Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovernmental Members of ACUS ( 2010 )


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  •                 APPLICABILITY OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE TO
    NONGOVERNMENTAL MEMBERS OF ACUS
    A nongovernmental member of the Administrative Conference of the United States does not
    occupy an office of profit or trust within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause.
    June 3, 2010
    MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE CHAIRMAN
    ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
    This memorandum responds to your request that we reconsider our 1993 opinion that the
    nongovernmental members of the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS” or
    “the Conference”) hold an “Office of . . . Trust” within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause
    of the Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 8. See Memorandum for David J. Barron, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Paul R. Verkuil, Chairman, ACUS (May 18,
    2010) (“Verkuil Memorandum”); see also Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-
    Government Members of ACUS, 
    17 Op. O.L.C. 114
    (1993) (“ACUS Op.”). The Clause forbids
    anyone “holding any Office of Profit or Trust” under the United States from accepting, without
    Congressional consent, “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from
    any King, Prince, or foreign State.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Since the issuance of our 1993
    opinion, our Office has addressed the applicability of the Emoluments Clause to members of
    advisory committees in four published opinions, and in none of these have we concluded that
    the Clause was implicated. 1 In light of this subsequent guidance, we now confirm and further
    explain the oral advice we recently provided that a nongovernmental member of ACUS does
    not occupy an office of profit or trust within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause. 2
    I.
    ACUS was established in 1964 to develop recommendations to improve the efficiency
    and fairness of federal agencies. Among its stated purposes is to “provide suitable arrangements
    through which Federal agencies, assisted by outside experts, may cooperatively study mutual
    problems, exchange information, and develop recommendations for action by proper authorities
    to the end that private rights may be fully protected and regulatory activities and other federal
    responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously in the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 591(1)
    1
    See Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation, from John R.
    Elwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of the Emoluments Clause
    to a Member of the FBI Director’s Advisory Board (June 15, 2007) (“FBI Advisory Board”) (available at
    www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.htm); Memorandum Opinion for the Associate Counsel to the President, from Noel J.
    Francisco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of the Emoluments Clause
    to a Member of the President’s Council on Bioethics (Mar. 9, 2005) (“Bioethics Council”) (available at
    www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.htm); Applicability of Emoluments Clause to “Representative” Members of Advisory
    Committees, 
    21 Op. O.L.C. 176
    (1997) (“Representative Members”); The Advisory Committee on International
    Economic Policy, 
    20 Op. O.L.C. 123
    (1996) (“IEP”).
    2
    Nothing in this opinion should be viewed as expressing our views on any aspect of our 1993 opinion
    other than the narrow legal issue regarding the applicability of the Emoluments Clause to the nongovernmental
    members of ACUS.
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 34
    (2006); see also ACUS 
    Op., 17 Op. O.L.C. at 114-16
    (describing background and structure of
    ACUS). Although agencies are not compelled to follow ACUS’s recommendations, several
    of ACUS’s studies have had a significant influence on administrative law over the years. See
    Marshall J. Breger, The Administrative Conference of the United States: A Quarter Century
    Perspective, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 813, 831 (1992). Congress has also, from time to time, assigned
    ACUS to study and formulate recommendations as to particular issues, see ACUS Op., 17 Op.
    O.L.C. at 117 n.3 (citing several examples). Nonetheless, we are not aware of any instance in
    which ACUS’s role has been anything but advisory in nature. See Verkuil Memorandum at 2
    (characterizing these statutory assignments as involving “purely consultative, research, or
    reporting roles”).
    Although Congress created ACUS in 1964, the “idea of a government-sponsored
    organization which reviews and recommends improvements in agency procedures” dates back
    to a 1949 report of the Judicial Conference of the United States suggesting that the President
    convene such a body. See Breger, supra at 814-15. In 1953, President Eisenhower established
    a temporary Conference on Administrative Procedure, which consisted of representatives of
    federal agencies and several private-sector lawyers with expertise in administrative law. 
    Id. President Kennedy
    in 1961 convened a second temporary conference called the
    Administrative Conference of the United States, to recommend improvements regarding
    administrative procedure. This 1961 predecessor to ACUS was led by a Chairman, and its
    members consisted not only of federal agency officials but also of members of the public.
    See Exec. Order No. 10934, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 464 (1959-1963). As President Kennedy’s Executive
    Order establishing the 1961 Conference stated, “[m]embers of the Conference who are not in
    Government service shall participate in the activities of the Conference solely as private
    individuals without official responsibility on behalf of the Government of the United States.”
    
    Id. § 3.
    After several years and six plenary sessions, President Kennedy’s conference issued
    thirty recommendations regarding administrative procedure, one of which was to establish a
    permanent Administrative Conference. See Breger, supra at 817-18.
    In 1964, Congress did just that. See Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615; see also S. Rep.
    No. 88-621, at 4 (1963) (noting the statute “would establish a permanent Administrative
    Conference of the United States”). In creating a permanent body, Congress replicated the 1961
    Conference’s limited advisory role of developing recommendations for improving agency
    procedure. S. Rep. No. 88-621, at 5 (“The basic powers of the Conference would be to study
    problems and make recommendations. It would have no power whatever to enforce such
    recommendations.”). In addition, Congress established a structure much like the one that
    President Kennedy had established. The Conference consists of not more than 101 or fewer than
    75 governmental and nongovernmental members, including a Chairman and a Council. 5 U.S.C.
    § 593(a); see also 
    id. § 595(a)
    (noting that when meeting in plenary session, the Conference’s
    members along with the Chairman and the Council are known as “the Assembly of the
    Conference”). ACUS’s Chairman is appointed by the President for a five-year term, with the
    advice and consent of the Senate. 
    Id. § 593(b)(1).
    The Council is composed of the Chairman
    and ten other governmental and nongovernmental members, and the latter ten members are
    appointed for three-year terms by the President (without Senate involvement). 
    Id. § 595(b)
    2
    Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovermental Members of ACUS
    (2006). Congress specified that “not more than one-half [of the Council’s members] shall be
    employees of Federal regulatory agencies or Executive Departments.” 
    Id. Together, the
    Chairman and the Council manage several critical aspects of the
    Conference’s operations, including the selection of a portion of the Conference’s membership.
    Specifically, the Chairman may appoint to the Conference, with the Council’s approval, not more
    than forty nongovernmental members for two-year terms in addition to certain government
    officials who are required to serve on ACUS. 
    Id. § 593(b)(6)
    (“[T]he number of members
    appointed by the Chairman may at no time be less than one-third nor more than two-fifths of the
    total numbers of members.”). These nongovernmental members are selected by the Chairman to
    “provide [a] broad representation of the views of private citizens and [to] utilize diverse
    experiences.” 
    Id. (“The [nongovernmental]
    members shall be members of the practicing bar,
    scholars in the field of administrative law or government, or others specially informed by
    knowledge and experience with respect to Federal administrative procedure.”).
    ACUS ceased operations on October 31, 1995, but in 2004 Congress authorized funds for
    ACUS, Pub. L. No. 108-401, § 2(a), 118 Stat. 2255, although no funds were appropriated before
    the expiration of the authorization period. In 2008, Congress reauthorized ACUS, Pub. L. No.
    110-290, § 2, 122 Stat. 2914, which began operations on March 11, 2009, with the passage of the
    Omnibus Appropriations statute, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524.
    II.
    In 1993 our Office advised that the Emoluments Clause applied to the nongovernmental
    members of ACUS. ACUS 
    Op., 17 Op. O.L.C. at 117
    . More specifically, given that ACUS’s
    nongovernmental members were not paid for their services to the Conference, we concluded that
    they occupied an “Office of . . . Trust” (and not an office of profit) within the meaning of the
    Emoluments Clause. 
    Id. We reached
    this conclusion for several reasons. First, we noted that
    ACUS was a “Federal agency established by statute.” 
    Id. Second, although
    we acknowledged
    that ACUS was an advisory committee as well as an agency, we cited to our then prevailing view
    that “‘Federal advisory committee members hold offices of profit or trust within the meaning of
    the Emoluments Clause.’” 
    Id. (quoting Applicability
    of 18 U.S.C. § 219 to Members of Federal
    Advisory Committees, 
    15 Op. O.L.C. 65
    , 68 (1991) (“Section 219”)). Third, we noted that the
    Conference’s advice and recommendations “have had (and were intended to have) a significant
    effect on the Government’s administrative processes.” 
    Id. Finally, we
    observed that “under the
    Conference’s own by-laws, its members may be considered to be special government employees
    subject to Federal conflict of interest statutes and regulations.” 
    Id. Subsequent Office
    precedent, however, has undermined the rationale for our 1993
    opinion’s conclusion that nongovernmental members of ACUS are subject to the Emoluments
    Clause. Cf. Representative 
    Members, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 176-77
    (disavowing prior OLC opinion
    because of subsequent “refinements to our position” and because the opinion led to results that
    were “exceedingly incongruous” with intervening opinions of the Office). While we have
    previously characterized the Emoluments Clause as broad in scope, see, e.g., Applicability of the
    Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees by Foreign Public Universities,
    
    18 Op. O.L.C. 13
    , 17-18 (1994), the text of the Clause also makes clear that it applies only to
    a specified class of persons—i.e., those who hold offices of profit or trust under the United
    3
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 34
    States—and not to all positions in the United States government. Consistent with that textual
    limitation, our precedents since our ACUS opinion have endeavored to give substance to that
    category.
    In accord with this textual limitation, we have receded from the view, set forth in our
    Section 219 opinion, that all federal advisory committee members hold offices of profit or trust
    within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause. Indeed, only months after issuing our ACUS
    opinion, we advised that this categorical position, on which the ACUS opinion itself appeared to
    rely in part, was “overbroad” and that “not every member of an advisory committee necessarily
    occupies an ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ under the Clause.” Letter for Conrad K. Harper, Legal
    Adviser, Department of State, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
    Legal Counsel (Mar. 1, 1994). In a subsequent published opinion, we characterized that same
    conclusion in our Section 219 opinion as “sweeping and unqualified,” and specifically
    determined that members of an advisory committee established by the Department of State were
    not subject to the Emoluments Clause on the basis of a multi-factor test. See 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    . Under that test, we noted that the members of the committee were not subject to the
    Clause because they “meet only occasionally, serve without compensation, take no oath, and do
    not have access to classified information,” and that “the Committee is purely advisory, is not a
    creature of statute, and discharges no substantive statutory responsibilities.” 
    Id. In addition,
    on two later occasions, we concluded in published opinions that members
    of other advisory bodies are not subject to the prohibitions of the Emoluments Clause. In 2005,
    based on an extensive historical analysis of the phrase “Office of Profit or Trust,” we advised
    that the Clause did not apply to members of the President’s Council on Bioethics because that
    Council was “purely advisory” in nature. See Bioethics Council at 18; 
    id. at 15
    (noting that our
    conclusion was “generally consistent” with our Office’s 1996 opinion regarding the State
    Department’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy). We stated that to qualify
    as an office within the meaning of the Constitution, a position must “at least involve some
    exercise of governmental authority, and an advisory position does not.” 
    Id. at 10.
    Two years
    later, we advised that the Emoluments Clause did not apply to a board charged with providing
    advice to the FBI Director on improving the FBI’s operations because that Board served a purely
    advisory function. FBI Advisory Board at 1 (“The sole role of the Board is to advise the
    Director, who is free to adopt, modify, or ignore its recommendations. Board members have no
    decisional or enforcement authority, and they exercise no supervisory responsibilities over other
    persons or employees as a result of their positions on the Board.”).
    Our Bioethics Council and FBI Advisory Board opinions go further than our IEP opinion
    and indicate that only those persons considered officers within the meaning of the Appointments
    Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, may be subject to the Emoluments Clause, see, e.g., FBI Advisory
    Board at 2-3 (“The threshold question . . . in determining whether a member of the Board holds
    an ‘Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]’ is whether a position on the Board is an
    ‘Office under the United States’”); Bioethics Council at 16 (“A position that carried with it no
    governmental authority (significant or otherwise) would not be an office for purposes of the
    Appointments Clause, and therefore, under that analysis, would not be an office under the
    Emoluments Clause”), a conclusion that plainly would foreclose application of the Emoluments
    Clause here, given the purely advisory functions of ACUS. But, for present purposes, we need
    4
    Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovermental Members of ACUS
    not rest our decision on that ground. Because our Office had rejected the “sweeping and
    unqualified” view that all advisory bodies are subject to the Emoluments Clause, IEP, 20 Op.
    O.L.C. at 123, even before it had issued opinions suggesting that only those persons who were
    officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause were subject to the Emoluments Clause, it
    suffices to observe that, under the precedents issued since we decided ACUS, the nature of this
    advisory body is such that its nongovernmental members cannot be deemed to hold the kind of
    office to which the Emoluments Clause applies.
    In particular, the same factors that led us to conclude in our IEP opinion that the advisory
    committee for the State Department was not subject to the Emoluments Clause also lead to us to
    conclude that the nongovernmental members of ACUS, itself a purely advisory body, are not
    subject to it. See 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    (setting out multiple factors indicating that particular
    advisory body was not subject to the Clause). Such a conclusion best accords with our Office’s
    now substantial precedents giving substance to the Emoluments Clause through a careful
    explication of its proper scope, so as to ensure that concerns about foreign corruption and
    influence are accounted for with respect to the types of “Office[s]” that the Clause was meant
    to cover in identifying “Office[s] of Profit or Trust.”
    First, as was the case with the committee at issue in our IEP opinion, ACUS’s
    nongovernmental members serve without compensation, 5 U.S.C. § 593(c) (2006) (“Members
    of the Conference, except the Chairman, are not entitled to pay for service.”), and meet only on
    an occasional basis. By law, the Conference as a whole (i.e., the Chairman, the Council, and
    ACUS’s governmental and nongovernmental members) is required to meet for “at least one
    plenary session each year,” 
    id. § 595(b)(1),
    and we understand that the practice was to convene
    two such sessions a year. ACUS’s Council has in the past typically met only five to six times
    a year. See E-mail from Paul R. Verkuil, Chairman, ACUS, to Daniel L. Koffsky, Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General (May 28, 2010, 8:40 EST) (“Verkuil E-mail”). In addition, most
    ACUS members also participate in various subject matter committees, which in the past have
    held four or five meetings a year. See 1 C.F.R. § 302.3 (1995) (listing ACUS’s standing
    committees). By any measure, then, the nongovernmental members of ACUS “meet only
    occasionally.” 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    .
    To support the application of the Emoluments Clause, our 1993 opinion did point to the
    status of ACUS’s members as special government employees (“SGEs”) subject to federal
    conflict of interest statutes and regulations. See ACUS 
    Op., 17 Op. O.L.C. at 117
    . Advisory
    committee members often have that status, however, and subsequent opinions of this Office
    make clear that this factor is far from determinative. See 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    (concluding
    that advisory body members were not subject to the Emoluments Clause notwithstanding their
    SGE status); see also Representative 
    Members, 21 Op. O.L.C. at 177
    (“special government
    employees on some advisory committees do not occupy offices of profit or trust”).
    Moreover, as was also the case with the committee members at issue in IEP, 20 Op.
    O.L.C. at 123, neither the statutes nor the bylaws governing ACUS indicate that its
    nongovernmental members would be given access to classified information. See Verkuil
    Memorandum at 5 n.7 (“I cannot foresee any likelihood that nongovernmental members of
    ACUS would require . . . access [to classified information] in the performance of their role with
    5
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 34
    ACUS, particularly because ACUS is barred by statute from addressing ‘a military or foreign
    affairs function of the United States.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 592(1))). It is the case that, unlike
    the committee members in IEP, the nongovernmental members of ACUS have traditionally
    taken oaths of office. See Verkuil E-mail. We are uncertain how longstanding this practice
    is, however, and, we understand that, in contrast to the requirements of several other federal
    agencies, ACUS’s nongovernmental members are not required to take an oath by either organic
    statute or governing regulations. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (requiring members of the Board
    of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to “make and subscribe to the oath of office”);
    16 U.S.C.A. § 831g(c) (West Supp. 2010) (requiring Board members of the Tennessee Valley
    Authority to take an oath of office). Thus, while there is support for the notion that the taking of
    an oath may in certain circumstances indicate a constitutional office, see, e.g., Floyd R. Mechem,
    A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 6 (1890) (noting that “the taking of the
    oath is not an indispensable criterion” of an office), for purposes of analyzing purely advisory
    bodies, this factor is, in our view, not particularly weighty.
    We have arguably indicated that supervisory or decisional control may be of some
    relevance in determining the applicability of the Emoluments Clause to an advisory body,
    cf. FBI Advisory Board at 1 (noting that the Board was not subject to the Emoluments Clause
    in part because its members “have no decisional . . . authority, and they exercise no supervisory
    responsibilities over other persons or employees as a result of their positions on the Board”),
    but even if that factor is relevant, it is not significant here. The Council and the Assembly (i.e.,
    ACUS’s membership meeting in plenary session, 5 U.S.C. § 595(a)) do appear to have authority
    over certain limited decisions of the Chairman, see, e.g., 
    id. § 595(b)(7)
    (Council may “approve
    or revise the budgetary proposals of the Chairman”); 
    id. § 595(c)(5)
    (Chairman may “appoint,
    with the approval of the Council, members of committees authorized by the bylaws and
    regulations of the Conference”); 
    id. § 595(c)(10)
    (Chairman may “organize and direct studies
    ordered by the Assembly or the Council”), but nongovernmental members are likely to constitute
    only a minority of the members of the Conference and the Council. By statute, no more than
    two-fifths of the Conference’s general membership may consist of nongovernmental persons,
    5 U.S.C. § 593(b)(6), while ACUS’s Council may be composed of a majority of government
    officials. See 
    id. § 595(b)
    (permitting the appointment of up to five government officers, in
    addition to the Chairman, on the eleven-person Council). That Congress did not structure ACUS
    to ensure a majority of nongovernmental members reinforces our view that such members were
    not vested (either individually or collectively) with the type of discretion and authority that
    inheres in an office of profit or trust within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause. In light
    of ACUS’s purely advisory function as well as its governance structure, we do not believe its
    nongovernmental members exercise the type of supervisory power or decisional authority that
    could potentially be relevant to a conclusion that they are subject to the Emoluments Clause.
    We acknowledge that ACUS is established by statute and that we have characterized it
    as an “agency.” We emphasized these points in our 1993 ACUS 
    opinion, 17 Op. O.L.C. at 117
    ,
    and appealed to it again in distinguishing our application of the Emoluments Clause to ACUS
    from our conclusion that the Clause did not apply to the President’s Bioethics Council, which
    also exercised purely advisory functions, see Bioethics Council at 16. In the latter opinion,
    we observed that “while nominally called an ‘advisory committee,’ [ACUS] was, in fact, a
    ‘Federal agency established by statute’ with certain statutorily assigned powers and functions.”
    6
    Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Nongovermental Members of ACUS
    Id.; see also 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    (noting that advisory panel was “not a creature of
    statute”). In neither opinion, however, did we explain precisely why ACUS’s status in this
    regard would be significant to the analysis of whether ACUS’s nongovernmental members
    are subject to the Emoluments Clause, and on reflection we do not believe that it is.
    To be sure, ACUS’s policy recommendations may “have had (and were intended to have)
    a significant effect on the Government’s administrative processes,” 
    id., and our
    prior
    characterization of it as an “agency” is reflective of the importance of its mission. But this status
    ultimately does not meaningfully distinguish ACUS from other similar advisory bodies, which
    also are established to play an important advisory role in the formulation of public policy. In our
    IEP opinion, for example, we did not suggest the advisory committee at issue there was exempt
    from the Clause because its mission was unimportant, and the Office’s consistent decisions since
    1993 have rejected the Clause’s application to various advisory committees, even though they
    plainly had been charged with important missions. Cf. FBI Advisory Board at 1 (concluding
    that the Advisory Board was not subject to the Clause, while noting that it was charged with
    recommending to the FBI Director how the “FBI can more effectively exploit science and
    technology to improve its operations, particularly its priorities of preventing terrorist attacks,
    countering foreign intelligence operations, combating cyber-based attacks, and strengthening
    the FBI’s collaboration with other federal law enforcement agencies.”). And the mere fact that
    ACUS is not within an otherwise established agency does not provide a sufficient basis for
    drawing a different conclusion. Not every position in a free-standing agency constitutes an
    office of profit or trust within the meaning of the Emoluments Clause, and thus we do not think
    that the entity’s location within the federal government is determinative of whether ACUS’s
    nongovernmental members are subject to the Clause.
    Nor do we believe that the fact that ACUS was established by statute compels the
    judgment that the Clause applies to that entity’s nongovernmental members. Here, too, recent
    precedents of the Office are in direct tension with such a conclusion. For example, Congress by
    statute required the FBI Director to establish a board to advise on certain matters, see Pub. L. No.
    108-7, § 109, 117 Stat. 11, 67 (2003), and yet we nevertheless concluded that its members were
    not subject to the Emoluments Clause. FBI Advisory Board at 3. Similarly, although statutes
    created both the purely advisory Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
    Insurance Trust Fund and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund and the purely advisory Board
    of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Trust Insurance Fund, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 401(c) (West Supp.
    2009); 42 U.S.C. § 910 (2006), we advised that the members of neither were subject to the
    Emoluments Clause. See E-mail for John Elwood, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
    of Legal Counsel, from Daniel L. Koffsky, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 22,
    2008, 12:31 EST) (memorializing oral advice). But equally importantly, we do not see why the
    fact that ACUS is established by statute matters here. The Clause’s underlying concerns with
    undue foreign influence and corruption would seem, in principle, to be no more relevant with
    respect to the nongovernmental members of a purely advisory agency like ACUS that has been
    established directly by statute than they would be with respect to the nongovernmental members
    of an important advisory body that Congress has by statute authorized an executive official to
    establish. Consistent with this judgment, our precedents since 1993 provide no support for
    concluding that the Clause applies whenever (as will often be the case) an advisory committee’s
    creation may be traced to a statute; indeed, these precedents point against that conclusion in
    7
    Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 34
    rejecting the “sweeping and unqualified view” that all advisory committees are subject to the
    Clause. See 
    IEP, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 123
    . Thus, particularly given our Office’s subsequent
    precedents, we do not believe ACUS’s status as a statutorily created entity, ACUS Op., 17 Op.
    O.L.C. at 117, 123 n.10, provides sufficient ground to compel the application of the Emoluments
    Clause to ACUS’s nongovernmental members, even assuming that the Clause may apply in some
    instances to persons who do not hold an office under the Appointments Clause.
    III.
    For the reasons given above, we conclude that the Emoluments Clause does not apply to
    the nongovernmental members of ACUS.
    /s/
    DAVID J. BARRON
    Acting Assistant Attorney General
    8
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 6/3/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2017