Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County , 477 Mass. 102 ( 2017 )

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SJC-12201
GEORGE MODICA vs. SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY & others. 1
Suffolk. January 5, 2017. - May 15, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
Correction Officer. Words, "Bodily injury."
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 24, 2014.
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions
for summary judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Noah A. Winkeller for the plaintiff.
Allen H. Forbes, Special Assistant Attorney General, for
the defendants.
BUDD, J. Through G. L. c. 126, § 18A, and G. L. c. 30,
§ 58, the Legislature has afforded correction officers
additional compensation to close the gap between workers'
1
The Commonwealth and the Suffolk County sheriff's
department.
2
compensation benefits and an employee's salary if the employee
sustains bodily injury as a result of inmate violence during the
course of his or her duties. The plaintiff, George Modica, a
correction officer in the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department,
sued the defendants -- the sheriff of Suffolk County, the
Suffolk County sheriff's department, and the Commonwealth -- to
obtain compensation under the statutes. At issue in this case
is the meaning of "bodily injury" as the term is used in the two
statutes. We conclude that bodily injury is that which results
in physical injury; because the defendant has not suffered such
an injury, he does not qualify for compensation under the
statute.
Background. The pertinent facts, taken from the record,
are undisputed. As a result of breaking up inmate fights in
March and April of 2010, the plaintiff began to experience an
accelerated heart rate (sinus tachycardia) accompanied by light-
headedness and difficulty breathing.
The defendants initially paid workers' compensation
benefits voluntarily but soon after discontinued them. The
plaintiff filed a claim for further workers' compensation
benefits and, insofar as relevant here, the plaintiff underwent
two independent medical examinations. Both doctors concurred
that the defendant's symptoms were a physiological response to
stress, that the sinus tachycardia was neither the result nor
3
the cause of any physical harm, and that there was no evidence
of structural heart disease. 2
The parties eventually settled the plaintiff's workers'
compensation claim, stipulating that the plaintiff's injury was
a physiological response to his involvement in inmate
altercations. The plaintiff thereafter applied for compensation
under G. L. c. 126, § 18A, and G. L. c. 30, § 58, which the
defendants denied. 3 The plaintiff commenced an action in the
Superior Court. Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment, which were heard by a Superior Court judge. The judge
denied the plaintiff's motion and allowed the defendants'
motion. He concluded that the tachycardia "amount[ed] to a
change in function without physical damage" and that therefore
the condition was not a bodily injury entitling the plaintiff
the extra compensation. The plaintiff appealed, and we
transferred the case to this court on our own motion.
Discussion. Where the record is undisputed and the case
was decided below on motions for summary judgment, "one of the
moving part[ies] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
2
The plaintiff adopted these findings in pleadings he filed
with the Department of Industrial Accidents.
3
The plaintiff made claims under both G. L. c. 126, § 18A,
and G. L. c. 30, § 58. The former applies to county employees,
the latter to State employees; they are otherwise
indistinguishable. For the sake of simplicity, we refer only to
§ 18A in the remainder of this opinion, but we interpret G. L.
c. 30, § 58, in identical fashion in all relevant respects.
4
(quotation omitted). Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund
v. Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841 (2016). "The single issue
raised is one of statutory interpretation, and we review the
motion judge's decision de novo." Id.General Laws c. 126, § 18A, provides in relevant part:
"An employee . . . who, while in the performance of
duty, receives bodily injuries resulting from acts of
violence of patients or prisoners in his custody, and who
as a result of such injury would be entitled to benefits
under [G. L. c. 152 (the worker's compensation statute)],
shall be paid . . . the difference between the weekly cash
benefits to which he would be entitled under [c. 152] and
his regular salary . . . ."
Thus, in order to be entitled to compensation under the statute,
a correction officer must show (1) bodily injury (2) resulting
from an act of violence (3) committed by a prisoner who was (4)
in the plaintiff's custody and (5) resulting in the plaintiff
being entitled to worker's compensation. The parties dispute
only whether the plaintiff suffered a "bodily injury," a term
that is not defined in the statute.
"When a statute does not define its words we give them
their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are
consistent with the statutory purpose. . . . We derive the
words' usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known
to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal
contexts and dictionary definitions." Commonwealth v. Bell, 442
Mass. 118, 124 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc.,
5
372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). Bodily injury has been statutorily
defined in the criminal context as a "substantial impairment of
the physical condition, including any burn, fracture of any
bone, subdural hematoma, injury to any internal organ . . . ."
G. L. c. 265, § 13J. See also G. L. c. 265, §§ 13K (a), 39
(b). Certain civil statutes also make use of this definition of
bodily injury. See G. L. c. 111, § 72K (abuse and neglect of
patients or residents in long-term care); G. L. c. 208, § 31A
(parent's abuse a factor in determining custody of children);
G. L. c. 209, § 38 (same); G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (same).
Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines bodily injury as
"[p]hysical damage to a person's body." Black's Law Dictionary
906 (10th ed. 2014). Additionally, in the insurance context the
phrase "bodily injury" has been construed as referring to
physical injury. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654,
656 (1988) ("'Bodily injury'. . . encompasses only physical
injuries to the body and the consequences thereof").
Thus, we conclude that for the purposes of § 18A, bodily
injury refers to physical impairment or damage, i.e., physical
injury. As the plaintiff's sinus tachycardia is an impairment
of function which has not led to structural heart damage, it is
not a physical impairment or injury. Therefore, the plaintiff
does not have a bodily injury within the meaning of the statute.
6
The plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
He contends that because it is unknown when or if his symptoms
will subside, his condition falls within the meaning of bodily
injury in the statute. This reasoning conflates the duration of
an injury with the type of injury. Clearly the duration of an
injury has nothing to do with whether it is a bodily injury:
emotional injuries, too, may be long-lasting.
The plaintiff also suggests that we should broadly construe
"bodily injury" in order to provide this special class of
employees the extra protection intended by the statute. To
bolster this argument, he points out that we have done so with
other portions of the statute. See, e.g., Conroy v. Boston, 392
Mass. 216, 219-220 (1984) (inmate's escape was act of violence
under statute). Adopting this view would require us to overlook
the fact that the Legislature chose to use the term "bodily
injury" rather than "personal injury" (or simply "injury").
Personal injury, as the term is used in the workers'
compensation statute, encompasses physical as well as mental or
emotional disabilities. 4 See G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A). See
4
Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines personal
injury in the context of workers' compensation as "any harm
. . . that arises in the scope of employment" (emphasis added).
Black's Law Dictionary 906 (10th ed. 2014). In the insurance
context, "[t]he term 'personal injury' is broader and includes
not only physical injury but also any affront or insult to the
reputation or sensibilities of a person. 'Bodily injury,' by
comparison, is a narrow term and encompasses only physical
7
also Bisazza's Case, 452 Mass. 593, 598 (2008). As G. L.
c. 126, § 18A, expressly refers to the workers' compensation
statute, we must assume that the Legislature used the narrower
term intentionally. See Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984) ("words of a statute must be
construed in association with other statutory language and the
general statutory plan").
Conclusion. Although the plaintiff may well have
sustained an injury, he is unable to show that he has a bodily
injury within the meaning of G. L. c. 126, § 18A. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
So ordered.
injuries to the body and the consequences thereof." Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654, 656 (1988).