Ulla U., a juvenile v. Commonwealth ( 2020 )

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SJC-12752
ULLA U., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH.
Suffolk. January 9, 2020. - July 21, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher,
& Kafker, JJ.
Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction, Delinquent child. Jurisdiction,
Juvenile Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Transfer
hearing. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency
proceeding, Transfer hearing, Delay in commencement of
prosecution, Interlocutory appeal. Delinquent Child.
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for
the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2019.
The case was heard by Budd, J.
Michelle Menken (Ziyad S. Hopkins, Committee for Public
Counsel Services, also present) for the juvenile.
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney (Michelle
P. Slade, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.
Alison R. Bancroft, for youth advocacy division of the
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted
a brief.
LENK, J. We take this opportunity to clarify certain
procedural questions that have arisen in connection with the
2
"transfer hearing" in the Juvenile Court afforded juveniles by
G. L. c. 119, § 72A. That statute was enacted to close a gap in
the statutory scheme as it concerned the treatment of those
persons who had reached their nineteenth birthdays and were
apprehended for acts allegedly committed when they had not yet
reached their eighteenth birthdays. See St. 1996, c. 200, § 13A
(establishing transfer hearings); St. 2013, c. 84, § 23 (raising
birthdays by one year).
Because the Juvenile Court has limited jurisdiction,
ordinarily not including those over eighteen years of age, and
because "adult" courts have no jurisdiction over those whose
acts occurred while the individual was still a juvenile (i.e.,
under age eighteen), no court had jurisdiction in such
circumstances. The Legislature remedied this state of affairs
by creating the "transfer hearing," which was to take place in
the Juvenile Court. There, a Juvenile Court judge would
determine whether probable cause existed and, if so, whether the
public interest would be served best by prosecuting the
individual as an adult in the District Court, or by discharging
the individual. See G. L. c. 119, § 72A; Commonwealth v.
Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 172 (2015) (Mogelinski II);
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 & n.11 (2013)
(Mogelinski I).
3
There has been lingering uncertainty, however, about the
proper procedures to follow, both in the Juvenile Court and in
seeking appellate review, when what is at issue is whether the
prosecutor improperly delayed bringing criminal charges until
after a juvenile's nineteenth birthday. The merits of this
juvenile's1 motion to dismiss on such grounds are not before us,
and we express no view on that matter.
Rather, we direct our attention to a determination whether,
as the juvenile maintains, her motion to dismiss should have
been heard by the Juvenile Court judge prior to her arraignment,
or whether, as the Commonwealth maintains, the matter should
have been heard by the Juvenile Court judge after arraignment,
as part of the transfer hearing itself.2 We conclude that a
Juvenile Court judge has authority to hear such a motion to
dismiss as a part of the transfer hearing after arraignment.3 As
to whether a juvenile has an automatic right of appeal under
1 We refer to the subject of the proceedings below as the
"juvenile," even though she is now over twenty years old.
2 Both parties are in accord, and we agree, that the
Juvenile Court judge erred in declining to act on the juvenile's
motion, under the belief that she had no authority to do so.
3 If a juvenile moves to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint fails to establish probable cause, a Juvenile Court
judge may still decide this motion prior to arraignment. See
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575–576 (2013).
4
G. L. c. 211, § 3, where the motion is denied, we conclude that
he or she does not.
1. Background. Shortly after noon on October 14, 2016,
officers of the Boston police department responded to a two-
vehicle crash in the Roslindale section of Boston. They found
one of the vehicles turned over onto the driver's side and
identified the juvenile as the operator of the heavily damaged
vehicle. A reconstruction of the accident later would reflect
that she had been driving at approximately seventy miles per
hour, forty miles per hour over the speed limit, when she lost
control of the vehicle. At the time of the crash, she was
seventeen years old. The juvenile was taken to a local
hospital, where she was treated for injuries that were not life
threatening. A rear seat passenger in the juvenile's vehicle
was found unresponsive at the scene. The passenger also was
transported for medical treatment, but was pronounced dead at
the hospital.
In August of 2018, a detective with the Boston police
department filed an application for a complaint against the
juvenile. On August 16, 2018, an assistant clerk-magistrate
issued a complaint charging the juvenile with multiple offenses
related to the accident, including one count of involuntary
5
manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13.4 By that time, the juvenile
was nineteen years old.
The juvenile was summonsed to appear for arraignment in the
Juvenile Court on September 21, 2018. The arraignment was
postponed until October by agreement of the parties. On October
10, 2018, prior to arraignment, the juvenile filed a motion to
dismiss for prosecutorial delay and lack of probable cause. In
November 2018, a Juvenile Court judge determined that the
complaint was supported by probable cause, and therefore denied
the juvenile's motion on that ground. She also allowed the
Commonwealth's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
prosecutorial delay. Soon thereafter, however, the Commonwealth
filed a motion to arraign the juvenile. In that motion, the
Commonwealth argued that a Juvenile Court judge lacked the
authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss for
inexcusable or bad faith delay prior to arraignment.
Following a nonevidentiary hearing in February 2019, the
same judge denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss due to
prosecutorial delay. The judge concluded that, as a result of
the limited jurisdiction granted to the Juvenile Court under
4 The juvenile also was charged with assault and battery by
means of a dangerous weapon (the vehicle), G. L. c. 265, § 15A;
reckless operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90,
§ 24 (2) (a); speeding, G. L. c. 90, § 17; and unlicensed
operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 10.
6
G. L. c. 119, § 72A, she lacked the authority to decide the
merits of the juvenile's motion. The judge then determined that
the juvenile's motion should be heard after the transfer hearing
was complete and any subsequent complaint was issued in an adult
court. The judge also declined to report questions of law
regarding her authority under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and allowed
the Commonwealth's motion to arraign the juvenile.
In May 2019, the juvenile filed in the county court a
petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.
In June 2019, the single justice denied the petition. The
juvenile subsequently was arraigned; she pleaded not delinquent,
and was released on personal recognizance.
In June 2019, the juvenile appealed to this court from the
single justice's denial. We allowed the juvenile's appeal to
proceed, notwithstanding that, ordinarily, a juvenile may not
seek review of the denial of a motion to dismiss until after
trial. While recognizing that the question of prearraignment
dismissal was moot as to this juvenile,5 we noted that the issue
5 We note, however, that the question regarding the
authority of a Juvenile Court judge to decide a motion to
dismiss for prosecutorial delay is not entirely moot as to the
juvenile. Although she has been arraigned, no transfer hearing
apparently has taken place. Thus, because we conclude that a
Juvenile Court judge has the authority to hear a juvenile's
motion to dismiss as part of the transfer hearing after
arraignment, see part 2.b.iv, infra, this decision well may
affect the future proceedings in the Juvenile Court.
7
was one of the proper procedure and timing of efforts to appeal,
did not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss, was
"important, likely to recur in similar circumstances, but also
likely to evade review in the normal course," and that the
juvenile had no other means by which to seek relief. See Acting
Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000).
Before us are the two questions raised in the juvenile's
petition for extraordinary relief: the scope of a Juvenile
Court judge's authority to hear a juvenile's motion to dismiss
for bad faith or inexcusable delay under G. L. c. 119, § 72A,
and, if such a motion is denied, whether the juvenile has the
right to an interlocutory appeal.
2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. "We will not
reverse an order of a single justice in a proceeding brought
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, absent an abuse of discretion or
other clear error of law. Thus, we review independently the
single justice's legal rulings to determine whether it is
erroneous.'" Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 167
(2009), quoting Youngworth v. Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 608, 611
(2002).
"To facilitate this determination, this court previously
has exercised its power of review under {G. L.] c. 211, § 3, to
examine the merits of the case presented to the trial judge."
Commonwealth v. Nettis, 418 Mass. 715, 717 (1994), quoting
8
Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
406 Mass. 701, 709 n.7 (1990). Accordingly, we begin with the
procedural issue presented to the Juvenile Court judge -- the
scope of her authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss
prior to arraignment.
b. Judicial authority to hear motion to dismiss prior to
arraignment. As the motion judge recognized, the authority of
the Juvenile Court is limited by statute, and "must either be
articulated expressly or be capable of being deduced by
necessary and inevitable implication" (quotation and citation
omitted). Johnson v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 712, 716 (1991).
See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 792 (2019);
Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 645. To determine whether this
authority extends to resolving a motion to dismiss for
inexcusable or bad faith delay, we first must consider the role
of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in the broader statutory framework that
defines the respective jurisdictions of the juvenile and adult
courts.
i. Transfer hearings under G. L. c. 119, § 72A. General
Laws c. 119, § 72A, provides:
"If a person commits an offense or violation prior to his
eighteenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his
nineteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
said person committed the offense charged, and shall, in
its discretion, either order that the person be discharged,
if satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the
9
protection of the public; or, if the court is of the
opinion that the interests of the public require that such
person be tried for such offense or violation instead of
being discharged, the court shall dismiss the delinquency
complaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued. The
case shall thereafter proceed according to the usual course
of criminal proceedings and in accordance with the
provisions of [G. L. c. 218, § 30,] and [G. L. c. 278,
§ 18]. Said hearing shall be held prior to, and separate
from, any trial on the merits of the charges alleged."
This language grants the Juvenile Court jurisdiction over
juveniles who commit a crime before they are eighteen, but who
are not "apprehended" -- meaning that no prosecution is
commenced against them -- until after they are at least nineteen
years old. See Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 171 ("G. L. c. 119,
§ 72A, confers jurisdiction in circumstances where . . . a
defendant otherwise would face no possibility of prosecution");
Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 635; Commonwealth v. Porges, 460
Mass. 525, 531 (2011) (discussing legislative efforts to ensure
juveniles do not slip through "cracks"). Where the Juvenile
Court exercises jurisdiction over a juvenile by virtue of its
authority under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, a Juvenile Court judge has
express authority to take one of two actions. The judge may
exercise his or her discretion to discharge the juvenile, in
which case no criminal prosecution will occur, or the judge
instead may dismiss the juvenile complaint and cause a criminal
complaint to be issued in the District Court, where "[t]he case
10
shall thereafter proceed according to the usual course of
criminal proceedings." Id.
ii. Motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay.
When the Commonwealth proceeds against a juvenile under G. L.
c. 119, § 72A, some degree of delay is inherent in the
prosecution. This delay often will result from circumstances
entirely beyond the Commonwealth's control. See, e.g., J.H. v.
Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 293 (2018) ("As we discern no
indicia of bad faith from this record, and the timing of the
prosecution appears directly connected to the complainant's
willingness to proceed, we conclude that this argument [of bad
faith delay] has no merit"). Where other means of prosecution
are available, the possibility that a Juvenile Court judge might
exercise his or her discretion to discharge a juvenile serves as
a powerful disincentive from making use of G. L. c. 119, § 72A.
Given this, we consistently have expressed confidence that the
Commonwealth's resort to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, will be rare, and
will be exercised only where seeking a timely complaint or
indictment in the Juvenile Court was not feasible. See, e.g.,
Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 172.
Nonetheless, we have recognized that the transfer hearing
procedure of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, could, in theory, be misused
to proceed in an adult court against a person who committed an
offense as a juvenile. Under this scenario, the Commonwealth
11
intentionally could delay proceeding against a juvenile until
after his or her nineteenth birthday, at which point the
juvenile would have "'aged out' of the Juvenile Court's
jurisdiction." See Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798, 806
(2012). Such inexcusable or bad faith delay would deprive a
juvenile of certain advantages of the juvenile justice system.
See G. L. c. 119, § 53 (proceedings in Juvenile Court are not
"deemed criminal proceedings," and juveniles are "treated, not
as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and
guidance"); Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575–576
(2013) ("the juvenile justice system is primarily
rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences between
juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward the correction
and redemption to society of delinquent children" [quotations
and citation omitted]).6
We have not identified an actual instance of such bad faith
or inexcusable delay; nor are we aware of any case where another
court in the Commonwealth has done so. In the event that such
delay occurs, however, we have provided a potential remedy for
an aggrieved juvenile. Because inexcusable or bad faith delay
could implicate due process concerns, see, e.g., Porges, 460
Mass. at 532 n.4, the "acknowledged remedy for delay" is
6 Of course, the most serious implication of delay is the
possibility of being committed to adult prison.
12
dismissal of the charging instrument, Commonwealth v. Imbruglia,
377 Mass. 682, 688 (1979). On such a motion to dismiss, the
juvenile has the initial burden of raising the issue of bad
faith or inexcusable delay. Once the issue is raised, the
burden shifts to the Commonwealth to demonstrate the absence of
bad faith, including "the unfeasibility of timely seeking and
obtaining" alternative process. See Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at
646 n.11. See also, e.g., J.H., 479 Mass. at 293.
iii. Timing of a motion to dismiss due to bad faith or
inexcusable delay. The question before us is not whether the
juvenile may pursue a motion to dismiss, but rather, when that
motion may be decided. To resolve this question involves two
separate inquiries: first, whether a Juvenile Court judge has
the authority to hear the motion at all and, if so, whether the
judge must arraign the juvenile before deciding the motion.
The authority of a Juvenile Court judge to decide a motion
to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay is a "necessary
and inevitable implication" of the transfer hearing process
(quotation and citation omitted). See Johnson, 409 Mass. at
716. General Laws c. 119, § 72A, expressly grants a Juvenile
Court judge discretion to determine whether the public interest
requires that a juvenile be tried or discharged. To exercise
that discretion, a judge necessarily must have the authority to
consider the issue of prosecutorial delay. If the Commonwealth
13
were to misuse the transfer hearing process through bad faith or
inexcusable delay, the interests of the public would be ill
served by permitting such a prosecution to proceed.
Unduly limiting the authority of a Juvenile Court judge to
consider these issues would frustrate one of the fundamental
purposes of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, i.e., empowering Juvenile Court
judges to decide "whether the prosecution may proceed
altogether." Nanny, 462 Mass. at 806. We will not "impose an
overly narrow or artificial construction on a statute that would
frustrate a grant of jurisdiction that the Legislature clearly
intended." Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 171, quoting Porges, 460
Mass. at 532.
We turn to consider whether a Juvenile Court judge has the
discretion to hear a motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad
faith delay prior to arraignment, or may do so only after
arraignment. Following arraignment, "the juvenile's name and
delinquency charge become part of the juvenile's permanent
[court activity record information (CARI)] record, and may not
be expunged." See Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 572, citing
Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 437 Mass. 470, 473–474 (2002). If,
however, a Juvenile Court judge has discretion to dismiss a case
prior to arraignment, he or she may choose to spare the juvenile
from these "collateral consequences of a delinquency charge."
Humberto H., supra at 576.
14
As a general rule, a Juvenile Court judge has no authority
to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment. The decision to
arraign ordinarily is tantamount to a prosecutor's exclusive
discretion whether to prosecute a case. See Commonwealth v.
Newton N., 478 Mass. 747, 755–757 (2018). Arraignment is the
initial point at which a plea is entered, pretrial conferences
are scheduled, and the discovery process begins. See Mass. R.
Crim. P. 7, as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012); Mass. R.
Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004). To dismiss
a valid complaint at this initial stage would "short-circuit[]
the adversary process by silencing the people's elected voice,"
and thereby "usurp[] the decision-making authority
constitutionally allocated to the executive branch."
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500-501 (1991). This
would violate art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, which provides that "[i]n the government of this
commonwealth . . . the judicial [department] shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers."
There are only two circumstances under which we have
recognized that a Juvenile Court judge may dismiss a complaint
prior to arraignment without running afoul of the separation of
powers set forth in art. 30. First, the Legislature
occasionally has expressly granted judges the discretion to
decide whether a prosecution may go forward without the need for
15
conducting an arraignment. Second, in the absence of express
statutory authority, a Juvenile Court judge has discretion to
consider a motion to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment
where that complaint on its face is not legally valid. See
Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 167 (lack of jurisdiction);7 Humberto
H., 466 Mass. at 575 (lack of probable cause). Neither of these
exceptions is applicable here.
Where the Legislature has intended to permit prearraignment
dismissal, it has stated so explicitly.8 General Laws c. 119,
§ 72A, is conspicuously silent on this point. Had the
Legislature sought to single out juveniles who are discharged
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and shield them from the
7 Here, the motion judge properly exercised her discretion
to decide, prior to arraignment, whether the complaint against
the juvenile established probable cause.
8 For some offenses, juveniles are now eligible by statute
to participate in pretrial, prearraignment diversion programs,
if a judge determines that a particular program would be
suitable for the juvenile, see G. L. c. 119, § 54A (b), inserted
by St. 2018, c. 69, § 75; or, with the Commonwealth's approval,
if the juvenile agrees to participate in a restorative justice
program, see G. L. c. 276B, § 2, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69,
§ 202. "A child complained of as a delinquent child may, upon
the request of the child, undergo an assessment prior to
arraignment to enable the judge to consider the suitability of
the child for diversion. . . . If a case is continued pursuant
to this subsection, the child shall not be arraigned and an
entry shall not be made into the criminal offender record
information system until a judge issues an order to resume the
ordinary processing of a delinquency proceeding" (emphasis
added). See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 194-195
(2019), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 54A (b).
16
consequences of a CARI record, "it could have used similar
language; it chose not to do so." Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483
Mass. 186, 195 (2019). We will not read such additional
protections into this statute, particularly where doing so
unnecessarily would implicate separation of powers concerns.
See Commonwealth v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 224, 228 (2017) ("where
the Legislature used specific language in one part of an
enactment . . . , but not in another . . . , the language should
not be implied where it is not present").
In the absence of legislative authorization, a Juvenile
Court judge may also dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment
only where the complaint itself, on its face, is invalid.9 Cf.
Newton N., 478 Mass. at 755-756. Under such circumstances, the
judge may determine the issue of legal validity based on the
"four corners of the complaint," and without the need for an
evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 478 Mass. 759,
762 (2018), quoting Humberto H. 466 Mass. at 565.
Assessing an allegation of inexcusable or bad faith
prosecutorial delay under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, presents a
substantially different inquiry. Such delay does not implicate
the validity of the delinquency complaint itself, or the
9 Here, the motion judge properly exercised her discretion
to decide, prior to arraignment, whether the complaint against
the juvenile established probable cause.
17
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to hear it. Rather, it calls
into question whether a District Court ultimately may exercise
jurisdiction over the juvenile.
As noted supra, the legislatively prescribed vehicle for
determining whether the case should proceed to the District
Court is the second stage of the transfer hearing under G. L.
c. 119, § 72A. We repeatedly have recognized that the transfer
hearing in the Juvenile Court serves the same function as a
bind-over probable cause hearing in the District Court. See,
e.g., Nanny, 462 Mass. at 805. It is notable that when the
District Court does not exercise final jurisdiction over a
defendant pending a probable cause hearing, our rules of
criminal procedure nonetheless explicitly contemplate that an
arraignment must occur in the District Court. See Mass. R.
Crim. P. 7 (b) (4) ("At a District Court arraignment on a
complaint which is outside of the District Court's final
jurisdiction or on which jurisdiction is declined, the court
shall schedule the case for a probable cause hearing" [emphasis
added]). We see no reason to treat the analogous transfer
hearing under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, differently in this respect.
Moreover, a motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad faith
delay cannot be resolved merely by referring to the face of the
complaint. While some delay will always be apparent in a
complaint subject to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, the presence of bad
18
faith will not. Instead, the Juvenile Court judge likely would
need to hold an evidentiary hearing where the judge could
receive testimony from Commonwealth witnesses, such as
investigating officers, as to why a timely complaint or
indictment in the Juvenile Court was not feasible. At the very
least, because such an inquiry would occur as part of the
transfer hearing, the juvenile would have the opportunity to
"present a defense and cross-examine witnesses." Nanny, 462
Mass. at 805. This necessarily complex assessment is far
removed from a probable cause determination based on the four
corners of a complaint; it must be conducted following an
arraignment.
c. Right to immediate appeal. Finally, we turn to the
single justice's determination that the juvenile in this case
did not have a right to pursue an immediate appeal pursuant to
G. L. c. 211, § 3.
Our supervisory authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is
"exercised only in exceptional circumstances and where necessary
to protect substantive rights in the absence of an alternative,
effective remedy" (quotation and citation omitted). MacDougall
v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 505, 510 (2006). "Relief under G. L.
c. 211, § 3, is not available where the [defendant] has or had
adequate and effective avenues other than G. L. c. 211, § 3, by
19
which to seek and obtain the requested relief" (citation
omitted). Lanoue v. Commonwealth, 427 Mass. 1014, 1015 (1998).
As we noted in our order permitting this appeal, "[i]n
general, 'there is no right to interlocutory review of the
denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.'"
N.M. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 89, 91 (2017), quoting Flood v.
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2013). We have allowed such
appeals only in very narrow circumstances, where proceeding
without an appeal completely and irreparably would deprive a
defendant of his or her fundamental rights. See Gangi v.
Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 158, 160 n.2 (2012) (allowing
"temporarily" committed defendant to appeal from denial of
motion to dismiss sexually dangerous person petition "[i]n light
of his immediate liberty interest in resolution of this dispute"
[quotation and citation omitted]); McGuinness v. Commonwealth,
423 Mass. 1003, 1004 (1996) (permitting appeal from denial of
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds).
Given that we ordinarily do not allow interlocutory review
of motions to dismiss, the single justice did not abuse her
discretion by declining to reach the merits of the juvenile's
claims. "A single justice, in his or her discretion, may . . .
properly decline to employ the court's extraordinary power of
general superintendence where exceptional circumstances are not
present." Aroian v. Commonwealth, 483 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2019),
20
quoting Commonwealth v. Narea, 454 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.1 (2009).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 26 (2019) ("we
routinely uphold single justice denials of . . . petitions where
there are no novel, systemic, or case-determinative issues, or
other aspects that make the petitions exceptional").
Here, the single justice recognized that the juvenile had
other adequate avenues by which to obtain appellate review,
namely, by appeal following any subsequent conviction. The
single justice cited this court's decision in N.M., 478 Mass. at
91, and the Commonwealth's statements in its opposition, both of
which discuss just such a remedy. Thus, while the Juvenile
Court judge's conclusion that she lacked the authority to decide
the motion to dismiss was clearly erroneous, the single justice
was not compelled to address that error at the stage of the
proceeding before her. Cf. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454
Mass. 1005, 1005–1006 (2009) ("We will review interlocutory
matters in criminal cases only when substantial claims of
irremediable error are presented . . . and only in exceptional
circumstances . . . where it becomes necessary to protect
substantive rights" [quotations and citation omitted]). Because
the single justice properly applied the standard of G. L.
c. 211, § 3, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the
petition.
21
While the single justice did not err in declining to reach
the merits of the petition, we are not precluded from reaching
the procedural questions now. The second question remains:
whether a juvenile ordinarily may seek interlocutory review
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of a motion to dismiss
under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, on the grounds of inexcusable delay
or bad faith. As this issue has been fully briefed, and is
capable of repetition yet evading review, we exercise our
discretion to resolve it. For the reasons discussed infra, we
conclude that a juvenile has no automatic right to an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss for
bad faith or inexcusable delay.
The juvenile maintains that when the Commonwealth
inexcusably delays in bringing a prosecution under G. L. c. 119,
§ 72A, the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction to hear the case,
and the juvenile has the right not to be tried. To delay her
appeal until after the resolution of the criminal case against
her irreparably would deprive her of that right. Therefore, she
urges us to treat a motion to dismiss in such circumstances like
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, and to permit
interlocutory appeal. Cf. McGuinness, 423 Mass. at 1004.
We do not agree. In our prior cases, we have noted that an
adult defendant may not appeal immediately from the denial of a
motion to dismiss on grounds similar to those at issue here,
22
including undue preindictment delay, see King v. Commonwealth,
442 Mass. 1043, 1044 (2004), and even violations of due process,
see Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002). Nor
have we allowed an immediate appeal simply because a motion to
dismiss was considered and denied prior to arraignment. See
Brea v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2015). Further,
even if we agreed with the juvenile that inexcusable delay could
deprive the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction, we previously have
concluded that the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction likewise is not immediately appealable. See
Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2009); Gouin
v. Commonwealth, 439 Mass. 1013, 1013 (2003).
That the juvenile seeks to appeal from a decision of the
Juvenile Court does not alter our analysis. See A Juvenile v.
Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 1035, 1036 (2013) (applying G. L.
c. 211, § 3). In Fitzpatrick, 453 Mass. at 1015, we determined
that a juvenile had no right to immediate appeal from the denial
of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where a judge of
the Juvenile Court transferred that juvenile's case to adult
court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A. We noted that, in the
event that the juvenile were to be convicted, "any error [could]
be adequately remedied in his direct appeal." Id. We
subsequently reached the same conclusion where a juvenile, like
the petitioner here, argued that the Commonwealth inexcusably
23
delayed prosecution until the juvenile had aged out of the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, necessitating resort to
G. L. c. 119, § 72A. See A Juvenile, supra.
The petitioner has presented no compelling reason to depart
from this reasoning, and thus to apply G. L. c. 211, § 3, more
expansively in her case. While we acknowledge that "the
ordinary appellate process will not restore the protective
nature of juvenile proceedings," should error later be
discovered, "even the absence of an adequate alternative remedy,
as the juvenile claims here, does not by itself make review
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, automatic." N.M., 478 Mass. at 92-93.
Finally, it is not a fait accompli that this juvenile
indeed will face the range of possible consequences of
prosecution as an adult; to date, no Juvenile Court judge has
concluded that her case should be transferred to adult court.
In the event that her case were to be transferred, and she
ultimately were to be convicted, she would be able to raise the
denial of her motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable
delay on direct appeal.
Therefore, we affirm our earlier holding in A Juvenile, 466
Mass. at 1036, and conclude that a juvenile subject to G. L.
c. 119, § 72A, does not have a right to an immediate appeal
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of a motion to dismiss
for bad faith or inexcusable prosecutorial delay.
24
3. Conclusion. The matter is remanded to the county
court, where an order shall enter remanding the matter to the
Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.