Commonwealth v. Gibson , 474 Mass. 726 ( 2016 )

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SJC-11990
COMMONWEALTH vs. DONALD GIBSON.
Hampden. March 8, 2016. - July 13, 2016.
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
Hines, JJ.
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation,
Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law, Probation
revocation, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law,
Assistance of counsel.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 22, 2006.
A hearing on an order to show cause why the defendant
should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel at a
probation revocation proceeding was had before C. Jeffrey
Kinder, J., and a proceeding for revocation of probation was
heard by Richard J. Carey, J.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Glynis Mac Veety for the defendant.
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
2
HINES, J. The principal issue in this appeal is whether a
Superior Court judge properly ordered the forfeiture of the
defendant's right to counsel in a probation revocation hearing.
The judge, faced with a defendant who admittedly engaged in a
pattern of quarrelsome, confrontational, hostile, and
threatening conduct toward a succession of nine different court-
appointed attorneys over the course of the trial and posttrial
proceedings, ordered forfeiture on those grounds. Subsequent to
the forfeiture order, the defendant appeared pro se at the
probation revocation hearing. A different judge found the
defendant in violation of probation and sentenced him to State
prison for a term of not less than seven years and not more than
eight years, from and after the sentence he was then serving.
The defendant appealed, claiming error in the forfeiture order
and the probation revocation hearing. The Appeals Court
affirmed, Commonwealth v. Gibson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 829, 835
(2015), ruling that the judge had provided the defendant a full
and fair opportunity to be heard on forfeiture and that the
forfeiture order had been warranted based on the defendant's
pattern of threats to counsel. The Appeals Court also rejected
the defendant's claims related to the probation revocation
hearing.
We granted the defendant's application for further
appellate review to consider whether the forfeiture order, based
3
on the defendant's pattern of hostile and threatening conduct
toward counsel, warrants forfeiture under the guidelines we
articulated in Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 81 (2009).
Although we appreciate the imperative to force an end to the
defendant's interference with the timely and fair disposition of
the probation revocation matter, we are constrained to conclude
that the forfeiture order must be reversed, as it does not
comply with the strict guidelines we adopted in Means, supra.
Therefore, we vacate the forfeiture order based on our
conclusion that (1) the forfeiture hearing did not meet the
procedural due process requirements of Means; and (2) the
defendant's conduct, although egregious in many respects, did
not warrant forfeiture under the guidelines established in
Means.
Background. We describe the details of the proceedings
leading to the judge's forfeiture order and the subsequent
probation violation hearing. In 2006, the defendant was
indicted on three charges of indecent assault and battery on a
child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B. Six attorneys were
appointed to represent the defendant during the trial
proceedings. The third of these trial attorneys withdrew for a
number of reasons, including the defendant's written threat to
counsel that "street justice" would prevail if he were
convicted. The sixth attorney represented him during trial. He
4
was convicted on two of the three indictments in 2008.1 The
victim was his daughter. The trial judge sentenced the
defendant to a term of not less than eight years and not more
than ten years in State prison on the first indictment, and to
probation for fifteen years on the second indictment, to run
concurrently with the sentence on the first indictment. As a
condition of probation, the judge ordered the defendant to have
no contact, direct or indirect, with the victim or the victim's
mother (his ex-wife).
On September 14, 2011, the probation department issued a
probation violation notice alleging that the defendant had
violated the no-contact condition by sending sexually explicit
letters to the victim from prison.2 Prior to the probation
revocation hearing and after the appointment of three different
attorneys to represent the defendant in that matter, a judge
issued an order to the defendant to show cause why his right to
counsel should not be deemed forfeited. On February 27, 2013,
the day after the issuance of the show cause order, the judge
1
The defendant's convictions were affirmed by the Appeals
Court in a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule
1:28. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2011).
2
The probation department issued additional surrender
notices alleging that the defendant had written letters to the
victim on the following dates: November 27, 2010; June 10,
2011; March 15, 2012; December 22, 2012; and January 9, 2013.
5
conducted the hearing and made findings and rulings summarized
below.
1. The succession of posttrial appointed counsel. On
September 29, 2011, the court appointed an attorney from the
Committee for Public Counsel Services to represent the defendant
at the probation revocation hearing. On March 19, 2012, this
attorney filed a motion to withdraw with an affidavit detailing
the defendant's threats to file a complaint against the attorney
with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) unless counsel adopted
the defense strategies proposed by the defendant. A judge
allowed the motion to withdraw and, on March 30, 2012, appointed
a second attorney to represent the defendant. On June 21, 2012,
this attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing a breakdown in
the attorney-client relationship, and further specifying the
defendant's conduct in an impounded affidavit.3 A second judge
allowed the motion to withdraw. On June 28, 2012, that judge
considered the defendant's motion for appointment of a third
postconviction attorney and allowed the motion. During the
course of the hearing, however, the probation officer reminded
the judge that the matter had been pending since 2011 and opined
that the delay was caused by the withdrawal of the defendant's
3
Although this affidavit is not included in the record, we
assume that the judge reviewed it, as he referenced the
defendant's misconduct toward each of the attorneys who moved to
withdraw from representation of the defendant.
6
two prior attorneys. The defendant's newly appointed counsel
then assured the judge that despite this history, he would be
able to "take care of" the defendant. The following exchange
took place between the judge and the defendant:
Judge: "You know what, [counsel]? I know you'll be able
to take care of him, because if you can't take care of him, he's
going to have to take care of himself.
"Mr., Mr. . . . I'm talking to you, Sir. So look at me and
listen.
"I, I read prior counsel's affidavit and I was troubled by
the contents of her affidavit. You will not get another
attorney appointed to represent you, do you understand me, Sir?"
Defendant: "If they don't do me justice, I can't keep them
on. So, that's why I had to . . ."
Judge: "Do you understand? It's a yes or no. Do you
understand?"
Defendant: "Yes."
Several months later, on September 4, 2012, the defendant
filed a motion for the appointment of a fourth attorney. The
third attorney, who earlier had expressed optimism about his
ability to represent the defendant, filed a motion to withdraw
on September 10. On September 13, 2012, a third judge held a
hearing during which he allowed the motion to withdraw but
ordered that the attorney serve as standby counsel for the
probation revocation hearing.4 The relationship between counsel
and the defendant apparently deteriorated even further, as
4
The record does not contain a transcript of this hearing.
We rely on the docket for the outcome of the hearing.
7
counsel filed a second motion to withdraw on February 26, 2013.
In response to this second motion to withdraw, that judge issued
an order to show cause why the defendant should not be deemed to
have forfeited his right to counsel. The judge then appointed a
different attorney to represent the defendant at the show cause
hearing scheduled for the following day.5
On February 27, 2013, the day after the issuance of the
show cause order, the judge held the hearing, at which he
considered two issues: whether to allow counsel's motion to
withdraw; and if so, whether the defendant's conduct warranted a
forfeiture of the right to counsel. As to the first issue, the
judge inquired of the defendant whether he wished to be heard on
counsel's motion to withdraw. The defendant replied that he had
no desire to have counsel withdraw, but he admitted that he had
threatened to report counsel to the board. According to the
defendant, he believed the threat to report counsel to the board
and to the office of the Attorney General was appropriate
because counsel's legal advice to cease writing letters to the
victim in violation of his probation was causing him "undue
stress." In particular, the defendant complained that counsel
had lied in advising that the defendant could be subject to
"life in prison" as a consequence of the charge of which he was
5
The record is not clear as to whether this attorney was
appointed on the issuance of the show cause order or whether
counsel was appointed on the day of the hearing.
8
convicted.6 He also disagreed with counsel's advice that the
victim did not wish to have contact with him and that his
letter-writing to her was a violation of probation. Last, the
defendant expressed frustration that although he had other
reasons to be dissatisfied with counsel, he was unable to
articulate those reasons at that time because he had been
"diagnosed with a brain tumor deep in [his] brain that's . . .
inoperable [causing him to have] a little trouble . . . putting
things into words." After noting that much of the defendant's
recitation was consistent with counsel's affidavit in support of
the motion to withdraw, the judge allowed the motion and
proceeded to the forfeiture issue.
In commencing this stage of the hearing, the judge signaled
his awareness of the obligation to grant an evidentiary hearing
on whether, by engaging in the apparently undisputed pattern of
threats against a succession of appointed counsel, the defendant
forfeited his right to counsel for the probation revocation
hearing. At the judge's invitation, counsel -- who minutes
earlier had been allowed to withdraw from representation of the
defendant -- detailed the reasons for his motion to withdraw.
According to counsel, the motion was prompted by a letter from
6
As clarified at the hearing, counsel explained to the
defendant the ramifications of a sexually dangerous person
proceeding, under which a person convicted of a sex crime could
be civilly committed for life. See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d).
9
the defendant threatening to file complaints against him with
the board and the office of the Attorney General. In response
to questioning from the prosecutor and the defendant's newly
appointed counsel, the attorney disclaimed any knowledge of the
defendant's mental health issues except for what he had been
told by the defendant in the days preceding the hearing. He
acknowledged, however, that over the course of his
representation, the defendant had engaged in conduct against his
advice, including sending the letters to the victim, and that
the defendant's behavior was not "logical" and "not in his best
interest."
Neither the defendant's new counsel nor the prosecutor
presented evidence at the hearing. Defense counsel, however,
advised the judge that he had met with the defendant "for over
an hour in the back and [he] was not able to get very far."
Counsel described the defendant as being "highly agitated."
Without directly addressing the merits of the forfeiture issue,
counsel expressed concern with the propriety of forfeiture given
what appeared to be the defendant's current mental state and the
long-term consequences of a probation revocation hearing without
the assistance of counsel.7 Counsel repeated what he had been
7
More specifically, defense counsel's caution was prompted
by the possible consequences of a probation revocation in the
event the defendant were to become the subject of a sexually
dangerous person proceeding under G. L. c. 123A.
10
told by the defendant regarding the recent diagnosis of a "brain
tumor," raising the possibility that the defendant's conduct was
caused by a mental disability rather than by purposeful
oppositional behavior. Counsel then argued that prior to a
hearing on forfeiture, the better course was to require that the
defendant be examined for competency and to determine whether
the defendant is able to "work with a lawyer," preferably a
mental health attorney certified by the Committee for Public
Counsel Services.
The judge inquired about competency evaluations of the
defendant "in this case and others" and was informed by the
prosecutor that the defendant had been examined for competency
on at least two occasions during the pendency of the trial
proceedings.8 In both instances, according to the prosecutor,
the defendant had been found competent.
The judge made findings, commencing with the history of the
defendant's relationship with the "nine different attorneys"9 who
had been appointed to represent him over the course of the trial
and posttrial proceedings. In reciting this history, the judge
8
The docket reflects that the defendant was evaluated for
competency in March, 2007; January, 2008; and August, 2008; and
that the defendant was found competent in each evaluation.
9
The docket entries show that six attorneys, five of whom
withdrew their appearances, were appointed to represent the
defendant at the trial stage; one attorney was appointed during
appellate proceedings; and three attorneys were appointed for
the probation revocation matter.
11
listed each of the attorneys by name and stated the reason why
each had been allowed to withdraw from representing the
defendant. The judge found that between the arraignment in 2006
and the trial in 2008, the defendant had been represented by six
different attorneys, five of whom had been allowed to withdraw
after the defendant had accused them of unprofessional conduct
and had threatened to report them to the board. As to the
posttrial probation revocation proceedings, the judge found that
the defendant had been represented by three different attorneys
who had been subjected to accusations and threats similar to
those visited upon the trial attorneys, and that the defendant
had been warned that no further counsel would be appointed to
represent him.10 Except with respect to one trial attorney who
had withdrawn in 2007, the judge made no findings that the
defendant had threatened physical harm to any of the appointed
counsel. The judge characterized the defendant's conduct toward
those attorneys, all of whom are "experienced and skilled"
criminal defense lawyers, as "egregious." Last, the judge found
the defendant "lucid" and "responsive" during the earlier
exchange regarding counsel's motion to withdraw. Relying on the
prior competency evaluations as reported by the prosecutor, the
judge found that "mental health [was not] a mitigating factor."
10
The judge's reference was to the comments of a different
judge who, on June 28, 2012, appointed the third attorney to
represent the defendant in the probation matter.
12
Based on these findings, the judge ruled that "this is the
rare case where the defendant has forfeited the right to counsel
in this probation violation action by his own egregious
conduct." More specifically, the judge relied on the pattern of
hostile and threatening conduct consisting mainly of the threat
to sue or report counsel to the board, the single threat of
violence to a trial attorney, and the prior judge's warning that
no new counsel would be appointed to represent the defendant.
The judge advised the defendant that the probation revocation
hearing would be scheduled forthwith and that the defendant
would proceed pro se.
2. The probation revocation hearing. Between the
forfeiture and probation revocation hearings, a different judge
held a hearing on three motions filed by the pro se defendant:
a motion to dismiss the probation surrender notice,11 a motion
for medical records from Lemuel Shattuck Hospital, and a motion
for funds for a private investigator. The motion to dismiss was
based on the defendant's claim that the letters to the victim
did not violate the no-contact condition of probation because he
11
The motion to dismiss was based on the defendant's
allegation that the probation department unilaterally changed
the condition of probation to entrap him on the probation
violation. This allegation arose from a disparity between the
language of the probation contract prohibiting contact with the
victim "without permission from the Court" and the trial
transcript establishing the condition as no contact "without
[the victim's] express permission."
13
had the victim's permission to send the letters. The defendant
sought medical records to establish a causal relationship
between his "brain damage" and the letter writing to the victim.
The basis of the motion for funds for a private investigator was
to "check any future issues as they arise." The judge denied
these and subsequent motions filed by the defendant.12
Over the course of two days, the judge, who was not the
judge who had conducted the forfeiture hearing, conducted the
probation revocation hearing, where the sole issue was whether
the defendant violated the "no-contact" condition of his
probation by sending letters to the victim.13 On the first day
of the hearing, the judge ordered that the defendant be
evaluated for competency during the luncheon recess. After
interviewing the defendant and reviewing pertinent court
records, the court's forensic psychologist opined, "I do believe
he has a rational and meaningful understanding of what this
hearing is about. I believe he understands the gravity and the
12
The defendant filed fourteen subsequent motions,
including a renewed motion for funds for mental health records,
a motion for a medical expert, and a motion for permission "to
have one hour time with [the victim] after final hearing (with
security present if need be) to make 'peace' with her."
13
The judge relied on the no-contact condition as reflected
in the probation contract, which prohibited contact with the
victim unless permission was granted by the court. The
defendant did not argue that he had sought and received an order
vacating or modifying this condition, relying instead on an
asserted permission from the victim.
14
consequences for him. And I think, to the best of his ability,
he is prepared to try to convince the Court about his
innocence." The judge accepted the report and resumed the
hearing.
On the first day of the hearing, the victim and her mother
testified that the defendant had sent letters to the victim from
prison and that neither had consented to contact with the
defendant. The victim witness advocate testified on the second
day of the hearing and, in response to the defendant's
questions, testified that the victim had "told [her] on a number
of occasions that [the victim] does not want to have contact
with [him]." The defendant conceded that he had written letters
to the victim but asserted two defenses, permission and
necessity,14 both of which the judge rejected. At the end of the
second day of the hearing, the judge found the defendant in
violation of his probation, revoked the probation, and imposed a
term of imprisonment.
Discussion. 1. Forfeiture of the right to counsel. The
defendant argues that the judge erred on both procedural and
substantive grounds in ruling that his conduct justified the
forfeiture of his right to counsel at the probation revocation
hearing. The defendant argues that the hearing, held on one
14
Counsel disassociates herself from this argument with
support from the record. See Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass.
201, 208 (1981).
15
day's notice, violated his right to due process, in that he was
deprived of the opportunity to marshal and present evidence in
opposition to forfeiture. He also argues that the judge
erroneously considered conduct at the pretrial proceedings in
determining that his conduct warranted forfeiture of counsel at
the probation revocation hearing scheduled to occur seven years
later. The Commonwealth counters that the judge's forfeiture
order was proper given the defendant's pattern of threatening
conduct toward counsel and because the proceeding involved a
probation revocation rather than a trial. We conclude that (1)
given the timing, the hearing did not meet the procedural due
process requirement of a "full and fair" opportunity to be heard
on the issue of forfeiture; and (2) because the defendant's
posttrial conduct did not involve either threats of violence or
acts of violence toward counsel, his conduct did not warrant the
extreme sanction of forfeiture of the right to counsel for the
probation revocation hearing. We address each issue in turn.
a. The forfeiture hearing. In Means, we outlined the
requirements of the forfeiture hearing, explaining its
importance as a predicate to the denial of a defendant's
fundamental constitutional right to counsel. There, we said
that "[b]ecause the consequences of forfeiture of counsel are so
severe, the sanction of forfeiture should not be imposed until
the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity at a hearing
16
to offer evidence as to the totality of circumstances that may
bear on the question of whether the sanction of forfeiture is
both warranted and appropriate." Means, 454 Mass. at 97.
Beyond the broad command that due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the court in Means further specified
that (1) the judge should hear evidence regarding the alleged
conduct that may give rise to a finding of forfeiture; and (2)
the defendant has the right to "offer evidence, and to cross-
examine witnesses, both as to the allegations of his misconduct
and the totality of the circumstances that may bear on the
forfeiture finding, including his mental competency and
psychological condition, any other mitigating considerations,
and the willingness of appointed counsel to continue the
representation." Id.
The forfeiture proceeding was properly initiated by notice
"directing the defendant to appear at a hearing to show cause
why the court should not order forfeiture of his right to
appointed counsel." Id. The hearing, however, was not
sufficiently protective of the defendant's due process right to
a "full and fair" hearing where the timing of the hearing, one
day after the issuance of the show cause order, imposed
unacceptable limitations on the defendant's right to present
evidence on the totality of circumstances, including mental
disability, bearing on the issue of forfeiture. See id. At the
 17
very least, the "full and fair opportunity at a hearing to offer
evidence as to the totality of circumstances" bearing on the
issue of forfeiture requires an opportunity for the defendant to
consult fully with counsel and for counsel to marshal evidence
relevant to the conduct underlying the forfeiture. Id. Neither
of these minimum requirements for a fair hearing was met.
The judge conducted the hearing on one day's notice with
newly appointed defense counsel. Counsel, who met the defendant
for the first time on the day of the hearing, reported that he
had spoken to the defendant "for over an hour in the back and
[he] was not able to get very far."15 While we do not intend to
suggest that a one-day notice is never appropriate, it is
evident, however, that in the circumstances of this case, where
a potential defense to forfeiture was the defendant's mental
disability, the one-day notice was simply too short to
effectuate the defendant's right to a "full and fair" hearing.
The defendant was entitled to raise the issue of his mental
disability in his response to the show cause order, and the
court was obligated to consider it. That much is clear from
Means, 454 Mass. at 97. Implicit in the right to present a
defense is a fair opportunity to marshal facts in support of the
claim. Counsel, faced with a defendant claiming a serious
15
The defendant was incarcerated at the time of the
hearing, presumably limiting counsel's options in arranging an
interview prior to the hearing.
18
mental disability that surely was suggested by the history of
his conduct, was obligated to marshal all the relevant facts and
present the defense on the defendant's behalf. The mental
disability defense suggested by counsel's brief interview with
the defendant likely would require medical records and perhaps
expert testimony, neither of which was available to counsel
after the one-day notice of the hearing.16
Further, where forfeiture is at issue, Means imposes an
affirmative obligation to investigate a defendant's mental
condition through a competency hearing or waiver inquiry
"[w]here 'there is some indication of mental disorder or
impairment sufficient to create a "bona fide doubt" as to the
defendant's ability to make an informed decision to proceed
without counsel.'" Id. at 96, quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes,
399 Mass. 385, 389 (1987). The information available to the
judge from the colloquy with the defendant and from counsel
regarding the possibility that the defendant might have a mental
disorder was sufficient to require further inquiry into the
16
The record reflects that, after the forfeiture hearing,
the defendant attempted to obtain medical records that, he
indicated, would demonstrate a "cystic brain tumor" and other
brain damage that affected his behavior. The motion judge
denied the defendant's motion for medical records from the
Lemuel Shattuck Hospital, where the defendant claimed the
diagnosis had been made. Thus, it is not possible to say
whether such records actually exist.
19
defendant's ability to proceed without counsel. See Means,
supra.
Specifically, the judge had invited the defendant to
respond to counsel's motion to withdraw earlier in the hearing,
and the defendant alluded to a serious mental condition when he
told the judge that he had been diagnosed with a "brain tumor"
that was causing him to have difficulty "putting things into
words." Prior counsel testified at the hearing that he was
unaware of any current mental disorder but acknowledged that he
had been told of the claimed brain tumor and that the
defendant's conduct was not "logical" or otherwise in his best
interest. Newly appointed counsel reiterated the defendant's
claim of a brain tumor and appropriately requested that the
defendant be evaluated to determine if he was competent and
whether he could work with an attorney before any ruling on
forfeiture. Counsel suggested that, if true, this condition,
rather than a purposeful oppositional behavior, might explain
the defendant's inability to cooperate with counsel. Thus, the
matter of the defendant's mental state, whether it involved
competency or a mental disability related to the asserted brain
tumor, was highly relevant to the forfeiture issue.
The judge found that the defendant was "lucid" and
"responsive" in his exchange with the court regarding counsel's
withdrawal and that the defendant's mental health was not a
20
factor weighing against forfeiture. This finding was based in
part on competency evaluations that had been completed five
years earlier. We doubt the reliability of the prior competency
evaluations as evidence of the defendant's more recent or then-
current mental condition which, in the circumstances of this
case, was a required factor in the court's forfeiture analysis.
First, competency and mental illness are distinct concepts,
each of which may bear on the propriety of forfeiture. In
Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473 Mass. 840 (2016), we explained that
the focus of competency is the defendant's "functional
abilities" rather than "the presence or absence of any
particular psychiatric diagnosis." Id. at 846-847, quoting
Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 350 (2004). Thus, the
competency inquiry is (1) whether the defendant has a
"sufficient present ability to consult with his [counsel] with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding," and (2) whether he
has a "rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings." Chatman, supra at 847, quoting Commonwealth v.
Harris, 468 Mass. 429, 443 (2014). On the other hand, we noted
in Means that a court considering forfeiture should exercise
caution in applying a "single mental competency standard" in
determining whether a defendant may be permitted to represent
himself. Means, 454 Mass. at 96, quoting Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008). We recognized that, as here, a mental
21
disability or mental illness, quite apart from competency, may
be a factor in the forfeiture analysis in appropriate cases.
There, we said that "[m]ental illness itself is not a unitary
concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It
interferes with an individual's functioning at different times
in different ways." Means, supra, quoting Edwards, supra.
Thus, while competency is important to the forfeiture issue, it
is not dispositive.
Second, even if competency were the sole relevant issue, a
five year old competency evaluation would not suffice to inform
the required evaluation of the defendant's mental condition at
the time of the forfeiture order. Put simply, it was not
possible, based on the earlier competency evaluation, to
determine whether the defendant, at the time of forfeiture, had
a mental disability as he claimed.
To be clear, we agree with the Appeals Court that the
"judge was not required to credit the defendant's unsupported
claim that his mental state was impaired by 'a brain tumor deep
within the center of [his] brain,'" Gibson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at
834, but the judge should at least have given counsel a
reasonable opportunity to marshal any evidence there might be to
establish that there was or was not a bona fide issue of
competency either at that time or when prior counsel withdrew.
The defendant's mental condition should not have been left to
22
speculation, particularly when the constitutional right to
counsel was at risk.
b. The forfeiture decision. Although we conclude that the
forfeiture hearing did not comport fully with the procedural due
process protections we mandated in Means, we nonetheless address
the merits of the judge's forfeiture decision. We do so to
clarify the nature of the conduct required for forfeiture and to
emphasize the necessity to determine whether, given the totality
of the circumstances, forfeiture is in the interests of justice.
In reviewing a judge's forfeiture order, we defer to the
judge's findings of fact but we conduct an "independent
determination of the correctness of the judge's application of
constitutional principle to the facts found." Means, 454 Mass.
at 88, quoting Commonwealth v. Currie, 388 Mass. 776, 784
(1983). Although a probationer does not enjoy the full panoply
of rights guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal trial,
Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990), we have
determined that "whenever imprisonment palpably may result from
a violation of probation, 'simple justice' requires that, absent
waiver, a probationer is entitled to assistance of counsel."
Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 125 (2010), quoting
Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 737 (1966).
In Means, 454 Mass. at 92, we articulated the guidelines to
be applied in ordering forfeiture, explaining that any such
23
decision is to be made in light of the over-arching principle
that "[f]orfeiture is an extreme sanction in response to extreme
conduct that imperils the integrity or safety of court
proceedings." The guidelines require consideration of four
factors: (1) whether the defendant has had the services of more
than one attorney; (2) the type of proceeding in which
forfeiture is ordered; (3) the type of conduct offered as the
basis for forfeiture; and (4) the availability of a less
restrictive measure or whether forfeiture is a last resort. See
id. at 93-95. The issue for the judge after hearing all the
evidence and making findings and rulings is the application of
the two-part test: "whether the defendant's conduct was so
egregious as to warrant the sanction of forfeiture, and, if so,
in view of the totality of circumstances, whether the sanction
of forfeiture is in the interests of justice." Id. at 97.
We glean from the judge's findings and rulings that the
forfeiture order was grounded largely on his determination that
over the course of the proceedings, from trial up to and
including the probation violation hearing, the court had
appointed nine different attorneys to represent the defendant
and that seven of those attorneys had been permitted to withdraw
because of the defendant's pattern of verbally threatening
conduct against them. The judge found significant as well that
the defendant had threatened physical violence against one of
24
the trial attorneys. Thus, the judge focused on the first and
third factors in his forfeiture decision.17
It would be an understatement to say that over the course
of the seven years between the defendant's arraignment and the
forfeiture order, the defendant's turbulent relationship with
his withdrawing attorneys demonstrated an extraordinary
inability or unwillingness to cooperate with counsel.
Therefore, we have no quarrel with the judge's frustration with
what could have been a tactical ploy by the defendant to delay
the resolution of the matter likely to result in the revocation
of his probation and the imposition of a State prison sentence.
And we recognize that cases in which defendants consistently
find frivolous reasons to withhold their cooperation from
appointed counsel can and must be dealt with appropriately. See
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 389 Mass. 359, 366-367, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 941 (1983), quoting Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273,
278 (1st Cir. 1976) (assistance of counsel not absolute, and
17
Regarding the second factor, we recognize that forfeiture
of counsel at a probation revocation hearing "does not deal as
serious a blow to a defendant as would the forfeiture of counsel
at the trial itself." Commonwealth v. Means, 454 Mass. 82, 94
(2009), quoting United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 251 n.14
(3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999). Nonetheless,
we need not address the broader question of the types of
proceedings that might weigh more heavily in assessing the
validity of a particular forfeiture decision. In this case,
where the defendant's liberty interests are at stake in a fact-
dependent probation revocation proceeding, the right to counsel
attaches with full force.
25
"refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed
counsel is a 'voluntary' waiver"). We conclude, however, that
the forfeiture order in this case was erroneous for two reasons.
First, the defendant's conduct, consisting mainly of threats to
report counsel to the board over a seven-year period, was not
sufficiently "egregious" to warrant forfeiture. Second, even if
the defendant's conduct met the threshold for forfeiture, the
judge failed to consider whether forfeiture was in the interests
of justice, the second prong of the two-part test for
forfeiture.
In elaborating on the particular conduct warranting
forfeiture, we noted in Means, 454 Mass. at 94, that "forfeiture
may be an appropriate response to the defendant's threats of
violence or acts of violence against defense counsel or others."
We focused more narrowly on conduct involving "threats of
violence or acts of violence" in deference to the rationale
underlying the forfeiture doctrine: a court's ability to
respond to conduct that "imperils the integrity or safety of
court proceedings." Id. at 92, 94. Violence or threats of
violence pose obvious threats to the "integrity or safety of
court proceedings" that must be timely addressed in a firm and
fair manner. Id. at 92.
Except for the threat of violence to one trial attorney,
the defendant did not engage in such conduct in relation to the
26
attorneys appointed to represent him. Without question, the
defendant's conduct created an annoyance of the highest order
for counsel and an obstacle to the court's effort to efficiently
dispose of its docket in the interest of public safety.
However, where the defendant's conduct mainly involved threats
to file lawsuits or complaints against the attorneys with the
board, we discern no peril to the "integrity or safety of [the]
court proceeding[]," such as would likely inhere in a threat of
violence or an act of violence. Means, 454 Mass. at 92. We
find it significant as well that the one threat of violence
against an attorney was far removed in time from the probation
revocation proceeding. Thus, we adhere to the view expressed in
Means that violence or the threat of violence is the touchstone
for a forfeiture order. See id. at 94. Because the defendant's
conduct did not meet this test, the forfeiture order was
erroneous.
Last, we emphasize that if a judge determines that a
defendant has engaged in "egregious" conduct that warrants
forfeiture, he or she must also determine if, given the totality
of the circumstances, forfeiture is "in the interests of
justice." Means, 454 Mass. at 97. This requirement embodies
the concern that forfeiture be imposed only as a "last resort"
and only "when less restrictive measures are inappropriate"
(citation omitted). Id. at 95. It is a mandate to look beyond
27
the defendant's "egregious" conduct to the consequences of
forfeiture on the defendant's fundamental right to the
assistance of counsel. Thus, in any case where forfeiture is
ordered, the better practice is to clarify for the record that
all of the guidelines have been appropriately considered and
that forfeiture is in the interests of justice.
We hasten to add that a judge facing a pattern of hostile
conduct from an uncooperative defendant is not without a remedy.
Where a defendant persists in finding fault, without reason,
with a succession of appointed counsel, the court may in
appropriate circumstances consider whether to apply the doctrine
of waiver by conduct. Means, 454 Mass. at 90, citing
Commonwealth v. Babb, 416 Mass. 732 (1994) (recognizing "waiver
of counsel by conduct, occasionally termed abandonment of
counsel"). The waiver by conduct doctrine requires that the
judge must first conduct a colloquy with the defendant warning
the defendant of the consequence that he or she may lose the
right to counsel if he or she engages in abusive conduct (such
as threats to sue or complain to the board) toward the
attorney.18 If the defendant thereafter engages in the conduct
18
In the circumstances of this case, however, this remedy
was not available to the judge at the forfeiture hearing, as the
judge at the prior hearing did not conduct a colloquy suited to
a waiver by conduct. Although the prior judge had warned the
defendant that another attorney would not be appointed for him,
28
about which he or she was warned, the act may be treated as "an
implied request to proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the
right to counsel." Means, supra at 91, quoting United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995).
2. The probation revocation hearing. On appeal, the
defendant argues that he is entitled to a new hearing based on
the judge's error in limiting his right to cross-examine the
victim and her mother and denying his motion for funds to
procure certified copies of his medical records and for an
expert to interpret those records. In view of our determination
that the order forfeiting the defendant's right to counsel must
be vacated and that the matter must be remanded, we bypass these
issues except to note that where, as here, the defendant's
mental condition is asserted as a factor in both the forfeiture
and the violation, the defendant is entitled to a fair
opportunity to procure and present this evidence on remand.
Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, the forfeiture
order and the order revoking the defendant's probation are
vacated. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a
it does not appear -- at least with sufficient clarity -- that
this warning was intended to trigger the waiver by conduct rule.
Rather, it appears more likely that that judge had added the
warning to encourage the defendant's cooperation with counsel,
as the warning was given only after the judge had been informed
of the delay in the probation revocation proceeding caused by
the withdrawal of two prior court-appointed attorneys.
29
forfeiture hearing at which the defendant may offer evidence of
his mental condition as a defense to forfeiture. Regardless of
the outcome of the forfeiture hearing, the defendant is entitled
to a de novo probation revocation hearing.
So ordered.