State Of Louisiana v. Christopher Paul Glenn ( 2022 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
DOCKET NUMBER
2021 KA 1347
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CHRISTOPHER PAUL GLENN
Decision Rendered
APR 0 8 2022
ON APPEAL FROM THE
21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION E
LIVINGSTON PARISH, LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 37, 823
HONORABLE BRENDA BEDSOLE RICKS, JUDGE PRESIDING
Prentice L. White Attorney for Defendant -Appellant
Baton Rouge, LA Christopher Paul Glenn
Scott M. Perrilloux Attorneys for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Zachary Daniels
Assistant District Attorney
Livingston, LA
BEFORE: MCDONALD, LANIER, and WOLFE, JJ.
McDONALD, I
The Livingston Parish grand jury charged defendant, Christopher Paul Glenn, by
bill of indictment with one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R. S.
14: 30. 1 ( count one); one count of attempted second degree murder, a violation of La.
R. S. 14: 30. 1 and La. R. S. 14: 27 ( count two); and, one count of attempted first degree
rape, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 42 and La. R. S. 14: 27 ( count 3). The defendant pled
not guilty to each count.' After a trial, a jury unanimously found him guilty as charged
on each count. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, motion for post -verdict
judgment of acquittal, and motion for arrest of judgment. The trial court sentenced
him to life imprisonment on count one and to fifty years imprisonment on counts two
and three. All three sentences are to be served at hard labor and without the benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court imposed counts two and
three concurrent to each other but consecutive to count one. The trial court later
denied the defendant' s motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and claiming the trial court imposed an
excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and
sentences.
FACTS
On June 4, 2018, the defendant, his wife, J. G., his four children, and his mother-
in- law, T.S., lived together in a house in Denham Springs, Louisiana. 2 That night, the
defendant stabbed and killed T.S. while she slept in her bedroom. The defendant then
went to the room where J. G. was asleep, lured her to another room, strangled her until
she lost consciousness, cut off her clothing with a pair of scissors, and attempted to
force her to engage in sexual intercourse, as she regained consciousness and struggled
in an attempt to get away. J. G. ultimately escaped and ran to the home of a neighbor,
Vanessa McElroy. As Ms. McElroy described at trial, when J. G. arrived, she had
1 The defendant later withdrew his pleas of not guilty and pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity to each count. He subsequently withdrew those pleas and retained his original plea of not guilty
to each count.
2 As one of the charged crimes is a sex offense, we use initials to protect the identity of the victim and
certain family members. La. R. S. 46: 1844W.
Pa
scratches all over her neck, a bloody nose, bruises, and welts. Ms. McElroy called 911,
informed the dispatcher of what occurred and that the defendant was driving away
from the residence. The 911 dispatcher advised Ms. McElroy to check to see if T.S. was
still alive. Ms. McElroy and J. G. walked to the residence, unlocked T.S.' s bedroom door
with a key, and saw T.S. lying in bed in a pool of blood and cold to the touch.
Deputy Derek Brantley of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office ( LPSO), Uniform
Patrol, was dispatched to the scene and given a description of the defendant' s vehicle.
While en route to the residence, Deputy Brantley spotted a vehicle that fit the
description of the defendant' s vehicle and called for assistance. After checking the
license plate number and verifying that it was the defendant's vehicle, Deputy Claire
Naquin stopped the vehicle and ordered the defendant to exit. Deputy Brantley arrived,
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, 3 and handcuffed him. After being advised
of his rights, the defendant made statements in reference to stabbing T.S.
After the defendant was transported to the Livingston Parish courthouse, LPSO
Detective Joseph Ballard and LPSO Deputy Sean Lange also advised the defendant of
his Miranda rights and reviewed a waiver -of -rights form with him. The defendant
stated that he understood his rights, signed the waiver -of -rights form, and participated
in two separate recorded interviews with Detective Ballard4 and Deputy Lange. During
the recorded interviews, the defendant fully confessed to stabbing T.S. to death and to
attempting to kill and have non- consensual sex with J. G. 5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues that he did not intend
to attack or stab T.S. but was provoked to do so when he overheard T.S. condone
J. G.' s desire to divorce him, although it was J. G. who had committed adultery. He
asserts that the facts of this case suggest that he reacted instantly. Thus, he argues
3
Specifically, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966), the
officers informed the defendant of his right to remain silent, that anything he said may be used against
him, and that he had a right to retained or appointed counsel.
4 LPSO Sergeant Lance Landry was also present and participated during the interview by Detective
Ballard.
5 While defendant was at the Livingston Parish courthouse, LPSO Detective Jeff Beatty observed that he
had a cut to his right pinky finger and blood splatter on his shirt and body.
W
his response to being told that his wife had an affair and wanted a divorce was a result
of sudden passion or heat of blood. He maintains that, as a high- ranking combat
veteran, being told his wife had sexual intercourse with another man and wanted to
restrict or eliminate his access to his children caused him to completely lose all control
and respond in compliance with his military training. He argues that there was no
evidence that he plotted to kill or injure his wife and mother- in- law. He concludes the
jury omitted mitigating factors during deliberation that should have led them to return
with a manslaughter conviction. 6 In response, the State contends the jury rejected the
defendant' s argument that the murder occurred in a sudden passion and argues it
would be out of the scope of a sufficiency review for this court to substitute its
appreciation of the evidence for that of the jury.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due
Process. See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See La. C. Cr. P. art. 82113; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318- 19, 99 S. Ct. 278112789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Ordodi, 06- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946 So. 2d 654,
660; State v. Landry, 19- 0486 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 297 So. 3d 8, 14. The Jackson
standard of review, incorporated in La. C. Cr. P. art. 82113, is an objective standard for
testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt.
When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R. S. 15: 438 provides that the factfinder
must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. State v. Ratorno, 01- 2585 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 21/ 02), 822 So. 2d 141, 144.
When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the
hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the
6 The defendant challenges the convictions on counts one and two of second degree murder and
attempted second degree murder, as to the evidence to prove the element of specific intent and the
existence of mitigating factors, but does not challenge the conviction on count three of attempted first
degree rape.
4
defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt.
Landry, 297 So. 3d at 14.
Second degree murder is pertinently defined as '' the killing of a human being ...
w] hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" La.
R. S. 14: 30. 1A( 1). Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal
consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R. S. 14: 10( 1); Landry, 297 So. 3d at
15. Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be
inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by
direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial
evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific
intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. Landry, 297
So. 3d at 15.
Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act
for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty
of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether,
under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R. S.
14: 27A. The gravamen of attempted second degree murder is the specific intent to kill
and the commission of an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal.
Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a
conviction based on ` specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm," a conviction
for attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill. See La. R. S.
14: 30. 1A( 1) and 14: 27A ( emphasis added); State v. Giroir, 18- 1295 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
4/ 10/ 19), 2019 WL 1551736, * 3 ( unpublished).
Manslaughter is a homicide that would be either first or second degree murder,
but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool
reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds
that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person' s blood would
have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. La. R. S. 14: 31A( 1). " Sudden
5
passion" and ""heat of blood" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather,
they are mitigating factors in the nature of a defense. If a defendant establishes those
factors by a preponderance of the evidence, a murder verdict is not appropriate. State
v, Eby, 17- 1456 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 6/ 16), 248 So. 3d 420, 424- 25. Provocation and time
for cooling are questions for the jury to determine using an average -person standard, a
person with ordinary self-control. Id, at 425. If a person unreasonably permits his
impulse and passion to obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the
consequences of his act. State v. Pinestraw, 16- 0553 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 31/ 16), 2016
WL 64277141 * 3 ( unpublished).
At trial, J. G. testified that she and the defendant were " separated" at the time of
the offense but still living together in the family home along with their four children and
her mother, the deceased victim, T.S. Prior to the attacks, while the children were
asleep, J. G. and T.S. conversed before also going to bed in their separate sleeping
areas. Specifically, T.S. was sleeping in one of the bedrooms, J. G. slept on the couch,
while the defendant, to J. G.' s knowledge, was in the master bedroom, where he slept
with their nine -month- old baby. At some point, the defendant awakened J. G. and told
her that she needed to get the baby, claiming that the baby was in the bedroom
screaming. After J. G. entered the master bedroom, she turned around, as the baby
was not crying. The defendant had shut the bedroom door and began to strangle her.
As she unsuccessfully attempted to fight off the defendant, she fell to the floor, and the
defendant got on top of her and continued to strangle her until she lost consciousness.
J. G. stated that when she regained consciousness, " He [ the defendant] was
raping me." Her clothes had been cut, removed, and were on the floor. She struggled
and attempted to get the defendant off of her, as she called out to her mother for help.
At that point, the defendant told J. G. " that he had already killed her" mother. J. G.
asked to see her children and the defendant grabbed some clothes from the dresser to
allow her to get dressed to check on the children. The defendant allowed J. G. to make
a bottle for the baby, who was screaming at that point. After she gave the bottle to the
baby, the defendant brought J. G. to the bedroom where her mother was located. The
defendant unlocked the bedroom door and allowed J. G. to see her mother who was
9
lying in the bed and was covered in blood. He then allowed her to go check on two of
their children, who were in their bedroom located near the front door of the home.
While in the bedroom, J. G. told the defendant that she also wanted to see her oldest
child who was asleep in the playroom. When the defendant turned around and began
walking towards the playroom, J. G. unlocked the front door and ran out. J. G. ran down
the street to Ms. McElroy' s residence, who then called 911, reported the incident, and
informed the operator that the defendant was in the process of leaving the home.
On cross- examination, J. G. testified that she and the defendant had been
separated for about a month prior to the incident, although they were still living
together. She noted that the defendant had been asking to reconcile, but she told him
no. She admitted having an affair with another man leading up to the incident. J. G.
testified that she told the defendant she was seeing someone else about a week or a
week and a half before the incident and that she had spent the entire weekend before
the incident with the other man. While the defendant was hurt and angry when she
told him about the affair, she did not recall them having a fight or altercation as a
result. She further confirmed that she had previously told the defendant she wanted a
divorce but denied that they had ever talked about custody of the children or child
support. As to the defendant having any history of being violent, she noted that she
had to call the police once, stating, " I think he had hit me or something like that." She
noted that the defendant was working overseas for the military during that time. When
asked if there were any other incidents of the defendant putting his hands on her or
anyone else and whether or not the defendant's behavior on the night in question was
normal for him, J. G. gave a negative response to each question. When further asked if
it seemed as though the defendant " snapped" on the night in question, she stated,
Yes, I would say so." However, she also stated that the defendant appeared to be
acting rationally that night when interacting with her and seemed like himself ' for the
most part."
LPSO Detective Jeff Beatty and Detective Ballard responded to the residence to
process the scene. As Detective Beatty walked through and photographed the scene,
he observed blood on the floor in the hallway leading to a bedroom. Detective Ballard
noted that keys were in the bedroom door at the time. When they entered the
bedroom, they saw T.S. laying on the bed with a pool of blood under her head and
what appeared to be multiple stab wounds to her neck. They also observed a large
amount of blood splatter on the wall near the victim in a cast- off pattern. The officers
followed blood drops that led to the kitchen and to the kitchen sink where they
observed and recovered a bloody knife with a black handle. They continued to follow
the blood trail in the house to the living room and master bedroom where they
observed and seized a similar knife with a black handle and a serrated edge, but with
no apparent blood on it, laying on the floor at the foot of the bed. The officers further
observed a small pool of blood by the bed and collected a pair of scissors from the
dresser and female clothing from the floor that appeared to have been cut with
scissors. In addition to photographing the residence and T.S., Detective Beatty further
photographed J. G. and observed her injuries, including red marks around her neck
consistent with strangulation and dried blood on the top of her head.
Deputy Brantley testified that, at the time of the defendant's arrest, when he
was asked what occurred that night, the defendant stated, "[ I] lost it." Sergeant Kyle
Hotard arrived after Deputy Brantley had placed the defendant under arrest, advised
him of his rights, and detained him in the police unit. Sgt. Hotard questioned the
defendant in the unit. The defendant explained that T.S. was turning his wife against
him. He further told the officer that he went to the bedroom with a knife while T.S.
was sleeping, stabbed her in the right side of the neck multiple times, subsequently put
the knife in the sink, and left the scene.
During each of the recorded interviews, the defendant was asked what happened
before the police were dispatched to his residence. The defendant explained that J. G.
was cheating on him and that T.S. was turning J. G. against him, which led to their
divorce." The defendant stated that he learned of J. G.' s affair and plans to leave him
about a week before the incident in question. The defendant stated that J. G. was not
trying to hide the affair. He further noted that J. G. " was all over Facebook with it."
The defendant stated that when he came home on the night in question, he overheard
a conversation between T.S. and J. G. in which his mother- in- law was " bad mouthing"
E:3
somebody. He went to sleep, but woke up a few hours later; he " flipped" and got
extremely angry, as he thought about T.S. "[ filling] my wife' s head up with who knows
what." The defendant confirmed that he blamed T.S. for the ending of his marriage
and that he killed her first because she ' was the biggest actor." He specifically
admitted to entering the bedroom and stabbing T.S. multiple times while she was
asleep. He stated that T.S. did not wake up during the stabbing.
Consistent with J. G.' s testimony regarding the attack on her, the defendant
further indicated that he told J. G. that she needed to get the baby. After J. G. entered
the bedroom, he began choking J. G. as she fought back. He stated that he " choked her
out" and that she stopped breathing. The defendant stated that he grabbed a pair of
scissors, cut J. G.' s clothes off, and threw her on the bed. He explained that he wanted
to rape and kill her, because he wanted to punish her for cheating on him and for
leaving him. The defendant repeatedly admitted that he wanted to rape and kill J. G.,
stating that he attempted to have sex with her but " couldn' t get it up." The defendant
further explained that he wanted to rape J. G., because he wanted to be the last person
with whom she had sex. When J. G. " came to," she again began fighting off the
defendant, and the baby started crying. At that point, the attack ended. The
defendant also admitted telling J. G. that her mother was dead, showing her the knife
that he had used, and taking her to the bedroom where her mother lay. He denied
previously wanting to kill J. G. or her mother, stating, " something triggered, something
clicked." The defendant stated that he and J. G. had been married for five years before
the incident, and he only recalled being violent ( i.e., slapping her) on one prior
occasion.
In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical
evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support
for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Dorsey, 10- 0216 ( La. 9/ 7/ 11), 74 So. 3d 603,
634. Further, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution
of which depends upon a determination of witness credibility, the matter is one of the
weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not
assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder' s
0
determination of guilt. State v. Lavy, 13- 1025 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 11/ 14), 142 So -3d
1000, 1006.
Herein, the jury heard the testimony of all the witnesses and saw the pretrial
police interviews. The jury observed the defendant calmly describe the events that led
to the offenses, the actual offenses, and explaining his actions to the officers. The
verdict rendered in this case indicates that the jury rejected the defendant's theory that
the offenses occurred in sudden passion or heated blood. Testimony presented at trial
showed that J. G. told the defendant that she was seeing someone else and wanted a
divorce at least a week prior to the offenses. Based on these circumstances, we find
that the jury could have reasonably determined that an average person' s blood would
have cooled at the time the offenses were committed. Further, the jury could have
reasonably determined that the circumstances were insufficient provocation to deprive a
reasonable man of self-control to the point that he would commit murder.
Moreover, we note that the defendant's actions were not entirely consistent with
someone who lost complete control, as he locked the bedroom door after killing T.S.,
manipulated J. G. into entering another room before attacking her, and drove away from
the scene before the police arrived. After considering all of the evidence presented in
the light most favorable to the State, we find that it was reasonable for the jurors to
conclude that the defendant' s anger did not preclude the presence of specific intent.
Thus, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and
circumstances presented. See Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. Considering the testimony
and the defendant's own statements during his confessions, the jury could have
rationally concluded that the defendant had the specific intent to kill both victims.
An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and
credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on
the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally
rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 07- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418
per curiam). An appellate court impinges on a factfinder's discretion beyond the
extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law in
accepting a hypothesis of innocence that the factfinder reasonably rejected. See State
10
v. Mire, 14- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698, 703 ( per curiam). After a thorough
review of the record, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence
presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence, all of the elements of second degree murder and attempted second
degree murder. Thus, assignment of error number one lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In arguing that the sentences are excessive and unconstitutional, the defendant
notes that he was given '[ devastating] news" that his wife had an extramarital affair,
that she wanted a divorce, and that she would oppose him receiving any visitation
rights with their children. He further notes that he is a first -felony offender. The
defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that
shocked one' s sense of justice given the fact that the evidence showed that he is a war
veteran who acted in the heat of passion. The defendant further contends that he is
not among the worst of all offenders. Also, the defendant claims that the trial court
failed to address any of the sentencing factors listed in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894. 1 before
announcing its sentence. He concludes that the imposition of a life sentence
consecutive to two concurrent fifty-year sentences was excessive, cruel, and
unconstitutional.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Louisiana
Constitution Article I, § 20 prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a
sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right
against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepuivado,
367 So. 2d 762, 767 ( La. 1979); State v. Honea, 18- 0018 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 21/ 18), 268
So. 3d 1117, 1120. A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless
and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if,
when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it
shocks the sense of justice. Honea, 268 So. 3d at 1120.
11
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894. 1 sets forth the factors for the
trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894. 1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the trial court adequately
considered the criteria. Remand is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the
sentence is shown, even where the trial court has not fully complied with La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894. 1. State v. Lanc%s, 419 So. 2d 475, 478 ( La. 1982); State v. Graham, 02- 1492
La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 14/ 03), 845 So. 2d 416, 422.
A trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within
statutory limits, and an appellate court will not set aside the sentence as excessive
unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Collins, 09- 1617 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 2/ 12/ 10), 35 So. 3d 1103, 1108. Thus, on appellate review of a sentence, the
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Smith, 01- 2574
La. 1/ 14/ 03), 839 So. 2d 1, 4; State v. Spikes, 17- 0087 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 15/ 17), 228
So. 3d 201, 205. This court has stated that maximum sentences permitted under
statute may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders or
when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of
repeated criminality. See State v. Parker, 12- 1550 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 26/ 13), 116 So. 3d
744, 754.
If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act or
transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of
imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some
or all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr. P, art. 883. Thus, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883
specifically excludes from its scope sentences which the court expressly directs to be
served consecutively. A trial judge retains discretion to impose consecutive penalties
based on the offender's past criminality, violence in the charged crimes, or the risk he
poses to the general safety of the community. State v. Thomas, 98- 1144 ( La. 10/ 9/ 98),
719 So. 2d 49 ( per curiam). Although the imposition of consecutive sentences requires
particular justification when the crimes arise from a single course of conduct,
consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive. State v. Alexander, 20- 1337 ( La.
12
App. 1 Cir. 10/ 18/ 21), 2021 WL 4851320, * 6( unpublished). Moreover, the failure to
articulate specific reasons for imposing consecutive sentences does not require remand
if the record provides an adequate factual basis to support the consecutive sentences.
State v. Green, 15- 0308 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 17/ 15), 2015 WL 9260586, * 13
unpublished).
Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. La. R. S. 14: 30. 16. Whoever commits the crime of attempted second degree
murder shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R. S.
14: 27D( 1)( a) & 14: 30. 16. Whoever commits the crime of attempted first degree rape
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R. S. 14: 27D( 1)( a) &
14: 42D( 1).
Courts are charged with applying a statutorily -mandated punishment unless it is
unconstitutional. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276, 1278 ( La. 1993). It is incumbent
on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is
constitutional by " clearly and convincingly" showing that:
he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual
circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature' s failure to
assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the
offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.
State v. Johnson, 97- 1906 ( La. 3/ 4/ 98), 709 So. 2d 672, 676; State v. Adams, 07- 0386
La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 2/ 07), 2007 WL 3407507, * 8 ( unpublished).
In this case, for the defendant' s conviction of second degree murder, the trial
court imposed life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence. For his convictions of attempted second degree murder and
attempted first degree rape, the defendant was sentenced to fifty years at hard labor
on each count, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The
trial court expressly directed that the fifty-year sentences be concurrent to each other
13
but consecutive to the life sentence. Thus, the consecutive nature of the sentences is
beyond the scope of La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. See Alexander, 2021 WL 4851320, at * 6.
At the sentencing hearing, an impact statement prepared by the members of the
victims' family was read to the trial court. The letter detailed T.S.' s life and the family's
emotional suffering due to the loss of T.S., including her grandchildren who also lost
the defendant, their father, as a result of the defendant's actions. J. G.' s statement was
also read to the trial court wherein she described her mother as an amazing, beautiful
person who loved her grandchildren. She noted that her mother was her best friend
and ' rock" and described how she would be missed. She further stated that her mother
did not deserve to be killed and that she was " the only one pushing for me to have my
marriage fixed."
We note that the trial court heard the evidence presented at trial, including the
defendant' s confessions. As to the sentence imposed for the second degree murder
offense, we note that the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor is the
mandatory minimum under the statute and, thus, is presumed constitutional. It is
therefore incumbent upon the defendant to rebut this presumption. Based upon our
review of the record in this case, we do not find that the defendant has clearly and
convincingly shown that he is exceptional. The defendant made no showing of
exceptional circumstances to justify a lesser sentence! As to the consecutive nature of
the sentencing, we note that while the crimes all occurred during a single episode,
there were two victims. During the defendant's brutal attack in which he attempted to
kill and rape her with their infant daughter present in the room, J. G. called out to her
mother, only to be told by the defendant that he had already killed her mother. The
defendant then showed her the bloody body of her mother, who he had stabbed to
death while she was asleep. Further, the defendant committed these horrific crimes
while his four children were present in the same house. After reviewing the evidence
presented at trial as to the manner in which the offenses were committed, we are
We note that after the imposition of the sentences, it was noted for the record that the instant offenses
are crimes of violence and that the sex crime in this case was the defendant's second sex offense.
Further, the State dismissed obstruction of justice and violation of protective order charges in connection
with this case.
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convinced that the defendant is the worst of offenders and committed the worst of
offenses. The record before us clearly establishes an adequate factual basis for the
sentences imposed. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing the sentences in this case. Assignment of error number two lacks merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
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