State v. Crawley , 455 Md. 52 ( 2017 )

State of Maryland v. Anthony Allen Crawley, No. 65, September Term, 2016. Opinion by
Barbera, C.J.
CRIMINAL LAW — PLEA AGREEMENT — CORRECTING AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE — Respondent, Anthony Allen Crawley, entered into a plea agreement for
first degree murder and, in accordance with the agreement, was sentenced to life, suspend
all but 35 years. Because the sentence did not include a period of probation, Crawley’s
sentence would be converted to a 35-year term-of-years sentence—an illegal sentence that
violates the statutorily-prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for first degree
murder. See Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477, 513 (2012). A period of probation was an
implied term of the plea agreement, and, therefore, the circuit court properly added a period
of probation to correct the illegality and effectuate the originally-intended split sentence.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CT 97-0647B
Argued: March 3, 2017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 65
September Term, 2016
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
ANTHONY ALLEN CRAWLEY
Barbera, C.J.,
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Getty,
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, C.J.
Filed: August 2, 2017
All forms of first degree murder carry a statutorily-mandated life sentence. See Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(b) (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.).1 Although a life
sentence must be imposed, the sentencing court retains the discretion to suspend any
portion of it so long as the suspended portion carries with it a period of probation. Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222 (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.);2 Cathcart v. State,
397 Md. 320, 327 (2007). The absence of a period of probation has the effect of removing
the portion of the life sentence that has been suspended, leaving standing only the term-of-
years portion of the sentence. See Cathcart, 397 Md. at 330. A term-of-years sentence for
first degree murder is an illegal sentence that must be corrected by adding a period of
probation. Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477, 513 (2012).
1
Crim. Law § 2-201(b) provides: “A person who commits a murder in the first degree is
guilty of a felony and on conviction shall be sentenced to . . . imprisonment for life.”
Section 2-201 was derived, without substantive change, from Md. Code Ann., Article 27,
§ 412(b) (1996 Repl. Vol.), which was in place at the time Crawley entered into his plea
agreement.
2
Crim. Proc. § 6-222 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Limits on probation after judgment. — A circuit court or the District
Court may:
(1) impose a sentence for a specified time and provide that a lesser
time be served in confinement;
(2) suspend the remainder of the sentence; and
(3)(i) order probation for a time longer than the sentence but, subject
to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, not longer than:
1. 5 years if the probation is ordered by a circuit court[.]
Section 6-222 was derived, without substantive change, from Md. Code Ann., Article 27,
§ 641A (1996 Repl. Vol.), which was in place at the time Crawley entered into his plea
agreement. We also note that this section has recently been amended, with the amendment
to take effect in October 2017. The changes do not affect the substance of the statute as it
pertains to this case.
The case before us presents the question of whether a sentence for first degree felony
murder containing such an illegality must be corrected as described in Greco when the
illegal sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. For the reasons that follow,
we hold that the rule established by Greco applies regardless of whether the sentence was
the product of a plea agreement or upon a conviction following trial.
I
The crime, the plea agreement, and the sentencing
This case has its genesis in the 1997 armed robbery and murder of a District of
Columbia policeman, Officer Oliver Smith, who was off duty at the time. The subsequent
investigation quickly led the police to conclude that Respondent, Anthony Allen Crawley,
and two co-actors, Antwaun Brown and Donovan Strickland, were involved in the
commission of the crime. Crawley was charged with first degree felony murder and armed
robbery. In exchange for his agreement to testify truthfully against Brown and Strickland,
Crawley agreed to plead guilty to both charges.
The plea hearing was held in September 1997. At the outset of that hearing, counsel
for Crawley made the following request: “We are asking the Court to bind itself to an
agreement reached between the State and the Defense that the sentence in this case would
be life, which the Court would be required to impose, but that all but thirty-five years would
be suspended on the felony murder charge.” The plea agreement, which was read at the
hearing, provided in pertinent part:
The State, the Court, and the Defendant agree that the Defendant shall be
sentenced after the conclusion of the trials of codefendants Antwaun Brown
and Donovan Strickland, to life suspend all but 35 years for the aforesaid
2
felony murder charge. The underlying charge of robbery with a deadly
weapon will merge, by operation of law, with the felony murder charge at
sentencing.
The plea agreement did not mention probation, and the court did not utter the term
“probation” during the hearing, except in the course of a somewhat lengthy colloquy with
Crawley concerning the impact that his guilty plea in the present case could have on his
then-current status in the criminal justice system. Even then, the court’s reference to
probation was in asking Crawley whether he was “on any kind of parole or probation at
this point in time.” Neither the State nor defense counsel referred to probation in
connection with the sentence presented by the plea, and neither brought up the necessity to
have a period of probation attached to the suspended portion of the life sentence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared its satisfaction that the plea was
“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made,” and that defense counsel had discussed
the plea in detail with Crawley and, with Crawley’s consent, his family. The court then
formally accepted the plea agreement.
Sentencing took place a little more than a year later, on October 16, 1998. At the
hearing, the court reiterated the agreement in imposing the sentence:
The sentence of this Court is, as to Count One, first degree felony murder,
that you be sentenced to life in prison. Pursuant to the plea agreement, all
but 35 years is suspended, and that sentence is to commence as of February
27th, 1997.
As to Count Two, robbery with a deadly weapon, the sentence is that the
Court rules that no sentence can be imposed because under felony murder
robbery with a deadly weapon merges with Count Number One.
3
No mention of probation was made by anyone at any time during the hearing. The
commitment record indicates a sentence of “life, all but 35 years suspended,” with the box
for the probation period left blank.
In 2011, Crawley initiated the present challenge to the legality of his sentence.
Before addressing that claim, we pause to review the then-evolving jurisprudential
landscape in Maryland that bears directly on the claim he makes.
II
Cathcart v. State, Greco v. State, and their effect on this case
Cathcart v. State
On February 9, 2007, this Court decided Cathcart, 397 Md. at 320. The defendant
Cathcart was convicted by a jury of first degree assault and common law false
imprisonment. Id. at 322. He was sentenced to ten years in prison on the assault conviction
and to life imprisonment with all but ten years suspended on the false imprisonment
conviction. Id. Cathcart appealed and challenged the life sentence for false imprisonment
as disproportionately excessive, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of Maryland. Cathcart v. State, 169 Md. App.
379, 388 (2006). The Court of Special Appeals, noting in part that “no period of probation
was imposed,” concluded that, “[i]f . . . appellant serves the entire unsuspended ten years,
he will have no future risk of being retaken, as there is no probation to be violated.” Id. at
389. Focusing on what was effectively a ten-year sentence, the Court of Special Appeals
readily concluded that the sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the
crime. Id. at 391.
4
Cathcart sought and we granted a writ of certiorari to review his challenge to what
he maintained was an illegal sentence. Before us, Cathcart advanced an argument different
from his argument in the Court of Special Appeals. We summarized the new argument
this way:
Acknowledging that, in the absence of a period of probation attached to the
suspended part of the sentence, there will be no occasion for the suspended
part of the sentence ever to be executed and that, as a result, he will never
have to serve more than ten years on that sentence, [Cathcart] complains that
the effect of the sentence [for common law false imprisonment] as articulated
[by the Court of Special Appeals to be ten years] and when considered
together with the ten-year sentence for assault, is to preclude any parole
consideration for the entire duration of the twenty years.
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 324. To that argument, we responded:
We do not agree that the sentences imposed on Cathcart were in any way
illegal. The sentence imposed on the assault conviction was well within the
permissible statutory range, and, as we shall explain, the sentence imposed
for false imprisonment, despite its wording, was not a life sentence and has
no attribute or collateral consequence of a life sentence. What the court has
effectively done is to impose two ten-year sentences, one consecutive to the
other, and there is nothing unlawful in its doing so.
Id. at 325.
Our conclusion was grounded in three sentencing principles:
“[1] in the absence of statutory authority a court does not possess any power,
after sentence has been pronounced, to suspend the execution of its judgment
so as to relieve an accused, either in whole or in part, from suffering the
sentence imposed”[; 2] that, pursuant to Art. III, § 60 of the Maryland
Constitution, the General Assembly has the power, by “suitable general
enactment,” to provide for the suspension of sentences in criminal cases[;]
and [3] that any suspension of execution of a sentence by a court, in whole
or in part, must be in conformance with an authorizing statute.
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 327 (citing State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 512-13, 518-
19 (1974)).
5
For purposes of resolving the sentencing issue presented in Cathcart, we noted:
What is relevant from Shearin is the principle that, because the Maryland
Constitution has vested in the General Assembly the power to enact
legislation providing for the suspension of sentences, if the Legislature,
pursuant to that authority, enacts such legislation setting conditions or
limitations on the suspension of sentences, courts are not authorized to ignore
or act inconsistently with those conditions or limitations.
Cathcart, 397 Md. at 328. We recognized nonetheless that, in Cathcart’s case, because
there was not a mandatory minimum sentence for the false imprisonment conviction, the
court’s failure to impose a period of probation did not render the sentence illegal, “but
simply precludes it from having the status of a split sentence.” Id. at 330. Important to the
case at bar, we addressed the relevance of Crim. Proc. § 6-222 to the analysis. We
explained that, “[u]nder what is now CP § 6-222,” courts have the authority to “impose
what is commonly referred to as a split sentence.” Cathcart, 397 Md. at 326. “If a court
chooses to use that approach, however, it must comply with the requirements of CP § 6-
222, one of which is that there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part
of the sentence.” Cathcart, 397 Md. at 327. We held that, “[b]ecause the effect of the
omission is to limit the period of incarceration to the unsuspended part of the sentence, that
becomes, in law, the effective sentence.” Id. at 330.
Greco v. State
Five years after Cathcart, we decided Greco. Greco was tried and convicted by a
jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and first degree rape. Greco, 427
Md. at 485. The circuit court sentenced Greco to concurrent terms of life imprisonment
for the premeditated murder and rape, with all but 50 years suspended; the court did not
6
impose a period of probation. Id. at 486. No separate sentence was imposed for the felony
murder conviction. Id.
We determined that “[Greco’s] previously imposed sentence for first degree
premeditated murder of life, suspend all but fifty years, was converted by operation of law
into a term-of-years sentence of fifty years imprisonment.” Id. at 513. Such conversion,
as we had said in Cathcart, “does not necessarily make the sentence illegal but simply
precludes it from having the status of a split sentence” under Crim. Proc. § 6-222. Greco,
427 Md. at 505 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But, unlike the convictions at issue
in Cathcart, Greco’s conviction for premeditated murder carried a statutorily-prescribed
penalty of life imprisonment, rendering the resultant 50-year sentence illegal. See id. at
505-07, 513.
We further explained in Greco that correcting a split sentence by tacking on a
probationary period was not an abuse of the authority granted by Maryland Rule 4-345(a).
We noted that the courts have revisory power, pursuant to Rule 4-345(a), to correct illegal
sentences and, if necessary, can accomplish the correction by increasing the sentence.
Greco, 427 Md. at 508. We held:
In sum, Petitioner’s previously imposed sentence for first degree
premeditated murder of life, suspend all but fifty years, was converted by
operation of law into a term-of-years sentence of fifty years imprisonment.
That converted sentence was not authorized by statute; therefore, it was
illegal. On remand, the Circuit Court is limited by the maximum legal
sentence that could have been imposed, with the illegality removed. That is,
the Circuit Court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment, all but fifty
years suspended, to be followed by some period of probation.
Id. at 513.
7
III
Subsequent proceedings in the present case
Crawley’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
In May 2011, after Cathcart but before Greco was issued, Crawley, representing
himself, filed a “Memorandum of Law” requesting the circuit court to “Revise Judgment
of an Illegal Sentence.” Crawley asserted that the trial court’s failure to impose a period
of probation precluded the sentence from having the status of a split sentence. Crawley
argued that, under Cathcart, the omission of a period of probation rendered his sentence a
fixed term-of-years sentence of 35 years. The circuit court treated Crawley’s pleading as
a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
By the time the motion came on for a hearing, Greco had been decided. The circuit
court ruled that, pursuant to Greco, Crawley’s sentence was an illegal sentence and a new
sentence was necessary to correct the illegality. A resentencing hearing was held on April
26, 2013. The circuit court explained that, although his “personal druthers would be stick
with the binding plea agreement, [because] that’s what the parties agreed to,” he could not
because the sentence was illegal. Over defense objection, the court vacated the then-extant
sentence and resentenced Crawley to life imprisonment, all but 35 years suspended, with
8
four years of supervised probation.3 Crawley, satisfied with the 35-year portion of the
sentence, but displeased with the addition of the period of probation, appealed that decision
to the Court of Special Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Special Appeals and Petition for Writ of Certiorari
A majority of the three-judge panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the
judgment of the circuit court in an unreported opinion. Crawley v. State, No. 467, Sept.
Term, 2013, slip op. at 20-21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 8, 2016). The panel majority
agreed with Crawley that the sentence, as modified by the circuit court, was itself illegal
because it added four years of probation not included as a term of the plea agreement. Id.
3
The court stated:
Life, suspend all but 35 years. Give him credit from February 27, 1997,
which Madam Clerk has put it in the computer, translates to 16 years, 62
days. Give him credit for that.
The Court will place him on a period of probation. I can go up to five years.
But in recognition that you have done extremely well, while balancing the
interest of society at the same time, the Court will place you on a period of
four years probation, with the special conditions as follows.
As to Count 1, this is all to Count 1 . . . .
Special conditions. I am required by law for you to provide a DNA sample,
which I will order that that be done.
Special conditions are: during that period, you are to submit and pay for
random urinalysis as directed by your supervising agent, and submit to any
alcohol, drug evaluation testing, treatment and education, as directed by the
supervising agent.
The circuit court also ordered Crawley not to have any contact with eight named
individuals, and waived court costs, Public Defender fees, and probation fees.
9
The panel majority recognized that Crawley’s sentence, as converted by operation
of law to a term-of-years sentence, violated the statutorily-mandated life sentence and that
Greco mandates the illegality be corrected to impose the life sentence, “with the illegality
removed.” Crawley, slip op. at 18-20; see Greco, 427 Md. at 513. The panel majority
further recognized the distinction between Greco and Crawley’s case, as the latter and not
the former involved a plea agreement to which the court had bound itself. Crawley, slip
op. at 21. The panel majority reasoned that the remedy for the sentencing illegality in
Crawley’s case—suspending a part of the sentence without imposing a period of
probation—should apply only where the record “demonstrate[s] both an understanding [of]
and an agreement to the imposition of a probationary period.” Id. at 19-20 (quoting Rankin
v. State, 174 Md. App. 404, 414 (2007)). The panel majority concluded that, because the
evidence does not establish that Crawley contemplated probation when he entered into the
plea agreement, that element of the sentence that was imposed at resentencing following
the motion to correct the original must be removed. Id. at 20-21.
The panel majority vacated the sentence imposed by the circuit court and remanded
the case for a hearing, at which Crawley would have the opportunity to negotiate a
probationary period with the State. Id. at 21. The panel majority further directed that, if
that negotiation is successful, then Crawley “must be resentenced to life imprisonment,
with all but thirty-five years suspended and to be followed by the agreed-to probationary
term. . . . [I]f the appellant does not agree with the State to a probationary term, then he
shall have the right to withdraw his guilty plea in favor of a new trial.” Id. at 22.
10
The third member of the panel, now-Chief Judge Patrick Woodward, dissented from
the judgment. He agreed with the majority that, “we must determine what are the terms of
his plea agreement,” but he “diverge[d] from the views of appellant and the majority as to
exactly what are those terms.” Crawley, slip. op. at 1 (Woodward, J., dissenting). Chief
Judge Woodward relied in this case on Rankin. There, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that “we consider terms implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly
provided.” Rankin, 174 Md. App. at 409 (citation omitted). The Rankin court held that,
because a period of probation must be attached to a suspended sentence, . . .
the right to impose a period of probation is included in any plea agreement
that provides for a suspended sentence. If we were to hold otherwise, the
imposition of a suspended sentence would be meaningless.
Id. at 411-12 (footnotes omitted). Chief Judge Woodward reasoned in his dissent in this
case:
[T]he instant case leads me to the conclusion that a period of probation is an
implied term of appellant’s plea agreement to a split sentence of life
imprisonment suspend all but thirty-five years. Such conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that, without a period of probation as an implied term, the plea
agreement would be for an illegal sentence, and “[a] defendant cannot
consent to an illegal sentence.”
Crawley, slip op. at 1 (Woodward, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190,
196 (2000)). Chief Judge Woodward, finding no error or abuse of discretion on the part of
the circuit court, would have affirmed the sentence as corrected by that court. Id. at 4.
11
We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals. State v. Crawley, 450 Md. 421 (2016).4
IV
Discussion
The parties’ arguments
The State seeks reversal of the holding of the panel majority of the Court of Special
Appeals. The State maintains that the circuit court, in resentencing Crawley pursuant to
Maryland Rule 4-345(a), properly corrected Crawley’s illegal sentence by adding the
period of probation to effectuate the split sentence imposed at the original sentencing.
Relying on the undisputed proposition that Crawley’s original sentence was illegal
pursuant to Greco, the State argues that, because the statutory minimum sentence for felony
murder is life imprisonment, absent a provision for a period for probation, “there would be
no ability for the court ever to direct execution of the suspended part of the sentence.”
(Citation omitted). The State disagrees with Crawley’s emphasis on the fact that his
sentence was imposed as a result of a guilty plea. The State maintains that an illegal
sentence remains illegal even if it was the product of a plea agreement. The State further
4
The Question Presented for review was:
Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly vacate Crawley’s corrected
sentence, where the trial court, pursuant to Greco v. State, 427 Md. 477
(2012), corrected the illegality in Crawley’s sentence by the addition of a
period of probation in order to effectuate the split sentence imposed in the
case?
Oliver Smith, Sr., the father of the deceased murder victim, also filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, which this Court denied.
12
argues that “Crawley’s negotiated arrangement for a split sentence of life imprisonment
implicitly and necessarily contemplated a period of probation.”
Crawley argues, in response, that the test for determining the legality of a sentence
imposed pursuant to a plea deal is based upon what a “reasonable lay person would
understand the agreement to be.” He asserts that “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude
. . . that a lay person in [Crawley’s] position would somehow know that his sentence
included probation, especially in light of the fact that this Court has held that, in other
circumstances, probation is not part of the sentence, if a sentencing court fails to mention
‘probation.’” (citing Cathcart, 397 Md. at 329). Crawley maintains that any ambiguity as
to the nature of the plea agreement must be resolved in his favor to avoid a violation of
Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(3).5 He agrees with the majority of the Court of Special Appeals
panel that Greco is distinguishable from the instant case because the defendant in Greco
received his original sentence following a guilty verdict, rather than a guilty plea. Finally,
Crawley requests that, even if this Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals, this case be remanded with instructions for the parties to attempt to negotiate a
new sentence.
What is—and is not—controlling authority
5
Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(3) provides that: “If the plea agreement is approved, the judge
shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action
encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more
favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.”
13
Our decision in this case is guided by settled law. A substantively illegal sentence
is subject to correction at any time. Md. Rule 4-345(a). Whether a sentence is an illegal
sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) is a question of law that is subject to de novo
review. Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 663 (2015).
Courts do not possess the authority to impose a sentence that does not comport with
a legislatively-mandated sentence, and any such sentence must be corrected to remedy the
illegality. See Cathcart, 397 Md. at 325, 329. The mandated sentence for the crime of first
degree murder is “imprisonment for life.” Crim. Law § 2-201(b). The sentencing court,
however, is not precluded from imposing a split sentence, even when the crime is first
degree murder. But, a court, when imposing a split sentence, must impose a period of
probation. Cathcart, 397 Md. at 329 (discussing Crim. Proc. § 6-222). Moreover, a
defendant cannot consent to an illegal sentence. Holmes, 362 Md. at 196.
Crawley acknowledges that the statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment,
though legitimately split by suspending all but 35 years of imprisonment, suffered from the
fatal flaw of not including a period of probation. And, he agrees that the sentence originally
imposed on his plea of guilty to first degree murder, given the inherent illegality of it, could
not stand and therefore was subject to later correction pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a).
Neither does Crawley take issue with the remedy established in Greco, which is to
“impose a sentence of life imprisonment, all but [the term-of-years portion of the original
split sentence] suspended, to be followed by some period of probation.” Greco, 427 Md.
at 513. He insists, though, that the Greco remedy does not apply here because the
sentencing illegality arose out of a plea agreement.
14
Crawley directs us to Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010). We held in that case
that “any question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term of a
binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record established at the
Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.” Id. at 582. What Crawley does not mention is that Cuffley,
as well as its progeny, Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 (2010), and Matthews v. State, 424
Md. 503 (2012), dealt with resolving ambiguous sentencing terms of a plea agreement. See
Cuffley, 416 Md. at 583 (stating that where “examination of the record leaves ambiguous
the sentence agreed upon by the parties, then the ambiguity must be resolved in the
defendant’s favor”); Baines, 416 Md. at 615 (same); Matthews, 424 Md. at 523 (holding
that the sentencing term of the plea agreement was “ambiguous” and that the “ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of Petitioner”). We do not have here an issue concerning an
arguably ambiguous sentencing term of a plea agreement. What we have, instead, is a
sentencing term of a plea agreement that, though agreed upon by the parties and imposed
by the court, was unequivocally illegal. Cuffley and its progeny therefore have no
application here.
Our decision
The principle that a substantively illegal sentence must be corrected applies
regardless of whether the sentence has been negotiated and imposed as part of a binding
plea agreement. Here, the negotiated split sentence to which Crawley agreed and the court
imposed was the statutorily-mandated life imprisonment, with all but 35 years suspended.
Because the suspended portion could not remain due to the lack of a probationary period,
the sentence was converted by operation of law to an illegal term-of-years sentence, which
15
could not stand. Crawley’s sentence—unlawful as originally imposed—was properly
remedied through the imposition of a period of probation.
Greco instructs that a corrected sentence is “limited by the maximum legal sentence
that could have been imposed, with the illegality removed.” 427 Md. at 513. The circuit
court followed the dictates of Greco by vacating the original unlawful sentence, reimposing
the mandatory life sentence with all but 35 years suspended, and adding a period of
probation to the suspended portion of that sentence. In doing so, the circuit court
effectively removed the illegality created by the absence of a period of probation attached
to the suspended portion of the life sentence. There is no dispute that the four-year
probation period satisfied constitutional standards and statutory limits. Meyer, 445 Md. at
670 (“When imposing probation conditions, [a] judge is vested with very broad discretion
. . . [in order] to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing—punishment, deterrence and
rehabilitation[,] and is limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). The imposition of that period of probation,
moreover, did not constitute an abuse of the circuit court’s “very broad discretion.” Id.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.
16