In Re: E.G.J., Minor Appeal of: R.J. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: E.G.J., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: R.J., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 780 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000011-2016
IN RE: B.J., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: R.J., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 781 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-00010-2016
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2017
R.J. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders dated May 2, 2016, and
entered May 3, 2016,1 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
While the order was dated May 2, 2016, notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236
was not provided until May 3, 2016. See Frazier v. City of Philadelphia,
735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not appealable until
it is entered on the docket with the required notation that appropriate notice
has been given”).
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Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office
of Children, Youth and Families (“OCYF”) and involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her dependent children, daughter, E.G.J., born in March of
2008, and son, B.V.J., born in August of 2006 (collectively, the “Children”),
pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).2
After review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history,
in part, as follows:
. . . OCYF became involved with this family on
June 19, 2014, subsequent to allegations made by
Mother’s oldest child, J.J., that [Father] was sexually
abusive. As a term of his bond, Father was ordered
to leave the home and have no contact with his
children.[3] On September 2, 2014, OCYF learned
during a forensic interview that Father stayed
overnight in the family’s home. Father was arrested
for Violation of Bond and Mother was arrested for
Endangering the Welfare of Children. The Children
were placed with family members.
A Court Order on October 17, 2014, placed the
Children with their Maternal Aunt [] at Mother’s
2
By the same orders, the trial court also involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of Children’s father, T.J. (“Father”), also pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Father has filed appeals at Superior
Court Docket Nos. 776 and 777 WDA 2016, addressed by separate
memorandum.
3
A criminal no contact order was in place with regard to Father and J.J.
Mother was to supervise any contact between Father and the other children.
(Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at 11-12.)
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request.[4] They have remained in her care since
that time. On November 7, 2014, the Children were
adjudicated dependent under Section (1) as to
Mother because:
[H]er conduct in light of her knowledge that
[J.J.] has made these allegations [of sexual abuse
against Father] . . . demonstrates impaired
[judgment] and impaired parenting, which has
resulted in all of the children being without proper
care and control. Mother did not readily schedule
the forensic evaluations for the other children, and
she continued to have contact with Father. Further,
based on the testimony of the police detective, it can
be inferred that Mother influenced [J.J.] to decline
the rape kit and recant her testimony.[5]
OCYF developed an Initial Family Service Plan
(hereinafter, “FSP”) which listed the following goals
for Mother: 1) ensure Father does not return to the
residence; 2) come to an understanding of the
impact of sexual abuse; and 3) relocation. The FSP
goals remained the same throughout the entirety of
the case.
In May of 2015, the Children alleged sexual
abuse by Father. On June 4, 2015, Mother pled
guilty to the charge of Endangering the Welfare of
Children and was placed on probation. On June 17,
2015, the Children made allegations of abuse against
Mother which were later determined to be
unfounded. The Children continued to allege abuse
after the initial claims were made.
4
Children were initially informally placed with extended family members
following Mother’s arrest in September 2014. Children were then placed
with maternal aunt in Ohio on October 17, 2014. (Notes of testimony,
5/2/16 at 13-16.)
5
Children’s three older siblings, who are placed separately, were also
adjudicated dependent. In adjudicating Children dependent, the court
additionally considered the behavior of Father. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16
at 18-20.)
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In August of 2015, Father was convicted of
sexual abuse against J.J. and incarcerated. Mother
wrote a letter to the Judge presiding over Father’s
criminal case and asked for leniency asserting that
he was a good man and that she wanted Father to
remain in the Children’s lives.
Prior to November 2015, Mother was not
permitted to have contact with the Children.[6] In a
Court Order on November 20, 2015, Mother was
permitted to contact the Children by Skype or by
phone during therapy sessions with Ms. Sophia
Sparks [], a therapist with New Reflections
Counseling.
On February 12, 2016, this Court permitted
Mother to have supervised visits with the Children
once a month.
Trial court opinion, 7/25/16 at 3-5 (footnotes omitted and citations to record
omitted).
On January 25, 2016, OCYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
parental rights. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on May 2,
2016.7 In support of the termination petitions, OCYF presented the
testimony of Clare Chiaverini, CYF caseworker; Dr. Beth Bliss, licensed
psychologist, who performed a risk assessment of Father and individual and
6
Children were, however, permitted to have supervised contact with Mother
at a family funeral. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at 39-40.)
7
A permanency review hearing with regard to Children’s three older siblings
was also conducted at this time.
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interactional evaluations of Children, Mother, and Maternal Aunt; 8 and
Sophia Sparks, Children’s therapist. Mother testified on her own behalf.
Mother additionally presented the testimony of her brother, S.M. Father,
who is incarcerated, was present, but did not testify.
By order dated May 2, 2016, and entered May 3, 2016, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children.9 On June 2,
2016, Mother, through counsel, filed timely notices of appeal, along with
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County
Children, Youth and Families met its burden of
proving that termination of Birth Mother’s parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
Children pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.[A.] § 2511(b) by
clear and convincing evidence when such
determination is not supported by the record?
Mother’s brief at 7.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
8
Dr. Bliss’ assessments and/or evaluations were completed on
November 24, 2014, September 29, 2015, and April 8, 2016, and were
marked and admitted collectively as OCYF Exhibit 5 at the hearing on May 2,
2016.
9
The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent order,
on the record at the conclusion of the hearing on May 2, 2016.
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The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should
not be reversed merely because the record would
support a different result. Id. at 827. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts
that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9
A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of
the child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
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the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We
have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, Mother concedes grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). (See Mother’s brief at 15.) We,
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therefore, analyze the court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(b) only,
which provides as follows:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as
follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M.,
53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on
the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed
below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent
....
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and determining whether
termination of Mother’s parental rights serves Children’s needs and welfare,
the trial court reasoned:
This Court judiciously evaluated the bond
between Mother and the Children and determined
that there was no indication that an emotional bond
exists to the extent that the termination of parental
rights of Mother would cause the Children to suffer
extreme emotional consequences. In reaching this
conclusion, this Court weighed the totality of the
circumstances and relied upon the testimony of
Dr. Bliss who opined within a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty that the Children should not
be reunified with their Mother and should remain in
[Maternal Aunt]’s care.
The uncontroverted testimony established that
the Children’s needs are best met with [Maternal
Aunt]. A strong bond exists between [Maternal
Aunt] and the Children because the Children have
been living in [Maternal Aunt]’s home since
September of 2014 and were not in contact with
their Mother for a significant period of time. While
the Children may have been raised primarily with
Mother, their bond is merely residual. The Court was
within its discretion when it determined that bond is
secondary and that severing the Children’s bond with
Mother would not cause extreme emotional
consequences.
....
After careful review of the record, the evidence
presented unequivocally established that the
Children do not have secure bonds with their Mother
because they felt she was not consistent in meeting
their needs. It is notable that the Children’s desire
for contact with Mother is limited and they have
frequently stated that they want to continue living
with [Maternal Aunt]. During a therapy session with
Ms. Sparks, E.J. repeatedly indicated “that she feels
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safe and loved and wants to stay [with Maternal
Aunt.]” B.J. stated that he is “in a safe place with
[Maternal Aunt] and loved everyday. I felt unsafe
with my parents. . .I love them, but don’t want to
live with them.” The Children explicitly told Dr. Bliss
that “they don’t feel safe returning to [Mother.]”
This Court credits Dr. Bliss’ testimony that despite
counseling, Mother does not seem to appreciate the
seriousness of the sexual abuse of the Children.
Dr. Bliss’ recommendation of SPLC is so rife with
limitations and parameters that it would not provide
the Children with the much needed stability and
permanence they require. Accordingly, the
testimony presented demonstrated that termination
would serve the Children’s developmental, physical
and emotional needs.
Trial court opinion, 7/25/16 at 7, 11 (citations to record omitted).
Mother, however, argues that a bond was present between her and
Children. (Mother’s brief at 17.) Moreover, Mother highlights that Dr. Bliss
even testified that termination would not meet Children’s needs and welfare
at the time, as to dissolve this relationship would cause Children trauma.
(Id.) Mother therefore avers that, while Dr. Bliss did not recommend
reunification, the trial court failed to examine the emotional trauma that
Children may suffer if her parental rights are terminated. (Id. at 17-18.)
We disagree.
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
Children’s needs and welfare favor termination of Mother’s parental rights.
Children had been out of Mother’s care for almost two years and had limited
telephonic and supervised contact. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at 13-16,
39-40, 52-54.) Although acknowledging love for Mother, Children
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consistently made allegations of abuse against Mother and expressed a fear
of returning to Mother’s care and lack of safety. (Id. at 47-48, 130-131,
133, 135, 176-177, 181, 190, 192, 210, 225.) In addition, B.V.J. was
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and E.G.J. with adjustment
disorder related to the alleged abuse and situation involving OCYF. (Id. at
190, 192-193, 221.) Symptoms centered around court appearances,
evaluations, or family visitation and/or contact. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16
at 139, 145-146, 189-190; Exhibit 5, Psychological Evaluation 4/8/16, report
dated 4/13/16, at 17, 18, 20.) Notably, Children initially declined some of
the telephonic contact afforded with Mother. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at
134-135.)
While Dr. Bliss recognized a bond with Mother and testified that
severing the parent-child relationship between Mother and Children would
not meet Children’s needs and welfare at the time, she opined that Children
should not be reunified with Mother and should remain in Maternal Aunt’s
care. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at 223-224; Exhibit 5, Psychological
Evaluation 4/8/16, report dated 4/13/16, at 19-20.) Significantly, Dr. Bliss
indicated that Mother “doesn’t seem to appreciate the seriousness of the
sexual abuse of her children,” noting, for example, the letter Mother wrote
on behalf of Father to the judge presiding in his criminal case, as well as
Mother’s “emotionless” reaction regarding Children’s allegations and their
suffering. (Id. at 198-199; 18.) Dr. Bliss also testified that Mother had
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difficulty placing the needs of Children ahead of her own. In support
thereof, Dr. Bliss referenced that it was Mother’s brother who convinced her
to accept a plea bargain and keep her children from testifying against her.
In addition, Dr. Bliss highlighted that Mother would keep Children from
contact with Maternal Aunt, if reunified, due to Mother’s own issues with
Maternal Aunt, which could be “quite traumatic” for Children as Children are
“very attached” to Maternal Aunt. (Id. at 199-200; 18.) Dr. Bliss likewise
confirmed concerns regarding Mother’s response to Children’s emotional
needs if they were reunified. (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at 208.) Further,
Dr. Bliss concluded that Mother exhibited maladaptive cognitions or thinking
errors, such as “not fully understanding that the Court and truth don’t
necessarily always have to go together.” (Notes of testimony, 5/2/16 at
208-209; Exhibit 5, Psychological Evaluation 4/8/16, report dated 4/13/16,
at 18.) Moreover, and more importantly, Children, feel safe with and desire
to remain with Maternal Aunt, with whom Dr. Bliss observed they are
bonded and have a “positive,” “close” relationship. (Id. at 130, 133, 136,
138-139, 144, 149-150, 179, 184, 185, 196; 19.) E.G.J., in particular,
“appeared strongly bonded” to Maternal Aunt. (Id. at 197; 19.) Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
termination of Mother’s parental rights serves Children’s needs and welfare
pursuant to Section 2511(b).
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s
termination of Mother’s parental rights, we affirm the orders of the trial
court.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/6/2017
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