Commonwealth v. McCray , 109 N.E.3d 1091 ( 2018 )

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16-P-1109 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. RODNEY McCRAY.
No. 16-P-1109.
Essex. December 11, 2017. - August 31, 2018.
Present: Rubin, Lemire, & Shin, JJ.
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.
Identification. Constitutional Law, Identification,
Harmless error. Evidence, Identification, Joint venturer.
Joint Enterprise. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress,
Required finding, Instructions to jury, Harmless error,
Defendant's decision not to testify. Error, Harmless.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on September 25, 2013.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by David
A. Lowy, J., and the cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley,
J.
David B. Hirsch for the defendant.
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
SHIN, J. On the afternoon of August 30, 2013, two men
attacked another man on a public street, inflicting life-
altering injuries. Both men punched the victim, one slammed him
2
to the pavement, and one or both kicked him while he lay on the
ground. After an eyewitness identified the defendant as one of
the assailants, the defendant was indicted on charges of assault
and battery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
(to wit, pavement) causing serious bodily injury (ABDW-SBI), and
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (to wit, shod
foot). A jury convicted the defendant of all three charges.1
On appeal the defendant argues that (1) the motion judge
should have suppressed the eyewitness's identification, (2) the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of ABDW-SBI
under a theory of joint venture, (3) the trial judge erred in
instructing the jury on the intent required for ABDW-SBI under a
theory of joint venture, and (4) the trial judge failed to
instruct the jury that they could draw no adverse inference from
the defendant's failure to testify, despite his request for such
an instruction. As to the third of these arguments, we agree
that the joint venture instructions were erroneous because they
did not convey to the jury that the defendant must have shared
his coventurer's intent to use a dangerous weapon to be guilty
of ABDW-SBI. Nonetheless, we conclude that there is no
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because the jury,
1 The jury acquitted the defendant of intimidation of a
witness.
3
by convicting the defendant of assault and battery with a shod
foot,2 necessarily rejected his theory that he withdrew from the
assault before the climactic moment when the pavement was used
as a dangerous weapon. Instead, the jury necessarily found that
the defendant consciously acted together with his coventurer
throughout the course of the assault, including at that
climactic moment. Accordingly, and as we reject the defendant's
remaining arguments, we affirm.
Background.3 1. The assault. Jesse Downs was walking on
Winter Street near Lafayette Square in Haverhill when, seemingly
without provocation, two men attacked him. Four eyewitnesses to
the assault testified at trial as follows.
Maria Baez, a childhood acquaintance of Downs, was driving
on Winter Street when she saw Downs and rolled down her window
to say hello. Before she could do so, two "dark complexion[ed]"
men walking behind Downs yelled something that caught his
attention. They approached and immediately started punching
Downs in his upper body. The shorter man held Downs's hands,
while the taller man with tattoos "continued to punch, and at
2 The jury were instructed only as to principal liability on
that charge.
3 We summarize the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).
4
one point lift[ed] Downs off the floor and dropped him on the
ground." One of the two men -- Baez did not remember which --
then kicked Downs, while the other stood nearby, before both
took off running down the street. Baez telephoned 911 and
followed the two men as they ran up Winter Street. A third man
was at the scene but did not participate in the assault.
Christopher Siek was driving on Winter Street when he saw
two "dark-skinned" men punching a white man in the torso, while
a third man stood off to the side. As the victim went into the
street to avoid the punches, one of the two men followed him,
"picked him right up and just slammed him down . . . [l]ike a
body slam." The attack "happened so fast [Siek] couldn't do
anything." After Siek sounded his horn, the three men ran up
the street.
Kenneth Farinelli was driving through Lafayette Square when
he saw "[t]hree African American[s]" standing around a white
man. One of the men "picked [the victim] up from around the
waist" and "slammed [him] on his head." The three men then "ran
off."
James Flanagan was driving through Lafayette Square when he
saw two men with "dark skin" attacking a white man. One "fairly
tall" man "picked [the victim] up and body slammed him." Both
men then kicked the victim in the head before running down the
5
street together. A third man was there but was not involved in
the assault.
Downs was transported to the hospital, where he collapsed
in the waiting room and was airlifted to another hospital to
undergo emergency brain surgery. Four months after the assault,
he was finally released from a rehabilitation facility. By the
time of trial in June of 2015, Downs was still confined to a
wheelchair, dependent on a feeding tube, and had a pump in his
stomach "to control the tone in his body." According to his
girl friend, Downs "needs assistance with everything" -- "[h]e
can't go to the bathroom on his own, he can't shower on his
own."
2. The investigation. Haverhill police Officer Bryan
Bailey was dispatched to Winter Street following "a report that
a male was laid out after being beat up." As he was heading
that direction, he was redirected to a different location about
one-quarter of a mile away. There, he saw two men matching the
descriptions provided by dispatch. One man, later identified as
the defendant, was wearing jeans and had a black tank top draped
over his shoulder. The other man was wearing a white shirt and
jeans.
Officer Bailey stopped the defendant and asked to speak
with him. The defendant "went off," "flailing his arms and
yelling and screaming." The officer then asked dispatch to
6
"have the witness that was following [the two] individuals come
to [his] location." Although the officer did not see anyone
arrive, he was told by dispatch "that the witness had driven by
and said the party [he] had stopped was the correct person."4
Officer Bailey drove the defendant back to the scene of the
assault. As he was taken out of the cruiser, the defendant
started yelling at Downs, to the effect of "I hit you? You said
I fucking hit you?" When Downs could not make an
identification, the officer returned the defendant to the
cruiser and drove him to the police station. During booking the
defendant's height was recorded as six feet, two inches, and his
weight as 160 pounds.
Officer Jamie Landry headed to a different location in
search of the second suspect wearing the white shirt and jeans.
There, he saw a man known to him as Xavier Simms. Although
Simms admitted he had been with the defendant, the officer
allowed him to leave because he did not match the description of
either suspect.
Ten to fifteen minutes later, Officer Landry saw Simms
again, a few blocks from his previous location. Simms was with
the defendant's brother and a man known to the officer as
4 This witness was Baez, and her identification was the
subject of the defendant's motion to suppress. We discuss the
identification in greater detail, infra.
7
Roberto Hilerio. Several hours later, the three men entered the
police station asking about the defendant. Sergeant Meaghan
Buckley interacted with them and saw no tattoos on either
Hilerio or Simms. At some time thereafter, Hilerio was arrested
in connection with the assault; during booking his height was
recorded as five feet, ten inches, and his weight as 180 pounds.
Officer Dennis Moriarty was transporting the defendant from
the police station on the night of the assault. While seated in
the cruiser, the defendant asked "multiple different times,
different ways," "how much time he could get for the crimes,"
"if he was going to get life," and "if he told the truth, could
he get less time." He also said, "Seriously, I didn't kill no
one, right? . . . I'm just going to say everything I did. I
can't go away for life."
Also that night, the police interviewed Baez. She
described one suspect as "tall and skinny kind of like muscled
with tattoos on his arms," wearing a black tank top and jeans,
and the other as "probably about five something height" wearing
a white shirt and jeans. She stated that "[t]he much taller,
tattooed, dark-skinned guy lifted [Downs] in the air and smashed
him against the ground." She also stated that the "much taller"
man "was the one [who] did the kicking."
In October of 2013, Sergeant Buckley interviewed Flanagan,
who recalled that "the bigger of the two" men "grabbed . . . the
8
white guy and picked him up and slammed him on his head."
According to Flanagan, the man with the white shirt was "le[ss]
aggressive" and "smaller." He also stated that he saw an
officer with "the bigger," "well-built" man, and that that man
was the one who had picked the victim up and dropped him on the
ground.
At trial the prosecutor asked the defendant to remove his
shirt and show his arms, hands, and shoulder to the jury. When
he did so, he revealed three tattoos -- one on each hand and one
on his right shoulder.
3. The defendant's case. The defense's theory at trial
was that, while the defendant "threw a couple punches," he had
stopped punching when "out of nowhere" Hilerio "ran up, grabbed
Mr. Downs from behind, and picked him up and slammed him onto
the street." The defendant was merely "standing there watching
this whole thing unfold."
In support of this theory, the defense elicited testimony
from Officer Guy Cooper that Baez told him at the crime scene
that a man "with a white t-shirt" had slammed Downs to the
ground. The defense also called Simms, who testified that the
defendant had "stopped throwing punches" and "backed up" when
Hilerio "jumped in," picked Downs up, and dropped him.
According to Simms, the defendant was just "standing there," and
"then after that, he took off." Finally, the defense called the
9
defendant's brother, who testified that Hilerio told him that
"he slammed the guy down" and the defendant "didn't know he was
going to do it."
Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The motion judge made
the following findings regarding Baez's identification. After
witnessing the attack, Baez telephoned 911 and gave a
description of the suspects. She continued to relay information
to dispatch as she followed the suspects in her vehicle.
Within two to four minutes of the 911 call, Officer Bailey
saw an individual, identified at the motion to suppress hearing
as the defendant, who matched Baez's description. The officer
stopped the defendant on Fifth Avenue and conducted a patfrisk.
The defendant became "very agitated" and started "flailing his
arms and yelling." As a result, the officer arrested the
defendant for disorderly conduct, handcuffed him, and put him in
the cruiser.
While this was happening, the dispatcher told Baez to go to
Fifth Avenue and wait in her vehicle for an officer to come
over. Instead of following these instructions, Baez drove by
and observed the defendant with Officer Bailey. She then
telephoned back to dispatch and stated that the person the
officer was holding was one of the perpetrators. When Baez
drove by, Officer Bailey was in the process of arresting the
defendant but had not yet placed him in the cruiser.
10
Based on these findings, the motion judge ruled that Baez's
identification was admissible because it did not result from
"unnecessarily suggestive" circumstances. We review this ruling
only for abuse of discretion as it is uncontested that the
identification did "not arise from a police procedure." See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 602 (2016). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the "decision resulted from a clear error
of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision
. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of
reasonable alternatives." Ibid. (quotation omitted).
Out-of-court identifications made without police wrongdoing
are analyzed under common law principles of fairness, as
articulated in Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99, 109 (1996).
See Johnson, 473 Mass. at 598. A judge applying those
principles "may decline to admit an unreliable eyewitness
identification that resulted from a 'highly' or 'especially'
suggestive confrontation with the defendant." Id. at 598-599,
quoting from Jones, 423 Mass. at 109. The defendant bears the
burden of proving suggestiveness by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. at 599. If he meets that burden, then the
judge must weigh "the probative value of the identification
against the danger of unfair prejudice" arising from the
suggestive circumstances. Id. at 600.
 11
Here, the motion judge assumed that the defendant was
already handcuffed when Baez drove by, but concluded that that
alone did not render the circumstances of her identification
"unnecessarily suggestive."5 The defendant does not contend that
the judge abused his discretion in this respect. In fact, he
concedes that the judge was correct. See Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 627-628 (2008) (showup procedure was
not unnecessarily suggestive even though defendant was in police
wagon, handcuffed and flanked by two officers).
Nevertheless, the defendant argues that Baez's
identification was so unreliable -- because, among other
reasons, she drove by quickly, while distracted, and without
5 Although the judge phrased the inquiry in these terms, we
note that unnecessary suggestiveness is the standard that
applies to identification procedures conducted by the police.
See Johnson, 473 Mass. at 604. Where, as here, there is no
allegation of police misconduct, the standard is whether the
identification was made under "highly" or "especially"
suggestive circumstances -- meaning, circumstances that are "so
suggestive that there is a substantial risk that they influenced
the witness's identification of the defendant, inflated his or
her level of certainty in the identification, or altered his or
her memory of the circumstances of the operative event." Id. at
603-604. Under either standard, however, the result is the
same. As the judge correctly observed, if the procedure would
not have been unnecessarily suggestive had it been conducted by
the police, "a common law analysis provides no more protection."
See Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 617 (2016),
quoting from Johnson, 473 Mass. at 603-604 (where identification
was made "in circumstances comparable to a permissible showup
conducted by a police officer," procedure "could not have been
'especially suggestive' because it was conducted by a third
party").
12
stopping to hear instructions from the officer -- that it should
have been suppressed. But under the Jones framework, a judge
need not conduct a reliability analysis unless the defendant
first demonstrates the existence of especially suggestive
circumstances. See Jones, 423 Mass. at 109; Johnson, 473 Mass.
at 604. Because the defendant failed to make that showing here,
the motion judge properly left the reliability of Baez's
identification to the jury to decide.
2. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence only as to his conviction of
ABDW-SBI. As to this charge, the Commonwealth proceeded on
theories of both principal and joint venturer liability, and the
jury returned a general guilty verdict. While not contesting
that the evidence was sufficient to convict him as a principal,
the defendant argues that he could not be convicted as a
coventurer because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knew
or intended that Hilerio would throw Downs to the pavement. In
considering this challenge, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any
"rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.
Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 523 (2017).
The flaw in the defendant's argument is that, under
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 468 (2009), a reviewing
13
court does not "examine the sufficiency of the evidence
separately as to principal and joint venture liability."
Instead, we ask "whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a
rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the crime
charged, with the intent required to commit the crime." Ibid.
See Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 706-707 (2011);
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 665 (2017). Regarding
the charge here, the intent required is general -- the
Commonwealth must prove "that the defendant intentionally
touched the victim . . . with an inherently dangerous weapon or
an object used in a dangerous fashion" without justification,
resulting in serious bodily injury.6 Commonwealth v. Vick, 454
Mass. 418, 432 (2009).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence supports a finding that the defendant was the assailant
who threw Downs to the pavement, establishing that the defendant
had the requisite knowledge and intent to commit the crime.
Baez testified and stated in her police interview that the
taller man with tattoos dropped Downs on the ground. Similarly,
Flanagan testified that the "fairly tall" man "body slammed"
6 The defendant does not contest that the pavement qualifies
as a dangerous weapon, that the touching was without
justification, and that Downs's injuries were serious.
14
Downs, and he stated in his police interview that the "bigger"
man picked Downs up and dropped him. Given the additional
evidence that the defendant was four inches taller than Hilerio,
and has tattoos while Hilerio does not, a rational jury could
have found that it was the defendant himself who slammed Downs
to the pavement, causing his grievous injuries.
Furthermore, even examining the evidence of joint venture
separately as the defendant requests,7 we conclude that it was
sufficient to support his conviction. "[T]here is no need to
prove an anticipatory compact between the parties to establish
joint venture . . . if, at the climactic moment the parties
consciously acted together in carrying out the criminal
endeavor." Commonwealth v. Sexton, 425 Mass. 146, 152 (1997)
(quotation omitted). Here, there was testimony from several
witnesses that the defendant and Hilerio acted in concert
throughout the course of the assault. The two men approached
Downs together and attacked him in a coordinated fashion, one
holding his hands while the other punched him. After Downs was
thrown to the pavement, the defendant continued the assault by
kicking him. The two men then fled together. "At no time
7 We entertain the defendant's argument as it is relevant to
our discussion, infra, regarding the instructions on joint
venture.
15
during [the] conflict did the defendant seek to withdraw."
Ibid.
From this evidence the jury could have found that the
defendant had the intent to touch Downs with the pavement in a
dangerous fashion. See Vick, 454 Mass. at 432. Contrary to the
defendant's contention, the Commonwealth did not need to prove
that he knew or intended in advance that the pavement would be
used during the assault. See Sexton, 425 Mass. at 152. Rather,
the jury could have inferred the requisite knowledge and intent
from the evidence that the defendant kicked Downs immediately
after he was slammed to the pavement. See ibid. (although
defendant "may not initially have had knowledge that his brother
intended to use the pavement to effectuate the attack," jury
could still convict him as coventurer based on his actions of
"continuously kick[ing] and punch[ing] [the victim] while his
brother repeatedly slammed [the victim's] head into the
pavement"); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 232-233
(2016) (evidence sufficient to support conviction of assault and
battery with knife, where defendant and coventurer pursued
victim together and defendant kicked victim while coventurer
stabbed him). Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 92 Mass. App. Ct.
538, 545 (2017) (there was probable cause that defendant shared
intent to use glass as dangerous weapon, where "after
[coventurer] struck the victim with the glass, [defendant] did
16
not retreat from the combat, but instead went after the victim
himself").
3. Instructions on joint venture. We next consider the
defendant's challenge to the joint venture instructions, which
he says were deficient because they failed to "advise the jury
that the aider and abettor needed to share the principal's
intent that some dangerous weapon be used." Consistent with
Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 467-468, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the defendant was guilty of ABDW-SBI if the
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he "knowingly
and meaningfully participated in the commission of the crime of
[ABDW-SBI]" and "had the intent required for that particular
crime." The judge then gave a more specific instruction on
intent. After first explaining that the principal must have
"intentionally used pavement as a means of inflicting serious
harm," the judge instructed as follows on the intent required of
an aider and abettor:
"The intent required [of] an aider and abettor is
different. The aider and abettor must have intended a
joint venture with the principal to assault and batter
Jesse Downs. The aider and abettor need not have agreed to
use pavement as a dangerous weapon, or even known or
intended that the principal use pavement as a dangerous
weapon.
"The aider and abettor must have intended that he and the
principal would jointly commit an assault and battery upon
Jesse Downs. That is, the aider and abettor must have
intended a joint enterprise with the principal to assault
17
and beat Jesse Downs in a harmful way, without
justification or excuse."
We agree with the defendant that these instructions were
erroneous in that they would have allowed the jury to convict
the defendant of ABDW-SBI upon mere proof that he intended
jointly with Hilerio to commit a simple assault and battery.
The Commonwealth's burden was higher: it had to prove that the
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the
charged offense "with the intent required for that offense,"
Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 468, which for ABDW-SBI includes intent to
use a dangerous weapon. But it is not the case, as the
defendant argues, that "such proof could be established only by
evidence that Mr. Hilerio communicated to [the defendant] that
he intended to . . . use the pavement as a weapon or that [the
defendant] urged him to use or otherwise supported his use of
it." Again, the jury could infer the requisite intent from
evidence that "at the climactic moment the parties consciously
acted together in carrying out the criminal endeavor." Sexton,
425 Mass. at 152 (quotation omitted). See Lugo, 89 Mass. App.
Ct. at 232-233; Johnson, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 544-545.
Nevertheless, the instructions here, viewed as a whole and
notwithstanding the judge's accurate statement of Zanetti, did
not clearly apprise the jury of this element of the crime. See
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 119 (1987), quoting from
18
Connolly v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527, 536 (1979) ("[N]o
general statement of the charges can remedy a specific
instruction which is defective 'unless the general statement
clearly indicates that its consideration must be imported into
the defective instruction'").
The error does not, however, require automatic reversal of
the defendant's conviction as he suggests. "Although
constitutional error, the omission of an element of the crime
from the jury instruction is not among the very limited class of
structural errors subject to automatic reversal, and upon proper
objection would be subject to harmless error analysis."
Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2001). See
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 424-425 (2003).
The defendant claims that he preserved his objection, but the
record demonstrates, to the contrary, that he affirmatively
agreed with the instructions.8 We must therefore determine
8 As the defendant notes, lead defense counsel and the judge
had an extended discussion about the intent element of the
offense. At no point, however, did counsel object to the
instructions. He failed to do so despite the judge's expressed
concerns that it appeared as though counsel "[didn't] agree with
[the] instructions" and that he (the judge) "didn't quite
understand . . . [counsel's] contentment with these
instructions." Nonetheless, counsel stated three times that he
agreed. And although the defendant's second counsel indicated
that he did have concerns, he chose not to specify the nature of
his objection, stating that he "[didn't] want to confuse anyone
else." Furthermore, after the judge finished instructing the
jury, lead counsel again stated that he was content. From these
circumstances we conclude that the objection was not preserved.
19
whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice. See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 15 (1999);
Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 456 Mass. 411, 427 (2010). This
standard requires us to "review the evidence and the case as a
whole, considering the strength of the Commonwealth's case, as
well as the nature and significance of the alleged errors."
Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass. 293, 299 (2001). After doing
so, we will reverse the verdict "only in the extraordinary
situation where . . . we are left with uncertainty that the
defendant's guilt has been fairly adjudicated." Ibid.9
The Commonwealth argues that no substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice exists because "the overwhelming weight
of credible evidence suggested that the defendant" was the
principal in the assault. It is true that, under the
substantial risk standard, overwhelming evidence of guilt can
overcome an error in instructing on an element of the offense.
See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 15. But the evidence here, while
9 Our dissenting colleague suggests that we must presume a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where there has
been an instructional error on an element of the offense. See
post at . But to the contrary, the Supreme Judicial
Court and this court have repeatedly held that such an error
does not require reversal where the circumstances reveal that it
did not materially affect the guilty verdict. See, e.g.,
Alphas, 430 Mass. at 15; Loadholt, 456 Mass. at 427; Palmer, 59
Mass. App. Ct. at 426; Commonwealth v. Velez, 82 Mass. App. Ct.
12, 19-20 (2012).
20
certainly sufficient to convict the defendant as the principal,
would also support a finding that Hilerio was the one who threw
Downs to the pavement.10 The cases suggest that a greater
quantum of evidence is needed for us to conclude that justice
did not miscarry. See Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 688-
689 (2002) (erroneous malice instruction created substantial
risk of miscarriage of justice where Commonwealth's evidence was
"strong" but "controverted" and malice could not be "ineluctably
inferred").
The verdicts that the jury actually returned, however,
allow us to conclude that there is no substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. Even under harmless error analysis, "an
instructional omission, misdescription, or conclusive
presumption" does not mandate reversal "where other facts
necessarily found by the jury are the 'functional equivalent' of
the omitted, misdescribed, or presumed element." Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 13 (1999). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 98-99 (2013) (omission of instruction on
knowledge of dangerous weapon did not create substantial
10In particular, such a finding would be supported by
Simms's testimony and Siek's statement in his police interview
that the "small, thin one, that was about five-eight, [was] the
suspect who slammed the white boy on the ground." There was
also conflicting evidence about the color and type of shirt worn
by the principal assailant.
21
likelihood of miscarriage of justice where jury, by convicting
defendant of other counts, necessarily found that she herself
possessed a firearm); United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432,
1438-1439 (9th Cir. 1993) (failure to give overt act instruction
was harmless error where jury could not have convicted defendant
of other counts without finding overt act); United States v.
Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (error in defining
"use" and "carry" was harmless where jury could not have
convicted defendant of another count without finding "act that
constitutes both 'using' and 'carrying'"). Furthermore, where
"the omitted element was uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have
been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is
properly found to be harmless." Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. See
Alphas, 430 Mass. at 15; Loadholt, 456 Mass. at 427.
In this case, by convicting the defendant of simple assault
and battery and assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon (shod foot), the jury necessarily found that the
defendant punched Downs and then kicked him once he was on the
pavement. This means, in turn, that the jury necessarily
rejected the defendant's theory that he threw a few punches and
then withdrew from the conflict. Critically, this was the only
theory presented by the defense. The defense did not argue, and
no reasonable view of the evidence would permit a finding, that
22
the defendant withdrew from the rapidly unfolding conflict
before Downs was thrown to the pavement, then returned to kick
him moments later. Therefore, by convicting the defendant of
kicking Downs, the jury had to have found that he "consciously
acted together" with Hilerio throughout the assault, including
"at the climactic moment" when the pavement was used as a
dangerous weapon. Sexton, 425 Mass. at 152 (quotation omitted).
No substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists in
these circumstances. Under Sexton, proof that a defendant
"consciously acted together" with his coventurer at the moment a
dangerous weapon is used is alone sufficient to show the
defendant's intent to commit assault and battery by means of
that dangerous weapon. Ibid. Accord Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at
233. Were the rule otherwise, assailants who participate in a
group attack would be insulated from criminal liability where it
is not possible to determine which one used which weapon or
inflicted which injuries. But in a joint venture situation, our
law does not require the Commonwealth to prove who actually
committed the crime and who aided and abetted it. See Zanetti,
454 Mass. at 468. Thus, it is enough here that the defendant
was consciously participating in the assault at the point when
either he or Hilerio used the pavement as a dangerous weapon.
See Sexton, 425 Mass. at 152; Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 233.
23
Against this legal backdrop, the jury's finding that the
defendant did not withdraw from the conflict is critical, and
our reliance on that finding does not "eliminate[] the shared
intent requirement," as the dissent posits. Post at .
Again, once the jury determined that the defendant kicked Downs,
no view of the evidence would have allowed them to conclude that
he was anything other than an active participant in the conflict
when, moments earlier, Downs was thrown to the pavement.
Contrary to the dissent's view, see post at , it is of no
legal consequence that the kicking occurred immediately after
the assault with the pavement, as compared to Sexton where the
two acts appeared to have occurred simultaneously. What matters
is whether the defendant was consciously acting together with
Hilerio during the assault with the pavement. The verdicts
returned by the jury, in light of the evidence presented, compel
the conclusion that he was.
In reaching the result that we do, we do not, as the
dissent puts it, "in effect usurp the jury's function." Post
at . Rather, we "in typical appellate-court fashion,
ask[] whether the record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element."
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. Here, based on the evidence and the
verdicts that the jury actually returned, we are confident that
the error in the instruction did not materially influence the
24
outcome of the trial. That is, this is not the "extraordinary
situation where . . . we are left with uncertainty that the
defendant's guilt has been fairly adjudicated." Chase, 433
Mass. at 299.
4. Failure to give "no adverse inference" instruction.
Finally, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred in
failing to instruct the jury that they could not draw an adverse
inference from the defendant's decision not to testify. Before
the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant requested
such an instruction, but the judge, it appears inadvertently,
did not give one. Because the defendant did not bring the
omission to the judge's attention, our standard of review again
is whether there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice. See Commonwealth v. Dussault, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 542,
544 (2008).
We discern no such risk. The judge gave a clear
instruction in his opening remarks to the venire that the
defendant had "an absolute right not to testify" and no
"negative inference" could be drawn from his decision. See
Commonwealth v. Cintron, 438 Mass. 779, 786 (2003) (instructions
given to venire "will be considered along with the judge's final
instructions in deciding whether the instructions were
correct"). In his opening instructions to the jury, the judge
reiterated that the defendant had "no obligation, no burden" to
25
call witnesses or offer evidence. And although in the final
charge the judge did not use the specific words "adverse
inference," he carefully instructed on the presumption of
innocence and then stated: "The presumption of innocence also
means that no person ever has to prove his innocence. No person
charged with a crime ever has to explain anything or prove
anything to a jury. Exactly the contrary is true." Considering
these instructions as a whole, we view them as similar to those
that the Supreme Judicial Court has held to "satisf[y] the
requirement for an instruction minimizing the danger that the
jury will draw an adverse inference from the defendant's
decision not to testify." Commonwealth v. Gilchrist, 413 Mass.
216, 219 (1992). Cf. Commonwealth v. Feroli, 407 Mass. 405,
410-411 (1990) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of
justice where judge did not use specific words "no adverse
inference" but did instruct that "defendant has the absolute
right to remain passive and require the Commonwealth to prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt").
Moreover, it is fair to say that the Commonwealth's case
was strong, and defense counsel's failure to object to the
omission of the instruction suggests that it had minimal
significance in the overall context of the trial. In fact, we
think it plausible, as the Commonwealth argues, that counsel
could have made a tactical decision not to object in order to
26
draw the jury's attention away from "the question why the
defendant decided not to assist the jury in their fact-finding
function" and to focus them instead on the three witnesses who
testified on his behalf. Commonwealth v. Buiel, 391 Mass. 744,
746-747 (1984). See Dussault, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 545. And
unlike in Commonwealth v. Botelho, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 846, 852-
853 (2015), on which the defendant heavily relies, the
prosecutor in her closing argument did not comment on the
defendant's decision not to testify. In this situation we can
conclude with confidence that the omission did not materially
affect the jury's verdicts.
Judgments affirmed.
RUBIN, J. (dissenting). The jury in this case were not
instructed on an element of the offense of assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon (to wit, pavement) causing
serious bodily injury. They were not told that, assuming the
defendant was not the principal, in order to convict him as a
joint venturer in the commission of the crime with which he was
charged, they were required to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant shared with the principal, Roberto Hilerio,
the intent to use a dangerous weapon when the principal did so
by hurling the victim to the pavement. See Commonwealth v.
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009) (judge must instruct jury
that conviction of crime as joint venturer requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt that "the defendant knowingly participated in
the commission of the crime charged . . . with the intent
required for that offense").1 Indeed, they were told they could
convict him if he merely had the intent to assault and batter,
1 As the majority describes, although the jury could also
have found the defendant guilty as the principal, the evidence
would have supported a finding that Hilerio was the individual
who threw the victim to the ground. Thus, as the majority
concludes, because there was a general verdict, we must assess
the adequacy of the instructions on both possible theories of
conviction, principal and joint venturer liability, since the
failure to give a correct instruction as to both theories is
constitutional error. See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass.
440, 450 (2012) (failure to properly instruct on both theories
is error); Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 6-7
(2001) (omitting essential element of crime in jury instruction
is constitutional error).
2
which, the overwhelming evidence showed, he certainly did.
Because no objection was made to the inadequacy of the
instruction on intent, we are required to determine whether the
failure to instruct the jury that they were required to find
this element beyond a reasonable doubt created a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice.2 Under settled law, because
the evidence did not compel a finding that the defendant had the
requisite intent, the error did create a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass.
App. Ct. 1, 8 (2001). Because the court majority finds to the
contrary only by effectively replacing the shared intent
requirement for joint venturers with respect to use of a
dangerous weapon with a weaker requirement that they were
already "consciously acting together" with the principal, I must
respectfully dissent.
When we uphold the conviction of an individual in the
absence of a jury instruction on an essential element of the
offense, we in effect usurp the jury's function. An individual
may be found guilty of a crime, of course, only after a finding
2 The Commonwealth does not argue that the failure to object
was a reasonable tactical decision of trial counsel, see
Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 401, 405 (2000) (defendant's
trial strategy is relevant to substantial risk analysis), or
that this was "invited error." Commonwealth v. Knight, 37 Mass.
App. Ct. 92, 99-100 & n.2 (1994) (when defendant specifically
requests instruction at trial, defendant may not challenge
instruction on appeal).
3
that each element of the offense has been proven has been made
by a jury, not by a panel of appellate judges who have not heard
the live testimony or deliberated about the evidence as jurors
do. And, of course, it is a bedrock principle of due process
that one may not be convicted of a crime, with, among other
things, the attendant loss of liberty, unless each essential
element of the offense has been proven to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
When we uphold a conviction in these circumstances, by
definition the jury, which has not been instructed on an element
of the offense, has not explicitly found it proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Thus, although our cases hold that not every failure to
instruct on an essential element of the offense creates a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, in light of the
fundamental nature of such an error, a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice must be found unless the presence of that
element can be "ineluctably inferred" from the evidence,
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 688 (2002) (quotation
omitted), that is, unless the evidence "required the jurors to
find" the essential element on which they were not instructed.
Ibid.
The rule does not create a "presum[ption,]" ante
at n.9. As in all cases of unpreserved error, the
4
burden to show a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice
lies with the defendant. But the law is clear. As Justice
Grasso wrote in Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 8,
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is created by
failure to instruct on an element of the offense unless "the
only permissible inference" from the evidence is that the
element was present. The defendant's burden in this
circumstance thus is to show merely that that is not the only
permissible inference. This is what creates the requisite
"uncertainty that the defendant's guilt has been fairly
adjudicated," that requires reversal. Commonwealth v. Chase,
433 Mass. 293, 299 (2001).
Thus, while viewed with a wide-angle lens it may be an
"extraordinary situation" in which we find a substantial risk of
a miscarriage of justice, ibid., where the judge fails to
instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense –-
itself, I hope an extraordinary situation –- it is an ordinary
one. Unsurprisingly, both the Supreme Judicial Court and our
court conclude routinely that that such a failure has created
such a risk. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has reached
such a conclusion without even mentioning, let alone analyzing,
the possibility that failure to instruct on an essential element
of the offense might not create such a risk, see Commonwealth v.
Paquette, 475 Mass. 793, 802 (2016), and we have made clear that
5
in at least some circumstances when a jury is not charged on,
and therefore has not found, an essential element of the
offense, a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is
"inherent." Commonwealth v. Gorman, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 482, 492
(2013).
While I agree with the court majority that the evidence in
this case would have supported a finding that the defendant, if
he was acting as a joint venturer and not a principal, shared
the intent of the principal, the evidence does not compel such a
finding.
The court majority does not conclude otherwise. Instead it
asks a different question, one that eliminates the shared intent
requirement: whether the defendant consciously acted together
with the principal throughout the assault and battery or,
instead, "withdrew from the rapidly unfolding conflict before
[the victim] was thrown to the pavement." Ante at .
Because this is the question it asks, the court majority then
suggests that, given the other verdicts, the only way the
defendant could not have had the intent required would be if he
"withdrew from the . . . conflict before Downs was thrown to the
pavement, then returned to kick him moments later," a most
unlikely scenario.
The court majority concludes unsurprisingly that the jury's
other verdicts demonstrate that the jury found the defendant did
6
not withdraw in this exceedingly implausible way. It concludes
that "by convicting the defendant of kicking [the victim],"
after he was thrown to the pavement, "the jury had to have found
that [the defendant] 'consciously acted together' with Hilerio
throughout the assault, including 'at the climactic moment' when
[the victim] was thrown to the pavement." Ante at ,
quoting from Commonwealth v. Sexton, 425 Mass. 146, 152 (1997).
This, the majority concludes, demonstrates there was no
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, regardless of
whether the defendant actually had the intent to use a dangerous
weapon at the moment when (by hypothesis) Hilerio threw the
victim to the pavement.
But to convict the defendant on the joint venture theory,
the jury were required, as the majority explains elsewhere in
its opinion, not merely to find that the parties "consciously
acted together," before and after the climactic moment, or that
the defendant did not withdraw prior to it, but to find that the
defendant had the intent at the moment of the principal throwing
the victim to the pavement to assault and batter the victim by
means of a dangerous weapon. Since the use of the pavement was
the first use of a dangerous weapon in the assault, if Hilerio
was the principal the defendant might at that moment not have
had the intent to use a dangerous weapon not because he
withdrew, but because he had not yet formed the intent to use a
7
dangerous weapon at the time when Hilerio suddenly acted. That
the defendant had acted together with Hilerio prior to this
moment demonstrated only an intent to assault and batter; that
the defendant had an intent to use a dangerous weapon (his shod
foot) afterward suffices to support a finding that he had the
requisite shared intent at the prior time when the victim was
thrown to the ground, but it does not compel such a conclusion.
Thus, in holding that the necessary implication of the defendant
"consciously acting together" with Hilerio both before and after
the victim was thrown to the pavement is that the defendant had
the requisite intent to be convicted as a joint venturer for
throwing the victim to the pavement, the majority reads the
shared intent requirement out of its analysis.
An examination of the defendant's conviction for kicking
the victim may make the point more clearly. The majority and I
agree that the critical evidence necessary to support a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared the
requisite intent is the defendant's own assault of the victim
with a dangerous weapon, his shod foot. See ante at .
But this conduct came after the victim was thrown to the
pavement, the first use of a dangerous weapon against the
victim. Whether, at the "climactic moment" when the victim was
thrown to the pavement the defendant already had an intent to
utilize a dangerous weapon, or instead was surprised by such use
8
of the pavement, and developed his own intent only afterward, is
thus a question for the jury. The finding that he shared the
principal's intent at that moment was neither "required" nor did
the evidence make it "ineluctable." It was not the only
inference the jury could have drawn. See Redmond, 53 Mass. App.
Ct. at 8. Therefore the failure to instruct on intent created a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
The court majority may be read to suggest that if I am
correct, "assailants who participate in a group attack would be
insulated from criminal liability where it is not possible to
determine which one used which weapon or inflicted which
injuries." Ante at . But this conflates sufficiency of
the evidence with the question of whether failure to instruct
creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Of
course assailants in a group attack can be, and routinely are,
convicted as joint venturers (just as, on retrial, the defendant
may be convicted here), so long as a jury actually finds the
assailants share the requisite intent with the principal. The
evidence here (and in all such similar cases) is sufficient to
support such a finding. It just does not in this case compel
it. And therefore, because, and only because, the jury were
erroneously instructed they did not have to find shared intent,
the defendant is entitled to a new trial on this charge.
9
Commonwealth v. Sexton, 425 Mass. at 152, to the extent it
is relevant –- the court there did not hold that the jury were
required to find the requisite intent, only that there was
sufficient evidence to support such a finding –- supports my
analysis and my conclusion. The Supreme Judicial Court
explicitly noted there that the defendant "may not initially
have had knowledge that [the principal] intended to use the
pavement to effectuate the attack." Ibid. It stated, however,
that it was "apparent" that the defendant shared the principal's
intent, but only because "the defendant continuously kicked and
punched [the victim] while [the principal] repeatedly slammed
[the victim's] head into the pavement." Ibid. The critical
fact that made the defendant's shared intent to use the pavement
as a dangerous weapon apparent in that case was that the
principal slammed the victim's head against the pavement not
only before, but after the defendant himself began kicking the
victim. By contrast, the court recognized that at the time of
the principal's initial use of the pavement as a dangerous
weapon, the defendant, as here, may not have had sufficient
knowledge to share his intent. Ibid.
Because evidence is absent here that ineluctably requires a
finding of shared intent at the climactic moment when, by
hypothesis, Hilerio threw the victim to the ground, under our
case law, the failure to instruct the jury properly on the
10
essential element of intent with respect to the one charge at
issue created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Because I conclude as a consequence that there must be a new
trial on this charge, I must respectfully dissent.