Com. v. Daniels, G. ( 2017 )


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  • J. S47041/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                     :
    :
    GARY MARC DANIELS,                         :             No. 3373 EDA 2016
    :
    Appellant       :
    Appeal from the PCRA Order, September 26, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-23-CR-0007136-2005
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                      FILED AUGUST 15, 2017
    Gary Marc Daniels appeals from the September 26, 2016 order
    dismissing his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts of this case were summarized by the PCRA court in
    its February 1, 2017 opinion and need not be reiterated here. (See PCRA
    court opinion, 2/1/17 at 1-4.) Appellant was found guilty of possession of a
    controlled    substance,    possession   with   intent   to   deliver   a   controlled
    substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia1 following a bench trial. On
    May 28, 2008, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of five to
    ten years’ imprisonment, followed by one year of probation. Appellant filed
    a timely direct appeal, and this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of
    1
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32), respectively.
    J. S47041/17
    sentence on October 9, 2009. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 
    987 A.2d 811
     (Pa.Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    9 A.3d 626
     (Pa. 2010).        On November 1, 2010, our supreme court denied
    appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal, and appellant did not file a
    petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 
    Id.
    On June 15, 2015, appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his first,
    with the assistance of Michael J. Malloy, Esq. (hereinafter, “PCRA counsel”).
    On July 25, 2016, the PCRA court provided appellant with notice of its
    intention   to   dismiss     his   petition   without   a   hearing,   pursuant   to
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).       Thereafter, on September 23, 2016, the PCRA court
    conducted a hearing as to whether it had jurisdiction over this matter. As
    noted, on September 26, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s
    petition. This timely appeal followed.2
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    1.     Did the [PCRA] court err in denying
    [a]ppellant’s [PCRA petition] without a hearing
    when [a]ppellant’s counsel failed to notify
    [a]ppellant of the denial of the appeal in a
    timely manner, and further, failed to follow
    [a]ppellant’s instruction to seek further
    [a]ppellate review?
    Appellant’s brief at 4.
    2
    The record reflects that on October 27, 2016, the PCRA court ordered
    appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in
    accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b)
    statement on November 16, 2016, and the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a)
    opinion on February 1, 2017.
    -2-
    J. S47041/17
    Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition
    is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is
    supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,
    
    102 A.3d 988
    , 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s
    findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in
    the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 4 (Pa.Super.
    2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings
    of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the
    record could support a contrary holding.”       Commonwealth v. Hickman,
    
    799 A.2d 136
    , 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
    Preliminarily, we must consider the timeliness of appellant’s PCRA
    petition because it implicates the jurisdiction of this court and the PCRA
    court.     Commonwealth v. Davis, 
    86 A.3d 883
    , 887 (Pa.Super. 2014)
    (citation omitted). All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of when
    a   defendant’s    judgment    of   sentence   becomes   final.   42   Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
    including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for
    seeking the review.”      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).      If a PCRA petition is
    untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction over the petition.     Commonwealth v.
    Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    -3-
    J. S47041/17
    Instantly,    appellant’s   judgment   of   sentence   became     final   on
    January 31, 2011, 90 days after our supreme court denied appellant’s
    petition for allowance of appeal and the time for filing a petition for writ of
    certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9545(b)(3). Thus, in order to comply with the filing requirements of the
    PCRA, appellant was required to file his petition by January 31, 2012.
    See id. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s petition, filed June 15, 2015, is patently
    untimely.      As a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review
    appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged and proved one of the statutory
    exceptions to the time-bar, as set forth in Section 9545(b)(1).3
    3
    The three PCRA time-bar exceptions are as follows:
    (i)     the failure to raise the claim previously was the
    result of interference by government officials
    with the presentation of the claim in violation
    of   the     Constitution    or  laws    of  this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
    the United States;
    (ii)    the facts upon which the claim is predicated
    were unknown to the petitioner and could not
    have been ascertained by the exercise of due
    diligence; or
    (iii)   the right asserted is a constitutional right that
    was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
    United States or the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to
    apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
    -4-
    J. S47041/17
    Our review of the September 26, 2016 hearing transcript reveals that
    PCRA counsel specifically acknowledged that appellant could not satisfy any
    of the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar:
    THE COURT: Okay. So, you haven’t met any of the
    three exceptions.
    [PCRA COUNSEL]: That’s correct.
    THE COURT: You agree with that?
    [PCRA COUNSEL]: That’s correct. I’m asking that it
    be considered nunc pro tunc. That’s exactly right.
    Notes of testimony, 9/26/16 at 12-13, 15.
    On appeal, appellant contends that his trial counsel, Clinton L.
    Johnson, Esq., was ineffective in failing to timely notify him when the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal and
    in failing to pursue federal habeas corpus relief. (Appellant’s brief at 9.)
    Appellant maintains that counsel’s purported ineffectiveness is the sole
    reason why his instant PCRA petition was untimely filed and that the PCRA
    time-bar requirements should not be applied to this matter. (Id. at 10-12.)
    “It is well-settled that couching a petitioner’s claims in terms of
    ineffectiveness will not save an otherwise untimely filed petition from the
    application of the time restrictions of the PCRA.”        Commonwealth v.
    Robinson, 
    139 A.3d 178
    , 186 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). In Robinson,
    our supreme court explained that,
    [the PCRA’s] statutory time-bar implicates the
    court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and
    -5-
    J. S47041/17
    prohibits a court from extending filing periods except
    as the statute permits. Accordingly, the period
    for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the
    doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time
    for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only
    by operation of one of the statutorily
    enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.
    Id. at 185 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
    added).
    Furthermore, even to the extent that appellant’s ineffectiveness claim
    could arguably be construed as a “newly-discovered fact” exception to the
    PCRA time-bar, appellant would still not be entitled to relief.      In order to
    invoke the PCRA court’s jurisdiction, appellant would need to demonstrate
    that he filed his petition raising this exception “within 60 days of the date
    the claim first could have been presented.”       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
    Appellant’s issues allege ineffectiveness on the part of his trial counsel, but
    he failed to explain why he did not know or should have known about
    counsel’s purported ineffectiveness until June 15, 2015, nearly four and a
    half years after his judgment of sentence became final.      Accordingly, any
    timeliness exception raised pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii) would fail.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court lacked
    jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellant’s claims.    Accordingly, we
    discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in dismissing appellant’s PCRA
    petition as untimely.
    Order affirmed.
    -6-
    J. S47041/17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/15/2017
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Daniels, G. No. 3373 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 8/15/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/15/2017