JACK G. KEARTON v. E.W. MILLWORK, LLC (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT) ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1426-20
    JACK G. KEARTON,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    E.W. MILLWORK, LLC,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    __________________________
    Submitted December 6, 2021 – Decided January 27, 2022
    Before Judges Sumners and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Labor
    and Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
    Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2005-6845.
    Dickie McCamey & Chilcote, PC, attorneys for
    appellant (Dorothy T. Daly, of counsel and on the
    briefs; Michelle D. Gasior, on the briefs).
    Stephen D. Berryhill, attorney for respondent.
    PER CURIAM
    Respondent E.W. Millwork, LLC appeals the Division of Workers'
    Compensation court orders of January 14, 2008, denying its motion to dismiss
    the petition of Jack G. Kearton, and June 23, 2008, denying its motion for
    reconsideration. 1 We agree with E.W. Millwork that Kearton, one of its two
    members, did not affirmatively elect workers' compensation owner's coverage
    as required by N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 and, therefore, we reverse.
    On August 27, 2003, Kearton sustained several injuries 2 while working at
    E.W. Millwork, a manufacturer of wooden railings and moldings. He formed
    the limited liability company earlier that year with his equal owner, Edward
    Brigante. 3
    On March 4, 2005, Kearton filed a workers' compensation petition seeking
    medical treatment and temporary disability benefits. Almost eight months later,
    1
    Defendant's notice of appeal only seeks review of the compensation court's
    January 14, 2008 order, not the June 23, 2008 order. We could, therefore, limit
    our review to that order alone. See W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins,
    Ltda, 
    397 N.J. Super. 455
    , 458 (App. Div. 2008) ("It is clear that it is only the
    orders designated in the notice of appeal that are subject to the appeal process
    and review."). We choose to overlook that technical error because, as discussed
    later, our reversal of the January 14 order makes review the June 23 order moot.
    2
    Keaton alleged that his left knee was struck by a steel rod, causing permanent
    injuries to his left leg, knee, and back.
    3
    In December 2003, Brigante left the business and withdrew his membership.
    2                                   A-1426-20
    E.W. Millwork through its workers' compensation carrier Zurich American
    Insurance Company, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing coverage
    was not provided to its two members because the application for coverage did
    not request coverage for them.
    After a three-day hearing, the workers' compensation judge issued a bench
    decision on January 14, 2008, denying the motion. The court determined that
    Richard E. Pawlak, the insurance producer, made a mistake on E.W. Millwork's
    workers' compensation insurance application and should have elected coverage
    for Kearton and Brigante. The court also found that Zurich was negligent and
    should have looked at the policy to ensure that coverage was provided to the
    members.
    E.W. Millwork filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing the
    policy "clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]" did not provide coverage for its
    members and there was no such endorsement listed on the declaration page.
    Since there was no affirmative choice for members' coverage––declining it twice
    on the application, E.W. Millwork argued Kearton was not covered as an
    employee of the company. Because the compensation court that issued the
    January 14 order retired, a different court decided the motion. On June 23, the
    compensation judge entered an order denying the motion, stating in his bench
    3                                  A-1426-20
    decision that he was "taking the coward's way out" by not deciding the merits,
    believing for him to do so "would [require] trying [the hearing] over again." 4
    Kearton suffered a second workplace injury on April 24, 2009, resulting
    in an additional claim petition that was consolidated with his initial petition for
    trial on the nature and extent of his injuries. On May 4 and 5, 2017, a third
    compensation judge presided over the trial, again due to retirement.
    On December 23, 2020, the matter was concluded by a fourth
    compensation judge, who issued a final order of judgment regarding the 2003
    work-related accident, awarding Kearton 46.5% partial total permanent
    disability for his injuries.
    Before us, E.W. Millwork argues:
    POINT I
    IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE [COMPENSATION
    JUDGE'S] DISCRETION TO DENY THE MOTION
    FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION COVERAGE FOR
    [KEARTON].
    POINT II
    THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
    COVERAGE FILED BY RESPONDENT/CARRIER
    ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
    4
    On August 20, 2008, this court denied E.W. Millwork's motion for leave to
    appeal.
    4                                    A-1426-20
    SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AS THE
    EVIDENCE IN THE       RECORD   CLEARLY
    ESTABLISHES AT THE TIME THE APPLICATION
    FOR INSURANCE WAS SIGNED, THERE WAS AN
    INTENT NOT TO COVER THE MEMBERS OF THE
    LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATION.
    A.  THE APPLICATION OF INSURANCE WAS
    NOT AMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE AND THUS THE
    [COMPENSATION JUDGE] SHOULD HAVE
    GIVEN THE APPLICATION AND POLICY ITS
    PLAIN MEANING.
    We agree with E.W. Millwork that the compensation court erred in not
    granting its motion to dismiss Kearton's claim because he was not included in
    his company's workers' compensation coverage. The compensation judge's
    findings were not supported by credible evidence in the record, and, in our de
    novo review of its legal findings, we are convinced coverage was not afforded
    to Kearton. See Hersh v. Cnty. of Morris, 
    217 N.J. 236
    , 242-43 (2014).
    Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, members of a limited liability company, "who
    actively perform services on behalf of the" company, "shall be deemed an
    'employee' of the" company "for purposes of receipt of benefits and payment of
    [workers' compensation insurance] premiums pursuant to [the Workers'
    Compensation Act 5], if the" company "elects, when [its] workers' compensation
    5
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128.
    5                                 A-1426-20
    policy . . . is purchased or renewed, to obtain coverage for the" company's
    members. "[T]he election may only be made at purchase or at renewal and may
    not be withdrawn during the policy term." 
    Ibid.
     For any member of a limited
    liability company to opt in for workers' compensation coverage, all members
    must do so. 38 N.J. Practice, Workers' Compensation Law § 3.4 at 35 (Jon L.
    Gelman) (3d ed. 2000, 2020 Supplement).
    Based on the record before us, we conclude E.W. Millwork did not obtain
    workers' compensation coverage for Kearton.      Both Brigante and Kearton
    testified that they were supposed to be covered under their company's workers'
    compensation coverage. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that E.W. Millwork's
    application did not request such coverage.    Pawlack testified he informed
    Brigante, who was responsible for securing insurance coverage for the company,
    of the consequences of not electing coverage for the company's members. He
    told Brigante that without coverage for members, if there was an "on[]the[]job
    or occupational injury, illness, sickness[,] or disease, there would be no
    coverage for neither he nor []Kearton." Notwithstanding that advice, he stated
    Brigante chose not to select coverage for the members.
    A separate document to the insurance application titled "NOTICE OF
    ELECTION - PROPRIETORS AND PARTNERS," included an "x" within a box
    6                                 A-1426-20
    stating that "COVERAGE IS REJECTED."             In addition, a section titled
    "COMPLETE THIS SECTION ONLY WHEN COVERAGE IS ELECTED" had
    Kearton's and Brigante's names filled in underneath, but the sections for
    "ESTIMATED ANNUAL WAGE[S]" and "DUTIES," which was required to
    provide coverage for them, was not completed. Although the application listed
    E.W. Millwork having six employees for a total wage of $155,000, it did not
    specify the amount of the members' wages. According to Pawlack, the member's
    names were only included in the section in case Brigante chose to elect coverage
    prior to signing, and if he did so, the form could be completed––which it was
    not.
    Despite the clear fact that E.W. Millwork's application did not request
    workers' compensation coverage for its members, the compensation judge
    justified finding there was coverage based on Pawlack's mistake in not selecting
    coverage for members. The judge also found that Zurich was negligent and
    should have looked at the policy to make sure coverage was provided for the
    members. Without further explanation, the judge determined that Kearton was
    a covered employee. This was error.
    Accepting Pawlack erred, there was no legal basis cited by the
    compensation judge for imputing liability on Zurich—by finding coverage that
    7                                  A-1426-20
    was not requested—based on that error. Any mistake by the producer should be
    borne by him. There is no evidence to support the finding that Zurich was
    responsible for Brigante's failure to secure workers' compensation coverage for
    Kearton and him. Contrary to the judge's finding, there is nothing ambiguous
    about the application that warrants imposing coverage for Kearton. It clearly
    provided how the company's members had to obtain workers' compensation, and
    the completed application plainly showed coverage for the members was not
    requested.
    We find no merit in Kearton's argument that the insurance policy should
    be construed against Zurich because he was included as an employee under the
    $155,000 total wages listed in the application. At the motion to dismiss hearing,
    Kearton testified that five employees would be paid for fifty-two weeks, with
    total annual salaries of $104,000. The remaining $51,000 represented his salary
    with Brigante not receiving salary. Kearton claimed Zurich calculated E.W.
    Millwork's premium coverage based on $155,000 total wages, thereby covering
    him. 6 The testimony, however, contradicts the plain language of the insurance
    application, which specifically requires the listing of members' salary. As noted,
    6
    Kearton later gave contradictory testimony at the May 5, 2017 permanent
    disability trial that there were probably "eight or ten" employees when the
    business was first formed.
    8                                   A-1426-20
    the required information was not provided.           We recognize the Workers
    Compensation Act is social legislation that is liberally construed "to implement
    the legislative policy of affording coverage to as many workers as possible."
    Brower v. ICT Group, 
    164 N.J. 367
    , 373 (2000). Nevertheless, we cannot
    authorize coverage where there is a clear disregard of a statutory requirement as
    was the case here.
    Finally, as for E.W. Millwork's arguments regarding the June 23, 2008
    order denying its reconsideration motion, they are moot given our conclusion
    that the compensation judge erred in entering the January 14, 2008 order denying
    the motion to dismiss being reconsidered. That said, we are compelled to point
    out that the compensation judge who entered the June 23, 2003 order did not
    fulfill his obligation to address the merits of the motion and explain its denial.
    See Strahan v. Strahan, 
    402 N.J. Super. 298
    , 310 (App. Div. 2008) ("Meaningful
    appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her
    opinion." (quoting Salch v. Salch, 
    240 N.J. Super. 441
    , 443 (App. Div. 1990))).
    The judge should not have avoided his duty by leaving reconsideration of the
    January 14 order to "appellate review." Even though that order was entered by
    a different compensation judge, the reconsideration court had the responsibility
    and the ability to review the record of the proceeding that produced the order.
    9                                    A-1426-20
    In short, the judge punted without making any effort to fulfill its judicial
    function.
    Reversed and remanded for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
    We do not retain jurisdiction.
    10                                  A-1426-20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1426-20

Filed Date: 1/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/27/2022