Commonwealth v. Louis , 113 N.E.3d 893 ( 2018 )

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17-P-966 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. EMMANUEL LOUIS.
No. 17-P-966.
Middlesex. July 9, 2018. - November 6, 2018.
Present: Blake, Sacks, & Ditkoff, JJ.
Armed Assault with Intent to Murder. Armed Assault in a
Dwelling. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous
Weapon. Evidence, Knife, Motive.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on September 13, 2016.
The cases were heard by Thomas P. Billings, J.
Alexandra H. Deal for the defendant.
Jamie M. Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
DITKOFF, J. The defendant, Emmanuel Louis, appeals from
his convictions following a jury-waived trial of armed assault
with the intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); armed assault
in a dwelling, G. L. c. 265, § 18A; aggravated assault and
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265,
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§ 15A (c) (i); and assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon on a person sixty years or older, G. L. c. 265,
§ 15A (a). We conclude that the evidence that the defendant
swung his arm while holding a knife, knowing that the primary
victim's mother was in close proximity, was sufficient to
establish a reckless assault and battery on the mother. Further
concluding that the trial judge could have rationally found that
the defendant was armed at the time he entered the primary
victim's house, we affirm.
1. Background. The defendant's wife was living in the
victim's home in Waltham, and the victim had forbidden the
defendant to come to the house. The defendant told his wife
that he believed that the victim was "trying to destroy his
relationship."
One morning, the defendant's wife and the victim saw the
defendant outside the victim's house, in front of a sliding
glass door. The defendant's hand was raised above his head in a
fist, and he was apparently grasping an object. The defendant
entered through the sliding glass door, tripped and fell to the
floor, stood up, and then began stabbing the victim. Although
the victim could not see what the defendant was holding, she
testified that he used the object that was in his hand to stab
her.
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While the defendant was stabbing the victim, the victim's
eighty-two year old mother attempted to intervene by grabbing
the defendant's shoulder. In response, the defendant stepped
away from the victim and swung his arm. The victim's mother
suffered a deep cut to the palm of her hand. The defendant
said, "Hey, Grandma, stay away," and fled. Both the victim and
her mother required medical care and were brought to the
hospital. The victim suffered thirty-one stab wounds and was
hospitalized for ten days. The victim's mother required
stitches to her hand.
After being arrested, the defendant "continuously mumbled
about what did you expect me to do, she was trying to break up
my family." The defendant later left a recorded message with
his family in which he stated that he "just made an example out
of" the victim, and that he "did it because [the victim] must
never think that she could do that again."
2. Standard of review. "When reviewing the denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, 'we consider the
evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct.
129, 133 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539,
547 (2017). "The inferences that support a conviction 'need
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only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or
inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295,
303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713,
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014).
3. Assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a
person age sixty or older. "There are two theories of liability
for assault and battery . . . : 'intentional battery and
reckless battery.'" Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 87 Mass. App. Ct.
274, 276 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526,
529 (2010). Under the recklessness theory, "the Commonwealth
must prove (1) that the defendant's 'conduct involve[d] a high
degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to
another,' or that it 'constitute[d] . . . a disregard of
probable harmful consequences to another,' and (2) that, as a
result of that conduct, the victim suffered some physical
injury" (citations omitted). Hamilton, supra, quoting
Commonwealth v. Welch, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 275 (1983). It is
not necessary that the defendant intended to touch the victim,
but "the act, itself, must be intentional, and its character
wanton and reckless." Commonwealth v. Mistretta, 84 Mass. App.
Ct. 906, 907 (2013). The injury "need not have been permanent,
but it must have been more than transient and trifling."
Hamilton, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Burno, 396 Mass. 622,
627 (1986). See Burno, supra (to meet recklessness standard,
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injury must "interfere[] with the health or comfort of the
victim").
Here, sufficient evidence existed for the trial judge to
find that both elements of a reckless battery on the victim's
mother were proved. While the defendant was stabbing the
victim, the victim's mother came up behind him and grabbed his
shoulder. Despite knowing there was a person touching his
shoulder, the defendant swung his arms, while still gripping the
knife, creating a high degree of likelihood that substantial
harm would be inflicted on anyone in close proximity. See
Hamilton, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 277, quoting Commonwealth v.
Perry, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 127, 130 (1993) ("[T]hrusting a
recently used hypodermic needle at [an officer] involved a high
degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to [the
officer]"). Cf. Commonwealth v. Pease, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 539,
542 (2000) (defendant pushed victim with force, "creating the
requisite level of risk of physical harm to sustain a conviction
of manslaughter" under recklessness theory). The defendant's
conduct involved a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm
to the victim's mother.
The Commonwealth also presented sufficient evidence that
the victim's mother's injury was more than transient and
trifling. The victim's mother suffered a deep cut on the palm
of her hand. As a result of her wound, the victim's mother was
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taken to the hospital and required stitches. The trial judge
could reasonably conclude that being stabbed in the hand with
enough force to draw blood and require stitches "interfered with
the health or comfort" of the victim's mother. Hamilton, 87
Mass. App. Ct. at 276, quoting Burno, 396 Mass. at 627. The
victim's mother's injury, therefore, was neither transient nor
trifling. Contrast Burno, supra at 623, 627 (injury is
considered "transient and trifling" where victim was "shaken"
and his "wrist was sore and [he] held it for a 'few minutes'").
We reject the defendant's theory that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the defendant's knife was the cause of
the mother's injuries. Although the victim's mother did not
actually see the knife while she was being cut, she did see the
defendant stabbing her daughter with the knife. She then was
cut when the defendant, who was still attacking her daughter,
swung his hand while she was in contact with him. The trial
judge could reasonably infer that the knife remained in the
defendant's hand and caused the victim's mother's injury. See
Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 303.
The case of Commonwealth v. Correia, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 455
(2000), is instructive. There, the defendant, a prisoner, "was
'completely out of control'" and "was kicking his feet and
flailing his arms." Id. at 458. He kicked one of the
correctional officers in the chest and stomach, sending the
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officer into a metal railing, and requiring hospital treatment
for a sore back and a concussion. Id. We found that this was
reckless conduct, despite the absence of "[p]roof of an intent
to strike the officer." Id. Similarly here, the defendant's
swinging his arm with a knife when he knew another person was in
close proximity was enough to establish a reckless battery.1
4. Armed assault in a dwelling. To sustain a conviction
under G. L. c. 265, § 18A, the Commonwealth was required to
prove that (1) the defendant "entered a dwelling that was not
his own while armed with a dangerous weapon"; (2) he "assaulted
another inside the dwelling"; and (3) "the assault was committed
with the intent to commit a felony." Commonwealth v. Negron,
462 Mass. 102, 109 (2012). The defendant contests only the
first element -- whether the defendant "was armed with a
dangerous weapon at the time of entry into a dwelling house."
Commonwealth v. Putnam, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 481 n.9 (2009).
See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 426 Mass. 391, 393 (1998) (under G. L.
c. 265, § 18A, Commonwealth must prove that defendant was armed
at time of entry, not merely after entry).
1 Because we find sufficient evidence to support the
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
under a recklessness theory, we need not consider whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the conviction under a theory
of intentional assault and battery. See Mistretta, 84 Mass.
App. Ct. at 907.
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The trial judge reasonably inferred that the defendant was
armed at the time he entered the victim's house. See Waller, 90
Mass. App. Ct. at 303-304 (judge was entitled to make inferences
based on expert opinions and testimony, despite defendant
positing conflicting theories of events). The victim testified
that the defendant "lunged at the sliding door with [his] hand
up." She stated that he was coming "[f]rom the outside" of the
house and it "looked like he had something [in] his hand." Upon
entering the house, the defendant tripped but then immediately
got up and began stabbing the victim with "whatever was in his
hand." Moreover, the victim's mother testified that she saw the
defendant "on top of [her daughter] . . . stabbing her with a
knife." It was reasonable for the trial judge to infer that the
knife the defendant used to stab the victim was the same object
the victim saw in the defendant's hand as he entered her house,
rather than (as the defendant suggests) an object he picked up
after falling to the floor upon entering the house. See Woods,
466 Mass. at 713, quoting Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass.
267, 272 (1992) ("Where conflicting inferences are possible from
the evidence, 'it is for the [fact finder] to determine where
the truth lies'").
The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the defendant
blamed the victim for "trying to destroy his relationship."
This was circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a motive
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to hurt the victim and that he would likely have come to the
victim's home armed to accomplish his objective that the victim
"must never think that she could do that again." See
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 666 (2017) (defendant's
motive to kill victim supported finding that evidence was
sufficient).
Moreover, after the incident, the defendant left a recorded
message for his family, stating that he "just made an example
out of the" the victim. The judge was entitled to infer that
the defendant would have armed himself to carry out his
intention of making an example out of the victim. See
Commonwealth v. Bouley, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 711-712 (2018).
The evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was
armed with a knife when he entered the victim's house.
Judgments affirmed.