State v. McCarthy ( 2022 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LAMAR MCCARTHY
    (AC 43785)
    Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Vertefeuille, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted of three counts of kidnapping in the second degree and one count
    each of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree and larceny
    in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant
    drove R, an individual who sought to purchase heroin from him and
    who owed him money, to a bank. Unbeknownst to the defendant, who
    had remained in his vehicle during the incident, R robbed the bank.
    Although the defendant was unaware of R’s wrongdoing, as he drove
    away from the scene, he noticed a police cruiser following him and
    began to drive very erratically and at high speeds. After his motor vehicle
    became disabled, the defendant stopped in front of a gas station. The
    defendant and R exited the vehicle, ran toward a Jeep that was parked
    at a gas pump, and demanded that W, the driver of the Jeep, get out of
    the vehicle. When W responded that his family was inside, the defendant
    ran to the passenger side of the vehicle, climbed over M, W’s wife, and
    got into the driver’s seat. R attempted to enter the backseat of the Jeep
    but was unsuccessful, as M and W’s grandchildren were strapped into
    booster seats in the backseat. The defendant promptly exited the gas
    station at a high rate of speed with M and her grandchildren still inside
    the vehicle. The defendant took M’s cell phone from her and entered
    the highway, continuing to drive erratically and at a high rate of speed.
    Approximately ten minutes after gaining control of the Jeep, the defen-
    dant pulled over to the side of the highway to let M and her grandchildren
    exit the vehicle. The defendant then immediately drove away, without
    returning M’s cell phone, and M had to flag down a passerby for assis-
    tance. The defendant was not charged with any crimes relating to the
    robbery of the bank, rather, the charges against him stemmed solely
    from his taking of the Jeep. Held:
    1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a
    new trial on the kidnapping charges because the trial court improperly
    failed to provide an incidental restraint instruction to the jury in accor-
    dance with State v. Salamon (
    287 Conn. 509
    ), the state having persuaded
    this court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless: the
    trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the
    offense was a constitutional error, requiring the state to prove that
    the failure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; moreover, when
    evaluated in accordance with the relevant factors set forth in Salamon,
    there was no reasonable possibility that a properly instructed jury would
    have reached a different result concerning whether the defendant’s
    restraint of M and her grandchildren was incidental to or necessary
    for him to complete the larceny, as, even though the defendant took
    possession of the Jeep at approximately the same time that he first
    restrained the victims and he restrained them only for approximately
    ten minutes, the defendant could have completed the larceny and
    released the victims earlier, he transported the victims to multiple loca-
    tions while they were confined to the Jeep, the fact that the defendant
    was more likely to be apprehended by the police at the gas station if
    he permitted the victims to immediately exit the Jeep did not compel
    a conclusion that the victims’ restraint was incidental to or necessary
    for the commission of the larceny, the defendant’s restraint of the victims
    in a fast-moving vehicle while withholding M’s cell phone from her,
    prevented the victims from summoning assistance or alerting the police
    to his location, the defendant’s risk of detection was reduced and he
    was able to flee the gas station unhindered because he did not stop to
    free the victims at or near the scene of the larceny, and the restraint
    increased the victims’ risk of harm independent of that posed by the
    larceny because the defendant confined them to a moving car that he
    was operating in an erratic manner and at high speeds and then left
    them on the side of the highway, he refused to return M’s cell phone
    before he drove away, and he inspired fear in his victims.
    2. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, there was sufficient evidence from
    which the jury reasonably could have found the defendant guilty beyond
    a reasonable doubt of each of the three counts of kidnapping in the
    second degree: because, with respect to the defendant’s first claim, this
    court concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that a properly
    instructed jury would find that the defendant’s restraint was incidental
    to or necessary for his completion of the larceny, it necessarily followed
    that a reasonable view of the evidence supported the jury’s finding that
    the defendant intended to prevent the victims’ liberation beyond that
    which was incidental to or necessary to complete the larceny and,
    consequently, supported the jury’s verdict; moreover, the evidence
    admitted at trial, including testimony regarding the defendant’s erratic
    driving at high speeds and M’s concern for her safety and for that
    of her grandchildren, and the reasonable inferences that the jury was
    permitted to draw therefrom, were more than sufficient to establish
    that the defendant used or threatened to use force or intimidation to
    restrain the victims from exiting the vehicle before he began driving
    and while the vehicle was in motion.
    3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused
    its discretion and violated his constitutional right to due process when
    it denied his requests to have his leg shackles removed during trial:
    although the defendant expressed concern at trial that one of the jurors
    may have seen his leg shackles, the trial court had instructed a judicial
    marshal to sit in various chairs in the jury box to confirm that the
    defendant’s leg shackles were not visible to the jury and the record
    revealed no evidence to suggest that the jurors actually saw or otherwise
    knew of the defendant’s leg shackles; accordingly, the defendant failed
    to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the jurors actually saw or
    otherwise was aware of his restraints and, therefore, failed to establish
    that the trial court’s denial of his requests to remove his restraints
    deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
    Argued September 15, 2021—officially released January 18, 2022
    Procedural History
    Substitute information charging the defendant with
    three counts of the crime of kidnapping in the second
    degree and with one count each of the crimes of robbery
    in the second degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in
    the second degree, and larceny in the second degree,
    brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
    New Britain, geographical area number seventeen, and
    tried to the jury before D’Addabbo, J.; verdict and judg-
    ment of guilty of three counts of kidnapping in the
    second degree and one count each of conspiracy to
    commit robbery in the second degree and larceny in
    the second degree, from which the defendant appealed
    to this court. Affirmed.
    Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the
    appellant (defendant).
    Jonathan M. Sousa, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Brian W. Preleski, state’s
    attorney, and Christian Watson, supervisory assistant
    state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Lamar McCarthy,
    appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered fol-
    lowing a jury trial, of one count of conspiracy to commit
    robbery in the second degree in violation of General
    Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-135 (a) (1) (A), one count
    of larceny in the second degree in violation of General
    Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (1), and three counts of kidnap-
    ping in the second degree in violation of General Stat-
    utes § 53a-94. The defendant claims that (1) the trial
    court improperly failed to instruct the jury in accor-
    dance with State v. Salamon, 
    287 Conn. 509
    , 550, 
    949 A.2d 1092
     (2008); (2) there was insufficient evidence
    to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended
    to prevent the liberation of the victims beyond that
    which was incidental and necessary to commit the lar-
    ceny and that he used or threatened to use physical
    force or intimidation to restrain the victims; and (3)
    the court violated his constitutional right to due process
    by denying his requests to remove his leg shackles. We
    affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
    have found, and procedural history are relevant to this
    appeal. On June 18, 2017, the defendant received a
    phone call from Norman Renaldi, who sought to pur-
    chase heroin from the defendant and asked him for a
    ride from Newington to Hartford. Renaldi previously
    had purchased heroin from the defendant on several
    occasions. The defendant picked up Renaldi in a red
    Honda minivan and told Renaldi that he owed the defen-
    dant money. Renaldi instructed the defendant to drive
    to the Stop & Shop at 505 North Main Street in South-
    ington, inside of which was a People’s United Bank
    branch (bank). During the drive and unbeknownst to
    the defendant, Renaldi wrote a note on the back of a
    coupon, which stated, ‘‘EMPTY BOTH CASH DRAW-
    ERS QUICKLY + QUI[E]TLY AND NO-ONE GETS
    HURT!!’’
    After the defendant and Renaldi arrived at Stop &
    Shop, the defendant remained in the minivan while
    Renaldi went inside. Renaldi approached the bank and
    handed the note to one of the bank tellers. He kept one
    of his hands in the pocket of his sweatshirt, suggesting
    to the teller that he had a weapon. The teller retrieved
    and handed to Renaldi a large quantity of cash, which
    Renaldi placed, along with the note, into a slit that he
    had cut into the lining of his sweatshirt. Renaldi then
    exited the Stop & Shop, got back into the minivan, and
    told the defendant that they could leave. He did not tell
    the defendant that he had robbed the bank. Meanwhile,
    one of the bank tellers activated an alarm, which alerted
    the police that a robbery had occurred at the bank.
    At approximately 1:15 p.m., on duty police officers
    received a dispatch that a white male had entered the
    bank, demanded cash, implied that he possessed a
    weapon, and then fled the scene in a red minivan. When
    the dispatch was received, the defendant was driving
    the minivan northbound on Route 10 in Southington.
    Southington Police Officer Jeremey Busa, who was on
    patrol, observed a red minivan that matched the
    description from the dispatch driving on Route 10.
    When the minivan stopped at a red traffic light, Busa
    pulled behind it in his police cruiser. The defendant
    noticed Busa’s cruiser and became nervous. The defen-
    dant attempted to maneuver the minivan around a vehi-
    cle that was stopped in front of it at the stoplight but
    proceeded to hit the vehicle. The defendant then exe-
    cuted a U-turn and accelerated southbound down Route
    10, at which point Busa activated the lights and siren
    of his cruiser. The defendant drove at a high rate of
    speed, striking the curb on the side of the road, weaving
    in and out of traffic, crossing into incoming traffic,
    failing to stop at red lights, and driving across the drive-
    ways and lawns that abutted Route 10. Southington
    Police Officer Neal Ayotte, who was also on patrol,
    responded to the bank robbery dispatch, activated his
    body camera, and joined in the pursuit of the minivan
    in his police cruiser. As he approached the minivan
    on Route 10, Ayotte observed the driver operating the
    minivan erratically, and, at some point, Ayotte had to
    pull his cruiser into the front yard of a nearby residence
    to avoid being hit by the minivan.
    Eventually, the tires on the passenger side of the
    minivan became flat, began to squeal, and emanated
    sparks and smoke. The defendant told Renaldi that the
    minivan belonged to his wife and that they needed to
    obtain another vehicle. Accordingly, the defendant
    stopped in front of a Shell gas station located at 212
    Main Street in Southington (gas station) and parked the
    minivan so that it straddled the curb and the sidewalk in
    front of the gas station. Several police officers, including
    Busa and Ayotte, simultaneously arrived at the gas sta-
    tion. The defendant and Renaldi exited the minivan and
    ran toward a white Jeep Cherokee that was parked at
    a gas pump in front of the gas station.
    The driver of the Jeep, W, had just finished pumping
    gas and had begun to get back into his Jeep when the
    defendant and Renaldi approached him. W’s wife, M,
    was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle,
    and their grandchildren, L and O, were sitting in booster
    seats in the backseat. Renaldi grabbed W and instructed
    him to get out of the Jeep, to which W responded that
    his family was inside of the vehicle. The defendant ran
    to the passenger side of the vehicle, climbed over M,
    and got into the driver’s seat. Renaldi unsuccessfully
    attempted to enter the backseat of the Jeep through
    the passenger side door. Once the defendant was in the
    driver’s seat, he promptly exited the gas station in the
    Jeep at a high rate of speed with M, L, and O still inside.
    Police officers chased Renaldi, who had exited the
    parking lot of the gas station on foot and had run onto
    Route 10. The officers ordered Renaldi to stop running
    and to get on the ground. Eventually, the officers appre-
    hended Renaldi and recovered his sweatshirt, the stolen
    cash, which totaled more than $12,000, and the note.
    Later, Renaldi identified the driver of the Jeep as the
    defendant.1
    While at the gas station, Busa observed that the mini-
    van, which was still running, had sustained damage to
    its front bumper and quarter panel, its rear rim, and its
    passenger side tires. Busa recovered a wallet on the
    driver’s seat of the minivan. The defendant’s license
    and several other cards with his name on them were
    located inside of the wallet. Various documents
    addressed to the defendant, including a letter, a receipt,
    and an invoice, were also recovered from the minivan.
    After exiting the gas station, the defendant drove the
    Jeep southbound on Route 10 at a high rate of speed.
    M had to hold onto the dashboard, the handle above
    the passenger side door, and the inside of the door
    while he was driving. The defendant asked M about the
    location of the nearest highway and whether she had
    a cell phone. M directed the defendant to the entrance
    of Interstate 84 and, although she initially lied and
    responded that she did not have a cell phone, eventually
    gave her cell phone to the defendant for fear that the
    phone may ring. Throughout the course of the drive,
    M tried to calm her grandchildren, one of whom was
    crying, while acknowledging that she ‘‘couldn’t believe’’
    what was happening. She also told the defendant that
    she ‘‘didn’t know’’ or ‘‘care’’ what he had done, but she
    ‘‘just wanted [her grandchildren] to be safe . . . .’’ The
    defendant told M that he ‘‘wasn’t going to hurt’’ her and
    the grandchildren.
    The defendant entered Interstate 84 westbound and
    drove on the highway. Eventually, the defendant pulled
    the Jeep to the side of the highway and instructed M to
    quickly exit the vehicle. Although the defendant pulled
    over on the side of the highway near an exit, he did
    not exit the highway to release M, L, or O. M exited
    the Jeep, removed her grandchildren from their booster
    seats, and shut the door. The defendant immediately
    drove away without returning M’s cell phone to her.
    M attempted to calm her grandchildren and, shortly
    thereafter, flagged down a passerby and borrowed his
    cell phone to call her son. The police subsequently
    arrived to where the defendant had left them. In total,
    approximately ten minutes passed between when the
    defendant gained control of the Jeep at the gas station
    and when the defendant allowed the victims to exit the
    vehicle.
    On September 25, 2017, the defendant was arrested
    pursuant to a warrant. Prior to trial, the state filed a
    corrected substitute information dated September 12,
    2019, charging the defendant with one count of robbery
    in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1)
    (A), one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the
    second degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-135 (a)
    (1) (A), one count of larceny in the second degree in
    violation of § 53a-123 (a) (1), and three counts of kid-
    napping in the second degree in violation of § 53a-94.
    Following a jury trial, the defendant was found not
    guilty of robbery in the second degree but was found
    guilty of all other counts.2 The defendant was sentenced
    to a total effective term of twenty-five years of imprison-
    ment. This appeal followed. Additional facts and proce-
    dural history will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant first claims that he is entitled to a
    new trial on the kidnapping charges because the court
    improperly failed to provide to the jury an incidental
    restraint instruction in accordance with State v. Sala-
    mon, 
    supra,
     
    287 Conn. 550
    , which would have ensured
    that the defendant could be convicted of kidnapping
    only if the restraint that formed the basis of the kidnap-
    ping charges held criminal significance separate and
    apart from that incidental to or necessary for the com-
    pletion of the larceny. See White v. Commissioner of
    Correction, 
    170 Conn. App. 415
    , 423–24, 
    154 A.3d 1054
    (2017). The state concedes that the court improperly
    declined to provide a Salamon instruction in the present
    case. The state contends, however, that the court’s fail-
    ure to give a Salamon instruction was harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt because no reasonable juror could
    have concluded that the defendant did not intend to
    prevent the victims’ liberation for a longer period of
    time or to a greater degree than that which was inciden-
    tal to or necessary to commit the underlying larceny.
    Stated differently, the state argues that the court’s fail-
    ure to provide to the jury an incidental restraint instruc-
    tion did not affect the verdict. Because we conclude
    that the state has persuaded us beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the court’s failure to provide a Salamon
    instruction was harmless, we reject the defendant’s
    claim.
    The following additional procedural history is rele-
    vant to our resolution of this claim. Throughout the
    duration of the trial, the court and the parties discussed
    in chambers whether the court should provide to the
    jury an incidental restraint instruction in accordance
    with Salamon. The court held a charge conference on
    September 26, 2019, following the close of evidence
    and outside of the presence of the jury, in accordance
    with Practice Book § 42-19. During the charge confer-
    ence, the defendant requested an incidental restraint
    instruction. The court informed the parties that,
    although it preliminarily was inclined not to include
    such an instruction, it would rule on the defendant’s
    request the following day.
    On September 27, 2019, the court denied the defen-
    dant’s request, stating in its oral ruling that the defen-
    dant’s restraint of the victims was not incidental to
    the larceny or the robbery and that it believed that a
    defendant is entitled to a Salamon instruction only if
    a defendant was charged with kidnapping and another
    substantive crime arising out of an assault, such as a
    sexual assault. The court charged the jury later that day
    and did not provide to the jury a Salamon instruction.
    Following the jury charge and outside of the presence
    of the jury, the defendant noted on the record his objec-
    tion to the court’s failure to provide a Salamon instruc-
    tion.
    We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
    review and the relevant principles of law. ‘‘The applica-
    bility of Salamon and whether the trial court’s failure
    to give a Salamon instruction was harmless error are
    issues of law over which our review is plenary.’’ Farmer
    v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    165 Conn. App. 455
    ,
    459, 
    139 A.3d 767
    , cert. denied, 
    323 Conn. 905
    , 
    150 A.3d 685
     (2016). Further, ‘‘the question of whether conduct
    bears . . . criminal significance as kidnapping [inde-
    pendent from the completion of another substantive
    offense] is one of law. It is, of course, the function of
    the jury to find the relevant facts, including, ultimately,
    whether a crime was committed with the intent neces-
    sary to qualify as kidnapping, namely, the specific intent
    to prevent the victim’s liberation and not simply to
    perpetrate the underlying crime. . . . At the same time,
    it is beyond cavil that it is the role of the judiciary to
    interpret the relevant statutes and to define, as a matter
    of law, what type of conduct constitutes kidnapping
    according to those statutes. . . . As [our Supreme
    Court] explained in Salamon, a necessary corollary is
    that it falls to the courts to define the intent element
    of the crime of kidnapping . . . to delineate the ways
    in which kidnapping differs from coterminous crimes
    such as robbery and sexual assault . . . and to specify
    the factors that are relevant to that analysis . . . in
    light of our understanding of the legislative history of
    the kidnapping statutes and the policy objectives that
    animated their modern revision.’’ (Citations omitted.)
    Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    339 Conn. 1
    , 34,
    
    259 A.3d 1082
     (2021).
    In Salamon, our Supreme Court ‘‘reconsidered [its]
    long-standing interpretation of our kidnapping statutes,
    General Statutes §§ 53a-91 through 53a-94a. . . . [T]he
    defendant [in Salamon] had assaulted the victim at a
    train station late at night . . . and ultimately was
    charged with kidnapping in the second degree in viola-
    tion of . . . § 53a-94, unlawful restraint in the first
    degree, and risk of injury to a child. . . . At trial, [the
    defendant] requested a jury instruction that, if the jury
    found that the restraint had been incidental to the
    assault, then the jury must [find him not guilty] of the
    charge of kidnapping. . . . [Consistent with estab-
    lished precedent of our Supreme Court] [t]he trial court
    declined to give that instruction [and the defendant
    was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree in
    addition to the two other crimes]. . . .
    ‘‘[The Supreme Court] . . . ultimately concluded
    that [o]ur legislature . . . intended to exclude from the
    scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its
    accompanying severe penalties those confinements or
    movements of a victim that are merely incidental to
    [or] necessary for the commission of another crime
    against that victim.3 Stated otherwise, to commit a kid-
    napping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant
    must intend to prevent the victim’s liberation for a
    longer period of time or to a greater degree than that
    which is necessary to commit the other crime’’; (foot-
    note added; internal quotation marks omitted) id.,
    11–12; or than that which was ‘‘merely incidental to
    that underlying crime.’’ Id., 4.
    Our Supreme Court thus explained in Salamon that
    ‘‘a defendant may be convicted of both kidnapping and
    another substantive crime if, at any time prior to, during,
    or after the commission of that other crime, the victim
    is moved or confined in a way that had independent
    criminal significance, that is, the victim was restrained
    to an extent exceeding that which was [incidental to or]
    necessary to accomplish or complete the other crime.
    Whether the movement or confinement of the victim
    is merely incidental to [or] necessary for another crime
    will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of
    each case. Consequently, when the evidence reasonably
    supports a finding that the restraint was not merely
    incidental to the commission of some other, separate
    crime, the ultimate factual determination must be made
    by the jury. For purposes of making that determination,
    the jury should be instructed to consider . . . various
    relevant factors . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. Hampton, 
    293 Conn. 435
    , 460, 
    988 A.2d 167
    (2009); see also State v. Salamon, 
    supra,
     
    287 Conn. 542
    .
    Since its decision in Salamon, our Supreme Court
    has reiterated that, ‘‘when a criminal defendant is
    charged with kidnapping in conjunction with another
    underlying crime . . . the jury must be’’ provided a
    Salamon instruction. Banks v. Commissioner of Cor-
    rection, supra, 
    339 Conn. 4
    ; see also State v. Fields, 
    302 Conn. 236
    , 247–48, 
    24 A.3d 1243
     (2011). ‘‘The failure to
    charge in accordance with Salamon is viewed as an
    omission of an essential element . . . and thus gives
    rise to constitutional error’’; (internal quotation marks
    omitted) White v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
    
    170 Conn. App. 428
    ; that is subject to harmless error
    analysis. Banks v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 29–30.
    In the present case, the defendant was charged with
    kidnapping in conjunction with larceny arising from his
    taking the Jeep with M, L, and O inside. Accordingly,
    the court was required, as the state concedes, to instruct
    the jury in accordance with Salamon and its progeny.
    See id., 4; State v. Fields, 
    supra,
     
    302 Conn. 247
    . No such
    instruction, however, was given. Because the court’s
    failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of
    the offense is constitutional error, the burden shifts
    to the state to demonstrate that the court’s failure to
    instruct the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt. See Banks v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 
    339 Conn. 15
    ; see also Hinds v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    321 Conn. 56
    , 78, 
    136 A.3d 596
     (2016)
    (‘‘this standard imposes the burden of persuasion exclu-
    sively on the state’’).
    ‘‘Under Neder [v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 15, 
    119 S. Ct. 1827
    , 
    144 L. Ed. 2d 35
     (1999)]4 . . . the state
    must demonstrate that a trial error [of constitutional
    magnitude] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
    (Citation omitted; footnote added.) Banks v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 15
    ; see also
    Neder v. United States, 
    supra, 15
     (articulating test ‘‘for
    determining whether a constitutional error is harm-
    less’’ (emphasis added)). ‘‘[T]he test for determining
    whether a constitutional [error] is harmless . . . is
    whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    [error] complained of did not contribute to the verdict
    obtained.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Hampton, 
    supra,
     
    293 Conn. 463
    . Put differently, we
    evaluate ‘‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that
    a properly instructed jury would reach a different
    result.’’ State v. Flores, 
    301 Conn. 77
    , 87, 
    17 A.3d 1025
     (2011).
    In the present case, the jury, properly instructed,
    would have been tasked with determining whether the
    defendant’s restraint of the victims was incidental to
    or necessary for his completion of the larceny. See
    State v. Hampton, 
    supra,
     
    293 Conn. 460
    . To make this
    determination, the jury should have been instructed to
    consider a series of factors laid out by our Supreme
    Court in Salamon, namely, ‘‘(1) the nature and duration
    of the victim’s movement or confinement, (2) whether
    that movement or confinement occurred during the
    commission of the separate offense, (3) whether the
    restraint was inherent in the nature of the separate
    offense, (4) whether the restraint prevented the victim
    from summoning assistance, (5) whether the restraint
    reduced the perpetrator’s risk of detection, and (6)
    whether the restraint created a significant danger or
    increased the victim’s risk of harm independent of that
    posed by the separate offense.’’ Banks v. Commissioner
    of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 42
    ; see also State v.
    Salamon, 
    supra,
     
    287 Conn. 548
    .
    On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude
    that the court’s failure to provide an incidental restraint
    instruction was harmless because the state has per-
    suaded us that there is no reasonable possibility that
    the jury, properly instructed, would have reached a
    different result concerning whether the defendant’s
    restraint of the victims was incidental to or necessary
    to complete the larceny. In so concluding, we consider
    the various relevant factors set forth in Salamon;5 see
    White v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 429
    ; and acknowledge that, ‘‘[a]lthough the relative
    importance of the various factors will vary depending
    on the context, [our Supreme Court] ha[s] made clear
    that the touchstone in any Salamon case, in assessing
    whether conduct associated with [another substantive
    offense] has independent criminal significance as a kid-
    napping, is the intent of the offender.’’ Banks v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 43
    .
    With regard to the first relevant factor, the nature
    and duration of the victims’ movement or confinement,
    the state argues that the nature of the defendant’s con-
    finement of the victims in a moving vehicle and the
    distance the defendant moved the victims indicates that
    the restraint was neither incidental to nor necessary for
    his completion of the larceny. The defendant disagrees,
    arguing that this factor weighs in his favor because the
    larceny and the alleged kidnappings commenced at the
    same time, the defendant did not harm or threaten to
    harm the victims while he drove them, and the victims
    were in the vehicle for no more than ten minutes.
    ‘‘[T]here are no minimum time or distance require-
    ments to establish a restraint’’ within the context of
    kidnapping. State v. Winot, 
    294 Conn. 753
    , 767, 
    988 A.2d 188
     (2010). Nonetheless, our Supreme Court, in Hinds,
    ‘‘attempted to categorize various Salamon incidental
    restraint cases with differing degrees of confinement
    or movement’’; White v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 430
    ; and noted that ‘‘an important
    facet of cases where the trial court has failed to give
    a Salamon instruction and that impropriety on appellate
    review has been deemed harmless error is that longer
    periods of restraint or greater degrees of movement
    demarcate separate offenses. . . . [M]ultiple offenses
    [like kidnapping and another substantive crime] are
    more readily distinguishable—and, consequently, more
    likely to render the absence of a Salamon instruction
    harmless—when the offenses are separated by greater
    time spans, or by more movement or restriction of
    movement.
    ‘‘Conversely, multiple offenses occurring in a much
    shorter or more compressed time span make the same
    determination more difficult and, therefore, more likely
    to necessitate submission to a jury for it to make its
    factual determinations regarding whether the restraint
    is merely incidental to another, separate crime.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinds
    v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    321 Conn. 92
    –93.
    For the purpose of evaluating harm in light of this factor,
    our Supreme Court in Hinds distinguished cases in
    which a defendant restrained the victims for a longer
    period of time and confined or moved the victims to a
    greater degree; State v. Hampton, 
    supra,
     
    293 Conn. 456
    ,
    463–64 (defendant confined victim for approximately
    three hours before committing substantive crime); State
    v. Jordan, 
    129 Conn. App. 215
    , 222–23, 
    19 A.3d 241
    (defendant committed substantive crime during forty-
    five minute period and employed restraint significantly
    greater than necessary to commit substantive crime),
    cert. denied, 
    302 Conn. 910
    , 
    23 A.3d 1248
     (2011); State
    v. Strong, 
    122 Conn. App. 131
    , 143, 
    999 A.2d 765
     (defen-
    dant restrained victim for more than one hour in multi-
    ple locations after making threats), cert. denied, 
    298 Conn. 907
    , 
    3 A.3d 73
     (2010); State v. Nelson, 
    118 Conn. App. 831
    , 860–62, 
    986 A.2d 311
     (defendant assaulted
    victim, then confined victim for several hours in several
    locations), cert. denied, 
    295 Conn. 911
    , 
    989 A.2d 1074
    (2010); from cases in which a defendant restrained the
    victims for a shorter period of time and subjected the
    victims to limited confinement or movement, as in State
    v. Flores, 
    supra,
     
    301 Conn. 81
    –82, 89 (defendant’s rob-
    bery and confinement of victim lasted between five
    and twenty minutes and remained limited to singular
    location), and State v. Thompson, 
    118 Conn. App. 140
    ,
    144, 162, 
    983 A.2d 20
     (2009) (defendant confined victim
    and committed other substantive crime within fifteen
    to twenty minute span and subjected victim to limited
    movement), cert. denied, 
    294 Conn. 932
    , 
    986 A.2d 1057
    (2010). See Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 92–93. The Supreme Court concluded that,
    ‘‘where kidnapping and multiple offenses occur closer
    in time to one another, it becomes more difficult to
    distinguish the confinement or restraint associated with
    the kidnapping from another substantive crime.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 93.
    As we have noted, approximately ten minutes passed
    between when the defendant gained control of the Jeep
    at the gas station and when the defendant allowed the
    victims to exit the vehicle, indicating that the victims
    were restrained for ten minutes. Although, on its face,
    a ten minute period of confinement appears to fall
    within the latter line of cases recognized by our
    Supreme Court, rather than the former; see id., 91–93;
    we note that, for the commission of the larceny, the
    defendant only needed to, ‘‘with intent to deprive
    another of property . . . wrongfully [take], [obtain] or
    [withhold] [the Jeep] from [its] owner. . . .’’ General
    Statutes § 53a-119; see also General Statutes § 53a-123
    (a) (1). The larceny statute under which the defendant
    was convicted did not require that he continuously oper-
    ate the vehicle for some specified amount of time after
    taking it; the defendant could have stopped the vehicle
    one block or two blocks away from the gas station to
    release the victims without frustrating his commission
    of the larceny.6 The degree to which the defendant
    moved the restrained victims; see Hinds v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, supra, 
    321 Conn. 92
    ; further sup-
    ports the state’s position. Although, as the defendant
    contends, the kidnappings and the larceny commenced
    at the same time, and, by implication, at the same loca-
    tion, he transported the victims on Route 10 in South-
    ington, onto an interstate highway, and on the highway
    some distance. Put differently, the defendant moved
    the victims to multiple locations while they were con-
    fined to the vehicle. Thus, we conclude that the first
    factor weighs in favor of the state.
    We next address the second relevant Salamon factor,
    that is, whether the movement or confinement occurred
    during the commission of the separate offense. The
    state argues that this factor weighs in its favor because
    the defendant completed the larceny before he confined
    and moved the victims, which the state asserts substan-
    tiated the kidnapping charges. The state specifically
    argues that, once the defendant took possession of the
    Jeep with the intent to deprive the true owner of it
    permanently, he successfully satisfied each element of
    larceny. See State v. Hayward, 
    169 Conn. App. 764
    ,
    772–73, 
    153 A.3d 1
     (2016), cert. denied, 
    324 Conn. 916
    ,
    
    154 A.3d 527
     (2017). Accordingly, it is the state’s posi-
    tion that any additional action the defendant took, spe-
    cifically, confining and moving the victims for the ten
    minutes that followed his gaining control of the Jeep
    at the gas station, was not necessary to accomplish the
    already completed offense of larceny. The defendant
    contends that he restrained the victims while commit-
    ting the larceny because he took control of the Jeep
    while the victims were already inside and fled the scene
    with the victims in the vehicle.
    Our Supreme Court’s analyses in Banks and Bell v.
    Commissioner of Correction, 
    339 Conn. 79
    , 
    259 A.3d 1073
     (2021), guide our analysis in the present case. In
    Banks, the petitioner was convicted of multiple counts
    of kidnapping in connection with the robberies of two
    retail stores. Banks v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 
    339 Conn. 5
    , 10. During both robberies, the peti-
    tioner took money from the stores’ cash registers while
    brandishing a gun, then subsequently moved and con-
    fined the store employees in the stores’ bathrooms
    before he fled the scenes. 
    Id.,
     5–9. At the defendant’s
    criminal trial, the court failed to provide a Salamon
    instruction to the jury, and, on review,7 the habeas court
    concluded that the instructional error was harmless
    because the conduct that gave rise to the kidnapping
    convictions occurred after the petitioner had completed
    the robberies. Id., 13.
    Our Supreme Court, evaluating whether the trial
    court’s failure to provide an incidental restraint instruc-
    tion constituted harmless error under Brecht v. Abra-
    hamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 623, 
    113 S. Ct. 1710
    , 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 353
     (1993), analyzed whether the restraint occurred
    during the commission of the robberies. Banks v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 34
    , 39–40,
    42–43. Our Supreme Court noted that the case before
    it presented ‘‘a distinct and novel scenario—asportation
    and confinement to facilitate a perpetrator’s escape
    following the completion of a robbery’’; id., 35; and
    characterized the case as ‘‘categorically distinct from
    . . . [its] prior Salamon cases insofar as the petitioner
    indisputably had accomplished the criminal objective
    of his underlying crimes prior to the commencement
    of the alleged kidnapping.’’ Id., 39. Accordingly, our
    Supreme Court concluded, the robbery had been com-
    pleted once the petitioner took the cash, not after he
    fled the scene. See id.
    Our Supreme Court further determined: ‘‘Under such
    circumstances, there simply is no concern that the
    intent of the legislature will be frustrated by prosecuting
    a defendant for kidnapping solely on the basis of the
    restraint inherent in or necessary to accomplish the
    underlying crime. Many if not most robbers choose to
    leave the scene immediately upon obtaining the fruits
    of their crime. . . . [A] perpetrator’s choice to remain
    at the crime scene and further restrict a victim’s liberty
    after having robbed him or her manifests independent,
    criminal significance.’’ Id. Because the petitioner con-
    fined the victims after he had taken the cash, his
    restraint of the victims did not occur during the commis-
    sion of the separate offense. See id., 43 (‘‘[t]he [kidnap-
    ping] conduct at issue occurred after the objective of
    the robbery had been completed’’). In Bell, our Supreme
    Court summarized its holding in Banks, stating: ‘‘[W]hen
    it is clear that a perpetrator forcibly moved and
    restrained his victims after having taken their property,
    for the apparent purpose of escaping undetected and
    unhindered from the scene of the robbery, a reviewing
    court typically may conclude as a matter of law that
    such conduct bears independent criminal significance
    and is not merely incidental to the underlying robbery.’’
    (Emphasis altered.) Bell v. Commissioner of Correc-
    tion, supra, 
    339 Conn. 92
    .
    In Bell, the petitioner was convicted of two counts
    of kidnapping in connection with the robberies of two
    restaurants. Id., 83, 85. During the first robbery, the
    petitioner, after stating that he had a gun, instructed a
    restaurant employee to open the restaurant’s safe. Id.,
    83. While he looted the safe, he confined the employee
    in the walk-in refrigerator of the restaurant.8 Id., 83, 93.
    After looting the safe, he required that the employee
    remain confined in the refrigerator for a period of time.
    Id., 83–84. During the second robbery, the petitioner,
    while appearing to brandish a gun, instructed a restau-
    rant employee to open the restaurant’s safe and, before
    extracting money from the safe, instructed her to get
    into the restaurant’s walk-in cooler. Id., 84. The peti-
    tioner told the employee that he would ‘‘let [her] know
    when he was finished and when it was safe to come
    out’’ and, after waiting several minutes, the employee
    exited the refrigerator. (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, which was
    held six years prior to the decision in Salamon, the
    court failed to provide a Salamon instruction to the
    jury. Id., 83, 86. On review, after our Supreme Court
    determined that Salamon applied retroactively, the
    habeas court concluded that the instructional error was
    harmless because the petitioner’s confinement of the
    victims was not inherent in the robberies themselves
    and, by contrast, the petitioner confined the victims to
    reduce the risk that he would be detected. Id., 87–88.
    Like in Banks, our Supreme Court in Bell evaluated
    whether the court’s failure to provide an incidental
    restraint instruction constituted harmless error and spe-
    cifically considered whether the restraint occurred dur-
    ing the commission of the robberies. Id., 92–93. Our
    Supreme Court stated that, ‘‘[u]nlike in Banks, the jury
    in the present case reasonably could have found that
    the petitioner [confined each employee] . . . not to
    facilitate his postrobbery escape but, rather, to incapac-
    itate them while he completed the robberies. The peti-
    tioner informed the police that he took the money from
    each safe while the victims were restrained . . . . [The
    employee of the second restaurant that the petitioner
    robbed] seemed to confirm that account of events, indi-
    cating that the petitioner ordered her into the [cooler]
    immediately after she had opened the safe, and that he
    stated that he would release her when he was finished,
    presumably meaning after he was finished emptying
    the safe. Although [the employee of the first restaurant
    that the petitioner robbed] testified that the petitioner
    had ordered her into the refrigerator after he finished
    looting the . . . safe, she did not directly witness him
    taking the contents of the safe, and the jury might well
    have credited his statement that, consistent with his
    modus operandi in the [second] robbery, he waited to
    empty the safe until [the employee] was incapacitated
    so he could do so unobstructed. At the very least,
    defense counsel should have had the opportunity to
    make such an argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Id., 92–93. Thus, the Supreme Court con-
    cluded, ‘‘[i]f a victim is restrained in the midst of a
    robbery, rather than after the victim’s property has
    been taken, then it rarely will be possible to say, as a
    matter of law, that the restraint bore independent crimi-
    nal significance and was not merely incidental to the
    completion of the underlying crime.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Id., 93.
    The present case presents a situation that does not
    fall squarely into either of the categories described in
    Banks or Bell. In this case, the defendant did not restrain
    the victims in the middle of the larceny or after having
    taken the Jeep; see id.; but, instead, he took possession
    of the Jeep at approximately the same time he first
    restrained the victims—when he got into the Jeep and
    drove it out of the parking lot of the gas station. Thus,
    unlike in Banks or Bell, the larceny and the initial
    restraint of the victims appear to have taken place at
    approximately the same time. We conclude, however,
    that, because the defendant took the Jeep and initially
    restrained the victims almost simultaneously, the sec-
    ond factor weighs in favor of the defendant.
    We next address the third relevant Salamon factor,
    namely, whether the restraint was inherent in the nature
    of the other substantive offense. The state argues that
    the restraint of the victims was not inherent in the
    larceny of the Jeep and, accordingly, the restraint was
    neither incidental to nor necessary for the commission
    of the larceny. The state contends that the defendant
    was consciously aware of the victims’ presence in the
    car, and he nonetheless confined and moved the victims
    for ten minutes to facilitate his escape from the scene
    without being apprehended by the police. The defen-
    dant argues that the restraint was inherent in the nature
    of the larceny because the defendant could not have
    taken the Jeep and escaped the scene without
    restraining the victims.
    As this court explained in White, ‘‘our Supreme Court
    [in Fields] expressly rejected the notion that the ratio-
    nale of Salamon is not implicated merely because
    restraint of the victim is not an essential element of the
    other substantive offense charged along with kidnap-
    ping.’’ White v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 436
    . ‘‘On the contrary, restraint may be used
    in the commission of the underlying offense . . . even
    though it is not an element of that offense. Thus,
    depending on the facts of the underlying crime, the fact
    finder reasonably might conclude that the kidnapping
    was merely incidental to the underlying crime irrespec-
    tive of whether that crime requires the use of restraint.’’
    State v. Fields, 
    supra,
     
    302 Conn. 248
    . Because restraint
    is not an essential element of larceny in the second
    degree; see General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-123 (a)
    (1); we consider ‘‘whether restraint was inherent in the
    nature of the [larceny] in this particular case.’’ White
    v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 436.
    In light of our review of the record, we conclude that
    the defendant’s restraint of the victims was not inherent
    in the nature of the larceny of the Jeep. After exiting
    the parking lot of the gas station at a high rate of speed,
    the defendant drove away from the scene erratically
    for ten minutes. The defendant continued driving errati-
    cally throughout the duration of the drive, despite M’s
    pleas that the defendant not hurt her grandchildren,
    and confiscated M’s cell phone, preventing her from
    calling for assistance. He did not stop at any point to
    let the victims free, despite acknowledging their pres-
    ence in the vehicle by stating that he would not hurt
    them, until he had merged onto and driven some dis-
    tance on the highway.
    To the extent the defendant contends that, had he
    allowed the victims to exit the vehicle at the scene or
    shortly thereafter, he could not have successfully taken
    the Jeep because he would have been apprehended by
    the police, we note that the mere fact that the restraint
    facilitated his commission of the larceny does not mean
    that the restraint was incidental to or necessary for
    the completion of the larceny. Although the defendant
    escaped from the scene without delay because he did
    not stop to let the victims out of the Jeep at the gas
    station or shortly thereafter, his taking of the Jeep
    would not have been frustrated had he released the
    victims at any point immediately after taking the Jeep.
    See Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 40
    –41 (‘‘There is nothing specific to—let alone
    inherent in—the crime of robbery about forcing some-
    one at gunpoint to the back of a store and restraining
    them in a bathroom or cooler. That conduct could just
    as well follow, and facilitate the offender’s escape from,
    a physical or sexual assault, or other crime. The purpose
    is to escape unhindered from a crime scene—which,
    presumably, is a goal of most criminals . . . .’’). In
    other words, the defendant could have stolen the vehi-
    cle without restraining the victims for approximately
    ten minutes. The fact that he was more likely to be
    apprehended by the police at the gas station if he had
    permitted the victims to get out of the car immediately,
    or at any point shortly thereafter, does not compel a
    conclusion that the victims’ restraint was incidental to
    or necessary for the commission of the larceny. Thus,
    we conclude that the third factor weighs in favor of
    the state.
    With regard to the fourth relevant factor, whether
    the restraint prevented the victim from summoning
    assistance, the state argues that the defendant’s
    restraint of the victims in a moving vehicle prevented
    them from exiting the vehicle to summon assistance.
    The state relies on the fact that the defendant withheld
    M’s cell phone from her, further preventing her from
    contacting assistance while inside of the vehicle. The
    defendant argues that, because he released the victims
    in a place where they easily could summon help—on
    the side of a highway—his restraint of the victims did
    not prevent them from summoning assistance.
    As we have explained, the defendant restrained the
    victims in a moving vehicle, which he operated in an
    erratic manner and at a high rate of speed, in South-
    ington and on the interstate highway. The two minor
    victims were strapped into their booster seats, such
    that they could not escape without being unstrapped,
    and M could not exit the vehicle to summon assistance
    without opening the door of a moving car. Only after
    the defendant released the victims could M flag down a
    passerby to summon assistance. Further, the defendant
    confiscated M’s cell phone and did not return it to her,
    even after he let her exit the vehicle. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the fourth factor weighs in favor of the
    state.
    With respect to the fifth relevant factor, whether the
    restraint reduced the defendant’s risk of detection, the
    state argues that the defendant’s restraint of the victims
    reduced his risk of detection because the defendant
    confined the victims inside of a moving vehicle, pre-
    vented M from calling the police to report the defen-
    dant’s location, and left the victims on the side of a
    highway, rather than in a place of safety, so he could
    drive away without being detected. The defendant
    insists that he did not hide the victims. His eventual
    release of the victims, the defendant contends, in fact
    increased his risk of detection because the victims were
    able to contact the police once he released them.
    As we explained in our analysis of the fourth relevant
    Salamon factor, the defendant transported the victims
    in a fast-moving vehicle and withheld M’s cell phone,
    which prevented the victims from summoning assis-
    tance. Likewise, the defendant’s transportation of the
    victims in a fast-moving vehicle and the withholding of
    M’s cell phone prevented the victims from alerting the
    police to the defendant’s location by exiting the vehicle
    or by calling for help. Moreover, as the defendant argued
    in his brief and as we noted in our analysis of the third
    relevant Salamon factor, because the defendant did
    not stop to free the victims at or near the scene, the
    defendant fled the scene unhindered. Although the
    defendant freed the victims in public—on a highway—
    he did not release the victims until he had driven away
    from the gas station for ten minutes, and he released
    the victims on the side of the highway, instructing them
    to exit quickly before he continued driving on the high-
    way. The fifth factor, thus, weighs in the state’s favor.
    Finally, we address the sixth relevant Salamon factor,
    namely, whether the restraint created a significant dan-
    ger or increased the victims’ risk of harm independent
    of that posed by the separate offense. The state argues
    that the defendant’s erratic driving and decision to leave
    the victims on the side of a highway exposed them to
    significant danger and increased their risk of harm,
    independent of that posed by the defendant simply tak-
    ing the Jeep. The state also relies on the fear experi-
    enced by M, who fearfully handed her cell phone over
    to the defendant, and the grandchildren, one of whom
    was crying during the incident. The defendant contends
    that his restraint of the victims did not create a signifi-
    cant danger because the victims remained secured in
    their seats throughout the drive and that the defendant
    neither harmed nor threatened to harm them at any
    point during the period of confinement.
    To start, we note that the defendant’s restraint of the
    victims was indeed ‘‘especially dangerous’’; White v.
    Commissioner of Correction, 
    170 Conn. App. 438
    ; even
    though there was no evidence presented to suggest that
    the defendant physically assaulted the victims. None-
    theless, the defendant confined the victims within a
    moving vehicle, which he operated in an erratic manner
    and at a high rate of speed, for ten minutes in order to
    evade arrest by the police. The defendant’s attempt to
    elude the police by driving erratically and at high speeds
    posed a risk of danger to the victims. Had the victims
    been outside of the Jeep, as was W, when the defendant
    took it at the gas station, they would not have been
    subjected to any risk of harm presented by the defen-
    dant’s erratic driving. Further, as we have explained,
    the defendant eventually released the victims from the
    vehicle onto the side of the highway, without exiting
    the highway, and refused to return M’s cell phone to
    her before driving away. The defendant’s decision to
    leave the victims on the side of an interstate highway,
    in and of itself, posed a risk of danger to which they
    otherwise would not have been exposed, namely, the
    risk that they could have been injured by a passing car.
    Further, as our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘the
    distinct danger that is relevant to the question of
    whether criminal conduct bears independent signifi-
    cance as kidnapping need not be physical danger. . . .
    Criminal conduct that inspires distinct fears or has a
    uniquely harmful psychological impact on the victim
    also qualifies.’’ (Citation omitted.) Banks v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 46
    . In the present
    case, it is clear that the defendant’s confinement and
    movement of the victims inspired distinct fear in them.
    While the defendant erratically operated the Jeep, M
    had to hold onto various parts of its interior, exhibiting
    the fear she experienced while confined within the car.
    When the defendant asked M whether she had a cell
    phone, M initially lied to him and stated that she did
    not have one, but she eventually surrendered her cell
    phone to him out of fear that the phone may ring. She
    additionally pleaded with the defendant not to harm
    her grandchildren and expressed that she was worried
    about them, reflecting her fear that he may harm them.
    Likewise, one of M’s grandchildren was crying while in
    the Jeep. During the ride and once the victims were
    released, M attempted to calm both of her grandchil-
    dren, reflecting the distinct fear they experienced as a
    result of their restraint. In sum, therefore, we conclude
    that the sixth factor weighs in the state’s favor.
    Balancing the foregoing considerations,9 we conclude
    that the state has persuaded us beyond a reasonable
    doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the
    jury, properly instructed, would have reached a differ-
    ent result with respect to whether the defendant
    restrained the victims ‘‘with the intent necessary to
    qualify as kidnapping . . . and not simply to perpetrate
    the underlying’’ larceny. Id., 34. We therefore conclude
    that the defendant cannot prevail on this claim.
    II
    The defendant next claims that there was insufficient
    evidence to support his conviction of three counts of
    kidnapping in the second degree.10 With respect to this
    claim, the defendant makes two related arguments.
    First, the defendant asserts that, on the basis of the
    evidence presented at trial, no reasonable jury could
    determine that the state had proven beyond a reason-
    able doubt that he intended to abduct, or prevent the
    liberation of, the victims beyond that which was inci-
    dental or necessary to commit the larceny of the Jeep.
    Second, the defendant argues that no reasonable jury
    could determine that the state had proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt that he used or threatened to use
    physical force or intimidation to restrain the victims.
    We are not persuaded.
    We begin our analysis by setting forth the well estab-
    lished legal principles for assessing an insufficiency of
    the evidence claim. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a
    [two part] test.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    State v. Shin, 
    193 Conn. App. 348
    , 357, 
    219 A.3d 432
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    333 Conn. 943
    , 
    219 A.3d 374
     (2019). ‘‘[W]e
    first must construe the evidence in the light most favor-
    able to sustaining the verdict . . . .’’ State v. Rhodes,
    
    335 Conn. 226
    , 229, 
    249 A.3d 683
     (2020). ‘‘[E]stablished
    case law commands us to review claims of evidentiary
    insufficiency in light of all of the evidence [adduced at
    trial]. . . . In other words, we review the sufficiency
    of the evidence as the case was tried . . . . Accord-
    ingly, we have traditionally tested claims of evidentiary
    insufficiency by reviewing no less than, and no more
    than, the evidence introduced at trial.’’ (Citation omit-
    ted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. Petersen, 
    196 Conn. App. 646
    , 656, 
    230 A.3d 696
    , cert. denied, 
    335 Conn. 921
    , 
    232 A.3d 1104
     (2020).
    Second, we must ‘‘determine whether, on the basis
    of those facts and the inferences reasonably drawn from
    them, the jury reasonably could have concluded that
    the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . On appeal, we do not
    ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence
    that would support a reasonable hypothesis of inno-
    cence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable
    view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict
    of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Rhodes, supra, 
    335 Conn. 229
    . Put
    differently, ‘‘before this court may overturn a jury ver-
    dict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that no
    reasonable jury could arrive at the conclusion the jury
    did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 233.
    Accordingly, ‘‘[a] party challenging the validity of the
    jury’s verdict on grounds that there was insufficient
    evidence to support such a result carries a difficult
    burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
    ‘‘Although the jury must find every element proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defen-
    dant guilty of the charged offense . . . each of the
    basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions
    need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The jury, ‘‘[i]n evaluat-
    ing evidence . . . is not required to accept as disposi-
    tive those inferences that are consistent with the
    defendant’s innocence. . . . The [jury] may draw what-
    ever inferences from the evidence or facts established
    by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Shin, supra,
    
    193 Conn. App. 358
    . ‘‘Because [t]he only kind of an
    inference recognized by the law is a reasonable one
    [however] . . . any such inference cannot be based on
    possibilities, surmise or conjecture. . . . It is axio-
    matic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference] drawn must be
    rational and founded upon the evidence.’’ (Internal quo-
    tation marks omitted.) State v. Ervin B., 
    202 Conn. App. 1
    , 6, 
    243 A.3d 799
     (2020).
    In light of the foregoing legal principles, we turn to
    the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole, beginning
    with the elements of the offense for which the defendant
    was charged. Section 53a-94 provides in relevant part:
    ‘‘(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second
    degree when he abducts another person. . . .’’ Section
    53a-91 (2) defines ‘‘ ‘[a]bduct’ ’’ to mean, in relevant
    part, ‘‘to restrain a person with intent to prevent his
    liberation by . . . (B) using or threatening to use physi-
    cal force or intimidation.’’ Section 53a-91 (1) defines
    ‘‘ ‘[r]estrain’ ’’ to mean ‘‘to restrict a person’s move-
    ments intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner
    as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving
    him from one place to another, or by confining him
    either in the place where the restriction commences
    or in a place to which he has been moved, without
    consent. . . .’’
    The defendant first argues that the evidence in the
    record is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that he intended to prevent the victims’ liberation
    beyond that which was incidental to or necessary for
    the commission of the larceny of the Jeep. Specifically,
    he argues that the evidence, namely, the testimony that
    established that the victims were already in the vehicle
    when the defendant arrived at the gas station, that the
    defendant did not further restrain the victims, and that
    the defendant told the victims that he would not harm
    them, indicated that his restraint of the victims was
    incidental to the larceny. The defendant also asserts
    that he did not restrain, harm, or threaten the occupants
    in any way beyond what was necessary to commit the
    larceny. Because, in connection with our resolution of
    the defendant’s first claim, we concluded that the
    court’s failure to provide a Salamon instruction to the
    jury was harmless error because there was no reason-
    able possibility that a properly instructed jury would
    find that the defendant’s restraint was incidental to or
    necessary for his completion of the larceny, it necessar-
    ily follows that a reasonable view of the evidence sup-
    ports the jury’s finding that the defendant intended to
    prevent the victims’ liberation beyond that which was
    incidental to or necessary to complete the larceny and,
    consequently, the jury’s verdict of guilty.
    The defendant also contends that no reasonable fact
    finder could conclude that he used or threatened to use
    force or intimidation to restrain the victims. Specifi-
    cally, the defendant argues that there is no evidence
    that he physically harmed or threatened to physically
    harm the victims. The defendant asserts that he never
    physically blocked M from exiting the Jeep before he
    drove out of the parking lot of the gas station, nor did
    he brandish a weapon or threaten M to prevent her
    from exiting the vehicle. Further, the defendant asserts
    that he did not use physical force to restrain L and O
    because they were already strapped into their booster
    seats when he entered the Jeep. In response, the state
    argues that the defendant used physical force to restrain
    the victims when he confined them in a moving vehicle
    for ten minutes and failed to permit them to get out
    of the car. The state notes that, during that time, M
    surrendered her cell phone to the defendant out of fear.
    Accordingly, the state contends, the jury reasonably
    concluded that the defendant intimidated the victims
    or, through his actions, implicitly threatened the use of
    force against them.
    A defendant who uses force or threatens to use force
    ‘‘coerc[es] or comp[els] [the victim] by an actual or
    threatened act,’’ to acquiesce to the defendant’s
    demand. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Tucker, 
    226 Conn. 618
    , 650 n.37, 
    629 A.2d 1067
     (1993).
    This court has held that the jury, in evaluating whether
    a defendant intended to restrain a victim by using
    threats of force or intimidation, may consider the vic-
    tim’s reasonable belief that, had she tried to escape
    his confinement, the defendant may have used force
    against her. See State v. Morlo M., 
    206 Conn. App. 660
    ,
    688–90, 
    261 A.3d 68
    , cert. denied, 
    339 Conn. 910
    , 
    261 A.3d 745
     (2021); State v. Franko, 
    142 Conn. App. 451
    ,
    461, 
    64 A.3d 807
    , cert. denied, 
    310 Conn. 901
    , 
    75 A.3d 30
     (2013); see also State v. Wideman, 
    36 Conn. App. 190
    , 196, 
    650 A.2d 571
     (1994) (‘‘[t]he state of mind of the
    victim is a relevant consideration in’’ jury’s evaluation
    of whether defendant restrained victim ‘‘by the threat of
    force’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
    
    232 Conn. 903
    , 
    653 A.2d 192
     (1995). In State v. Myers,
    
    129 Conn. App. 499
    , 513–14, 
    21 A.3d 499
    , cert. denied,
    
    302 Conn. 918
    , 
    27 A.3d 370
     (2011), for example, this
    court, in affirming the jury’s determination that the
    defendant had used the threat of force to restrain the
    victim, relied on a victim’s testimony that she felt as if
    she had ‘‘ ‘no choice’ ’’ other than to comply with the
    defendant’s demand to get into a car.
    The evidence admitted at trial in the present case,
    and the reasonable inferences from that evidence that
    the jury was permitted to draw, were more than suffi-
    cient to establish that the defendant used or threatened
    to use force or intimidation to restrain the victims.
    Contrary to the defendant’s contention that he did not
    prevent M from exiting the Jeep, M testified that, to
    enter the Jeep, the defendant opened the passenger
    side door, next to where M was sitting, and climbed over
    M to get into the driver’s seat. M and Ayotte testified
    that the defendant drove out of the parking lot of the
    gas station at a high rate of speed, and Ayotte’s body
    camera footage documented that far less than one
    minute passed between the defendant arriving at the
    gas station in the minivan and exiting the gas station
    in the Jeep. M’s grandchildren, L and O, were strapped
    into their booster seats in the backseat. M additionally
    testified that the defendant drove erratically and at a
    high rate of speed, such that she had to hold onto the
    Jeep’s interior, and that the defendant drove the Jeep
    on the highway. From this evidence, the jury reasonably
    could have inferred that the defendant used force to
    prevent the victims from exiting the vehicle before he
    began driving and while the vehicle was in motion.
    Further, M testified, she expressed to the defendant
    that she ‘‘just wanted [her grandchildren] to be safe,’’
    regardless of what the defendant had done. Having
    heard M’s pleas, the defendant nonetheless did not
    allow the victims to exit the vehicle until after he had
    driven for ten minutes in total, at which point he pulled
    over on the side of the highway and instructed M to
    quickly exit the vehicle. M testified that she was worried
    about her grandchildren, one of whom was crying. M
    also testified that the defendant had asked her whether
    she had a cell phone and that she initially had lied to
    the defendant by stating that she did not have one. M,
    however, eventually surrendered her cell phone to the
    defendant, out of fear that the phone may ring. The jury
    reasonably could have inferred that M surrendered her
    only channel of communication because she feared that
    the defendant may have reacted by using force against
    her or her grandchildren, had the phone rang. Viewing
    the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
    the verdict, the jury reasonably could have inferred that
    the defendant intimidated or threatened to use force
    to restrain the victims and that M reasonably believed
    that, if she tried to escape her confinement, the defen-
    dant would use force against her or her grandchildren.
    In sum, we are not persuaded that the evidence in
    the present case was insufficient to prove that the defen-
    dant intended to prevent the victims’ liberation beyond
    what was incidental to or necessary for the successful
    completion of the larceny and that he used or threat-
    ened to use force or intimidation to restrain the victims.
    We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evi-
    dence from which the jury reasonably could have found
    the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each
    of the three counts of kidnapping in the second degree.
    III
    The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the court
    abused its discretion when it denied his requests to
    have his leg shackles removed during the trial11 and
    violated his constitutional right to due process by
    requiring him to be shackled during the trial. Specifi-
    cally, the defendant argues that the court’s denial of his
    requests to remove his leg shackles without adequately
    explaining why it denied the requests resulted in the
    defendant being unfairly restrained, deprived him of
    his right to a fair trial and undermined his presumption
    of innocence.12 The state argues that the court provided
    sufficient reasons to support its denial of the defen-
    dant’s requests and, more importantly, the defendant
    failed to present evidence establishing that the shackles
    were visible to the jury. Because we find that the defen-
    dant has failed to meet his burden of proving that his
    leg shackles were visible to the jury, the defendant’s
    claim necessarily fails.
    The following additional procedural history is rele-
    vant to our resolution of this claim. On the first three
    days of jury selection on September 11, 13 and 16, 2019,
    the defendant requested that his handcuffs be removed,
    and, on confirming with the judicial marshals that there
    existed no security concern, the court granted each
    request. The court noted on September 11 and 13, 2019,
    that the defendant’s legs remained shackled and that
    his leg shackles were not visible to the venirepeople.
    On September 16, 2019, a judicial marshal characterized
    the defendant’s behavior as ‘‘[g]reat.’’ On September 19,
    2019, the court granted the defendant’s request that his
    shackles be removed.13
    The trial began on September 23, 2019. During a mid-
    trial recess on the first day of trial, counsel for the
    defendant requested in chambers that the defendant’s
    leg shackles be removed. On the record, the court asked
    the judicial marshals whether they had any safety or
    behavioral concerns, and the judicial marshals
    answered that the defendant had not presented any
    issues. Accordingly, although the court noted that it
    believed that his leg shackles were not visible to the
    jury, the court granted the defendant’s request and
    ordered that the leg shackles be removed. A judicial
    marshal asked the court whether the defendant’s legs
    should remain unshackled for the duration of the trial,
    and the court clarified that it would reevaluate whether
    to remove the defendant’s leg shackles on each day of
    the proceedings, at the request of the defendant.
    On September 24, 2019, and outside of the presence
    of the jury, the defendant requested that his leg shackles
    be removed. The court stated that, on the basis of its
    conversations with the parties that morning, it antici-
    pated that certain testimony the state planned to elicit
    from one of its witnesses could produce an emotional
    reaction from the defendant.14 The court noted that,
    although it did not ‘‘have a crystal ball,’’ it would be
    easier to prevent an emotional reaction than to remedi-
    ate any consequences of one. Consequently, the court
    denied the defendant’s request.
    Counsel for the defendant expressed to the court that
    the defendant was ‘‘concerned’’ that, on the previous
    day, one of the jurors had seen the shackles. The court,
    however, explained that, earlier that day, it had
    instructed one of the judicial marshals to sit in various
    chairs in the jury box, including in two chairs near the
    counsel’s tables, to determine whether the leg shackles
    were visible to any juror. The judicial marshal con-
    firmed that the leg shackles were not visible from the
    various seats in the jury box.
    The trial resumed, and, on September 26, 2019, the
    defense rested. The following day, before the com-
    mencement of closing arguments and jury instructions,
    the defendant once again requested that his leg shackles
    be removed. The court denied the defendant’s request,
    providing as reasons for its decision that the defendant
    would not ‘‘be moving around the courtroom’’ during
    closing arguments and jury instructions, that his leg
    shackles were not visible to the jury, and that he was
    not wearing hand shackles.15
    We begin by setting forth the legal principles that
    govern our analysis of this claim, including the applica-
    ble standard of review. ‘‘[I]n reviewing a shackling
    claim, our task is to determine whether the court’s
    decision to employ restraints constituted a clear abuse
    of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. Brawley, 
    321 Conn. 583
    , 589, 
    137 A.3d 757
     (2016).
    ‘‘Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the
    [s]ixth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments [to the United
    States constitution], is the principle that one accused
    of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence
    determined solely on the basis of the evidence intro-
    duced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion,
    indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances
    not adduced as proof at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Marcus H., 
    190 Conn. App. 332
    , 345,
    
    210 A.3d 607
    , cert. denied, 
    332 Conn. 910
    , 
    211 A.3d 71
    ,
    cert. denied,      U.S.      , 
    140 S. Ct. 540
    , 
    205 L. Ed. 2d 343
     (2019). ‘‘[C]ourts must be alert to factors that may
    undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In
    the administration of criminal justice, courts must care-
    fully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is
    to be established by probative evidence and beyond a
    reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    State v. Woolcock, 
    201 Conn. 605
    , 613, 
    518 A.2d 1377
    (1986). Thus, ‘‘[i]n order for a criminal defendant to
    enjoy the maximum benefit of the presumption of inno-
    cence, our courts should make every reasonable effort
    to present the defendant before the jury in a manner
    that does not suggest, expressly or impliedly, that he
    or she is a dangerous character whose guilt is a foregone
    conclusion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. Webb, 
    238 Conn. 389
    , 455, 
    680 A.2d 147
     (1996).
    Accordingly, ‘‘[i]t is well established that, [a]s a gen-
    eral proposition, a criminal defendant has the right to
    appear in court free from physical restraints. . . .
    Grounded in the common law, this right evolved in
    order to preserve the presumption favoring a criminal
    defendant’s innocence, while eliminating any detrimen-
    tal effects to the defendant that could result if he were
    physically restrained in the courtroom. . . . The pre-
    sumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
    [c]onstitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under
    our system of criminal justice.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 587
    .
    As this court explained in Marcus H., ‘‘the United States
    Supreme Court [in Deck v. Missouri, 
    544 U.S. 622
    , 628,
    
    125 S. Ct. 2007
    , 
    161 L. Ed. 2d 953
     (2005)] stated that
    . . . [c]ourts and commentators share close to a con-
    sensus that, during the guilt phase of a trial, a criminal
    defendant has a right to remain free of physical
    restraints that are visible to the jury; [and] that the
    right has a constitutional dimension . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Marcus H., supra, 
    190 Conn. App. 347
    .
    ‘‘Nonetheless, a defendant’s right to appear before
    the jury unfettered is not absolute. . . . A trial court
    may employ a reasonable means of restraint [on] a
    defendant if, exercising its broad discretion in such
    matters, the court finds that restraints are reasonably
    necessary under the circumstances.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 587
    . For example, a defendant’s ‘‘right to remain free
    of physical restraints that are visible to the jury . . .
    may be overcome in a particular instance by essential
    state interests such as physical security, escape preven-
    tion, or courtroom decorum.’’ (Emphasis omitted; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marcus H., supra,
    
    190 Conn. App. 347
    , quoting Deck v. Missouri, 
    supra,
    544 U.S. 628
    . Because ‘‘[a] trial judge has a duty to do
    what may be necessary to prevent escape, to minimize
    danger of harm to those attending trial as well as to
    the general public, and to maintain decent order in the
    courtroom . . . [s]hackles may properly be employed
    in order to ensure the safe, reasonable and orderly
    progress of trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Woolcock, supra, 
    201 Conn. 614
    .
    ‘‘Despite the breadth of [the court’s] discretion, how-
    ever, [t]he law has long forbidden routine use of visible
    shackles during the guilt phase . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 587
    . ‘‘[T]he [United States
    Supreme] [C]ourt held [in Deck v. Missouri, 
    supra,
     
    544 U.S. 629
    ] that the [f]ifth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments
    prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury
    absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of
    its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest
    specific to a particular trial.’’ (Emphasis in original;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marcus H.,
    supra, 
    190 Conn. App. 347
    .
    Practice Book § 42-46 mandates in relevant part: ‘‘In
    ordering the use of restraints or denying a request to
    remove them, the judicial authority shall detail its rea-
    sons on the record outside the presence of the jury.
    The nature and duration of the restraints employed
    shall be those reasonably necessary under the circum-
    stances. . . .’’ See also State v. Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 589
     (‘‘a trial court must ensure that its reasons
    for ordering the use of restraints are detailed in the
    record’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although
    a trial court is not mandated to conduct ‘‘an evidentiary
    hearing concerning the necessity for restraints,’’ our
    ‘‘appellate review is greatly aided when a court develops
    the record by conducting [such] an evidentiary hearing
    . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
    If ‘‘a court, without adequate justification, orders [a]
    defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury,
    the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice
    to make out a due process violation. The [s]tate must
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling]
    error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
    obtained.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     588–89. ‘‘The negative connotations
    of restraints, nevertheless, are without significance
    unless the fact of the restraints comes to the attention
    of the jury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. Webb, supra, 
    238 Conn. 455
    . ‘‘[T]o establish that he
    was deprived of his right to a fair trial, the defendant
    . . . must provide evidence demonstrating that the jury
    actually saw or otherwise was aware of his restraints.’’
    State v. Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 590
    –91. ‘‘The defen-
    dant bears the burden of showing that he has suffered
    prejudice by establishing a factual record demonstra-
    ting that the members of the jury knew of the restraints.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 588
    .
    In light of the foregoing legal principles, we remind
    courts to follow the prescriptions of Practice Book § 42-
    46 and to articulate the reasons that support a court’s
    decision to order the use of, or to deny a defendant’s
    request to remove his, leg shackles, regardless of
    whether the shackles are visible to the jury. See Practice
    Book § 42-46. We also emphasize the constitutional
    dimension inherent in a defendant’s right to remain free
    of physical restraints that are visible to the jury during
    the guilt phase of his trial. See State v. Marcus H.,
    supra, 
    190 Conn. App. 347
    .
    Turning to the present case, our review of the record
    reveals no evidence to suggest that the jurors actually
    saw or otherwise knew of the defendant’s leg shackles.
    See State v. Brawley, supra, 
    321 Conn. 592
    . Although
    defense counsel expressed to the trial court on one
    occasion that the defendant was ‘‘concerned’’ that one
    of the jurors had seen his leg shackles, the defendant
    pointed to no evidence, neither to the court nor in his
    brief to this court, to support that any juror could see the
    shackles.16 By contrast, the court instructed a judicial
    marshal to sit in various chairs in the jury box to assure
    that the defendant’s leg shackles were not visible to
    the jury. Because the defendant has failed to satisfy
    his burden of demonstrating that members of the jury
    actually saw or otherwise were aware of his restraints,
    he has failed to establish that the court’s denial of his
    requests deprived him of his right to a fair trial, and,
    accordingly, his claim fails.17
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    At some point prior to trial, Renaldi and the defendant were incarcerated
    in the same correctional facility. Renaldi testified at trial that, during this
    period of incarceration, the defendant asked him to recant his statement
    identifying the defendant as the driver of the Jeep. Initially, Renaldi recanted
    his statement, but he later executed a cooperation agreement under which
    he agreed to testify at trial against the defendant.
    2
    The robbery charge of which the defendant was acquitted related to his
    taking of the Jeep. During oral argument before this court, the state clarified
    that it did not charge the defendant with any crimes related to the robbery
    of the bank.
    3
    In previous Salamon cases, our Supreme Court and this court have used
    a phrase that our Supreme Court refers to as Salamon’s ‘‘ ‘incidental and
    necessary test’ ’’; Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 50
    –51; that is, that ‘‘[o]ur legislature . . . intended to exclude from the
    scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe
    penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely
    incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against
    that victim.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Salamon, 
    supra,
     
    287 Conn. 542
    . In
    Banks, however, our Supreme Court acknowledged that Salamon’s ‘‘ ‘inci-
    dental and necessary’ ’’ language has created ‘‘confusion among litigants
    and the lower courts’’ with respect to whether ‘‘a defendant [is] entitled to
    Salamon’s protections if either prong of the [incidental and necessary] test
    applies (if, for example, restraint of the victim was incidental to a sexual
    assault but was not necessary to accomplish the assault).’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 50–51.
    In evaluating ‘‘whether the incidental and necessary [language in Salamon]
    is to be understood as conjunctive or disjunctive’’; id., 51; our Supreme
    Court stated that the terms ‘‘incidental to the underlying crime, necessary
    to commit the underlying crime, inherent in the nature of the underlying
    crime, and having no independent criminal significance . . . are merely
    different ways of expressing the same concept, namely, whether the restraint
    imposed evidenced an independent criminal intent or subjected the victims
    to risks distinct from those necessarily entailed by or inherent in the underly-
    ing offenses.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 54–55. Our Supreme Court concluded
    that ‘‘conduct that is wholly incidental to the commission of an underlying
    crime cannot qualify as kidnapping, regardless of whether it is strictly
    necessary to commit that crime.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 54. Accordingly,
    the court confirmed that a defendant is entitled to Salamon’s protections
    if his actions are either incidental to or necessary to commit the underlying
    offense. See id., 51–54. Thus, throughout this opinion and in accordance
    with our Supreme Court’s analysis in Banks, we use the phrase ‘‘incidental
    to or necessary for,’’ as opposed to ‘‘incidental to and necessary for,’’ the
    commission of another substantive crime.
    4
    In Banks, a habeas proceeding, our Supreme Court adopted the harm-
    lessness standard laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Brecht v.
    Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637, 
    113 S. Ct. 1710
    , 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 353
     (1993),
    under which ‘‘the harmlessness of constitutional errors is assessed according
    to whether the error had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in
    determining the jury’s verdict. . . . The Brecht standard reserves the rem-
    edy of a new trial for errors resulting in actual prejudice, as distinguished
    from errors giving rise to a mere possibility of harm.’’ (Citations omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction,
    supra, 
    339 Conn. 15
    –16. The court, however, clarified that a reviewing court
    assesses harm according to the Brecht standard only ‘‘on collateral review’’;
    id., 18; including in state habeas proceedings. Id., 5, 19. By contrast, a court
    assesses harm according to the Neder standard ‘‘on direct review,’’ including
    in the direct appeal of a defendant’s conviction. Id., 17. Thus, ‘‘it is undisputed
    that Neder is the proper standard’’ to assess harm on direct review of cases
    involving an instructional error pursuant to Salamon. Id.
    5
    As this court noted in White, ‘‘[a]lthough we recognize that the factors
    enumerated in Salamon are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list of
    the possible factors that may be relevant in a given case, the parties have
    not identified any other factors relevant to the present case, and, thus, we
    limit our discussion to those factors expressly identified in Salamon.’’ White
    v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 
    170 Conn. App. 429
     n.9.
    6
    As we explain in our evaluation of the third Salamon factor, the mere
    fact that a defendant’s unlawful actions facilitated his commission of a
    substantive crime does not necessarily mean that those actions were inciden-
    tal to or necessary for the completion of that crime. In the present case,
    the mere fact that the defendant’s confinement and movement of the victims
    facilitated his avoidance of immediate arrest for the larceny because it
    prevented him from being stopped by the police officers at the gas station
    does not necessarily mean that the restraint was incidental to or necessary
    for the successful completion of the larceny.
    7
    Although the defendant was convicted of the robberies in 1997, before
    our Supreme Court decided Salamon in 2008; see Banks v. Commissioner
    of Correction, supra, 
    339 Conn. 5
    , 11; ‘‘in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of
    Correction, 
    299 Conn. 740
    , 
    12 A.3d 817
     (2011), [our Supreme Court] held
    that Salamon applies retroactively in habeas actions.’’ Bell v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    supra,
     
    339 Conn. 87
    .
    8
    We acknowledge that, earlier in its opinion in Bell, our Supreme Court
    stated that only ‘‘after the petitioner [had] finished looting the safe’’ did he
    order the employee ‘‘to proceed into the refrigerator.’’ (Emphasis added;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Bell v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    supra,
     
    339 Conn. 83
    . Later in its opinion, however, and as we note in this
    opinion, the Supreme Court clarified that ‘‘[t]he petitioner informed the
    police that [in each of the two robberies he committed] he took the money
    from each safe while the victims were restrained in the refrigerators.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Id., 93. The Supreme Court distinguished Bell from its
    opinion in Banks by emphasizing that, in Bell, the jury reasonably could
    have concluded that the petitioner confined the victims to incapacitate them
    ‘‘while he completed the robberies.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Because the
    analysis of the Supreme Court hinges on this distinction, we rely on its
    conclusion that ‘‘the jury . . . reasonably could have found that the peti-
    tioner forced [the employee of the first restaurant that the petitioner robbed]
    . . . into the walk-in [refrigerator] not to facilitate his postrobbery escape
    but, rather, to incapacitate [her] while he completed the robber[y].’’ Id., 92–
    93.
    9
    To the extent that the second factor cuts in favor of the defendant, we
    find that it does not trump the significance of the remaining factors that
    weigh in the state’s favor.
    10
    This court and our Supreme Court, in previous cases, have addressed
    claims of insufficient evidence before addressing other claims raised on
    appeal because, ‘‘if the defendant prevails on [his] sufficiency claim, [he]
    is entitled to a directed judgment of acquittal rather than to a new trial.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bagnaschi, 
    180 Conn. App. 835
    ,
    840 n.3, 
    184 A.3d 1234
    , cert. denied, 
    329 Conn. 912
    , 
    186 A.3d 1170
     (2018);
    see also State v. Calabrese, 
    279 Conn. 393
    , 401, 
    902 A.2d 1044
     (2006). In the
    present case, however, we address the defendant’s claims in the order in
    which they were raised in his principal appellate brief because our resolution
    of his first claim necessarily resolves one of the two arguments related to
    insufficiency of the evidence that he raised in his second claim.
    11
    We note that, although the defendant argues in his brief that the court
    improperly required his legs to be shackled ‘‘during most of his trial,’’ that
    characterization is somewhat misleading. The court instructed the defendant
    to request that his shackles be removed on a day-by-day basis. The defendant
    requested the removal of his leg shackles on September 23, 2019, and the
    court granted his request. The defendant did not request that his leg shackles
    be removed on September 25 or 26, 2019, and, thus, it is unclear whether
    the court would have allowed the leg shackles to be removed on those days
    if asked.
    12
    The defendant also argues that the court’s denial of his requests to
    remove his leg shackles inhibited his ability to assist in his defense, noting
    that physical restraints generally may inhibit a defendant’s ability to interact
    with counsel or affect his decision to testify. The defendant, however, neither
    argued nor pointed us to any evidence in the record to suggest that his leg
    shackles inhibited his ability to assist in his defense in this case.
    13
    The record, however, is unclear whether the defendant requested that
    his hand shackles or his leg shackles be removed and, thus, whether the
    court granted the removal of the defendant’s hand or leg shackles.
    14
    On September 24, 2019, the state called four witnesses to testify: Renaldi,
    Sergeant Steve Cifone, Detective Adam Tillotson, and Officer Ryan Lair.
    15
    Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘[The defendant is] not going to be moving
    around the courtroom. We’ve noted for the record previously that the shack-
    les are not visible to the jury. He is not wearing hand shackles and this is,
    I think for today’s purposes, the answer is no.’’
    16
    The defendant also argues that the jurors may have heard the defendant’s
    leg shackles. He has not pointed us to anywhere in the record to support
    this contention, and our review of the record has uncovered no evidence
    from which to conclude that the jurors heard the defendant’s shackles at
    any point during the trial. Thus, with respect to this argument, the defendant
    has not met his burden of ‘‘demonstrating that the members of the jury
    knew of the restraints.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brawley,
    supra, 
    321 Conn. 588
    .
    17
    The defendant requests that we exercise our ‘‘supervisory authority’’ to
    require trial courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the neces-
    sity for restraints and, should the court determine that restraints are neces-
    sary, to create a record detailing the steps it took to assure that the jury is not
    aware of the restraints. The defendant argues that the protections afforded
    to him, namely, by the rules of practice and in our Supreme Court’s decision
    in Brawley, are insufficient to ensure to him a fair trial and that the state
    should bear the burden of proving that the defendant’s shackles were not
    visible to the jury.
    As we have explained, our Supreme Court in Brawley specifically stated
    that courts need not conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the necessity
    of restraints and that the burden lies with the defendant to provide evidence
    demonstrating that the jury was aware of his restraints. State v. Brawley,
    supra, 
    321 Conn. 589
    –91. ‘‘As an intermediate appellate court, we . . . are
    bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court.’’ Nogueira v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    168 Conn. App. 803
    , 805 n.1, 
    149 A.3d 983
    , cert. denied, 
    323 Conn. 949
    , 
    169 A.3d 792
     (2016). Accordingly, we decline to create such a
    rule because it is not the province of this panel to disregard binding authority
    of our Supreme Court.