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 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The burden of showing that existing representation may be
inadequate is a minimal one.”

Id. at 102

 (citation omitted). The person
seeking to intervene need not show that existing representation is, in fact, inadequate, or
that the person’s interests are adverse to existing representation; “[i]t is sufficient that the
representation may be inadequate.”

Id. at 102

 (citation and internal
- 39 -
quotation marks omitted).
This Court has “adopted the ‘interest-analysis’ test for determining whether the lack
of adequate representation requirement has been met.”

Id. at 102

 (citation
omitted). We have explained the “interest-analysis” test as follows:
The cascading test to be applied is: 1) if the proposed intervenor’s interest is
not represented or advocated to any degree by an existing party, or if the
existing parties all have interests which are adverse to those of the proposed
intervenor, the intervenor should be permitted to intervene; 2) if the proposed
intervenor’s interest is similar, but not identical, to that of an existing party,
a discriminating judgment is required on the circumstances of the particular
case, but the proposed intervenor ordinarily should be allowed to intervene
unless it is clear that the party will provide adequate representation for the
absentee; 3) if the interest of an existing party and the proposed intervenor
are identical, or if an existing party is charged by law with representing the
proposed intervenor’s interest, a compelling showing should be required to
demonstrate why this representation is not adequate.

Id. at 102-03

 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the interest-analysis test, in relevant part, the person seeking to intervene always
satisfies the requirement of inadequate representation where the person’s interest “is not
represented or advocated to any degree by an existing party[.]”

Id. at 102-03

968 A.2d at 592

 (citation omitted). Notably, the person seeking to intervene generally satisfies the
requirement of inadequate representation where the person’s interest is similar to that of an
existing party, but where it is unclear that the party will adequately represent the person’s
interest. See

id. at 103

968 A.2d at 592

 (citation omitted). On the other hand, the person
seeking to intervene must make “a compelling showing” to satisfy the requirement of
inadequate representation where the person’s interest is identical to a party’s, or where a
party is legally required to represent the person’s interest.

Id. at 103

968 A.2d at

592
- 40 -
(citation omitted).
Permissive Intervention
Maryland Rule 2-214(b) governs permissive intervention as follows:
(1) Generally. Upon timely motion a person may be permitted to intervene
in an action when the person’s claim or defense has a question of law or fact
in common with the action.
***
(3) Considerations. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties.[24]
In the Fourth Edition of the Maryland Rules Commentary, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer,
Linda M. Schuett, and Joyce E. Smithey, address permissive intervention under Maryland
Rule 2-214(b) as follows:
The underlying ground of [permissive intervention] is to promote judicial
economy in the litigation process. More practical considerations, however,
often play a role. The intervenor may fear, for example, that in his or her
absence the court will rule the “wrong” way on an issue that the intervening
party may have to litigate later if intervention is not granted.
Maryland Rules Commentary (4th ed. 2014), at 199.
Declaratory Judgment
CJ § 3-405(a), part of the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, provides:
(1) If declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party.
(2) Except in a class action, the declaration may not prejudice the rights of
any person not a party to the proceeding.
24
Maryland Rule 2-214(b)(2) governs permissive intervention by governmental
entities, and thus is not applicable here.
- 41 -
Analysis
Here, we conclude that the Growers were entitled to intervention as of right under
Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) and that the circuit court erred in denying the Growers’ motion
to intervene; and, the Growers were entitled to be made a party pursuant to CJ § 3-405(a)(1)
and to joinder under Maryland Rule 2-211. We also determine that the circuit court abused
its discretion in denying permissive intervention as to the Growers under Maryland Rule
2-214(b). In contrast, we conclude that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion
in denying intervention as of right or permissive intervention as to the Patients and the
Trade Association Petitioners, and that the Patients and the Trade Association Petitioners
were not entitled to be made a party under CJ § 3-405(a)(1).
We first address intervention as of right as to the Growers. Relevant case law
establishes that intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) is comprised of
four requirements: timeliness, a claim of an interest, impairment or impediment to the
ability to protect that interest, and inadequate representation by the parties. See Md. R. 2-
214(a)(2); Washington Grove,

408 Md. at 69-70

968 A.2d at 571-72

. Given that this
analysis involves intervention as of right, we review the issue without deference to the
circuit court. See Washington Grove,

408 Md. at 65

968 A.2d at 568-69

.
As to the first requirement, timeliness, the threshold consideration, we are guided
by the four factors that we set forth in Washington Grove,

408 Md. at 70

968 A.2d at

572—(1) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (2) the probability of prejudice to
the parties; (3) the extent to which the proceedings have progressed; and (4) the reasons
for delay in seeking intervention. We conclude, as did the circuit court, that the Growers’
- 42 -
motion to intervene was timely. Here, the Growers sought to intervene to protect what they
described as a direct property interest that would have been impaired or impeded by the
action. AMM has not alleged that it was prejudiced by any delay in the filing of the
Growers’ motion to intervene. Although at the February 21, 2017 hearing, AMM’s counsel
indicated that AMM did not waive the issue of timeliness, in the opposition to the motion
to intervene, AMM did not argue that the motion to intervene was untimely filed. In not
raising an issue of timeliness in the opposition to the motion to intervene, AMM necessarily
did not allege any prejudicial delay. And, we do not discern the probability of any prejudice
to the parties based on the timing of the filing of the motion to intervene.
As to the extent to which the proceedings had progressed, the Growers filed the
motion to intervene on December 30, 2016, within two months of AMM’s filing of the
complaint for declaratory judgment, which was filed on October 31, 2016. At that point,
the circuit court had not yet ruled on the Commission’s motion to dismiss, or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, which was filed on December 12, 2016. Because the
motion to intervene was filed early in the litigation and shortly after the filing of the
complaint and the Commission’s motion to dismiss, there was no delay in seeking
intervention. Indeed, at the February 21, 2017 hearing, the circuit court determined that no
argument was necessary on the issue of timeliness and found that the motion to intervene
was timely filed. We agree. The motion to intervene was filed less than two months after
the filing of the complaint, approximately two weeks after the filing of the Commission’s
motion to dismiss, and before the filing of an answer.
The second and third requirements necessary for intervention as of right, namely, a
- 43 -
claim of an interest and impairment or impediment to the ability to protect that interest, are
also fully satisfied. Throughout the litigation, the Growers have claimed an interest in the
form of a direct or vested property right. Indeed, on February 20, 2017, the day before the
hearing on the motion to intervene, the Growers submitted three affidavits from owners or
members of Curio Cultivation, SunMed Growers, and ForwardGro. In the affidavits, the
owners or members averred that, after receiving pre-approvals for medical cannabis grower
licenses, the Growers had expended significant amounts of money to prepare to meet the
State’s regulatory deadline, had contracted for facilities, hired employees, and taken other
actions in reliance on their status as pre-approval awardees. After receiving pre-approvals
for medical cannabis grower licenses, the Growers had one year in which to become
operational. If the Growers failed to do so, their pre-approvals would become subject to
rescission by the Commission. See COMAR 10.62.08.06E. From our perspective, the
Growers plainly have an interest that intervention is necessary to protect. As required by
relevant case law, the Growers have demonstrated that intervention is essential to protect
their status as pre-approval awardees and, in one instance, a medical cannabis grower
licensee. The Growers have satisfied the statutory pre-approval process—and ForwardGro
has been approved for a medical cannabis grower license—and expended significant
resources to meet the necessary requirements for becoming fully approved licensed
medical cannabis growers. Despite AMM’s contentions, it almost goes without saying that
- 44 -
the Growers may be disadvantaged by this case’s outcome.25
In denying the motion to intervene, the circuit court defined the issue as whether the
Commission had administered the relevant statute in a constitutional manner and the circuit
court determined that the Growers did not have an applicable interest in the issue. At oral
argument, the Commission’s counsel contended that the question is whether the Growers
have an interest in the transaction that is the subject of the case, not whether the Growers
had an interest in the legal issue that is to be decided by the circuit court. The
Commission’s counsel’s view is consistent with case law concerning intervention as of
right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). See Washington Grove,

(The second requirement for intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-
214(a)(2) is that “the person claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that
is the subject of the action[.]”). The Growers have consistently claimed an interest in the
case by virtue of having been pre-approved for medical cannabis grower licenses. By
claiming such an interest, the Growers are obviously claiming an interest in the transaction
that is the subject of the action—namely, the Commission’s pre-approval process and
issuance of medical cannabis grower licenses.
As to any impairment or impediment of the Growers’ ability to protect their interest,
in the complaint for declaratory judgment, AMM sought an injunction prohibiting the
Commission from issuing final approvals for the fifteen businesses, including the Growers,
25
It is not necessary that we address the Growers’ contention that they have a
“vested” property interest. The circumstance is that the Growers have more than
demonstrated that they have an interest in the case that intervention is necessary to protect.
- 45 -
whose applications for medical cannabis grower licenses were pre-approved. AMM also
sought an order forcing the Commission to dispense with the existing results of the pre-
approval process and to reconduct the pre-approval stage of the medical cannabis grower
licensing process taking diversity into account. Obviously, if granted, this relief would
potentially impinge upon the Growers’ interest in the pre-approval and licensing process,
given that the Growers have already been designated as pre-approval awardees and
ForwardGro has been granted a medical cannabis grower license. Plainly, the Growers
“might be disadvantaged by” this case’s disposition, Emps.’ Ret. Sys.,

317 Md. at

89 n.19,

562 A.2d at

728 n.19, which could affect the Growers’ status in the licensing process. See
also Washington Grove,

408 Md. at 99

968 A.2d at 590

(“The standard . . . [i]s whether
the disposition of the action would at least potentially impair the [proposed intervenor]’s
ability to protect its interest.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum,
denial of the motion to intervene and exclusion of the Growers as parties in AMM’s request
for declaratory judgment would impede the Growers’ ability to protect their interest in the
pre-approval and licensing process.
No matter how this case proceeds, the Growers have interests that will be at stake.
If the circuit court orders the Commission to reconduct the pre-approval stage of the
medical cannabis grower licensing process, the Growers will be forced to undergo the
process of submitting an application a second time and awaiting the Commission’s
decision. If, in such a scenario, the Commission decided not to pre-approve the Growers’
applications, the Growers would not only lose the opportunity to become licensed medical
cannabis growers in Maryland, but also would have forfeited the investments made as a
- 46 -
result of the first pre-approval process. Even if the Commission pre-approved the Growers’
applications during a second pre-approval process—which is uncertain, given that the
second pre-approval process would necessarily be conducted under different rules—the
Growers’ interests would be impaired in the interim because of delay and uncertainty as to
whether the Growers would be successful during the second pre-approval process.
Finally, the fourth requirement for intervention as of right, inadequate
representation by the parties, is satisfied. Obviously, as competitors in the medical
cannabis growing industry, the Growers and AMM have interests that are adverse to each
other. The real question is whether the Commission adequately represents the Growers’
interests. The circumstances of this case make clear that the Commission cannot do so.
As Petitioners observe, this conclusion is not a critique of the Office of the Attorney
General. Indeed, tellingly, on behalf of the Commission, the Office of the Attorney
General candidly advises that it does not adequately represent the Growers’ interests. At
the risk of stating the obvious, the Office of the Attorney General represents the
Commission’s interest, not any business’s or individual’s interest. The Commission has
an interest in regulating Maryland’s medical cannabis industry while fully comporting with
applicable law, and in “implement[ing] programs to make medical cannabis available to
qualifying patients in a safe and effective manner.” HG § 13-3302(c). As such, the
Commission has an interest in licensing qualified medical cannabis growers, but the
Commission has no interest in licensing any particular individual medical cannabis grower,
as opposed to another. The Commission has an interest in selecting qualified medical
cannabis growers and regulating medical cannabis growers; as a result, the Commission,
- 47 -
in actuality, has a conflict of interest with respect to the representation of the Growers in a
lawsuit in which the Growers seek to maintain their status as pre-approval awardees and
the Commission seeks to assure that the selection process is lawfully implemented. In
other words, the Growers’ interest is in making sure that they maintain their pre-approval
status and receive medical cannabis grower licenses, and the Commission’s interest is in
assuring that the selection process comports with applicable law. The Growers have an
interest in achieving the outcome in which they are the recipients of medical cannabis
grower licenses as opposed to other growers; the Commission does not share this interest.
In short, the Growers have easily met the burden of showing that the Commission’s
representation may be inadequate—which is not a burden to demonstrate that the
Commission’s representation is, in fact, inadequate. Washington Grove,

408 Md. at 102

 (“The burden of showing that existing representation may be inadequate
is a minimal one.” (Citation omitted)). Essentially, under the “interest-analysis” test, the
Growers have shown that their interest is not fully represented or advocated by either AMM
or the Commission. AMM clearly has interests that are adverse to the Growers. And, the
Commission has interests that are not similar to that of the Growers, i.e., the Commission’s
interest is in conducting the medical cannabis grower licensing process lawfully, whereas
the Growers’ interest is in protecting their status and investment as pre-approval awardees.
In sum, the Growers were entitled to intervention as of right because the four
requirements for intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) were satisfied—
the motion to intervene was timely filed, the Growers’ have an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, the disposition of the action may
- 48 -
impair or impede the Growers’ ability to protect that interest, and the Growers’ interest is
not adequately represented by the existing parties.26
The Growers contend that CJ § 3-405(a)(1) and Maryland Rule 2-211(a) confer
indispensable party status on them in a declaratory judgment action. 27 On the other hand,
26
In light of the conclusion that the Growers were entitled to intervention as of right
under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) and, as explained infra, to be made parties under CJ § 3-
405(a)(1), the Court need not reach whether the Growers were also entitled to permissive
intervention. Nonetheless, we also conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in
denying permissive intervention for the Growers. Generally, permissive intervention is
warranted where the person seeking to intervene files a timely motion and has a claim or
defense with a question of law or fact in common with the case, and where intervention
would not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the parties’ rights. See Md. R. 2-
214(b). Here, all three of these circumstances exist. Petitioners’ motion to intervene was
timely. The Growers plainly have a claim with questions of law and fact in common with
this case. AMM contends that the Commission violated the law with respect to considering
racial and ethnic diversity during the medical cannabis grower licensing process. The
Growers have a claim that they have a property interest in the case and that their pre-
approvals for medical cannabis grower licenses were properly issued under the relevant
statutes and regulations. The respective claims involve common questions of law and fact.
And, intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the parties’
rights. Although granting permissive intervention could perhaps result in delay, the delay
would not be unreasonable or prejudice the adjudication of the parties’ rights.
27
The Growers contend that, in addition to intervention being required under
Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) and that they are entitled to be made a party under CJ § 3-
405(a)(1), Maryland Rule 2-211(a) requires their joinder as parties to the action. In short,
as ordered in the July 28, 2017 per curiam order, we agree. Maryland Rule 2-211(a),
concerning required joinder of parties, provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who is subject to service of
process shall be joined as a party in the action if in the person’s absence
(1) complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) disposition of the action may impair or impede the person’s ability to
protect a claimed interest relating to the subject of the action or may leave
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or
inconsistent obligations by reason of the person’s claimed interest.
- 49 -
AMM argues that CJ § 3-405(a)(1) “does not provide any greater right to intervention”
than the Growers would have under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). Of significance, CJ § 3-
405(a)(1) states: “If declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party.”
Given that this Court has concluded that the Growers are entitled to intervention as
of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), whether CJ § 3-405(a)(1) provides a basis for
the Growers to become a party independent of Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) is not
dispositive. In other words, if we were to accept AMM’s position that CJ § 3-405(a)(1)
requires the same analysis as Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), the result would be the same, i.e.,
the Growers would be entitled to be made a party under CJ § 3-405(a)(1), as well as to
intervention under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). It is not clear, however, as AMM contends,
that case law establishes that being made a party under CJ § 3-405(a)(1) is dependent upon
the satisfaction of Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2).
In Duckworth,

393 Md. at 529-30

903 A.2d at 886

, which predated the Civil
The court shall order that the person be made a party if not joined as required
by this section. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so,
the person shall be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff.
The requirement of Maryland Rule 2-211(a)(2)—that “disposition of the action may
impair or impede the person’s ability to protect a claimed interest relating to the
subject of the action”—is plainly satisfied for the same reasons that the third
requirement for intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), i.e., “the
person is so situated that the disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may
impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest[,]” Washington Grove,

, is satisfied.
- 50 -
Marriage Protection Act, a group of individuals sued the clerks of certain circuit courts
who had denied them licenses for same-sex marriages. Eight members of the General
Assembly sought intervention as of right and permissive intervention in the lawsuit. See
id. at 531,

903 A.2d at 887

. In Duckworth,

id. at 529, 534

903 A.2d at 886, 889

, this Court
held, in pertinent part, that a trial court did not err in denying the motion to intervene that
had been filed by the group of legislators, who relied on both Maryland Rule 2-214(a) and
CJ § 3-405(a) for intervention as of right. In analyzing the issue of intervention as of right
under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), this Court concluded that the legislators failed to satisfy
requirements for intervention, namely, that the proposed intervenor “claim an interest in
the subject of the action such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the
[proposed intervenor]’s ability to protect that interest[,]” and “that [the] interest might not
be adequately represented by existing parties.”          Id. at 539,

903 A.2d at 891-92

.
Specifically, the Court determined that the interest of the legislators “in the litigation [wa]s
no different from the interest of the general public” and that “[t]hey would be no more
affected by an adverse decision than any resident of Maryland.”

Id. at 540

903 A.2d at 892

. As to CJ § 3-405(a), this Court concluded that the legislators’ reliance on the
Declaratory Judgments Act was misplaced because the argument was not raised by the
legislators in the trial court and thus was not properly preserved for review. Id. at 542,

.     This Court noted that, alternatively, “for the reasons set forth above
[concerning intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2)], the legislators d[id]
not have an ‘interest which would be affected by the declaration’ within the meaning of
[CJ] § 3-405(a)(1)[.]” Id. at 542,

. From our perspective, the holding in
- 51 -
Duckworth does not preclude the conclusion that the Declaratory Judgments Act provides
a distinct right to intervention other than that set forth under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2).28
Notwithstanding AMM’s position, we conclude that CJ § 3-405(a)(1) provides an
independent basis for becoming a party in a declaratory judgment action. In Duckworth,

393 Md. at 542

, although this Court determined that intervention as of
right was not appropriate under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), this Court stated that the
legislators did “not have an ‘interest which would be affected by the declaration’ within
the meaning of [CJ] § 3-405(a)(1)[.]” In Duckworth, this Court did not explicitly tie
becoming a party, i.e., intervention, under CJ § 3-405(a)(1) to the need to satisfy the four
requisites of intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). Both CJ § 3-
405(a)(1) and Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) require that a party have an interest—under CJ
§ 3-405(a)(1), “a person who has or claims any interest which would be affected by the
declaration[] shall be made a party[,]” and under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) a person must
“claim[] an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action[,]”
Washington Grove,

. This Court’s holding in Duckworth
demonstrates that there may be an overlap in analyzing whether an interest exists under CJ
28
In its brief, AMM relies on Montgomery Cty. v. Bradford,

345 Md. 175

691 A.2d 1281

 (1997) and Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong,

69 Md. App. 615

519 A.2d 219

 (1987) to
support the assertion that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not provide a greater right
to intervention than Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). Contrary to AMM’s contention, Hartford,

69 Md. App. at 617-19

519 A.2d at 220-21

, involved a personal injury action in which
plaintiffs sought damages resulting from an automobile accident. Bradford,

345 Md. at 177-78

691 A.2d at 1282

, on the other hand, involved an action for declaratory judgment;
however, the interplay between CJ § 3-405(a) and Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) is not
discussed in the case.
- 52 -
§ 3-405(a)(1) and Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), but the holding does not remotely suggest
that Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2)’s requirements must be satisfied to establish intervention
under CJ § 3-405(a)(1).
Indeed, in Duckworth,

393 Md. at 542

, the Court determined that
the issue of intervention under CJ § 3-405(a) was not properly preserved and before the
Court for review. Thus, the Court’s comment concerning intervention under CJ § 3-405(a),
in the context of the issue not being before the Court, was dicta. Given the Court’s remarks,
however, a fair inference is that the Court recognized a separate basis for intervention under
CJ § 3-405(a)—tellingly, the Court indicated that the issue was not before the Court,
treating it as a separate issue from that of Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2).
Given that CJ § 3-405(a)(1)’s application is more specific than that of Maryland
Rule 2-214(a)(2)—CJ § 3-405(a)(1) applies only to declaratory judgment actions and
Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) applies to all civil actions—it is logical to conclude that CJ §
3-405(a)(1) provides an independent basis for intervention. Stated otherwise, CJ § 3-
405(a)(1) is relevant only in a specific class of cases where declaratory judgment is at issue;
in contrast, Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) is applicable in any type of civil case in which a
person seeks to intervene as of right, i.e., in cases involving contracts, torts, family law
matters, and the like. To determine that CJ § 3-405(a)(1) does not provide an independent
basis for intervention would render CJ § 3-405(a)(1)’s language that “a person who has or
claims any interest that would be affected by the declaration[] shall be made a party”
superfluous. Based on a plain reading of CJ § 3-405(a)(1), the ground for intervention
under the statute is that a person either has or claims an interest that would be affected by
- 53 -
the declaration sought in the action. In other words, CJ § 3-405(a)(1), by its plain language,
does not require satisfaction of all of the requisites of Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2). Put
simply, to warrant intervention under CJ § 3-405(a)(1), a person need only show that they
have or claim an interest that would be affected by the declaration. To hold otherwise
would be to read into CJ § 3-405(a)(1) language that does not exist. In short, the Growers
were entitled to intervention under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2) because they satisfied the
four requisites, and under CJ § 3-405(a)(1) because they clearly claimed an interest that
would be affected by the declaration sought by AMM.29
In contrast to our holding with respect to the Growers, we conclude that the circuit
court properly denied intervention as of right and permissive intervention as to the Patients
and the Trade Association Petitioners. Although Petitioners’ motion to intervene was
timely filed, the Patients’ and the Trade Association Petitioners’ interests are too attenuated
to satisfy the requirements for intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2).
The interest claimed by the Patients, who advise that they suffer from epilepsy, is that they
assert that, at some point in the future, a qualifying physician will find them to be qualifying
patients and prescribe the use of medical cannabis, which may benefit them. The interest
claimed by the Trade Association Petitioners is that they advocate for prompt access to
medical cannabis, patient rights, and the interests of the Growers. In our view, the
29
We are mindful of Petitioners’ claim, made in the motion to dismiss, that this
action is not properly brought as a declaratory judgment action and should be treated as a
petition for judicial review. Nothing in this discussion about the right to intervene under
CJ § 3-405(a)(1) is intended to supercede the circuit court’s ability to determine the issue
raised in the motion to dismiss on remand.
- 54 -
generalized and theoretical interests claimed by the Trade Association Petitioners and
Patients are simply not adequate to satisfy the second requirement for intervention as of
right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2), namely, that “the person claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action[.]” Washington Grove,

 (citations omitted). The Patients and the Trade Association
Petitioners may have an interest in seeing Maryland’s medical cannabis industry become
operational as soon as possible, but that does not mean that the interest is sufficiently or
specifically related to the transaction that is the subject of the action—namely, the
Commission’s lawful administration of the process utilized in issuing pre-approvals and
licenses for medical cannabis growers—to warrant intervention. Although the Patients’
and the Trade Association Petitioners’ interest may overall be in having the medical
cannabis industry becoming operational without undue delay, it cannot be said with any
degree of certainty that the outcome of this lawsuit might cause them to incur any kind of
special damage differing from that suffered by the general public. See Duckworth,

393 Md. at 540

903 A.2d at 892

.
We also conclude that the Patients and the Trade Association Petitioners do not
fulfill the third requirement for intervention as of right under Maryland Rule 2-214(a)(2)
because the Patients and the Trade Association Petitioners are not “so situated that the
disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impair or impede th[eir] ability to
protect that interest.” Washington Grove,