Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies ( 2022 )

Ernest and Maryann Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies, LLC, No. 6, September Term,
2022. Opinion by Hotten, J.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – REAL PROPERTY – MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. ARTICLE § 14-117 – ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEFERRED WATER
AND SEWER CHARGES
Section 14-117(a)(3)(i) of the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code provides that a
seller of residential real property in Prince George’s County must provide the purchaser
certain disclosures in the initial contract of sale, including the estimated cost of any
deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable. Section 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) limits a seller to a schedule of charges for the amortized water and sewer costs
to a charge period no longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale.
Petitioners purchased property in Charles County from Respondent, whereby Respondent
prescribed a thirty-year amortization period for the property’s water and sewer
assessments. Petitioners challenged the duration of the amortization period under § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii). The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), when
viewed in context of the entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year
amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s
County. The Court, therefore, analyzed the legislative history to confirm our plain text
interpretation. The Court concluded that the legislative history of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)
confirms our plain language interpretation. The legislative history indicates that the
General Assembly intended for the amortization provision to only apply to Prince George’s
County. As such, the Court held that the Court of Special Appeals correctly interpreted §
14-117(a)(3)(ii), and the circuit court correctly dismissed the action.
Circuit Court for Charles County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Case No.: C-08-CV-20-000406
Argued: September 8, 2022
OF MARYLAND
No. 6
September Term, 2022
__________________________________
ERNEST AND MARYANN ELSBERRY
v.
STANLEY MARTIN COMPANIES, LLC
__________________________________
Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Hotten,
Booth,
Biran,
Eaves,
Getty, Joseph M.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Hotten, J.
__________________________________
Filed: December 1, 2022
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2022-12-01 16:09-05:00
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Md. Code Ann., Real Property (“Real Prop.”) § 14-117(a)(3)(i) requires a seller of
residential real property in Prince George’s County to provide the purchaser with certain
disclosures in the initial contract of sale, including the estimated cost of any deferred water
and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable. Deferred water and sewer
assessments are usually provided in the form of a declaration and recorded in the applicable
county’s land records. Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3); Joseph N. Schaller & Shannon D.
Sentman, Private Water & Sewer Assessment Companies, Md. Bar J. 36, 37 (2006). The
declaration, in turn, reimburses the seller for the costs related to the construction and
installation of the water and sewer systems. Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3); Sullivan v. Caruso
Builder Belle Oak, LLC, 251 Md. App. 304, 310, 253 A.3d 1142, 1145 (2021); Schaller &
Sentman, supra, at 37. While Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) permits the seller to establish
amortized water and sewer costs, the seller cannot impose upon the purchaser a repayment
period for a duration longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale. Real Prop. §
14-117(a)(3)(ii). We are asked to determine whether the twenty-year deferred water and
sewer assessment amortization limit, pursuant to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), applies to
the entire state or exclusively to properties located within Prince George’s County.
The present dispute arose over the purchase of residential real property in Charles
County, Maryland. According to the real estate purchase agreement, the purchased
property was subject to a declaration, which prescribed, at the discretion of the seller, a
thirty-year collection period for the property’s water and sewer assessments. The
purchasers filed suit, alleging that the seller violated Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) by
imposing an amortized water and sewer charge longer than twenty years after the initial
date of sale of the property. The seller moved to dismiss, asserting that Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to real property located in Prince George’s County. Following a
hearing, the Circuit Court for Charles County granted the seller’s motion to dismiss.
The purchasers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an
unpublished opinion. Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, No. 172 Sept. Term, 2021,
2022 WL 94616 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 10, 2022). The Court of Special Appeals
declined to extend the geographic application of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) beyond
Prince George’s County. Id. at *6. We granted certiorari on May 9, 2022, Elsberry v.
Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 478 Md. 510, 275 A.3d 345 (2022), to address the following
questions presented, which we have rephrased as follows:1
1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by determining that the
“Prince George’s County—Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner
Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[,]” codified in part at Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii), is limited to residential real property located in Prince George’s
County?
1
This Court has discretion to rephrase questions presented. See, e.g., Nash v. State,
439 Md. 53, 64, 94 A.3d 23, 29 (2014). The original questions as presented in the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari are as follows:
[1.] Whether a court may rely on legislative history unrelated to the
specific statutory text at issue to override the consumer protections
granted in the plain language and tabulation of [Real Prop.] §14-
117(a)(3), an unambiguous remedial statute?
[2.] Whether the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland violated
Article III, Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution by using the title
of the bill “Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer
Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014” to contradict the plain
language of [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)?
2
2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by consulting the legislative
history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to help ascertain whether the intent
of the General Assembly was to limit the effect of the statutory provision to
residential real property located in Prince George’s County?
3. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by considering whether its
plain text interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would violate the
“one subject rule” for bill titles pursuant to Art. III, § 29 of the Maryland
Constitution?
We answer these questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court
of Special Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Relevant Facts
On April 5, 2019, Petitioners, Ernest and Maryann Elsberry (the “Elsberrys”)
entered into a New Home Sales Contract (the “Purchase Agreement”) with Respondent
Stanley Martin Companies, LLC2 (“Stanley Martin”) for the purchase of residential real
property and construction of a new home in Charles County (the “Property”). According
to the Purchase Agreement, the Property was subject to a Declaration of Deferred Water
and Sewer Charges (the “Declaration”) which required the Elsberrys to pay Stanley Martin
annual installments in the amount of $550 for thirty years, subject to a six percent interest
rate, to reimburse Stanley Martin for the construction and installation of water and sewer
systems. The Declaration was recorded in the Land Records of Charles County, and serves
2
The Purchase Agreement identifies SM Hamilton, LLC as the “Seller” and Stanley
Martin Companies, LLC as the “Builder[.]” SM Hamilton, LLC merged into Stanley
Martin after the purchase of the Property.
3
as a lien on the Property. Stanley Martin conveyed the Property to the Elsberrys on May
9, 2019, and the Elsberrys made a prorated initial payment pursuant to the Declaration.
On September 17, 2020, the Elsberrys filed suit in the Circuit Court for Charles
County, alleging, inter alia,3 that Stanley Martin’s Declaration violated Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period of thirty years
following the date of the initial sale of the Property.4 According to the Elsberrys, Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies to all counties in Maryland—not just Prince George’s
County—and prohibits the amortization of water and sewer charges for more than twenty
years; therefore, Stanley Martin’s Declaration violates this provision.
On October 5, 2020, Stanley Martin filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to property located in Prince George’s County.
3
The Elsberrys brought four causes of action against Stanley Martin, including
unjust enrichment (count one), violation of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act (count
two), breach of contract (count three), and violation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) (count
four). Since the Elsberrys do not challenge the dismissal of claims one through three, we
limit our focus to count four.
4
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) provides that:
(i) In Prince George’s County, a contract for the initial sale of residential real
property for which there are deferred private water and sewer assessments
recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water and sewer
improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain a
disclosure . . . .
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial sale
of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on to a
purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period longer
than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.
(Emphasis added).
4
Stanley Martin maintained that the Elsberrys’ claim is predicated on a misreading of Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), thereby “attempt[ing] to extend [its] reach [] beyond Prince
George’s County to manufacture a claim in Charles County that was never intended by the
legislature . . . .” Accordingly, since the Property is in Charles County, Stanley Martin
contended that the Elsberrys’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Legal Proceedings
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
The Circuit Court for Charles County held a hearing on Stanley Martin’s motion to
dismiss on February 23, 2021. Following the hearing, the circuit court agreed with Stanley
Martin and granted the motion. Upon review of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3), the court
“noticed that the subsection little i, 14-117.A.3.i, directly states, in Prince George’s County
. . . and then goes on to list items that have to be contained in the disclosure statement.”
(Emphasis added). The court also recognized that “[t]he placement of the small Paragraph
[(ii)] under small Paragraph [(i)], leads to the conclusion that this was intended . . . to be
provided to residents of Prince George’s County only.” (Emphasis added). “Furthermore,
. . . the title of the bills specifically state, in the first reading and the second reading, that
the bills . . . applied to Prince George’s County only.” (Emphasis added). Upon review of
“this bill, and looking that it applies to Prince George’s County in the title and in the
purpose of the bill, it is hard to see how any legislator reviewing this would automatically
assume that it applies to all counties.” (Emphasis added).
5
Ultimately, the circuit court “believe[d] the legislative history supports the
interpretation of the Court [], based upon its plain reading of the statute, that [Real Prop.
§ 14-117(a)(3)(ii)] is directly related to [Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i)], and relates to Prince
George’s County.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, on March 3, 2021, the court granted
Stanley Martin’s motion, dismissing the Elsberrys’ claim. On April 2, 2021, the Elsberrys
timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
B. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
On January 10, 2022, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an
unreported opinion. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616. The intermediate court concluded that the
General Assembly intended Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply to properties only
located within Prince George’s County—not statewide. Id. at *7.
The Court of Special Appeals began by examining the plain language of Real Prop.
§ 14-117(a)(3). Id. at *3. The court observed that subparagraph (i) contains the
introductory phrase, “In Prince George’s County[,]” which plainly limits its application to
Prince George’s County. Id. The court recognized that “[s]ubparagraph (ii)’s geographical
reach, however, is less obvious[]” because “[s]ubparagraph (ii), unlike subparagraph (i),
does not mention Prince George’s County.” Id. “It is, however, placed within a paragraph
that otherwise relates only to Prince George’s County – a construction not otherwise used
in [Real Prop.] § 14-117.” Id. After noting the ambiguity surrounding the geographical
6
scope of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), the Court of Special Appeals turned to the
legislative history to determine the intent of the General Assembly.5 Id.
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the legislative history of Real Prop.
§ 14-117(a)(3)(ii) also demonstrated its geographical limitation to Prince George’s County.
Id. at *4. The court examined several sources to ascertain legislative intent, including, but
not limited to, “the context of the bill, including the title and function paragraphs, the
amendments to the legislation, as well as . . . the bill request form[.]” Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). The court observed that “the title of an act is relevant to
ascertainment of its intent and purpose[.]” Id. (citation omitted).
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) was introduced to the General Assembly as House Bill
1043 (“HB 1043”). Id. HB 1043 was enacted in May 2014 as Chapter 441, entitled “Prince
George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of
2014[.]” Id. The court concluded that HB 1043’s purpose paragraph “generally relat[es]
5
At oral argument, the Elsberrys argued that the Court of Special Appeals never
made an express finding that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was ambiguous, and therefore,
erroneously used legislative history analysis to contravene the plain meaning of an
unambiguous statute. We disagree with the Elsberrys’ strict reading of the opinion and
find at least two instances where the court decided Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was
ambiguous. First, the court rejected the Elsberrys’ contention that the subparagraph was
unambiguous. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616, at *3 (“Even if [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3) is
not ambiguous, . . . we ‘do not read statutory language in a vacuum[.]’”) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). Second, the court provided in a footnote that “[w]hile we agree that
[certain subsections of Real Prop § 14-117] add to the ambiguity of [Real Prop.] § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii), we are not persuaded that they indicate legislative intent for [Real Prop.] §
14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply beyond Prince George’s County.” Id. at *5 n.7 (emphasis added).
The intermediate court could not have determined other subsections of Real Prop. § 14-
117 add to the ambiguity of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) without initially finding the
subparagraph to be ambiguous.
7
to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County[,]” and did not mention
other counties. Id. HB 1043 was introduced to the General Assembly less than three
months after the Legislative Task Force to Study Rates and Charges in the Washington
Suburban Sanitary District (the “Task Force”) submitted a report that specifically
recommended limiting amortized water and sewer costs to twenty years in Prince George’s
County (the “Task Force Report”). Id. at *5.
The Elsberrys observed “that the language in [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)
originated in [Real Prop.] § 14-117.1[,]” a statute limited to existing property in Prince
George’s County. Id. The Court of Special Appeals, nonetheless, was unpersuaded by the
Elsberrys’ argument that the relocation of statutory text from Real Prop. § 14-117.1 to Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) during the bill amendment process demonstrated an intent for the
provision to apply beyond Prince George’s County. Id. at *5–6. According to the court,
both Real Prop. § 14-117.1 and Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) apply only to Prince George’s
County, consistent with its interpretation of the statutory text and legislative history. Id. at
*6.
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals observed that adopting the Elsberrys’
interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would lead to absurd, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional results. Id. Extending the geographical reach of Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) beyond Prince George’s County to all counties “would render the title of [HB
1043] – ‘Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner
Disclosure Act of 2014’ – unconstitutionally misleading” because the statute would
encompass a broader scope than expressed by its title. Id. (citing Md. Const. art. III, § 29)
8
(“[E]very law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that
shall be described in its title[.]”). Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was limited to Prince George’s County and affirmed the
circuit court’s judgment. Id. at *7.
The Elsberrys filed a petition of certiorari, which we granted on May 9, 2022.
Elsberry, 478 Md. at 510, 275 A.3d at 345.
The Contentions of the Parties
A. The Elsberrys
The Elsberrys outlined three arguments on appeal: (1) the plain language of Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies statewide, (2) an analysis of the legislative history is not
required, but if used, is inconclusive at best, and (3) HB 1043’s title is not
unconstitutionally misleading.
First, the Elsberrys contend that the plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)
unambiguously prohibits amortization of water and sewer costs through deferred payments
for a period longer than twenty years. While the Elsberrys admit that Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(i) pertains exclusively to Prince George’s County, the Elsberrys assert that Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) pertains to “real property located in any county, including, but not
limited to, Prince George’s County.” According to the Elsberrys, the overall statutory
scheme of Real Prop. § 14-117 and Real Prop. § 14-117.1 supports this notion.
Specifically, the Elsberrys note that the General Assembly chose to geographically limit
the application of certain provisions throughout Real Prop. § 14-117 “to a certain county
or to certain counties.” The omission of a geographic limitation in Real Prop. § 14-
9
117(a)(3)(ii) suggests, according to the Elsberrys, that the General Assembly intended for
it to apply to all counties in Maryland.
The Elsberrys insist that this Court’s “only role” is to determine what the General
Assembly “actually said[]” and not what the General Assembly “meant to say[.]” The
Elsberrys reiterate that “this Court has never interpreted a law to mean something contrary
to the plain language unless . . . enforcing the plain language would lead to an absurd
result.” To the Elsberrys, holding otherwise “is tantamount to inserting words into the
statute in order to make the statute express an intention that was not evidenced in its original
form.” According to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin’s interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) would require this Court to impermissibly stretch the meaning of the statute’s
plain text and add verbiage not included by the General Assembly. Such an action, the
Elsberrys assert, would encroach upon the legislature. Instead, the Elsberrys insist Real
Prop. § 14-117 is “clearly remedial” and must be “construed liberally” to prevent private
developers from imposing “excessively long” water and sewer assessments on property
owners.6 Thus, the Elsberrys contend that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation [of Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)] is the literal interpretation,” which they have advanced.
Next, the Elsberrys argue that this Court need not consult the legislative history, but
should we decide to do so, the legislative history neither confirms nor contradicts the
6
But see The Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004)
(“Although remedial statutes are . . . to be given a liberal construction, the predominant
goal of the Court is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent . . . by considering the
language used by the Legislature and giving that language a plain and common sense
meaning.”).
10
unambiguous language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). The Elsberrys assert that “[t]he
statutory text does not include [HB 1043]’s title[;]” therefore, this Court may not use the
title as an aide to interpret the statutory text. (Emphasis added). During oral argument, the
Elsberrys contended that the short title constitutes part of the legislative history, so it should
not have been considered as part of the Court of Special Appeals’ plain text analysis. If
this Court reaches the legislative history, the Elsberrys argue that the short title (which the
Elsberrys concede begins with “Prince George’s County”) is not dispositive, but rather is
“one of three components that make up the entire title of a bill[.]” The Elsberrys also note
that the changes made to HB 1043 between the First Reading and the Second Reading
indicate that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies statewide. For example, the removal of
the language “in the county” (indicating Prince George’s County) from the purpose
paragraph, supports this interpretation. The Elsberrys maintain this removal “reflects the
fact that the General Assembly moved the Twenty-Year Provision from [Real Prop.] § 14-
117.1 (where it only applied ‘in the county’) to [Real Prop.] § 14-117 (where it is not
limited to any particular county).”
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court considers HB 1043’s legislative history, the
Elsberrys request that the entire legislative history, not selective portions, be examined.
According to the Elsberrys, the Court of Special Appeals erroneously “elevated” certain
portions of legislative history over the plain language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii),
which this Court has never sanctioned “unless the legislative history clearly contradicted
the plain text . . . and this Court also determined that the General Assembly made a patent
11
drafting error[]” that would lead to an absurd result. The Elsberrys maintain that neither
occurred in the case at bar, so the plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) should prevail.
The Elsberrys also criticize Stanley Martin’s and the Court of Special Appeals’
reliance on the Task Force Report. Specifically, the Elsberrys argue that the General
Assembly was not bound by the Task Force’s thirteen recommendations or its geographic
representation. Rather, the Elsberrys assert that the General Assembly intended the statute
to protect property owners “in all counties from the excessively long amortization periods
that private developers impose throughout the state.” The removal of the words “Prince
George’s County” from the Second Reading of HB 1043, the Elsberrys explain, further
supports the General Assembly’s intent to apply Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) statewide.
Lastly, the Elsberrys assert that construing Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply
statewide would not render the title of HB 1043 constitutionally misleading. According to
the Elsberrys, HB 1043’s entire title includes an accurate reference to Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) and “provides sufficient notice that [it] is not limited to Prince George’s
County.” The Elsberrys direct us to HB 1043’s short title, purpose paragraph, and function
paragraphs. Upon review, the Elsberrys maintain that the General Assembly intentionally
limited certain portions of the entire title to Prince George’s County, but notably did not
limit the twenty-year provision in the Second Reading. For example, in the First Reading
of the purpose paragraph, HB 1043 states: “prohibiting a person in the county that is
incurring certain water and sewer costs from amortizing costs passed on to a purchaser for
more than a certain period of time[.]” (Emphasis added). The Second Reading of the
purpose paragraph states: “prohibiting a person or entity establishing certain water and
12
sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property from amortizing certain costs for
more than a certain period of time[.]” According to the Elsberrys, the omission of the
words “in the county” from the purpose paragraph, which constitutes one part of HB 1043’s
title, demonstrates that the General Assembly did not intend for the provision to be
geographically limited to Prince George’s County.
Therefore, the Elsberrys request this Court to reverse the Court of Special Appeals.
B. Stanley Martin
Stanley Martin outlines three arguments in response: (1) Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) is not unambiguous, (2) HB 1043’s legislative history demonstrates that the
twenty-year deferred water and sewer charge limitation applies exclusively to Prince
George’s County, and (3) the overall statutory scheme bolsters its position.
First, Stanley Martin asserts that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) is not unambiguous.
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) starts with “In Prince George’s County” and references no other
county. Stanley Martin argues that “[f]rom this fact alone, one could infer that [Real Prop.]
§ 14-117(a)(3) applies in its entirety only to Prince George’s County.” Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3) is divided into two subsections, (i) and (ii), both of which relate to deferred water
and sewer charges on real property. Therefore, Stanley Martin contends it is “logical” for
romanette (ii) to also apply only to Prince George’s County. In contrast, the Elsberrys
argue that the phrase “In Prince George’s County” only applies to romanette (i), and the
twenty-year deferred water and sewer limitation under romanette (ii) extends statewide.
With more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, Stanley Martin contends this
Court “can and should use legislative history” to determine the meaning of the statute.
13
Next, according to Stanley Martin, the legislative history demonstrates that the
twenty-year deferred water and sewer charge limitation applies exclusively to Prince
George’s County. Stanley Martin refers this Court to the Task Force Report. The Task
Force studied private developers’ deferred water and sewer rates in Montgomery and
Prince George’s Counties. Relying upon its findings, the Task Force compiled thirteen
recommendations and, accordingly, submitted them to the General Assembly.
Recommendation 7, for example, “[r]equire[d] a contract for the sale of new residential
real property in Prince George’s County to contain a disclosure statement regarding the
estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may
become liable.” (Emphasis added). Likewise, as Stanley Martin identifies,
Recommendation 9 proposed “[p]rohibit[ing] a person from amortizing for more than 20
years from the date of the initial sale the deferred water and sewer costs that are passed
onto a purchaser. (Single-family residential property in Prince George’s County improved
by four or fewer single-family units).” (Emphasis added). Stanley Martin notes that this
recommendation is almost identical to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). This indicates to
Stanley Martin that “[t]he General Assembly relied on the Task Force’s recommendations
when framing and reviewing HB 1043.”
Stanley Martin maintains that the short title and text of HB 1043 further confirms
that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to Prince George’s County. As previously
mentioned, HB 1043’s short title is “Prince George’s County—Deferred Water and Sewer
Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[.]” HB 1043’s short title, Stanley
Martin argues, is persuasive evidence of the General Assembly’s intent. Specifically,
14
Stanley Martin notes that HB 1043’s short title never changed between its First and Second
Reading, and the enrolled law, Chapter 441, maintains the same title as the original bill.
Stanley Martin also directs this Court to the Department of Legislative Services’
Legislative Drafting Manual, which provides that “[i]f a bill relates to only one or two
counties, their names should appear first, with a word or two about the subject matter after
the dash.” Legislative Drafting Manual 2015, DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., at 36 (2014)
[“Legislative Drafting Manual”],
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/021000/021150/u
nrestricted/20151315e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/B86D-LWQL. “HB 1043’s title
begins with ‘Prince George’s County,’ followed by a dash and a few words about the bill’s
purpose.” Therefore, Stanley Martin asserts that, in line with the Legislative Drafting
Manual, HB 1043’s short title reflects “clear intent by the General Assembly for the bill to
apply only to Prince George’s County.” HB 1043’s local bill number “PG 413-14” also
indicates that the Prince George’s County legislative delegation “has charge of the bill[.]”
Additionally, Stanley Martin claims that HB 1043’s purpose paragraph further
underlines its intent to limit application to Prince George’s County. The purpose paragraph
references either “Prince George’s County” or “in the county” several times, including the
final phrase that the bill “generally relat[es] to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince
George’s County.” (Emphasis omitted). Contrary to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin argues
there is nothing in the purpose paragraph, nor in the entirety of HB 1043’s file, that
evidences the General Assembly’s intent to extend HB 1043 to any other county besides
Prince George’s County. Between the First and Second Reading, the phrase “in the
15
county” was removed from the clause pertaining to the deferred water and sewer costs
limit, but this omission, Stanley Martin argues, does not signify that the bill is no longer
limited to Prince George’s County. Rather, it was part of a general revision to track the
proposed statutory language.
Stanley Martin contends that the changes between HB 1043’s First and Second
Reading provide additional evidence that the General Assembly intended for HB 1043 to
apply only to Prince George’s County. As previously discussed, the disputed language of
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) originally resided within Real Prop. § 14-117.1. Real Prop.
§ 14-117.1 pertains to single-family residential property within Prince George’s County.
In the Second Reading of HB 1043, the Prince George’s County delegation moved the
salient provision to its current location, Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). In short, Stanley
Martin observes that the disputed language moved from a statutory section that exclusively
pertains to Prince George’s County to another section that also only references Prince
George’s County. To Stanley Martin, there is no indication that the Prince George’s
County delegation, or any other county delegation, wished to expand the scope of the
provision beyond Prince George’s County.
Finally, Stanley Martin argues that the overall statutory scheme of Real Prop. § 14-
117 further supports its interpretation. Contrary to the Elsberrys’ position, and as
demonstrated in other subsections of the statute, Stanley Martin asserts that “the mere
absence of county-specific language in [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) is not reflective of
any legislative intent to expand the geographical reach of the statute.” In Stanley Martin’s
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals’ “holistic approach” properly considered the entire
16
context of the bill—including the bill itself, the title, function paragraphs, and legislative
amendments—in its analysis. Therefore, Stanley Martin asks this Court to affirm the Court
of Special Appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de
novo. Davis v. Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC, 457 Md. 275, 284, 177 A.3d 709, 714
(2018); Lamson v. Montgomery Cnty., 460 Md. 349, 360, 190 A.3d 316, 323 (2018).
Whether the circuit court was legally correct in dismissing the Elsberrys’ complaint turns
on a question of statutory interpretation. Sullivan, 251 Md. App. at 317, 253 A.3d at 1149.
“Where questions of law and statutory interpretation are presented, this Court reviews them
de novo . . . .” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 373, 250 A.3d 197, 207 (2021)
(citations omitted). We first conduct a statutory analysis of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii).
Id. at 376, 250 A.3d at 209; Sullivan, 251 Md. App. at 317, 253 A.3d at 1149.
Analysis
A. The plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), when viewed in context of the
entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on
deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s County.
Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation of Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 478 Md. 588, 601, 275
A.3d 390, 397 (2022). “[W]e start with the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation—to
ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the
statute.” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376, 250 A.3d at 209 (citing 75-80 Properties, LLC v.
17
RALE, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 623, 236 A.3d 545, 559 (2020)); Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md.
257, 274, 987 A.2d 18, 28 (2010) (citations omitted). “To ascertain the intent of the
General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.”
Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 28 (citations omitted). This Court has stated that
“[t]he ‘meaning of the plainest language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears.”
Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987) (quoting Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ins. Comm’r of State of Md., 293 Md.
629, 642, 446 A.2d 1140, 1147 (1982)). This Court need not resort to other rules of
statutory construction when the plain language of the statute unambiguously communicates
the intent of the General Assembly. Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 28–29 (citations
omitted).
Consideration of the plain meaning of the statutory language does not entail a bare,
isolated, or literal reading of the statutory language. See id. at 275–76, 987 A.2d at 29(citations omitted). This Court construes the statute “‘as a whole, so that no word, clause,
sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’”
Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376, 250 A.3d at 209 (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14,
25–26, 63 A.3d 582, 589 (2013)). Still, this Court will neither “add nor delete language . .
. to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain . . . language . . . .” Lockshin, 412 Md. at
275, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). Nor does this Court construe statutory language
“with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Id. (citations
omitted); see also Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 388, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) (“We
18
cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the [General Assembly] apparently
deliberately left out.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless,
[i]t is important . . . to keep in mind that the meaning of the plainest language
in a statute may be controlled by the context, and if the language is fairly
susceptible of more than one construction, the Court may seek the legislative
intention by considering the facts of contemporary history, the prior state of
the law, and the particular evil, abuse, or defect which the statute was
designed to correct and the remedy which was intended.
Dep’t of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306, 309 (1953).
Therefore, our case law demonstrates that the plainest language does not mean limiting its
construction of a particular statutory provision to its bare text alone. As this Court
explained in Lockshin, “[w]e . . . do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we
confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section
alone.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to
which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the [General Assembly] in
enacting the statute.” Id. at 276, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). “We presume that [the
General Assembly] intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and
harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a
statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Id. (citations
omitted).
Contrary to the Elsberrys’ assertion, this Court does not confine its plain text
analysis to the literal text. We “are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed
in the Annotated Code.” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514–15, 525 A.2d at 632. In fact, as
19
this Court stated in Kaczorowski, “[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular
legislation may persuade a court that [the General Assembly] did not intend words of
common meaning to have this literal effect.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted). “This process allows courts to discern that construction which avoids an illogical
or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Patton v. Wells
Fargo Fin. Maryland, Inc., 437 Md. 83, 97–98, 85 A.3d 167, 175 (2014) (internal citation
omitted). Similarly,
[w]here the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous
when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a
larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for
legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or
other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.
Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). “In resolving ambiguities, a
court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose,
and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Id.(citations omitted). As this Court explained in Building Materials Corp. of America v.
Board of Education of Baltimore County,
[a] preliminary matter . . . is to identify the statutory or regulatory language
to be construed. Consider the well-known phrase “She loves me; she loves
me not.” If one focuses only on the first clause, the plain meaning appears
clear—no need for further exploration. Similarly, if one considers only the
second clause, the meaning seems equally clear though quite different. But
when the sentence is considered as a whole, there is ambiguity and one must
know more than the language alone to discern its meaning. Context and
history matter. As this Court has said, “the meaning of the plainest language
is controlled by the context in which it appears.”
428 Md. 572, 585, 53 A.3d 347, 354–55 (2012) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
20
At the outset, this Court begins its analysis with Real Prop. § 14-117(a), which
provides that:
(a)(1) In this subsection, “water and sewer authority” includes a person to
which the duties and responsibilities of the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission have been delegated by a written agreement or in accordance
with a local ordinance.
(2) A contract for the initial sale of improved, residential real property to
a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the property for
residential purposes shall disclose the estimated cost, as established by the
appropriate water and sewer authority, of any deferred water and sewer
charges for which the purchaser may become liable.
(3)(i) In Prince George’s County, a contract for the initial sale of
residential real property for which there are deferred private water and
sewer assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs
for water and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable
shall contain a disclosure that includes:
1. The existence of the deferred private water and sewer assessments;
2. The amount of the annual assessment;
3. The approximate number of payments remaining on the
assessment;
4. The amount remaining on the assessment, including interest;
5. The name and address of the person or entity most recently
responsible for collection of the assessment;
6. The interest rate on the assessment;
7. The estimated payoff amount of the assessment; and
8. A statement that payoff of the assessment is allowed without
prepayment penalty.
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial
sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed
on to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a
period longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.
(4) If the appropriate water and sewer authority has not established a
schedule of charges for the water and sewer project that benefits
residential real property or if a local jurisdiction has adopted a plan to
benefit residential real property in the future, the contract for the initial
sale of the residential real property shall disclose that fact.
21
(5)(i) This paragraph does not apply in a county that has adopted a
disclosure requirement that is substantially similar to the disclosure
requirement in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph.
(ii) A contract for the resale of residential real property that is served
by public water or wastewater facilities for which deferred water and
sewer charges have been established by a recorded covenant or
declaration shall contain a notice in substantially the following form[.]7
(Emphasis added).
The challenged language sits within a paragraph, (a)(3), split into two
subparagraphs, (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii). The first subparagraph, denoted by romanette (i),
begins with the phrase, “In Prince George’s County[.]” Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i). This
subparagraph requires sellers to provide purchasers, in the initial contract of sale, with
certain disclosures regarding the deferred water and sewer costs. Id. § 14-117(a)(3)(i)(1)–
(8). The second subparagraph, indicated by romanette (ii), contains the challenged
language prohibiting the amortization of water and sewer costs for a period longer than
twenty years. Id. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii).
The literal text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) does not include any geographical
limiting language. If the language, “[a] person or entity . . . may not amortize costs . . . for
a period longer than 20 years[,]” was surgically extracted from the statute and read in
isolation, it could be reasonably construed to apply generally to any person or entity in
Maryland. This textualist methodology of statutory interpretation advanced by the
Elsberrys is not reinforced by our case law. Our method of statutory construction is
7
The “following form” language has been omitted for concision.
22
designed to avoid “examin[ing] the trees so closely that we do not see the forest[.]”
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632. As previously stated, the “plainest
language” inquiry requires construction of the challenged language in the context of the
entire statute and its legislative purpose. See Sollers, 201 Md. at 611, 95 A.2d at 309;
Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275, 987 A.2d at 29; Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 428 Md. at 585,
53 A.3d at 354–55.
Once the plain text of the statute is viewed in the context of its broader statutory
scheme and its entire title as enacted by the General Assembly, it is clear that Real Prop. §
14-117(a)(3) applies only to Prince George’s County. The Elsberrys contend that both
Stanley Martin and the Court of Special Appeals read the statute “backwards[,]” and that
(a)(3)(ii) should be read first as a generally applicable provision while (a)(3)(i) is
specifically limited to Prince George’s County. There is no statutory text supporting the
Elsberrys’ reading of the statute, which belies drafting conventions and conflicts with a
basic principle of statutory construction: reading and applying terms from top to bottom.
See In re Walker, 473 Md. 68, 82–83, 248 A.3d 981, 989–90 (2021) (construing the
meaning of a term from top to bottom).
It is true that an introductory sentence or header usually pertains to everything that
follows until the next paragraph, section, or heading. See United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79, 115 S. Ct. 464, 472 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that “the normal, commonsense reading of a subsection” is for the introductory term to
modify the remainder of the subsection). The Maryland Style Manual also recommends
“plac[ing] an exception or limitation at the earliest possible point in the statutory unit to
23
which it applies[,]” unless doing so “would impair the clarity of the statute[.]” Maryland
Style Manual for Statutory Law, DEP’T LEGIS. SERVS., at 41 (Oct. 2018) [“Maryland Style
Manual”],
https://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/LegisBillDrafting/MarylandStyleManualforStatutory
Law2018.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/L4ES-QXFP. Thus, following the Maryland
Style Manual, the clearest way for the General Assembly to have ordered Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3) to make clear that both subsections apply exclusively to Prince George’s County
would have been to place the phrase “In Prince George’s County” outside both romanettes
(i) and (ii) as follows:
(3) In Prince George’s County, (i) a contract for the initial sale of residential
real property for which there are deferred private water and sewer
assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water
and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain
a disclosure that includes:
1. The existence of the deferred private water and sewer assessments;
2. The amount of the annual assessment;
3. The approximate number of payments remaining on the assessment;
4. The amount remaining on the assessment, including interest;
5. The name and address of the person or entity most recently responsible
for collection of the assessment;
6. The interest rate on the assessment;
7. The estimated payoff amount of the assessment; and
8. A statement that payoff of the assessment is allowed without
prepayment penalty.
(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial
sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on
to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period
longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale.
See id. Written that way, the opening phrase of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3), “In Prince
George’s County,” would intuitively modify the entire subsection that follows, including
24
subparagraph (a)(3)(ii). Because Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) is not written that way, and the
phrase “In Prince George’s County” appears only in romanette (i), the structure of § 14-
117(a)(3) suggests that the phrase should apply only to the contents of romanette (i). Our
review is not limited to the structure of the provision. See Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275–76,
987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted).
Common expectations of normal paragraph structures indicate that a second
subparagraph labeled “(a)(3)(ii)” would ordinarily relate in substance to the first
subparagraph labeled “(a)(3)(i).” See Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 328, 872 A.2d 681, 686
(2005) (noting that statutory “provisions must be read in a commonsensical perspective to
avoid a farfetched interpretation”) (internal citation omitted). In this case, the first
subparagraph, (a)(3)(i), pertains to deferred water and sewer costs in Prince George’s
County—a proposition not contested by the Elsberrys. Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i). It
follows that one would ordinarily expect the subsequent subsidiary paragraph, here
(a)(3)(ii), to also pertain geographically to deferred water and sewer costs in Prince
George’s County. It would be illogical for the General Assembly to enact a subsection of
a statute relating to water and sewer assessments of properties within Montgomery and
Prince George’s Counties ((a)(1)), then create a subparagraph also related to water and
sewer assessments within Prince George’s County ((a)(3)(i)), but then, like a bolt from the
blue, carve out a specific water and sewage amortization limitation that applies to the entire
state ((a)(3)(ii)). If the General Assembly preferred a general restriction on water and
sewer amortization for the entire state, it is highly unlikely that it would have buried the
language in the second subparagraph of a third subsection where the first paragraph is
25
limited in effect only to Prince George’s County. We agree with the Court of Special
Appeals that it would be “rather curious” for the General Assembly to start a subsection by
addressing deferred water and sewer assessments specifically in Prince George’s County,
but then expand the geographical reach of the next subsection to the entire state of
Maryland. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616, at *3. For that reason, even focusing exclusively
on the contents of § 14-117(a)(3), without broader context, we conclude that the language
is ambiguous. When we add in broader context supplied by the title and purpose
paragraphs the General Assembly enacted with the codified language, the ambiguity
disappears.
The Elsberrys argue HB 1043’s title and purpose paragraphs constitute legislative
history—not plain text. In support of this contention, the Elsberrys cite to Motor Vehicle
Administration v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 821 A.2d 62 (2003). As the Lytle Court explained,
[a]s we stated in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, . . .
even where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by
its context. In short, the statutory language must be construed in light of and
governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme. An appellate
court may consider evidence such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs,
amendments that occurred as it passed through the [General Assembly], and
its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to ascertain the
[General Assembly’s] goal in enacting the statute.
Id. at 57, 821 A.2d at 74 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Contrary to the
Elsberrys’ claim, the Lytle Court did not expressly state that a bill’s title and function
paragraphs constitute legislative history; rather, a bill’s title and function paragraphs are
indicative of legislative intent. Id.; Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.
26
The dividing line between plain text and legislative history may seem academic
since both support the same construction of an ambiguous statutory provision. As provided
in Lytle, this Court may use the bill title, purpose, amendments, and earlier and subsequent
litigation as tools in reaching the correct statutory construction. Lytle, 374 Md. at 57, 821
A.2d at 74 (citations omitted). As a matter of precision, the bill title and purpose are part
of the statutory text—not the legislative history—even if both are used in service of
ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly.
Generally, the title of the bill consists of three parts: the short title, the purpose
paragraph, and one or more function paragraphs. Legislative Drafting Manual, supra, at
36. First, “[t]he purpose of the short title is to give a general indication of the content of
the bill.” Id. It essentially “tells the reader what the bill is about.” Id. “If a bill relates to
only one or two counties, their names should appear first [in the short title], with a word or
two about the subject matter after the dash.” Id. “A local bill number, assigned by the
county delegation that has charge of the bill, appears on a separate line.” Id. Second, “[t]he
purpose paragraph is the part of the title that describes in constitutionally acceptable detail
what the bill does.” Id. at 37. Lastly, “[t]he function paragraph describes the action being
taken, specifies the article and section of the Annotated Code or public local laws or the
Session Laws that the bill affects, and identifies where the affected law is found.” Id. at
39.
HB 1043’s short title further demonstrates that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies
only to Prince George’s County. Its short title reads: “Prince George’s County — Deferred
Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[.]” This title,
27
evidenced by the subject followed by the dash, reinforces the connection between Prince
George’s County and the twenty-year water and sewer charges amortization limit in Real
Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). HB 1043’s short title also includes the local bill number assigned
by the Prince George’s County delegation. What the short title doesn’t say is just as
important as what it does say, and nothing in the short title indicates the bill applies
statewide. HB 1043’s purpose paragraph similarly does not provide any indication that the
amortization limit applies anywhere but Prince George’s County. HB 1043’s purpose
paragraph reads:
FOR the purpose of [1] requiring a registered home builder in Prince
George’s County to include certain information relating to deferred water
and sewer charges in certain sales contracts under certain circumstances; [2]
requiring a certain contract for the initial sale of residential real property in
the county to include certain information relating to deferred water and sewer
charges; [3] prohibiting a person or entity establishing certain water and
sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property from amortizing
certain costs for more than a certain period of time; [4] authorizing the
purchaser to recover certain damages or take certain actions under certain
circumstances; [5] applying certain provisions of law to existing single
family residential property in Prince George’s County; [6] requiring a certain
person that imposes a deferred water and sewer charge to provide the
property owner with a bill including certain information; [7] authorizing the
balance owed on a deferred water and sewer assessment to be redeemed for
a certain amount; [8] requiring the county to study certain issues relating to
deferred water and sewer charges and report its findings to the Prince
George’s County Senators and the House Delegation on or before certain
dates; [9] authorizing the county, in completing the studies required under
this Act, to consult with certain water and sewer companies; and [10]
generally relating to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s
County.”
(Emphasis added). The bracketed numbers denote the ten clauses in the purpose paragraph.
Of the ten clauses, six expressly include the phrase “in Prince George’s County” or “the
county.” Both the opening clause and the final summation clause, “relating to deferred
28
water and sewer charges[,]” are limited to applying “in Prince George’s County.” The
third clause directly relates to the challenged statutory language, which does not include
either “in Prince George’s County” or “the county.” However, the third clause immediately
follows these references. Notably, no other county is referenced, and the purpose
paragraph makes no mention of a statewide application.
Following the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis,8 “if the [General
Assembly] had intended the general words to be construed in an unrestricted sense, it would
not have enumerated the specific things.” In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 190, 634 A.2d
53, 56 (1993) (citations omitted). Similarly, if the General Assembly intended for the part
of the bill relating to “prohibiting a person or entity establishing certain water and sewer
costs for the initial sale of residential real property from amortizing certain costs for more
than a certain period of time” to apply statewide, then it would not have specifically
enumerated “Prince George’s County” or “in the county” so frequently. See Kaczorowski,
309 Md. at 516, 525 A.2d at 633. The literal text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) may not
specifically reference Prince George’s County, but construing the provision, considering
the entire statutory scheme, including the short title and purpose paragraph, indicates that
the plain text applies exclusively to Prince George’s County. We agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that “we cannot find a legislative intent that simply does not exist.”
Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616, at *6.
8
Ejusdem generis is Latin for “of the same kind or class[.]” Ejusdem Generis,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is “[a] canon of construction holding that when
a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be
interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.” Id.29
B. The legislative history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) confirms that the
amortization provision only applies to Prince George’s County.
This Court may use legislative history as a “check” on its plain text interpretation.
Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551, 165 A.3d 398, 401 (2017); see also Nationstar Mortg.
LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 170, 258 A.3d 296, 308 (2021) (“We also review the legislative
history of the statute to confirm conclusions drawn from the text or to resolve ambiguities.”)
(emphasis added); In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 50, 215 A.3d 300, 311 (2019) (“In addition to
the plain language, the modern tendency of this Court is to continue the analysis of the
statute beyond the plain meaning to examine ‘extrinsic sources of legislative intent’ in
order to ‘check [ ] our reading of a statute’s plain language’ . . . .”) (citations omitted). The
Elsberrys contend that Court of Special Appeals should not have consulted the legislative
history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) because the statute is unambiguous. Relying on
Patton v. Wells Fargo Financial Maryland, Inc., the Elsberrys assert that a court may not
consult legislative history when interpreting an unambiguous statute unless the General
Assembly made a drafting mistake and to avoid absurd results. 437 Md. at 101, 85 A.3d
at 177.
In Patton, a purchaser and lender disagreed regarding the appropriate statute of
limitations for actions brought under the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law (“CLEC”),
a Maryland statute that governed the parties’ loan contract. Id. at 95–96, 85 A.3d at 173–
74. Md. Code Ann., Commercial Law (“Com. Law”) § 12-707(g) provides that “[a]n
action under this title may be brought . . . within one year from the date of the occurrence
of the violation.” Id. at 96, 85 A.3d at 174. As a literal matter, CLEC appears in Title 12,
30
but the one-year statute of limitations, Com. Law § 12-707(g), appears in the Maryland
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, “a statute that is quite distinct from CLEC and the other
eleven subtitles of Title 12.” Id. Recognizing the ambiguity between the literal
interpretation of Com. Law § 12-707(g) and the contextual interpretation of Com. Law §
12-707(g), the Patton Court reviewed the statute’s legislative history “to resolve the
ambiguity of its application.” Id. at 98, 85 A.3d at 175.
Contrary to the Elsberrys’ stance, at no point did this Court or the Court of Special
Appeals use legislative history to contradict the plain meaning of the statute. Rather, both
courts employed legislative history (along with consideration of the context, objectives,
and purpose of the statute) to evince the intent of the General Assembly. What this Court
did in Patton is precisely what the Court of Special Appeals did in the instant case. Both
recognized that the literal text, read in isolation, suggested one meaning, while reading the
literal text in context of the larger statute, inclusive of its title, purpose, and other
provisions, produced another meaning. See id. at 96–101, 85 A.3d at 174–77. The
legislative history confirmed the latter meaning. Id. at 101, 85 A.3d at 177.
Our review of the legislative history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) supports the
conclusion reached by the Court of Special Appeals. In the case at bar, we derive the
legislative history of HB 1043 from the materials contained in the bill file.9 As previously
9
The bill file contains documents “reflecting the origins of a bill, the initial draft,
and any additional materials[,]” which are “maintained first by the committee to which the
bill is assigned and later by the Department of Legislative Reference Library.” Jack
Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use
and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. L. Rev. 432, 441 (1995) (footnote omitted).
31
stated, the General Assembly created the Task Force to study deferred water and sewer
rates by private developers in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County. The Task
Force provided its findings and recommendations to the Governor and Prince George’s
County and Montgomery County delegations in December 2013. The Executive Summary
of the Task Force Report provides: “Based upon findings from two informational meetings
and public hearing, the task force intends to support legislation that will improve the fiscal
transparency of the budgetary decision [] making process within WSSC and to establish
additional disclosure requirements for homeowners in Prince George’s County.”
(Emphasis added). None of the findings or recommendations in the Task Force Report
pertain to counties other than Montgomery County and Prince George’s County.
Furthermore, the recommendation that ultimately provided the basis for Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii), Recommendation 9, expressly references Prince George’s County: “Prohibit
a person from amortizing for more than 20 years from the date of the initial sale the deferred
water and sewer costs that are passed onto a purchaser. (Single-family residential property
in Prince George’s County improved by four or fewer single-family units).” (Emphasis
added).
Montgomery County did not adopt the recommendations from the Task Force
Report, but nonetheless voted for HB 1043. The decision to not adopt the recommendation
for a twenty-year amortization limit, but overall vote for the bill, indicates Montgomery
County’s support for the amortization cap in Prince George’s County, but not in
Montgomery County. It seems less than likely that the Montgomery County delegation
would endorse a statewide amortization cap when it declined to specifically adopt one from
32
the bi-county Task Force Report. Additionally, feasibility reports in the uncodified section
of the bill were directed to the Prince George’s County delegation. “The bill requires
Prince George’s County to study specified issues relating to deferred water and sewer
charges and report its preliminary findings to the Prince George’s County Senators and
House Delegation . . . .” (Emphasis added).
The Elsberrys rely upon Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572, 689 A.2d 59 (1997), for
the proposition that the Task Force Report cannot be used to thwart the intent of the General
Assembly. However, Taylor is distinguishable in two respects. First, Taylor concerned
whether Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 12-121 “prohibit[ed] a mortgagee from charging [a]
mortgagor fees for post-default, visual inspections of the mortgaged residence’s exterior .
. . .” Id. at 574, 689 A.2d at 60. There was no dispute that Com. Law § 12-121 applied
statewide. In Taylor, the Task Force on Real Property Closing Costs, a legislative task
force, provided the General Assembly a report of its findings and recommendations related
to real property closing costs (the “Commission Report”). Id. at 579, 689 A.2d at 62.
Accordingly, the Commission Report initiated the enactment of Com. Law § 12-121 but
was not cited as evidence to elucidate the geographical reach of Com. Law § 12-121. Id.
Unlike the Commission Report in Taylor, the Task Force Report provides evidence directly
pertaining to the issue in the case at bar: the geographic scope of Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii). Second, Taylor does not stand for the proposition that commission reports
or task force reports should not be used in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly,
or even that such reports should have negligible weight. The bottom line of Taylor is that
a commission or task force report “tail” should not wag the dog: “It is the intent of the
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General Assembly that we must discern, not that of the Commission.” Id. at 583, 689 A.2d
at 64.
In the case at bar, the Task Force Report underscores the same conclusion
manifested in the plain text of the statute, its short title, and purpose: Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) applies solely to Prince George’s County. We also disagree with the
Elsberrys’ contention that moving the twenty-year amortization limit from Real Prop. §
14-117.1 to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) between the First and Second Readings of HB
1043 provides any indication that the provision applies statewide. On the contrary, this
relocation elucidates the General Assembly’s intent that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) only
applies to Prince George’s County. Real Prop. § 14-117.1(a) expressly states that the
section exclusively applies to residential real property in Prince George’s County. Real
Prop. § 14-117.1. If language from a bill exclusively pertaining to real property in Prince
George’s County is moved to a new subparagraph within an existing paragraph exclusively
pertaining to Prince George’s County, it follows that the new subparagraph would not take
on new meaning and apply statewide.
One final indicia of our conclusion: The vote for HB 1043 was unanimous, but there
was no indication in the legislative record that other jurisdictions intended for (a)(3)(ii) to
apply statewide. Some jurisdictions, such as Baltimore County, already impose an
amortization limit that exceeds the twenty-year cap provided by (a)(3)(ii). If we adopt the
Elsberrys’ posture, then these jurisdictions’ existing laws would be rescinded by HB 1043;
however, there is no indication of discussion or debate from these jurisdictions, either
challenging or acquiescing, to a new statewide regime. Therefore, we conclude that HB
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1043’s legislative history confirms our plain text interpretation that Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3) only applies to Prince George’s County.
C. The Court of Special Appeals correctly interpreted Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) to avoid violating Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution.
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the Elsberrys’ proposed
statutory construction would violate Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution.
Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616, at *6 (citations omitted). We agree.
This Court generally construes statutory language in a way that avoids violating the
Constitution. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 425–26, 921 A.2d 171, 183 (2007) (“the .
. . canon of constitutional avoidance . . . provides that a statute will be construed so as to
avoid a conflict with the Constitution whenever that course is reasonably possible.”)
(footnote, citations, and internal quotations omitted). As explained above, HB 1043’s bill
title is part of the statutory text of the law and is subject to the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance. In addition to the general doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Maryland
Constitution, unlike other states, strictly limits the scope and subject of the short title.
Article III, Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution states:
The style of all Laws of this State shall be, “Be it enacted by the General
Assembly of Maryland:” and all Laws shall be passed by original bill; and
every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject,
and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, nor section of Law, shall
be revived, or amended by reference to its title, or section only; nor shall any
Law be construed by reason of its title, to grant powers, or confer rights
which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act . . . .
Md. Const. art. III, § 29 (emphasis added). The Maryland Legislative Desk Reference
Manual provides practical guidance to the General Assembly for crafting bill titles in
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compliance with Article III, § 29. See Legislative Desk Reference Manual, DEP’T LEGIS.
SERVS., at 37–41 (2018) [“Legislative Desk Reference Manual”],
http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/OPA/I/LDRM_2018.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/RZC2-W49A. As previously mentioned, Maryland’s Constitution
requires “every Law enacted by the General Assembly [to] embrace but one subject, and
that shall be described in its title[.]” Md. Const. art. III, § 29 (emphasis added). “This
requirement, known as the ‘one subject rule,’ is satisfied if an act does not contain foreign
or ‘nongermane’ matter and if the title of the act fairly advises the General Assembly and
the public of the real nature and subject of the legislation.” Legislative Desk Reference
Manual, supra, at 37 (emphasis added). Additionally, “[w]hile the title need not be an
abstract of the contents of the body of the act, it must not be misleading.” Id. Finally, “the
title of an act must be sufficiently clear and comprehensive to reasonably cover the contents
of the act.” Id.
The Legislative Drafting Manual similarly provides guidance on bill short titles.
Legislative Drafting Manual, supra, at 36. In short, “[t]he short title tells the reader what
the bill is about.” Id. Its “purpose . . . is to give a general indication of the content of the
bill.” Id. Generally, “no more than six to eight words need be used, and the drafter should
avoid short titles that exceed 100 characters in length.” Id. “Short titles commonly state
the general subject of the bill first, followed by successively more detailed phrases
separated by dashes.” Id. Notably, “[i]f a bill relates to only one or two counties, their
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names should appear first, with a word or two about the subject matter after the dash.”10
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[b]icounty agency bills should include the full name
of the agency, followed by a very brief description of the content of the bill.” Id. For local
bills, “[a] local bill number, assigned by the county delegation that has charge of the bill,
appears on a separate line.” Id.
While this Court has “historically construed the one subject rule liberally in order
to give effect to legislation, more recently the court has become stricter in its interpretation
and has warned that there are limits to its willingness to find ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’
connections between ‘completely separate and unrelated’ provisions in legislation.”
Legislative Desk Reference Manual, supra, at 38. Additionally, this Court “is prepared to
examine the circumstances surrounding the passage of the challenged legislation.” Id. For
example, in Migdal v. State, the Court rejected an “eleventh-hour” engraftment of a bill
that inappropriately attempted to include “completely separate and unrelated provisions”
of a previously defeated bill. 358 Md. 308, 319, 747 A.2d 1225, 1231 (2000) (footnote
omitted). Because the bill in question violated the “one subject rule” by “contain[ing] two
distinct and incongruous subjects,” the Migdal Court held the bill was unconstitutional
under Article III, § 29. Id. at 321, 747 A.2d at 1232 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). This, the Court stated, was “precisely the type of legislative action Article III,
[S]ection 29 was designed to prevent.” Id. at 322, 747 A.2d at 1232.
10
The Elsberrys even “concede [] that [HB 1043’s] short title begins with ‘Prince
George’s County’ followed by a dash[,]” and “acknowledge that this would tend to indicate
that the bill would apply only to Prince George’s County.”
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As discussed previously, both the short title and purpose paragraph of HB 1043
pertain to one subject: deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County. While
the purpose paragraph provides several detailed applications of the law, including notice
requirements and limits on amortization, each provision “generally relat[es] to deferred
water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County.” Therefore, this interpretation of the
title squarely falls within the “one subject rule” because it restrains the subject of HB 1043
to one item, deferred water and sewer costs, to one particular county, Prince George’s
County. The Court of Special Appeals avoided a violation of Article III, § 29 with its
construction. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616, at *7.
Conversely, if this Court adopted the Elsberrys’ interpretation of the law, then it
would conceivably jeopardize compliance with Article III, § 29. The Elsberrys’
interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would run afoul of Maryland’s Constitution
by expanding the application of the statute beyond the specified county and upending a
county-by-county approach to deferred water and sewer charges in Maryland. Rather than
violating Article III, § 29, the most doctrinally sound interpretation of the law is to hold
that the title limits its reach to real property within Prince George’s County.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies only to residential real property
located in Prince George’s County as evidenced by the statute’s plain text, short title, and
purpose paragraph, and further confirmed by the legislative history. We also hold that the
Court of Special Appeals did not err by considering whether a particular construction of
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Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) violated Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution. For
the reasons expressed within, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONERS.
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