LUANITA LANE v. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (And Two Companion Cases). ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-730
22-P-731
22-P-732
LUANITA LANE
vs.
BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (and two companion cases1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff appeals from the denial of her motion to
reopen her case as well as the allowance of motions to dismiss
two complaints that she filed in the Superior Court.2 We affirm.
Background. The plaintiff is the mother of a student in
the Boston public schools (BPS). On December 12, 2019, she
filed a complaint against BPS that was dismissed on January 24,
2020. Over two years later, on April 11, 2022, she filed a
motion to reopen the case, which was denied on April 26, 2022.
Thereafter, also on April 26, 2022, the plaintiff filed a second
1 Luanita Lane vs. Boston Public Schools; Luanita Lane vs. Emma
Simmons, in her capacity as the principal of the Roxbury Prep
Lucy Stone Charter School.
2 This case was paired with the companion cases for decision in
this court.
complaint against BPS and a third complaint, against Emma
Simmons in her capacity as principal of the Roxbury Prep Lucy
Stone Charter School (Roxbury Prep). The defendants filed
motions to dismiss the second and third complaints pursuant to
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The same judge
who denied the plaintiff's motion to reopen the case allowed the
motion to dismiss the second complaint, while a different judge
allowed the motion to dismiss the third complaint. The
plaintiff timely appealed the order and the judgments.
To the extent that we are able to parse her allegations,
the plaintiff claims that her son was bullied and harassed by a
teacher and a dean at Roxbury Prep; teachers withheld education
from her son; and teachers failed to document her son's
homework.3
Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to
dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts
alleged in the complaint." Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare
Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019), citing Calixto v. Coughlin,
3 We need not address claims, raised for the first time on
appeal, wherein the plaintiff purported to name four other
schools as defendants, alleged additional bullying and
harassment by teachers and other students, and alleged that she
"was told" of other harm to her son, although her son "said
nothing happened." See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 562-563
(2020) ("issues not raised below cannot be argued for the first
time on appeal").
2
481 Mass. 157, 158 (2018). To survive a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff must present factual allegations that rise above the
level of speculation and plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief. See Murrow v. Esh Circus Arts, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct.
233, 234 (2018), citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass.
623, 636 (2008).
The plaintiff does not argue that the judges erred in
dismissing her complaints or denying her motion to reopen the
first case, nor does she provide a factual record or legal
authority that would allow us to conclude that these decisions
were wrong. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in
481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (appellant's brief must contain "citations
to the authorities and parts of the record on which the
appellant relies" and "[t]he appellate court need not pass upon
questions or issues not argued in the brief"). See also Cabot
v. Cabot, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 768 (2002) ("Because he offers
no citation to authority to support his argument, we do not
address it"). "The fact that the plaintiff represents [her]self
does not excuse [her] noncompliance with procedural rules."
Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417
Mass. 183, 184 (1994).
3
Passing over the inadequacy of her brief, we conclude that
the plaintiff's complaint against Roxbury Prep4 failed to allege
facts rising above the speculative level that would allow relief
to be granted in her favor. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.
The complaint is devoid of specific factual allegations that
would entitle her to relief. The allegations are in vague
terms, such as "the teachers [were] withhold[ing] education
curriculum" from her child and "trying to make him get into
trouble." Additionally, the plaintiff's requested relief was
that the unnamed teachers and deans be fired and criminally
charged for the alleged crimes perpetrated on her son. These
claims and requests for relief do not "allege facts that
demonstrate [s]he has a cause of action." Flagg v. AliMed,
Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 38 (2013).
To the extent that the plaintiff's complaint can be
construed as a complaint seeking a civil harassment order under
G. L. c. 258E, she fares no better. The complaint does not
identify three distinct acts, allegedly committed by a
4 The plaintiff did not include in the appendix the two
complaints that she filed against BPS, as required by Mass. R.
A. P. 16 (e), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and Mass.
R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). As a
result, claims stemming from these complaints are waived. See
Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 449 Mass. 272, 279 (2007). And
although the plaintiff was granted leave to file a nonconforming
brief, this does not excuse her failure to comply with the Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
4
defendant, of "willful and malicious conduct . . . with the
intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property." See G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Bare assertions that merely
recite an element of a tort, such as harassment, do not suffice
as allegations of fact. See Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379,
388 (2014). Dismissal of the plaintiff's complaints was proper.
In case No. 22-P-730, the order denying the motion to
reopen the case is affirmed. In case No. 22-P-731, the judgment
is affirmed. In case No. 22-P-732, the judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Blake, Grant &
Smyth, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: April 20, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
5