Commonwealth v. Allen Bolden. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    22-P-110
    COMMONWEALTH
    vs.
    ALLEN BOLDEN.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The defendant, Allen Bolden, pleaded guilty to breaking and
    entering a building in the daytime with the intent to commit a
    felony, G. L. c. 266, § 18, and being a common and notorious
    thief, G. L. c. 266, § 40, reserving the right to challenge the
    denial of his motion to suppress evidence.            Concluding that
    police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and that a
    search of the defendant's backpack was justified as a search
    incident to arrest, we affirm.
    1.   Standard of review.       "In reviewing the denial of a
    motion to suppress, we 'accept[] the judge's subsidiary findings
    of fact absent clear error, give[] substantial deference to the
    judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but
    independently review[] the correctness of the judge's
    application of constitutional principles to the facts found.'"
    Commonwealth v. Quinones, 
    95 Mass. App. Ct. 156
    , 158-159 (2019),
    quoting Commonwealth v. Lujan, 
    93 Mass. App. Ct. 95
    , 100 (2018).
    2.    The stop.    "To justify an investigatory stop under the
    Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 14 of
    the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 'the police must have
    reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is
    committing, or is about to commit a crime.'"     Commonwealth v.
    Vick, 
    90 Mass. App. Ct. 622
    , 625 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.
    Costa, 
    448 Mass. 510
    , 514 (2007).     "Reasonable suspicion 'must
    be grounded in specific, articulable facts and reasonable
    inferences [drawn] therefrom rather than on a hunch.'"
    Commonwealth v. Matta, 
    483 Mass. 357
    , 365 (2019), quoting
    Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 
    449 Mass. 367
    , 371 (2007).     It "is
    measured by an objective standard, [considering] the totality of
    the facts."   Commonwealth v. Karen K., 
    491 Mass. 165
    , 174
    (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Meneus, 
    476 Mass. 231
    , 235
    (2017).
    Here, when the victim called 911 to report "someone
    breaking into [her] apartment," she initially described the
    defendant as a white male, in his twenties, wearing a black
    coat, a knit hat, and a gray backpack.    The victim's description
    of the defendant improved as she watched him over her
    surveillance camera.    After telling the dispatcher "maybe he's
    actually Hispanic or African-American, it's hard to say . . . he
    2
    has something covering his mouth . . . a scarf," the victim
    described the defendant as an African-American male wearing
    jeans and a dark coat, and covering his mouth.
    Within one minute after the defendant left the victim's
    apartment, police arrived on scene.    An officer saw the
    defendant approximately 433 feet away from the victim's
    apartment and stopped him.1   See Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 453
    , 458 (2009) (reasonable suspicion supported
    by "the proximity of the suspects to the scene of the crime, the
    minor lapse of time [three minutes] between the report of the
    crime and [the detective's] observation of the suspects").
    Contrast Commonwealth v. Warren, 
    475 Mass. 530
    , 536 (2016)
    ("defendant was stopped one mile from the scene of the crime
    approximately twenty-five minutes after the victim's telephone
    call to the police").
    At the moment the officer stopped the defendant, the active
    description was that the suspect was a light skinned, Black male
    with a scarf over his face, wearing a dark coat, a gray
    backpack, and a knit hat.2    The defendant was a light skinned,
    1 The officer who stopped the defendant arrived on the scene
    within two minutes after the defendant left the victim's
    apartment.
    2 After the defendant was stopped, the dispatcher informed police
    that the defendant had a black pair of gloves. The absence of
    the gloves from the description at the time of the stop does not
    eliminate reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Privette,
    
    491 Mass. 501
    , 519 (2023) (stop supported by reasonable
    3
    Black male with a cloth over his neck, wearing a dark coat, a
    gray backpack, and a knit hat.   This was a better and more
    specific match than "two black males wearing the ubiquitous and
    nondescriptive 'dark clothing,' and one black male wearing a
    'red hoodie,'" Warren, 
    475 Mass. at 535
    , or "the description of
    the suspect as a 'black male with a black ¾ length goose
    [jacket]' [which] could have fit a large number of men,"
    Commonwealth v. Cheek, 
    413 Mass. 492
    , 496 (1992).    Although the
    defendant was stopped in a busy area in Boston, an officer
    testified that there was no one else in the immediate vicinity
    matching that description.   See Commonwealth v. Bostock, 
    450 Mass. 616
    , 619 (2008) ("the police, having canvassed the area,
    had found no one else matching those descriptions").     In this
    case, "[t]he similarity of the physical description of the
    suspect to the defendant, the temporal and physical proximity of
    the defendant to the scene of the [crime], and the context of
    the stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion."    Commonwealth v.
    Privette, 
    491 Mass. 501
    , 519 (2023).
    3.   Search incident to lawful arrest.     "Once a custodial
    arrest occurs, as did here, no additional justification is
    required for a search of the person for weapons that otherwise
    might be used to resist arrest or to escape, or to discover
    suspicion "with or without the information that the suspect had
    facial hair").
    4
    evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made."
    Commonwealth v. Prophete, 
    443 Mass. 548
    , 552 (2005).3   This type
    of search must be limited "to the body of the person arrested
    and the area and items within his or her immediate possession
    and control at the time."   Commonwealth v. Phifer, 
    463 Mass. 790
    , 794 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    410 Mass. 737
    , 743 (1991).   Police "may secure the arrestee and then
    safely search the area within his immediate control at the
    moment of arrest."   Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 
    468 Mass. 204
    , 216
    (2014).   A search incident to arrest requires that the arrest be
    supported by "probable cause to believe that the individual
    arrested is committing or has committed a criminal offense."
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    464 Mass. 758
    , 761 (2013).
    Here, the search of the defendant's backpack was justified
    as a search incident to a lawful arrest.   See Commonwealth v.
    Villagran, 
    477 Mass. 711
    , 719 (2017), quoting G. L. c. 276, § 1
    ("Under our law, [the officer] could have searched the backpack
    for the 'fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other
    evidence of the crime . . . and remov[ed] any weapons that the
    arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his escape'").
    3 The Commonwealth did not raise this ground justifying the
    search before the motion judge, but we "may affirm a suppression
    decision on any ground supported by the record, even if neither
    the parties nor the judge relied on it below." Commonwealth v.
    Rosado, 
    84 Mass. App. Ct. 208
    , 217 (2013).
    5
    When the victim reported the breaking and entering, she saw that
    the defendant was "stealing [her] . . . Amazon Kindle Fire"4 and
    that he "took anything he could stuff into his backpack,
    including all of [her] quarters" and possibly her laptop.
    Within twenty minutes after the defendant was stopped, the
    victim identified the defendant based on his clothing and the
    backpack that he was wearing.   The detective testified that, "at
    that point, [the defendant] was placed under arrest."   Although
    the police looked in the backpack before the victim identified
    the defendant, they did not show the contents of the backpack to
    the victim until after the defendant was arrested.   Once police
    had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the breaking and
    entering, based on the victim's in-person identification, they
    were entitled to search his backpack for the stolen goods.     See
    Commonwealth v. Kipp, 
    57 Mass. App. Ct. 629
    , 632 (2003).     Cf.
    Jackson, 
    464 Mass. at 766
     (because officers lacked probable
    cause to arrest, "the subsequent search of the defendant's
    person and backpack was not justified as a search incident to a
    4 The Amazon Kindle Fire is a "tablet computer and e-reader."
    Huizenga v. Gwynn, 
    225 F. Supp. 3d 647
    , 651 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
    6
    lawful arrest").   Accordingly, the search of the backpack was a
    valid search incident to arrest.5
    Order denying motion to
    suppress affirmed.
    By the Court (Massing,
    Ditkoff & Singh., JJ.6),
    Clerk
    Entered:   June 5, 2023.
    5 The defendant suggests in passing that the patfrisk of his
    person was unlawful, but nothing in the record suggests that any
    evidence to be suppressed was recovered from his person.
    6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    7