was necessary to employ counsel to collect the note,
    Mr. McCoy agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs; (                        10) default was
    defined and upon default, any unpaid principal balance would be due and payable
    without    presentment,   demand,     or   notice;      and (   10)   the note was secured by a
    mortgage on Mr. McCoy' s interest in sale proceeds by Deer Dynasty Properties,
    LLC and/ or Deer Dynasty Ranch, LLC of certain land, and Mr. McCoy would
    grant a mortgage on all immovable property purchased with the money lent
    through the note.     The note bears the signature of "Josh Paul McCoy"                 and provides
    that it was executed on and to be effective as of October 25, 2015.
    According to Mr. McCoy' s deposition, he had been working as a builder on
    construction projects, through his company, Dynamic Group, LLC, when he came
    upon an opportunity to participate in the development and construction of houses
    in Sunset Lakes subdivision in Port Allen, Louisiana.                 Mr. McCoy purchased 12- 15
    lots in Sunset Lakes, and the purchase of those lots was mostly funded by money
    that he borrowed from Gurney. The houses in Sunset Lakes were sold as they
    8
    were built, and by the end of 2016, all of the houses had been built and sold.                 Mr.
    McCoy admitted that the loan from Gurney essentially operated like a construction
    line of credit in that he would make draws against the loan and Gurney would pay
    based on the status of the construction.2 In addition to the purchase of land and
    construction of houses in Sunset Lakes, the money that Mr. McCoy borrowed from
    Gurney also funded a project in Denham Springs, Louisiana, which involved the
    purchase of raw land for the development of Magnolia Mound subdivision and the
    purchase of two lots in Watson, Louisiana.           According to Mr. McCoy, no houses
    were built in Magnolia Mound subdivision, as its development stopped with the
    flooding in 2016 because the market went down and because Mr. McCoy decided
    that he wanted to end his dealings with Gurney. Mr. McCoy understood that the
    money from Gurney was a loan and that he was obligated to pay it back.                 However,
    he stated that " it wasn' t just a loan agreement" rather it was part of a " global deal"
    based on his rights and ownership in other entities involving Gurney.
    After Mr. McCoy got an email from Gurney that Mr. McCoy would not be
    able to go to the property that was the subject of the servitude, Mr. McCoy realized
    that Gurney was dissatisfied with the servitude agreement and that there were
    going to be issues involving his use of the servitude. At that point, Mr. McCoy
    determined that if Gurney was " going to breach our agreement,"              then he would let
    Gurney "     give [   McCoy his] servitude money of six hundred thousand, buy [ him]
    out of [the servitude],      and [ they would] settle up the difference on the loan."           In
    addition, Mr. McCoy decided that he was not going to re -pay the funds he had
    drawn on the note and that as soon as Magnolia Mound was "                 paid,"   they "   would
    settle everything out."
    Mr. McCoy admitted that he signed the note for $ 750, 000. 00             in favor of
    2
    We note that, although Mr. McCoy admitted that the loan from Gurney operated like a
    construction line of credit, he never stated or admitted that such arrangement was intended by the
    parties.
    I
    Gurney, that he complied with all payments due under the note until November
    2016,   and that he stopped paying the note in November 2016, when his rights
    under the servitude agreement were withheld.          Mr. McCoy also admitted that the
    note did not make his payment obligation contingent on the servitude rights.                   Mr.
    McCoy stated that he made interest payments totaling $ 90, 000. 00           and that had no
    reason to dispute the amount of the draws made on the loan.
    According to Gurney' s affidavit, Scott Gurney stated that he was trustee of
    the Gurney Family Trust and that he was the holder of, owner of, and entitled to
    enforce the note dated October 25, 2015 in the original principal amount of
    750, 000.00 bearing interest of 12% per year, which was executed by Mr. McCoy.
    Gurney stated that the loan operated as a construction line of credit and that Mr.
    McCoy received draws in the principal amount of $711, 274. 97.              Under the terms
    of the note, Mr. McCoy was obligated to pay eight quarterly interest payments of
    22, 500. 00 and to pay the note on the two year anniversary of the note' s date.              Mr.
    McCoy made only the first four interest payments, had not made any payments on
    principal,
    was in default, and was indebted to Gurney for the principal sum of
    711, 274. 97,   plus   accrued and unpaid        interest   of $ 90, 000. 00,   late   fees    of
    40, 063. 35, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. To date, Gurney had incurred
    attorney fees in the amount of $59, 688. 88        and costs of $1, 844. 95 related to the
    collection of the note.
    Herein, we find that Gurney produced the note and that he established, with
    the documents in support of his motion for summary judgment, he was the holder
    of the note, that Mr. McCoy signed the note, that Mr. McCoy received money
    pursuant to the note totaling $ 711, 274. 97,    that Mr. McCoy made only the first four
    interest payments, had not made any payments on principal, was in default, and
    was indebted to Gurney for the principal sum of $711, 274. 97,             plus accrued and
    unpaid interest of $90, 000. 00, late fees of $40, 063. 35, plus reasonable attorney
    10
    fees   and costs.    Therefore,     we find that Gurney met his initial burden of
    establishing a prima facie case for enforcement of the note; thus, the burden then
    shifted to Mr. McCoy to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact
    and/ or any defenses.
    In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. McCoy offered his
    own affidavit, along with the October 15, 2015 agreement and emails between the
    parties attached thereto.   According to Mr. McCoy' s affidavit, in January 2012, he
    formed Blackwater Farms, Inc. (" Blackwater").         Initially, 100 shares of stock were
    issued in Blackwater and he owned all 100 shares.          Blackwater was incorporated
    for the initial purpose of providing comprehensive deer hunting facilities to the
    public.   In order to accomplish this purpose, around February 17, 2012, Blackwater
    purchased approximately 300 acres in Livingston Parish for $ 1,         100, 000. 00 from
    Leonard Jerry Kinchen and L. Jerry Kinchen, Inc.          Blackwater paid $ 50, 000. 00 in
    cash to purchase the 300 acres and financed the remainder of the purchase price
    through a promissory note in the amount of $ 1,            050, 000 at 6%    interest (   the
    Kinchen note").
    Around October 25, 2013,       Mr. McCoy executed a resolution with Gurney
    wherein Gurney purchased 50 of the 100 shares of Blackwater stock for the sum of
    146, 982. 52, thereby making Gurney 50% owner of Blackwater and Mr. McCoy
    the owner of the remaining 50%        of Blackwater.    Gurney "   took out" the Kinchen
    note and became the lender on the 300 acres, and in connection therewith,
    Blackwater executed a promissory note in favor of Gurney in the amount of
    1, 020, 721. 00, with interest payable at prime plus 2. 75% over 240 months (            the
    300 acre note").       Since Mr.   McCoy and Gurney were equal shareholders in
    Blackwater at that time, they agreed to make equal payments on the 300 acre note.
    Mr. McCoy made alternating monthly payments on the note and Gurney claimed
    that he made alternating monthly payments on the note.
    11
    In January 2014, Blackwater purchased an additional 250 acres, which were
    contiguous to the 300 acres, from Leonard Jerry Kinchen and Sheila Gill Kinchen
    for $ 525, 000. 00,    and the purchase price was financed by Gurney.    In connection
    therewith,
    Blackwater executed a promissory note in favor of Gurney in the
    amount     of $ 553,   898. 00, with interest payable at prime plus 2. 75%    over 240
    months ("   the 250 acre note").    Since McCoy and Gurney were equal shareholders
    in Blackwater at that time, they agreed to make equal payments on the 250 acre
    note.
    Mr. McCoy made alternating monthly payments on the note and Gurney
    claimed that it made alternating monthly payments on the note.
    In June 2014, Blackwater decided to build an 8 -bedroom lodge on the 550
    acres and anticipated that it would need $ 600, 000. 00 to build the lodge.     Gurney
    loaned $ 600, 000. 00    to Blackwater for this purpose and the lodge was subsequently
    built.   Additionally, at this time, Mr. McCoy agreed to sell 25%      of his shares of
    stock in Blackwater to Gurney for $ 300, 000. 00.      In order to effectuate this sale,
    Blackwater issued an additional 100 shares of stock, which were sold to Gurney
    for $ 600, 000. 00.    However, Gurney never paid any money to Blackwater or Mr.
    McCoy for these additional shares of stock.
    Following the issuance of the additional 100 shares of stock, Mr. McCoy
    owned 25%      of Blackwater through his 50 shares of stock and Gurney owned 75%
    of Blackwater through its 150 shares of stock.      Gurney and Mr. McCoy placed a
    value of $300, 000. 00 on 50 shares of stock in Blackwater at that time, and thus, the
    total 200 shares of stock in Blackwater were worth $ 1, 200, 000. 00 at that time. In
    connection with the issuance of the additional 100 shares of stock to Gurney, Mr.
    McCoy retained the right for five years to repurchase from Gurney 50 shares of
    stock in Blackwater for $ 300, 000. 00.
    Additionally, in 2014, at the suggestion of Gurney, it was proposed that two
    limited liability companies be organized and that Blackwater' s assets and liabilities
    12
    be transferred to these new limited liability companies.          Based on this suggestion,
    Gurney and Mr. McCoy organized Deer Dynasty Ranch, LLC and Deer Dynasty
    Properties, LLC.       At the time of its organization, Mr.             McCoy owned 25%
    membership      interests   in Deer Dynasty          Ranch,   LLC      and
    in Deer Dynasty
    Properties, LLC and Gurney owned the remaining 75%.                 Blackwater then assigned
    all of its immovable assets and all of its movable assets and liabilities, including
    the 300 acre note and the 250 acre note, to Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC.
    In 2015,    negotiations began for the sale of Mr. McCoy' s remaining 25%
    interests to Gurney because Mr. McCoy had decided to convert his interest in those
    entities into cash and to pursue a residential housing development instead.               The
    terms of the sale of Mr.          McCoy' s interests were ultimately agreed upon,         and
    Gurney and Mr. McCoy executed the October 15, 2015 agreement.
    According to Mr. McCoy, pursuant to the October 15, 2015 agreement, he
    sold, conveyed, and transferred his 25%          interest in Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC
    and Deer Dynasty Ranch, LLC to Gurney; thus, Gurney became 100%                      owner of
    the lodge and the membership interests in Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC and Deer
    Dynasty Ranch, LLC. Mr. McCoy' s consideration for entering into the October
    151 2015 agreement consisted of a lifetime personal servitude on the lodge and the
    550 acres, as well as a loan made by Gurney to him. Specifically with respect to
    the loan,   funds equaling the approximate value of his 25%                  interests in Deer
    Dynasty     Properties,     LLC    and   Deer    Dynasty      Ranch,    LLC,   which   totaled
    approximately $ 750, 000. 00,      were to be transferred by Gurney to Mr. McCoy.         Mr.
    McCoy would then repay those funds over time in exchange for Gurney granting
    him a lifetime servitude over the lodge and 550 acres.           Mr. McCoy' s obligation to
    repay the funds set forth in the October 15, 2015 agreement was conditioned upon
    Gurney honoring Mr. McCoy' s lifetime servitude and complying with the terms of
    the October 25, 2015 note.          Likewise, Gurney' s duties to Mr. McCoy under the
    13
    servitude identified in the October 15, 2015 agreement were memorialized in the
    agreement.       Thus, the net effect of the October 15, 2015 agreement was that the
    servitude formed the consideration for Mr. McCoy' s execution of the note and his
    obligation to repay the $ 750, 000. 00 "       purchase price"       set forth in the note for his
    25%    interest in the lodge, Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC and Deer Dynasty Ranch,
    LLC.
    But for the lifetime servitude over the lodge and the 550 acres, Mr. McCoy
    would not have entered into the October 15, 2015 agreement, would not have
    executed the note,         and would not have borrowed any money from Gurney that
    forms the basis of the claims in this suit.          Rather, he would have simply demanded
    the payment of $750, 000. 00 for his remaining 25%               interest.
    Mr. McCoy executed the note, which Gurney prepared, in October 2015;
    however, Gurney did not disburse any of the loan proceeds from the promissory
    note until November 2015 and he never disbursed the full $750, 000. 00 as set forth
    in the note, even though it was required by the terms of the note. Rather, Gurney
    made disbursements as follows: $ 156, 305. 00 on November 19, 2015; $ 264, 513. 98
    on January 20, 2016; $ 97, 898. 28 on February 3,                2016; $ 62, 654. 94 on March 3,
    2016; $ 18, 500. 00 on March 30, 2016; $ 72, 500. 00 on April 11, 2016; $ 20, 402. 77
    on    April    27,   2016;    and $   18, 500. 00    on   June    30,   2016.   Although    these
    disbursements totaled $        711, 274.97, Gurney continued to charge Mr. McCoy full
    interest on the full $750, 000. 00 from the date that he executed the note on October
    25, 2015.       During this time, Mr. McCoy complied with all terms of the note,
    including payment of interest.
    In 2016,     Gurney began violating terms of the servitude agreement in
    multiple ways.       First, Gurney prevented Mr. McCoy from staying at the lodge on
    multiple      occasions.     Next,   Gurney also tried to make Mr. McCoy pay for the
    servitude, even though the consideration for Mr. McCoy executing the note ( and
    14
    effectively repaying the purchase price for his 25% interest) was the granting of the
    lifetime servitude, and it was agreed that Mr. McCoy would not pay for the use of
    the servitude.       Thereafter, Gurney terminated the servitude agreement in writing
    and Gurney has precluded Mr. McCoy from using the lifetime servitude or
    exercising any of the rights granted to him. After Gurney breached the October 15,
    2015 agreement with regard to the servitude, Mr. McCoy ceased making payments
    on the note in 2017 because the servitude agreement formed the consideration for
    his execution of the note and the October 15, 2015 agreement.
    According to the October 15, 2015 agreement between Mr. McCoy and
    Gurney, which was attached to Mr. McCoy' s affidavit, "[ o] wnership                  and capital
    obligations [
    of Deer Dynasty Ranch, LLC and Deer Dynasty Properties] [                   would
    be] 100%     Gurney"      and "[   c] apital obligations [ would] be borne 100%      by Gurney."
    The      October    15,   2015     agreement   also   provided   that   upon   the   sale   of the
    Endeavor,"        Gurney would be paid the first $ 3, 292, 000. 00 from the gross sales
    receipts; next, Mr. McCoy would be paid 1%              of the gross sales receipts; then, Mr.
    McCoy would be paid $ 212, 000. 00 from the gross sales receipts, if any; and all
    residue,    if any, would be paid to Gurney.            Mr. McCoy was provided a seven
    calendar day right of first refusal in the event of any proposed sale of the Endeavor
    for no less than $ 3, 292, 000. 00, and his time- limited right to redeem his 25%
    interest in the Endeavor for $300, 000. 00 was extinguished. The agreement further
    provided that Mr. McCoy would have a personal servitude on the 250 and 300
    acres,    which would exclude the right to take/kill game of any kind without
    Gurney' s written approval, except that Mr. McCoy would have the right to kill two
    turkeys per year, and would exclude the right to stay overnight if Gurney was
    present, other than as an invited guest.         Mr. McCoy was to obtain from Circle C a
    100 year lease in favor of Deer Dynasty Ranch, LLC and the Endeavor for a non-
    exclusive,    but unrestricted use of the barn,           with said lease having specific
    15
    provisions.
    The October 15, 2015 agreement further provided that Gurney would lend
    750, 000.00 to Mr. McCoy on a two year promissory note,                 which was for a
    residential development project.      The promissory note would be secured by Mr.
    McCoy' s monetary interests in the Endeavor that remain after and result from the
    agreement and by mortgages on all immovable property purchased with the loan
    capital.   The loan would have 12% interest per year based on the loan amount of
    750, 000. 00,   allowing quarterly interest only payments, each in the amount of
    22, 500. 00, thus the annual interest each year shall be $ 90, 000. 00 at $ 22, 500. 00
    per quarter year, and shall total $ 180, 000. 00   for the entirety of the note.
    In addition, the October 15,    2015 agreement provided that the operating
    agreements for Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC and Deer Dynasty Ranch,                 LLC
    would be amended to reflect the terms agreed to and the parties would enter into
    and execute any and every document necessary to memorialize, formalize, ratify
    and/ or notify third -parties of this agreement and its terms.         The agreement was
    signed by Mr. McCoy on November 3, 2015 and by Gurney on November 10,
    2015.
    Based on our de novo review of the documents offered by Mr. McCoy in
    opposition to the motion for summary judgment, we find Mr. McCoy met his
    burden of establishing that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue
    of consideration that preclude summary judgment in favor of Gurney on the note.
    More specifically, we find Mr. McCoy established genuine issues of material fact
    as to whether Gurney breached the October 15,              2015 agreement between the
    parties, thereby resulting in a failure of consideration, and whether Gurney was
    obligated under the note and the October 15, 2015 agreement to disburse the entire
    loan proceeds, thereby resulting in a lack of consideration.
    The documents offered by Mr. McCoy established that the note was part of
    16
    the October 15, 2015 agreement between the parties and that there was an issue of
    fact as to whether Gurney breached that agreement by preventing and eventually
    terminating Mr. McCoy' s servitude that was established by the agreement, and by
    failing to disburse the full proceeds of the loan. Mr. McCoy' s affidavit establishes
    that he both executed the note for the $            750,000. 00 loan from Gurney and
    transferred his interest in Deer Dynasty Properties, LLC and Deer Dynasty Ranch,
    LLC to Gurney in exchange for the lifetime servitude set forth in the October 15,
    2015 agreement.    Thus, any purported breach of the October 15, 2015 agreement
    by Gurney might result in a failure of consideration, or in a lack of consideration; it
    might also excuse Mr. McCoy' s non-performance under the note, or reduce the
    amount to which Gurney is entitled to recover under the note.
    Gurney contends that Mr. McCoy should not be able to rely on the October
    155 2015 agreement in defense to the suit on the note because (             1)   any purported
    breach of the October 15, 2015 agreement would be an unliquidated claim for
    damages, which cannot be used to offset a liquidated claim, such as enforcement of
    a   promissory   note,   and (   2)   the    October   15,    2015   agreement      constitutes
    inadmissible parol evidence, which cannot be used to alter the terms of the note.
    However, we find no merit to Gurney' s contentions.
    We recognize that in general, courts have held that an unliquidated claim for
    damages based upon a breach of contract may not be offset against a liquidated
    claim, such as a promissory note.           See American Bank, 
    553 So. 2d at
    844- 846.
    However, in cases where a promissory note is part of a larger related agreement
    between the parties, a breach of the larger related agreement may provide a defense
    to the enforcement of the promissory note, thereby rendering summary judgment
    inappropriate.   See Ouachita National Bank in Monroe v. Gulf States Land &
    Development, Inc., 
    579 So. 2d 1115
    , 1121- 1123 (             La. App. 2"   Cir.), writ denied,
    3rd
    
    587 So. 2d 695
     ( La. 1991) and Butler v. Begnauds, LLC, 2019- 51 (                La. App.
    17
    Cir. 5/ 29/ 19), 
    273 So. 3d 412
    , 481; see also Geaux Live Digital, L.L.C. v. Taylor
    and Ross Entertainment, L.L.C., 2011- 601 ( M.D. La. 6/ 28/ 12),                   
    2012 WL 130019029
     *   3- 4.
    In this case, we find the October 15, 2015 agreement and the note are so
    interrelated that a breach of the October 15, 2015 agreement could provide a
    defense to the enforcement of the note.             The note was a part of the October 15,
    2015 agreement, was executed in conjunction with the October 15, 2015 agreement
    and the specific terms, purpose, and security for the note were specifically set forth
    and related to the terms of the October 15, 2015 agreement. As such, we find that
    Mr. McCoy is entitled to rely on the October 15, 2015 agreement in defense of the
    suit on the note and in defense of Gurney' s motion for summary judgment.                And
    based on the terms of the October 15, 2015 agreement and Mr. McCoy' s affidavit,
    summary judgment was improper.
    As to whether the October 15, 2015 agreement constitutes inadmissible parol
    evidence, we also recognize that, in general, parol evidence is not admissible to
    vary or contradict the terms of an authentic act or an act under private signature,
    and further, that the promissory note herein was an act under private signature.
    See La. C. C.     art.   1848;   Sonnier v. Boudreaux, 95- 2127 ( La.          App.   1St Cir.
    5/ 10/ 96), 
    673 So. 2d 713
    , 718.       However, between the parties to an instrument,
    parol evidence is admissible to show want or failure of consideration.             Scafidi v.
    Johnson, 
    420 So. 2d 1113
    , 1115 ( La. 1982); M.G. Mayer Yacht Servs., Inc. v.
    Ryder, 2003- 2225 (      La. App.   1St Cir. 10/ 29/ 04), 
    897 So. 2d 72
    , 74.   Parol evidence
    is also admissible to prove that the written act was modified by a subsequent and
    valid oral agreement.     La. C. C. art. 1848. As such, parol evidence is admissible as
    between Mr. McCoy and Gurney to show either want or failure of consideration.
    Furthermore, we find that Mr.          McCoy was not offering the October 15,           2015
    agreement to vary or contradict the terms of the note. Indeed, the terms set forth in
    18
    October 15, 2015 agreement pertaining to the note are consistent with the terms of
    the note itself. Rather, Mr. McCoy has offered the October 15, 2015 agreement for
    the purpose of establishing the entire agreement of the parties, of which the note
    was a part, in order to establish a failure or a lack of/want of consideration and
    Gurney' s non-performance of the parties'          overall agreement.     Thus, the October
    15,   2015 agreement does not constitute inadmissible parol evidence and was
    appropriately relied on by Mr. McCoy in defense of the suit and in opposition to
    Gurney' s motion for summary judgment.'
    For all of the above and foregoing reasons,              we find that Mr.      McCoy
    established genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of consideration.               As
    such, the trial court improvidently granted Gurney' s motion for summary judgment
    and entered judgment in favor of Gurney and against Mr. McCoy for principal in
    the amount of $711,     274. 97, plus accrued and unpaid interest in the amount of
    90, 000. 00, plus late fees in the amount of $40, 063. 35.      Therefore, we reverse the
    April 1, 2020 judgment of the trial court.
    Additionally, we note that the March 2, 2021 judgment,                 which   granted
    Gurney' s motion to tax attorney fees,         costs,   and judicial interest and entered
    judgment in favor of Gurney and against Mr. McCoy for attorney fees in the
    amount of $73, 015. 00, court costs and fees in the amount of $3, 983. 48, deposition
    costs in the amount of $2, 102. 10, and judicial interest from October 25, 2017 until
    satisfied, was entered in furtherance of the April 1, 2020 summary judgment.                As
    we have reversed that judgment herein, we vacate the March 2, 2021 judgment
    rendered in furtherance of that judgment.
    3 We do note that Gurney offered parol evidence, i.e. the deposition testimony of Mr. McCoy, in
    order to establish that the note was a construction line of credit rather than a loan for
    750,000. 00 as provided by the note and by the October 15, 2015 agreement. However, because
    we find the documents offered by Mr. McCoy were sufficient to establish genuine issues of
    material fact as to the issue of consideration, we need not address the effect of that parol
    evidence.
    19
    CONCLUSION
    For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the April 1,        2020 judgment,
    which granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of
    Scott Gurney, in his capacity as Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust, and against
    Josh P. McCoy in the principal amount of $711, 274. 97, plus accrued and unpaid
    interest in the amount of $90, 000. 00, and late fees in the amount of $40, 063. 35, is
    reversed.   In addition, the March 2, 2021 judgment rendered in furtherance of the
    April 1, 2020 judgment, which entered judgment in favor of Scott Gurney, in his
    capacity as Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust and against Josh P. McCoy in the
    amount of $   73, 015. 00 for attorney fees, court costs and fees in the amount of
    3, 983. 48, and deposition costs in the amount of $2, 102. 10, plus judicial interest
    from October 25, 2017 until satisfaction of the April 1, 2020 judgment, is vacated.
    All costs of this appeal are assessed to Scott Gurney, in his capacity as
    Trustee of the Gurney Family Trust.
    APRIL      1,   2020   JUDGMENT          REVERSED;        MARCH        2,   2021
    JUDGMENT VACATED.
    20
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2021 CA 0864
    SCOTT GURNEY, IN HIS CAPACITY
    AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE GURNEY FAMILY TRUST
    VERSUS
    JOSH P. MCCOY
    McClendon, J., concurring.
    I concur in the result reached by the majority.