Commonwealth v. Carmelo Medina. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-539
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CARMELO MEDINA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Boston
Municipal Court of assault and battery; the victim was his
workplace supervisor.1 Because we are not persuaded that any
error in the evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge
resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, see
Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 398 (2010), we affirm the
defendant's conviction.
1. References to "assault" in victim's medical records.
The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant attacked and injured
the victim while both men were at work. Shortly after the
incident, the victim went to the emergency room at a nearby
hospital where he was treated and released. On the day of
1 He was acquitted of a separate charge of strangulation or
suffocation against the same victim.
trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to offer the records of
the victim's medical treatment as evidence at trial. The
defendant objected to any references in those records to the
victim's being "choked" and "ambushed from behind"; the judge
allowed the Commonwealth's motion subject to the redaction of
any references to the victim's being "ambushed from behind."2 In
several places, the records, as redacted, included references to
the victim's primary complaint as being "assault." The records
as introduced also included a "patient education" entry defining
"[g]eneral [a]ssault" to include "any behavior or physical
attack -- whether it is on purpose or not -- that results in
injury to another person[.]"
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in
admitting the records referencing the victim's "assault" because
the statements' probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice and, in the case of the patient
education materials, because the definition of assault included
in them would have confused the jurors. See Mass. G. Evid.
§ 403 (2021).
The defendant did not object at trial to the references in
the treatment notes to the victim's report of "assault," and we
are not persuaded that the admission of those statements in
2 Counsel indicated that they would undertake the necessary
redactions and provide "a fresh copy" for the jury.
2
evidence created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
See Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398. First, the statements were no
more than repetitions of "the victim's descriptions of the acts
[he] claims occurred," and so "constitute[d] 'fact-specific
references to the reported cause of [his] injuries' made for
purposes of obtaining medical treatment." Id. at 396, quoting
Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998). "[T]hese
statements were thus admissible even though 'incidental to
liability.'" Dargon, supra. Second, at trial, the defendant
did not seriously challenge that he fought with the victim or
that he caused the injuries described by the victim and depicted
in the trial exhibits; rather, he argued that the attack was the
result of the victim's provoking him, and that he acted in self-
defense. The references in the medical records to the victim's
report of an "assault" added nothing to the facts the defendant
had effectively conceded at trial -- that the victim reported
the altercation as an assault -- and to the extent that the jury
may have considered them, their substance was not inconsistent
with the theory offered by the defense.
We agree with the defendant that the educational materials
on "general assault" should not have gone to the jury but,
again, discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice
created by their admission. Neither party highlighted the
discharge instructions at trial, and, as we have noted, there
3
was no objection to their admission. Importantly, the judge
clearly and correctly instructed the jury on the fact that she
was the source of the governing law in the case, and on the
elements of assault as charged in the case on which they were
deliberating. We presume that the jury followed the judge's
instructions, notwithstanding the materials on "general assault"
included in the medical records. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 482
Mass. 275, 290 (2019) ("The jury are presumed to follow all
instructions they are given").
2. Evidence defendant "found guilty" by union. As we note
above, the incident giving rise to the charges against the
defendant occurred while the defendant and the victim were
together at work. On direct examination, the following exchange
took place between the prosecutor and the victim:
Q.: "Are you aware, is [the defendant] still employed
with the . . .[c]ompany?"
A.: "No, he's not."
Q.: "Okay."
A.: "He was found guilty by the union and he was
released."
There was no objection to this unsolicited statement about
the union action; a trial judge is not obligated to strike
unobjected-to hearsay evidence.3 See Commonwealth v. Pimental,
3 The parties disagree whether the victim's statement was
inadmissible hearsay. Given our conclusion that the admission
4
54 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 330 (2002). While the jury should not
have heard the victim's unsolicited statement about the union's
decision, it was not referred to again during the trial.4 We are
satisfied that in the circumstances here, the statement does not
raise a "serious doubt whether the result of the trial might
have been different had the error not been made" (quotations
omitted). Commonwealth v. Curran, 488 Mass. 792, 794 (2021),
quoting Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 189 (2014).
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the admission of that
statement did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice, whether considered in isolation or together with any
other errors in the case.
Conclusion. The conviction is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Rubin & Hand, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: April 3, 2023.
of the victim's statement did not create a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice, we assume for the sake of argument that
it was.
4 We also consider it unlikely that the jury would conclude that
"the union" could render a criminal verdict.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
5