Wesley Zoo Yang v. Everest National Insurance Company ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                    Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    Chief Justice:              Justices:
    Syllabus                                                      Bridget M. McCormack       Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been               Reporter of Decisions:
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.                 Kathryn L. Loomis
    YANG v EVEREST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
    Docket No. 160578. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 3, 2021. Decided
    June 10, 2021.
    Wesley Zoo Yang and his wife, Viengkham Moualor, brought an action in the Wayne
    Circuit Court against Everest National Insurance Company (Everest) and Motorist Mutual
    Insurance Company (Motorist), seeking to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits
    under a no-fault insurance policy issued by Everest to plaintiffs. Everest issued Yang a six-month
    no-fault insurance policy, the term of which ran from September 26, 2017, through March 26,
    2018. The policy required Yang to pay a monthly premium and provided that the policy could be
    canceled during the policy period by Everest sending at least 10 days’ notice by first-class mail if
    the cancellation was for nonpayment of the premium. On October 9, 2017, Everest mailed Yang
    a bill for the second monthly payment, stating that if Yang failed to pay the amount due by
    October 26, 2017, the policy would be canceled, effective October 27, 2017; the policy provided
    that the cancellation notice did not apply if Yang paid the premium on time. Subsequently, Yang
    did not pay the premium on time, and Everest sent Yang an offer to reinstate, explaining that the
    policy was canceled as of October 27, 2017, for nonpayment and that Yang could reinstate the
    policy with a lapse in coverage. On November 15, 2017, plaintiffs were struck by a car when they
    were walking across a street; Motorist insured the driver of the vehicle that struck plaintiffs. Two
    days later, on November 17, 2017, Yang sent the monthly premium payment to Everest; the policy
    was reinstated effective that day, and the notice informed Yang that there had been a lapse in
    coverage from October 27, 2017, through November 17, 2017. Plaintiffs filed this action after
    Everest refused plaintiffs’ request for PIP benefits under the policy. Everest moved for summary
    disposition, arguing that plaintiffs were not entitled to benefits under the policy because it had
    been canceled and was not in effect at the time of the accident and that the policy’s cancellation
    provision was not inconsistent with MCL 500.3020(1)(b); Motorist disagreed with Everest’s
    motion and argued that it was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because it
    was not the insurer responsible for the payment of PIP benefits. The court, Susan L. Hubbard, J.,
    denied Everest’s motion and granted summary disposition in favor of Motorist, reasoning that
    Everest’s notice of cancellation was not valid because it was sent before the nonpayment occurred
    and that Everest was therefore responsible for the payment of PIP benefits; the court dismissed
    Motorist from the action. Everest appealed. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals,
    SHAPIRO, P.J., and GLEICHER, J. (SWARTZLE, J., concurring), affirmed the trial court’s order,
    concluding that the cancellation notice was not valid under MCL 500.3020(1)(b) because Everest
    sent the notice before the premium was due and that the notice did not satisfy the terms of
    plaintiffs’ no-fault policy itself. 
    329 Mich App 461
     (2019). The Supreme Court ordered and heard
    oral argument on whether to grant Everest’s application for leave to appeal or take other action.
    
    505 Mich 1068
     (2020).
    In a unanimous opinion by Justice BERNSTEIN, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave
    to appeal, held:
    Under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), a policy of casualty insurance, including all classes of motor
    vehicle coverage, may not be delivered in Michigan by an insurer for which a premium or advance
    assessment is charged unless the policy provides, in part, that the policy may be canceled at any
    time by the insurer mailing to the insured at the insured’s address last known to the insurer or an
    authorized agent of the insurer, with postage fully prepaid, a not less than 10 days’ written notice
    of cancellation with or without tender of the excess or paid premium or assessment above the pro
    rata premium for the expired time. The phrase “notice of cancellation” has a peculiar and
    appropriate meaning in the law as reflected in the Supreme Court’s decisions in American Fidelity
    Co v R L Ginsburg Sons’ Co, 
    187 Mich 264
     (1915), and Beaumont v Commercial Cas Ins Co, 
    245 Mich 104
     (1928). Those decisions held that a notice of cancellation must be peremptory, explicit,
    and unconditional to be effective. Because there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to
    abrogate the common-law meaning of this phrase when it enacted MCL 500.3020(1)(b), the
    common-law definition of the phrase applies, and a notice of cancellation must be peremptory,
    explicit, and unconditional to be effective. An insurance company’s notice of cancellation for
    nonpayment of insurance premiums before any nonpayment actually occurs is not peremptory,
    explicit, and unconditional, and therefore it is not an effective cancellation for purposes of the
    statutory provision. In this case, Everest’s October 9, 2017 letter to plaintiffs was ineffective for
    purposes of MCL 500.3020(1)(b) because it provided that cancellation was conditioned on Yang’s
    failure to pay his insurance premiums. In other words, because the notice was not peremptory,
    explicit, and unconditional, it was not a valid cancellation notice. Accordingly, Yang’s insurance
    policy with Everest was still in effect at the time of the accident.
    Affirmed.
    Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    Chief Justice:                 Justices:
    OPINION                                        Bridget M. McCormack          Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    FILED June 10, 2021
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    WESLEY ZOO YANG and VIENGKHAM
    MOUALOR,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v                                                             No. 160578
    EVEREST NATIONAL INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
    BERNSTEIN, J.
    This case concerns whether MCL 500.3020(1)(b) of the Insurance Code, MCL
    500.100 et seq., allows an insurance company to cancel an insurance policy when the
    company mails its customer a letter purporting to be a notice of cancellation for
    nonpayment of insurance premiums before any nonpayment actually occurred. We hold
    that MCL 500.3020(1)(b) does not allow cancellation on these grounds. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Plaintiffs, Wesley Zoo Yang and Viengkham Moualor, are a married couple who
    purchased a six-month no-fault insurance policy from defendant Everest National
    Insurance Company (Everest). Yang was the primary insured party on the policy and was
    responsible for making the monthly premium payments. The policy went into effect on
    September 26, 2017, when he made the first premium payment. On October 9, 2017,
    approximately two weeks after Yang made the first payment, Everest mailed him a letter
    titled, “PREMIUM BILLING AND CANCELLATION NOTICE FOR NON-
    PAYMENT.” The letter informed Yang that his next insurance premium payment was due
    October 26, 2017, and that Everest would cancel the policy if he failed to pay by the due
    date. Everest maintains that this letter was sent in accordance with the termination
    provisions in the no-fault insurance policy, which stated:
    Cancellation - This Policy may be canceled during the policy period
    as follows:
    * * *
    2. We may cancel by mailing you at the address last known by us or
    our agent:
    a. at least 10 days notice by first class mail, if cancellation is for non-
    payment of premium[.] [Emphasis omitted.]
    2
    At the time the cancellation notice was mailed, Yang had made all required payments.
    However, Yang failed to make the subsequent payment due on October 26, 2017, and
    Everest terminated the policy for nonpayment of the premium on October 27, 2017.
    On October 30, 2017, Everest sent Yang a letter informing him that Everest would
    reinstate the policy with a lapse in coverage if he made a premium payment by
    November 27, 2017. At that time, Yang did not take any steps to reinstate the policy. On
    November 15, 2017, plaintiffs were struck by a car while walking down the street. Two
    days later, Yang made a payment to Everest to reinstate the policy. Plaintiffs then filed a
    claim for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits through Everest. Everest denied the
    claim, explaining that it was not responsible for PIP benefits because Yang did not have a
    valid no-fault insurance policy when the accident occurred.
    Following the denial of the claim for PIP benefits, plaintiffs sued Everest. 1 During
    litigation, Everest moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that
    the policy was lawfully canceled before plaintiffs were injured and that no genuine issue
    of material fact existed to show that Everest was responsible for servicing the claim for PIP
    benefits. In response, plaintiffs argued that a genuine issue of material fact did exist as to
    whether Yang’s payment to Everest on November 17, 2017, reinstated the policy. After
    hearing oral argument, the trial court denied Everest’s motion, concluding that the
    1
    Defendant Motorist Mutual Insurance Company (Motorist) was also named as a
    defendant in the trial court because the unnamed driver of the car that struck plaintiffs had
    a no-fault insurance policy through Motorist. All claims against Motorist were disposed
    of via summary disposition in the trial court. Although Motorist continues to participate
    in this appeal, the central issue in this case solely pertains to the cancellation notice Everest
    sent to Yang.
    3
    cancellation notice had not complied with the terms of the no-fault insurance policy and
    therefore the policy had never actually been canceled, rendering Everest first in priority for
    payment of PIP benefits to plaintiffs.
    Everest appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in a split published
    opinion. Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, 
    329 Mich App 461
    ; 942 NW2d 653 (2019). The
    Court of Appeals majority ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, holding that the cancellation notice
    Everest mailed to Yang did not satisfy MCL 500.3020(1)(b) and, moreover, that it did not
    satisfy the terms of plaintiffs’ no-fault policy. 
    Id. at 470-472
    . The majority explained that
    for a cancellation to be valid under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), “the event triggering the right to
    cancel must have taken place first.” 
    Id. at 470
    . Because Yang had not yet failed to pay his
    insurance premium when Everest mailed the cancellation notice for nonpayment of the
    premium, the majority ruled that the notice was invalid and did not satisfy MCL
    500.3020(1)(b). 
    Id.
     The concurrence provided a different rationale, concluding that the
    Court of Appeals could rule in plaintiffs’ favor without reaching the broader question of
    whether the cancellation notice failed to satisfy MCL 500.3020(1)(b). 
    Id. at 472-473
    (SWARTZLE, J., concurring). The concurrence explained that a cancellation notice must be
    unconditional to be effective. 
    Id.,
     citing American Fidelity Co v R L Ginsburg Sons’ Co,
    
    187 Mich 264
    , 276; 
    153 NW 709
     (1915). Thus, the concurrence reasoned, the cancellation
    notice Everest sent Yang was not an effective cancellation of the policy because it was
    conditioned on Yang’s failure to pay his insurance premiums. Yang, 329 Mich App at 472
    (SWARTZLE, J., concurring).
    4
    Everest timely sought leave to appeal in this Court. On May 20, 2020, we directed
    the Clerk to schedule oral argument on the application. Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, 
    505 Mich 1068
     (2020).
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The trial court denied Everest’s motion for summary disposition, which was brought
    under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for
    summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP
    v Detroit, 
    505 Mich 284
    , 294; 952 NW2d 358 (2020). When reviewing a motion brought
    under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
    admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties . . . in
    the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Mich Ass’n of Home Builders
    v Troy, 
    504 Mich 204
    , 211-212; 934 NW2d 713 (2019) (quotation marks and citations
    omitted). Summary disposition is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact
    exists. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 
    504 Mich 152
    , 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).
    “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which
    reasonable minds might differ.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    III. ANALYSIS
    Everest argues that MCL 500.3020(1)(b) did not preclude it from canceling Yang’s
    policy after mailing a letter—which it characterizes as a notice of cancellation for
    nonpayment of premium—before he failed to pay his insurance premiums. We disagree
    and hold that Everest’s letter was not a valid cancellation notice because it did not satisfy
    MCL 500.3020(1)(b).
    5
    When interpreting an insurance policy, “ ‘[t]he policy and the statutes relating
    thereto must be read and construed together as though the statutes were a part of the
    contract,’ ” because the parties are presumed to have contracted with the intention of
    executing a policy that complies with the related statutes. Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security
    Ins Co, 
    442 Mich 520
    , 525 n 3; 502 NW2d 310 (1993), quoting 12A Couch, Insurance, 2d
    (rev ed), § 45:694, pp 331-332. See also Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 
    502 Mich 390
    , 399; 919
    NW2d 20 (2018) (“When a provision in an insurance policy is mandated by a statute, the
    policy and the statute must be construed together as though the statute were part of the
    policy, and the rights and limitations of the coverage are governed by that statute.”)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the pertinent question here is what
    constitutes a valid cancellation notice under MCL 500.3020(1), which states:
    A policy of casualty insurance . . . , including all classes of motor
    vehicle coverage, shall not be issued or delivered in this state by an
    insurer . . . for which a premium or advance assessment is charged, unless
    the policy contains the following provisions:
    * * *
    (b) . . . [T]hat the policy may be canceled at any time by the insurer
    by mailing to the insured at the insured’s address last known to the insurer or
    an authorized agent of the insurer, with postage fully prepaid, a not less than
    10 days’ written notice of cancellation with or without tender of the excess
    of paid premium or assessment above the pro rata premium for the expired
    time. [Emphasis added.]
    Our analysis of this issue is governed by the general principles of statutory
    interpretation. When interpreting a statute, courts must “ascertain the legislative intent that
    may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” Andrie Inc v Dep’t
    of Treasury, 
    496 Mich 161
    , 167; 853 NW2d 310 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
    6
    omitted). Undefined words are generally “presumed to have their ordinary meaning,” but
    some words and phrases have a “peculiar and appropriate” meaning within the common
    law. Clam Lake Twp v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs, 
    500 Mich 362
    , 373; 902
    NW2d 293 (2017). If a word or phrase has acquired a peculiar or appropriate meaning in
    the law, it must be “construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate
    meaning.” MCL 8.3a.
    When a word “ ‘has been subject to judicial interpretation, the legislature is
    presumed to have used particular words in the sense in which they have been interpreted.’ ”
    McCormick v Carrier, 
    487 Mich 180
    , 192; 795 NW2d 517 (2010) (citation omitted). As
    we have previously explained:
    When the Legislature, without indicating an intent to abrogate the
    common law, borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
    tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and
    adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
    body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey
    to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. [Ray v Swager, 
    501 Mich 52
    , 69 n 34; 903 NW2d 366 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
    The outcome of this case depends on the meaning of the phrase “notice of
    cancellation,” which is not defined by the relevant statute. 2        The phrase “notice of
    cancellation” has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as reflected in
    two early rulings of this Court: American Fidelity Co, 187 Mich at 264, and Beaumont v
    Commercial Cas Ins Co, 
    245 Mich 104
    , 107; 
    222 NW 100
     (1928).
    2
    We have recognized that the term “cancellation” has itself acquired a peculiar and
    appropriate meaning in this context. See Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 
    491 Mich 547
    , 567; 817
    NW2d 562 (2012) (“In contract law, ‘cancellation’ has acquired a peculiar and appropriate
    meaning in the law.”). This case deals with a closely related issue, i.e., the legal sufficiency
    of a notice of cancellation.
    7
    In American Fidelity Co, 187 Mich at 266-267, the plaintiff insurance company sent
    a cancellation notice to the defendant insured stating that the plaintiff would cancel the
    defendant’s liability insurance policy if the defendant did not agree to an increased
    premium. When the defendant refused to agree to the rate increase, the plaintiff canceled
    the policy. Id. at 267. The trial court ruled that the cancellation notice was valid. Id.
    at 269. This Court disagreed, holding that a cancellation notice must “be according to the
    terms of the policy, and must also have been peremptory, explicit, and unconditional” in
    order to be valid. Id. at 276. Because cancellation of the liability policy was conditioned
    on the defendant’s refusal to accept the increased premium, this Court concluded that the
    cancellation notice was invalid. Id. at 276-277.
    In Beaumont, 
    245 Mich at 105
    , the plaintiff held a property insurance policy with
    the defendant insurance company. The plaintiff filed a large number of insurance claims
    with the defendant, and in an effort to avoid servicing the claims, the defendant sent the
    plaintiff a letter asking the plaintiff to “ ‘kindly endeavor to procure this insurance with
    some other company by November 1st, at which time we would like to be relieved.’ ” 
    Id. at 105-106
    . The defendant argued that the letter constituted a valid cancellation notice. 
    Id. at 106
    . On appeal, this Court reiterated the principle that “[n]otice of cancellation of an
    insurance policy must be according to the provisions of the policy and be peremptory,
    explicit, and unconditional.” 
    Id. at 106-107
    , citing American Fidelity Co, 
    187 Mich 264
    .
    This Court also stated that a cancellation notice “is not sufficient if it is equivocal or merely
    states a desire or intention to cancel.” Beaumont, 
    245 Mich at 107
    . Taking those principles
    into account, this Court concluded that the letter did not constitute a valid cancellation of
    the plaintiff’s property insurance policy because the letter never unequivocally stated that
    8
    the policy was canceled and instead merely informed the plaintiff that the defendant desired
    the plaintiff to find a different insurance company. 
    Id.
    MCL 500.3020(1)(b) was enacted well after our decisions in American Fidelity Co
    and Beaumont, and the peculiar and appropriate meaning of the phrase “notice of
    cancellation” has not been interpreted differently in the insurance context since American
    Fidelity Co was decided in 1915. See, e.g., Blekkenk v Allstate Ins Co, 
    152 Mich App 65
    ,
    72; 393 NW2d 883 (1986) (reiterating this Court’s holding in Beaumont, 
    245 Mich at
    106-
    107, that a notice of cancellation must be “ ‘peremptory, explicit, and unconditional’ ”). 3
    Moreover, there is no evidence that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common-law
    meaning of the phrase when it enacted MCL 500.3020(1)(b). “The common law remains
    in force unless it is modified.” People v Moreno, 
    491 Mich 38
    , 46; 814 NW2d 624 (2012).
    The Legislature’s abrogation of the common law “is not lightly presumed,” and we have
    required the Legislature to speak in “no uncertain terms” when it exercises its authority to
    modify the common law. 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, “[w]e must
    presume that the Legislature knows of the existence of the common law when it acts.” 
    Id.
    (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). We therefore presume that when the
    3
    We note that the phrase “notice of cancellation” has been similarly interpreted outside of
    Michigan. See Keys Engineering Co v Boston Ins Co, 192 F Supp 574, 577 (SD Fla, 1961)
    (“In order to be effective, a notice of cancellation of a policy of insurance must be
    unequivocal and absolute.”); Transamerica Ins Co v Bank of Mantee, 241 So 2d 822, 825
    (Miss, 1970) (“Cancellation of an insurance policy must be definite, clear and
    unequivocal.”); Stilen v Cavalier Ins Corp, 194 Neb 824, 828; 236 NW2d 178 (1975) (“[A]
    notice of cancellation of insurance for nonpayment of premium or a premium installment
    must be peremptorily explicit . . . .”); McQuarrie v Waseca Mut Ins Co, 337 NW2d 685,
    687 (Minn, 1983) (“In order to constitute notice of cancellation, the notice must be explicit,
    unconditional, and use unequivocal language.”).
    9
    Legislature enacted MCL 500.3020(1)(b), it did so knowing that the phrase “notice of
    cancellation” has a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the common law and that it
    intended for that meaning to be applied to the statute. See Ray, 501 Mich at 69 n 34;
    McCormick, 487 Mich at 192. 4            Accordingly, we interpret the phrase “notice of
    cancellation,” as used in MCL 500.3020(1)(b), to require cancellation notices to be
    peremptory, explicit, and unconditional. See Beaumont, 
    245 Mich at 106-107
    ; American
    Fidelity Co, 187 Mich at 276. 5
    With this understanding in mind, we hold that the cancellation notice Everest sent
    to Yang violated MCL 500.3020(1)(b). The cancellation notice specifically included the
    condition that Yang’s no-fault insurance policy would be canceled if he failed to pay his
    insurance premiums on time. Given that a cancellation notice must be unconditional to be
    effective, the letter that Everest sent Yang did not constitute a valid cancellation notice
    under MCL 500.3020(1)(b). Therefore, because Everest did not comply with MCL
    4
    We do not believe that the interpretation set forth in American Fidelity and Beaumont
    conflicts with the plain language of MCL 500.3020(1)(b). Although the statute provides
    that the policy may be canceled “at any time,” MCL 500.3020(1)(b), this does not conflict
    with the common-law rule that notice of such cancellation must be “peremptory, explicit,
    and unconditional.” See Beaumont, 
    245 Mich at 106-107
    ; American Fidelity Co, 187 Mich
    at 276. In other words, the policy may be canceled “at any time,” as long as the notice of
    cancellation is unconditional.
    5
    This interpretation is also consistent with the objective of MCL 500.3020(1)(b):
    The obvious objective of [MCL 500.3020] is to make certain that all of those
    who are insured under a policy are afforded a period of time, ten days, either
    to satisfy whatever concerns have prompted cancellation and thus revive the
    policy or to obtain other insurance, or simply to order their affairs so that the
    risks of operating without insurance will not have to be run. [Lease Car of
    America, Inc v Rahn, 
    419 Mich 48
    , 54; 347 NW2d 444 (1984).]
    10
    500.3020(1)(b), Yang’s insurance policy was still in effect at the time of the accident. See
    Nowell v Titan Ins Co, 
    466 Mich 478
    , 482-483; 648 NW2d 157 (2002) (describing that
    notice must be given in accordance with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) for a cancellation of an
    insurance policy to be effective). 6
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We hold that under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), a cancellation notice is effective only if
    it is peremptory, explicit, and unconditional. In this case, because Everest’s letter provided
    that cancellation was conditioned on Yang’s failure to pay his insurance premiums, the
    letter was ineffective as a notice of cancellation. We affirm the judgment of the Court of
    Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Bridget M. McCormack
    Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    6
    On appeal, Everest presents the alternate argument that the October 30, 2017 letter
    offering to reinstate the insurance policy was an effective notice of cancellation. We
    disagree. While that letter described an unconditional cancellation, stating that the
    “insurance has been cancelled,” that notice did not comply with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) or
    our holding in Nowell. MCL 500.3020(1)(b) requires that the insurer send a “not less than
    10 days’ written notice of cancellation . . . .” We concluded in Nowell that “the mailing
    must be reasonably calculated to be delivered so as to arrive at the insured’s address at least
    ten days before the date specified for cancellation for the notice to be effective.” Nowell,
    
    466 Mich at 484
    . In this case, the October 30 letter did not give that 10-day period; instead,
    it declared that the policy had already been cancelled and that the cancellation was already
    effective. It was insufficient to serve as a notice of cancellation under MCL
    500.3020(1)(b).
    11