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. Under the felony murder
doctrine, “a person’s conduct bringing about an unintended death in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony [is] guilty of murder.” State v. Jones,

451 Md. 680

, 696,

155 A.3d 492

, 501 (2017).
We have explained the application of the felony murder doctrine as follows:
[T]he felony-murder rule relies on the imputation of malice from the
underlying predicate felony. . . . [W]e [have] limited the felony-murder rule
to situations where the intent to commit the underlying felony existed prior
to or concurrent with the act causing the death of the victim, and not
afterwards. In so doing, we explained: the felony-murder rule is a legal
fiction in which the intent and the malice to commit the underlying felony is
‘transferred’ to elevate an unintentional killing to first degree murder. . . .
Christian v. State,

405 Md. 306

, 331–32,

951 A.2d 832

, 847 (2008) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). In other words, “the malice involved in the underlying felony is
permitted to stand in the place of the malice that would otherwise be required with respect
14
to the killing.” Allen,

387 Md. at 402

. In this way, even an accidental
killing of a person during the commission of a felony is elevated to the level of murder.
“To obtain a conviction for felony-murder in Maryland, the State must prove the
underlying felony and that the death occurred during the perpetration or in furtherance of
the felony.” Jones, 451 Md. at 696–97, 155 A.3d at 501.
We now turn to the manslaughter by motor vehicle statute, which Petitioner alleges
preempts felony murder when the killing in question is unintentional and committed with
a motor vehicle. Crim. Law § 2-209 provides, in relevant part:
Prohibition
(b) A person may not cause the death of another as a result of the person’s
driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent
manner.
Name of crime
(c) A violation of this section is manslaughter by vehicle or vessel.
Penalty
(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person who
violates this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or
both.[6]
Petitioner does not argue that there is any express pronouncement in the legislative
history or statutory text of Crim. Law § 2-209 reflecting that the statute is intended to
6
Enhanced penalties are imposed on those who have previously been convicted of
certain provisions of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code. See Crim. Law §
2-209(d)(2).
15
preempt common law felony murder, where the killing during the commission of a felony
is committed unintentionally and with a motor vehicle. Instead, Petitioner argues that “the
entire subject matter of common law unintended homicide resulting from the operation of
a motor vehicle has been preempted by statute[,]” including in cases of felony murder. In
support of his position, Petitioner relies on two cases from the Court of Special Appeals:
Gibson,

4 Md. App. 236

242 A.2d 575

 and Blackwell,

34 Md. App. 547

369 A.2d 153

.
In Gibson, a defendant killed a woman while allegedly driving under the influence
of alcohol.

4 Md. App. at

238–39,

242 A.2d at

576–77. Four of the five charges levied
against the defendant were not based on gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but
instead on a theory of common law misdemeanor-manslaughter, due to various alleged
violations of motor vehicle laws.7 Id. at 239,

. The defendant moved to
dismiss those charges, alleging that they were preempted by the manslaughter by vehicle
statute, then codified as Section 388 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code (1967 Repl. Vol.).8
7
The fifth charge, however, was expressly based on the manslaughter by vehicle
statute and alleged that defendant “while operating a motor vehicle ‘unlawfully in a grossly
negligent manner’ caused the death of the decedent.” Gibson,

4 Md. App. at 239

.
8
At the time of Gibson, the manslaughter by motor vehicle statute stated as follows:
Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving,
operation or control of an automobile, motor vehicle, motorboat, locomotive,
engine, car, streetcar, train or other vehicle in a grossly negligent manner,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as ‘manslaughter by
automobile, motor vehicle, motorboat, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar,
train or other vehicle,’ and the person so convicted shall be sentenced to jail
or the house of correction for not more than three years, or be fined not more
(continued …)
16
Id. at 240,

. The State countered that the manslaughter by motor vehicle
statute only applied to charges of manslaughter involving gross negligence and did not
preempt common law misdemeanor manslaughter charges arising from the operation of a
motor vehicle. Id. at 241,

242 A.2d at 578

.
The Court of Special Appeals ultimately agreed with the defendant that the
manslaughter by motor vehicle statute preempted common law misdemeanor manslaughter
charges arising from the operation of a motor vehicle.

 at 246–47,

242 A.2d at

581–82.
The court explained that, at the time the manslaughter by motor vehicle statute was passed
in 1941, “there was an overlapping and blurring between and among the different theories
of criminal responsibility,” arising from violations of the motor vehicle law “since in most
instances such a violation constituted not only an unlawful act, but one dangerous to the
lives and safety of others and such as manifested a wanton and reckless disregard of human
life.”

 at 245–46,

. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that,
in enacting Section 388, the [General Assembly] intended to deal with an
entire subject matter—unintended homicides resulting from the operation of
a motor vehicle—and that the common law crime of involuntary
manslaughter, when based on homicides so occurring, is in conflict with the
statute and must yield to it to the extent of the inconsistency.
(… continued)
than $1,000.00 or be both fined and imprisoned. . . .
Gibson,

4 Md. App. at

239–40,

 (quoting Md. Code, Art. 27 § 388 (1967
Repl. Vol.)). For our purposes, the substance of the statute is not meaningfully different
from its present form in Crim. Law § 2-209, although the penalty has been enhanced to a
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both, with greater
penalties available for persons previously convicted under certain sections of the
Transportation Article. See Crim. Law § 2-209(d).
17
Id. at 247,

. The intermediate court reasoned, in part, that to determine
otherwise would permit prosecutors to choose between charging offenders of such crimes
with felony common law manslaughter, which had a ten-year penalty at the time and
required a lesser degree of proof, and charging under the manslaughter by vehicle statute,
which had only a three-year penalty at the time and required a greater degree of proof. Id.
at 246,

.       The Court of Special Appeals determined that such an
incongruous result could not have been the intent of the General Assembly when enacting
the manslaughter by motor vehicle statute.

 at 246–47,

242 A.2d at

581–82. In State v.
Gibson,

254 Md. 399

, 401,

254 A.2d 691

, 692 (1969), we expressly approved this holding
and reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals.
The question of which crimes are preempted by the manslaughter by motor vehicle
statute was revisited by the Court of Special Appeals in Blackwell,

34 Md. App. 547

369 A.2d 153

. That case involved an appellant who was convicted of second-degree depraved
heart murder, after he hit and killed a bicyclist with his vehicle while driving when drunk
and fled the scene. Id. at 549,

369 A.2d at

155–56. The Court of Special Appeals
concluded the circuit court erred in instructing the jury on the element of malice, and there
was insufficient evidence presented to fulfill the “malice” requirement for second-degree
murder, as habitually driving while intoxicated[9] does not promote an inference of
“viciousness or extreme indifference to the value of human life[,]” necessary for second-
9
Evidence was introduced at trial that the appellant had a prior conviction of driving
while impaired, had been involved in an accident while intoxicated 2 to 3 years earlier, and
had a “propensity to overinduldge[.]” Blackwell,

34 Md. App. at 550

369 A.2d at 156

.
18
degree depraved heart murder. Id. at 554,

 (internal quotations omitted).
The court also held that an accident caused by a habitually drunk driver lacked the mens
rea requirement of “willfulness” necessary for second-degree depraved heart murder.

Id.,

.
The Court of Special Appeals also observed that in passing the manslaughter by
motor vehicle statute, “the [General Assembly] intended to preempt the subject matter of
unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.”

 at 554–55,

369 A.2d at

158–59 (citing Md. Code, Art. 27, § 388 and Gibson,

4 Md. App. at 246

). The Court of Special Appeals determined that “[i]n the absence of evidence of
intentional homicide, we hold that the statutory preemption applies as well to second
degree murder as it did in [Gibson] to manslaughter.” Id. at 555,

369 A.2d at 159

.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the holding in Blackwell. The Court of
Special Appeals in that case concluded the evidence was insufficient to convict the
defendant of second-degree depraved heart murder, and therefore its determination that a
second-degree murder conviction was preempted by the manslaughter by vehicle statute
was only dicta. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals in Blackwell mischaracterized
the mens rea necessary for second-degree depraved heart murder. In particular, the court
determined that the evidence was not sufficient to support a jury verdict for second-degree
depraved heart murder, in part, because the defendant lacked the “willfulness” which it
stated was necessary for depraved heart murder and “connotes a deliberate intent to bring
19
about the result which actually comes to pass[.]”10 Id. at 554,

 (emphasis
added). The Court of Special Appeals stated that:
Unless we assume that appellant’s drinking habits fulfill that interpretation
of willfulness, rather than viewing his propensity to imbibe as a personal
gratification-however selfish and objectionable-the record contains no
evidence of ‘willfulness’. There is no evidence to indicate the drinking was
motivated by a purposeful or deliberate intent to bring about the tragic result.
Id. at 554,

.
As we recently explained in Beckwitt v. State, the mens rea necessary for second-
degree depraved heart murder is “the willful doing of a dangerous and reckless act with
wanton indifference to the consequences and perils involved[.]”

477 Md. 398

, 467,

270 A.3d 307

, 348, (2022), reconsideration denied (Mar. 25, 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting
Robinson v. State,

307 Md. 738

, 744,

517 A.2d 94

, 97 (1986)). We explained further that,
[d]epraved heart murder may be perpetrated without the slightest trace of
personal ill-will and, instead, the willful doing of a dangerous and reckless
act with wanton indifference to the consequences and perils involved, is just
as blameworthy, and just as worthy of punishment, when the harmful result
ensues, as is the express intent to kill itself.
10
The Court of Special Appeals also cited from Black’s Law Dictionary for its
definitions of willfulness, as follows:
Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary.
Intractable; having a headstrong disposition to act by the rule of
contradiction.
Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; not
accidental or involuntary.
Blackwell,

34 Md. App. at 554

 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1773
(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted))
20
Id. at 468, 270 A.3d at 348 (quoting In re Eric F.,

116 Md. App. 509

, 520,

698 A.2d 1121

,
1126 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, contrary to the characterization of the
Court of Special Appeals in Blackwell, the “willfulness” necessary for second-degree
depraved heart murder pertains to willfully committing an act that demonstrates a reckless
disregard for the value of human life, not for willfully bringing about the result of another
person’s death. As such, second-degree depraved heart murder, when perpetrated with a
motor vehicle, still falls under the category of an unintended homicide and is preempted
by Crim. Law § 2-209.
We do not agree with Petitioner that the reasoning in Blackwell extends Crim. Law
§ 2-209 to preempt felony murder perpetrated with a motor vehicle. Unlike involuntary
manslaughter or second-degree depraved heart murder, felony murder is not an unintended
crime. As discussed above, felony murder is an artificial legal concept whereby the intent
to commit the underlying felony is transferred to the intent necessary for first-degree
murder. See Christian,

405 Md. at 332

951 A.2d at 847

 (“[T]he felony-murder rule is a
legal fiction in which the intent and the malice to commit the underlying felony is
‘transferred’ to elevate an unintentional killing to first degree murder. . . .”); Allen,

387 Md. at 402

 (“[T]he malice involved in the underlying felony is permitted
to stand in the place of the malice that would otherwise be required with respect to the
killing.”). We have explained that “[i]t is not the case that these mental states imply malice;
21
it is rather the case that they are malice by definition[,]”11 and thus the “defendant is acting
maliciously at the time he kills, even if the object of his malice is unrelated to the victim’s
death.” Allen, 387 Md at 403,

 (emphasis added). When a killing occurs
during the course of a felony, we treat the individual who intended to commit the felony,
as if he intended to kill the victim. In this way, felony murder is not an unintended
homicide. Since felony murder is not an unintended homicide, it cannot be preempted by
Crim. Law § 2-209. See Gibson,

4 Md. App. at 247

 (holding that the
manslaughter by vehicle statute is intended to preempt the “entire subject matter [of]
unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle”).
11
We also note that the Court of Special Appeals in Blackwell mischaracterized
felony murder as an “implied malice” homicide.

34 Md. App. at 553

369 A.2d at 157

. In
Allen, we explained:
The common law felony-murder doctrine solidified in the late 1500’s and
very early 1600’s as the expression of one of the forms of implied malice.
To constitute murder at that time, it was necessary that a homicide be
committed with ‘malice,’ to wit, with an intent to kill. In its earlier
manifestation, the notion was that the intentional perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a life-endangering felony implied the intent to kill so as to
make any homicide resulting from the felony or attempted felony an instance
of murder. Our current analysis, of course, is that the intended perpetration
of the felony is an independent murderous mens rea, should death result, and
is just as blameworthy and just as worthy of punishment as murder as would
be the specific intent to kill. ‘It is not the case that these mental states imply
malice; it is rather the case that they are malice by definition.’ The
transformation from an evidentiary phenomenon to a substantive
phenomenon did not alter the end result.

387 Md. at

402–03,

 (emphasis added) (quoting CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR.,
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE LAW § 5.1 at 105 (2002) in turn quoting Evans v. State,

28 Md. App. 640

, 700,

349 A.2d 300

 (1975), aff’d,

278 Md. 197

362 A.2d 629

 (1976)).
22
This determination is aligned with the particular policy judgments that lie behind
the felony murder rule. The felony murder rule is intended to “deter dangerous conduct by
punishing as murder a homicide resulting from dangerous conduct in the perpetration of a
felony, even if the defendant did not intend to kill[]” and is reflective of “society’s
judgment, [that] a felony committed intentionally that causes the death of another person
is qualitatively more serious than an identical felony that does not.” Jones, 451 Md. at 696,
155 A.3d at 501 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Treating a killing that occurs
during the course of a felony in the same way as first-degree murder is rooted in the
judgment that the intent to perpetrate a felony that results in a death, is as worthy of blame
and punishment as a specific intent to kill. See Allen,

387 Md. at 403

(quoting CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., CRIMINAL HOMICIDE LAW § 5.1 at 105 (2002)).
Permitting Crim. Law § 2-209 to preempt certain killings that occur during the
course of a felony would directly conflict with the felony murder rule’s rationale of
punishing all killings that occur during the course of the felony as if they were murder
because of this Court’s recognition of the seriousness of such offenses. See Campbell v.
State,

293 Md. 438

, 451–52,

444 A.2d 1034

, 1042 (1982) (“[U]nder the felony-murder
doctrine, criminal culpability shall continue to be imposed for all lethal acts committed by
a felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of a common design.”). Petitioner has failed
to offer any compelling rationale for why a killing perpetrated with a motor vehicle in
furtherance of a felony should be treated differently than all other felony murders, simply
because it was perpetrated with a motor vehicle.
23
Neither has Petitioner offered a compelling reason to believe that it was the General
Assembly’s intent when adopting the manslaughter by motor vehicle statute to preempt a
crime as serious as felony murder, with a criminal statute that provides comparatively
minor penalties. See Genies,

426 Md. at

153–54,

43 A.3d at 1010

 (“[I]t is not to be
presumed that the [General Assembly] intended to make any innovation upon the common
law, further than the case absolutely required, but that [t]he law rather infers that the act
did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified, and besides what has
been plainly pronounced.”) (citations, internal quotations, and emphasis omitted). Rather,
as discussed in Gibson, the General Assembly’s intent in passing the manslaughter by
motor vehicle statute was to homogenize the “overlapping and blurring between and among
the different theories of criminal responsibility[]” when “unintentional homicides
proximately resulted from driving an automobile in violation of laws designed to regulate
and control the operation of motor vehicles in the interest of public safety[.]”

4 Md. App. at 246

. This legislative purpose does not extend within the context of
felony murder, which constitutes a clear and longstanding doctrine to treat any killing that
occurs in furtherance of a felony, no matter the circumstance, as an intentional murder.
E. The Present Case
As stated above, “[t]o obtain a conviction for felony-murder in Maryland, the State
must prove the underlying felony and that the death occurred during the perpetration or in
furtherance of the felony.” Jones, 451 Md. at 696–97, 155 A.3d at 501. Petitioner does
not contest his conviction for felony burglary, nor does he dispute the killing of Officer
24
Caprio occurred during his attempted escape from the felonious burglary. Under the felony
murder doctrine, the intent that Petitioner had to commit felony burglary, was transferred
to the intent necessary to find him guilty of the felony murder of Officer Caprio. This is
true regardless of whether Petitioner actually intended to kill Officer Caprio when he ran
her over with the stolen Jeep.
We do see merit in Petitioner’s objection to the Court of Special Appeals’ statement
that evidence and arguments presented at trial are supportive of a finding that Petitioner
did intend to kill Officer Caprio, provided another ground for determining that Petitioner’s
felony murder conviction was not preempted by Crim. Law § 2-209. After determining
that Petitioner’s felony murder conviction could not be categorized as an unintentional
homicide and thus was not preempted by Crim. Law § 2-209, the Court of Special Appeals
went on to say,
although [Petitioner] argues that the killing here was unintentional, the jury
in this case was not asked to, and it did not specify, whether it found an
unintentional homicide. The State argued, and the facts would have
permitted a finding, that [Petitioner] intended to run over Officer Caprio
when he hit the gas while she was standing in front of the car. Accordingly,
we reject [Petitioner’s] argument that his felony murder conviction should be
vacated because the manslaughter by vehicle statute ([Crim. Law] § 2-209)
preempted his felony murder conviction.
Harris, 251 Md. App. at 640, 256 A.3d at 308–09.
Petitioner is correct to argue that, where the jury was not asked to find whether
Petitioner intentionally killed Officer Caprio, the Court of Special Appeals should not have
relied on a hypothetical finding of intentionality to support a conclusion that Crim. Law
§2-209 did not preempt Petitioner’s felony murder conviction. The jury, not the appellate
25
court, is the factfinder; where the jury is not asked to decide an issue of fact, the Court of
Special Appeals cannot rely on a factual finding that it could have made as a basis for
determining a question of law. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 23 (“In the trial of all
criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court
may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”); Tracy v. State,

423 Md. 1

, 11,

31 A.3d 160

, 165 (2011) (“We need not decide whether the jury could have
drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would
have drawn different inferences from the evidence.”); State v. Mayers,

417 Md. 449

, 466,

10 A.3d 782

, 792 (2010) (“[I]t is not the function or duty of the appellate court to undertake
a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case.”) (quoting
State v. Albrecht,

336 Md. 475

, 478,

649 A.2d 336

, 337 (1994)); Smith v. State,

415 Md. 174

, 185,

999 A.2d 986

, 992 (2010) (“Because the fact-finder possesses the unique
opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the
credibility of witnesses during their live testimony, we do not re-weigh the credibility of
witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”).
This error by the Court of Special Appeals is inconsequential. As discussed above,
we agree with the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that Crim. Law § 2-209 cannot
preempt a felony murder conviction because felony murder is not an unintended homicide.
See Harris, 251 Md. App. at 639–40, 256 A.3d at 308. This suffices for upholding
Petitioner’s felony murder conviction, and the Court of Special Appeals’ discussion of
factual inferences that could have been drawn from the evidence was not necessary for its
26
determination that there was no preemption under Crim. Law § 2-209. As such, the
statement can either be categorized as an alternative holding or dicta and, although
erroneous, does not necessitate a reversal of the holding of the Court of Special Appeals.
Cf. Margolis v. Sandy Spring Bank,

221 Md. App. 703

, 715,

110 A.3d 784

, 791 (2015)
(“[B]ecause the circuit court’s reliance on [a particular section of a statute] was in the
nature of an alternative holding, the error does not require reversal[.]”).
II.     The Constitutionality of Petitioner’s Sentence
A. Standard of Review
Under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), this Court “may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.” A motion to correct an illegal sentence will be granted where there is some illegality
in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed. See State v. Wilkins,

393 Md. 269

, 274,

900 A.2d 765

, 768 (2006). “Whether a sentence is an illegal sentence
under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) is a question of law that is subject to [de novo] review.”
State v. Crawley,

455 Md. 52

, 66,

166 A.3d 132

, 140 (2017). A sentence that constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment or Article 25 is an illegal
sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). See Randall Book Corp. v. State,

316 Md. 315

,
322,

558 A.2d 715

, 719 (1989).
B. Contentions of the Parties
Petitioner argues that the sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for
the felony murder of Officer Caprio was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460

, 132

27 S. Ct. 2455

(2012), Petitioner argues that he was entitled to a constitutionally heightened
individualized sentencing proceeding where his youth and attendant circumstances were
considered before such a sentence was imposed. He asserts the distinctive attributes of
youth are especially relevant for a conviction of felony murder, but that Maryland’s
statutory scheme, which automatically imposes a life sentence for a felony murder
conviction, does not provide for such a consideration. Petitioner also asserts Article 25 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights affords even greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment for juvenile offenders. Petitioner argues that the sentencing court did not meet
the constitutional standards for an individualized sentencing proceeding under either the
Eighth Amendment or Article 25. Petitioner further argues that, as applied, his sentences
were grossly disproportionate, and thus unconstitutional.
The State replies that Miller’s individualized sentencing requirements only apply to
juveniles sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and thus are not
applicable to Petitioner’s sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole. The State
also asserts that Article 25 provides Petitioner no greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment, but instead is interpretated in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment.
Furthermore, the State asserts that even if Miller was applicable, Petitioner did receive an
individualized sentencing proceeding where his youth and attendant circumstances were
considered. Finally, the State rejects Petitioner’s argument, that, as applied, Petitioner’s
sentences were grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment or Article
25.
28
C. Petitioner’s Sentence Did Not Violate the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits, among other
things, the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In
a string of cases, beginning with Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. 48

130 S. Ct. 2011

 (2010),
as modified (July 6, 2010) and culminating most recently with Jones v. Mississippi, ___
U.S. ___,

141 S. Ct. 1307

 (2021), the Supreme Court has addressed in what circumstances
it is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to sentence juvenile offenders to life in
prison without the possibility of parole. In Graham, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole for non-homicide crimes. 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. The Court specified
that while “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender
convicted of a nonhomicide crime[,]” it must give such offenders “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at
75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
Two years later in Miller, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
mandatory sentences of life without the possibility for parole, even for juvenile homicide
offenders.

567 U.S. at 465

132 S. Ct. at 2460

. The Court held that a mandatory sentencing
scheme posed “too great a risk of disproportionate punishment[]” and that instead,
sentencers are required “to take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”