Urbanski v. State ( 2022 )


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  • Sean Urbanski v. State of Maryland, No. 1318, September Term 2020.
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to
    actual speech. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    ABSOLUTE NATURE OF RIGHT
    The right to freedom of speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
    U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
    CIVIL RIGHTS > OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
    CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUORY PROVISIONS
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    LAW ENFORCEMENT; CRIMINAL CONDUCT
    BIAS OR HATE CRIMES
    First Amendment does not protect bias-motivated speech, coupled with non-verbal
    proscribed conduct. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-304
    .
    CIVIL RIGHTS > OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
    CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUORY PROVISIONS
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    LAW ENFORCEMENT; CRIMINAL CONDUCT
    BIAS OR HATE CRIMES
    First Amendment does not protect violent acts. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-304
    .
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    FIRST AMENDMENT IN GENERAL
    PARTICULAR ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS
    First Amendment does not erect per se barrier to admission of evidence concerning
    defendant’s beliefs and associations at sentencing, simply because those beliefs and
    associations are protected by First Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
    CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
    ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE RELEVANCE
    MOTIVE OR ABSENCE OF MOTIVE
    First Amendment does not prohibit evidentiary use of speech to establish elements of
    crime or to prove motive or intent. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW > FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
    PRESS
    JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
    CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
    ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE RELEVANCE
    MOTIVE OR ABSENCE OF MOTIVE
    Violent speech can be admissible evidence to show motive or intent because the First
    Amendment does not prohibit evidentiary use of speech to establish elements of crime or
    to prove motive or intent. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
    CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW
    DISCRETION OF LOWER COURT
    RECEPTION AND ADMISSIBILTY OF EVIDENCE
    Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of
    discretion.
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE AND RELEVANCE
    RELEVANCY IN GENERAL
    Evidence is relevant or material when it has tendency to prove proposition at issue in
    case.
    CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW
    HARMLESS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
    ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
    Appellate court is generally loath to reverse a trial court unless the evidence is plainly
    inadmissible under a specific rule or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an
    abuse of discretion.
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED
    NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OTHER
    MISCONDUCT AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY
    TEMPORAL RELATION OF EVENTS
    RELEVANCY IN GENERAL
    Evidence of defendant’s prior conduct is admissible, even if not directly concurrent,
    when acts are committed within such time, or show such relation to main charge, as to
    make connection obvious.
    CRIMINAL LAW > NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME
    CRIMINAL INTENT AND MALICE
    MOTIVE
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    CRIMINAL INTENT AND MALICE
    OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED
    OTHER MISCONDUCT SHOWING MOTIVE
    Motive is mental state, proof of which necessarily requires inferences to be drawn from
    conduct or extrinsic acts.
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE AND RELEVANCE
    RELEVANCY IN GENERAL
    EVIDENCE CALCULATED TO CREATE PREJUDICE
    AGAINST OR SYMPATHY FOR ACCUSED
    To be admissible, inflammatory or prejudicial nature of evidence must be outweighed by
    its probative value.
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE AND RELEVANCE
    RELEVANCY IN GENERAL
    EVIDENCE CALCULATED TO CREATE PREJUDICE
    AGAINST OR SYMPATHY FOR ACCUSED
    Responsibility for balancing prejudicial nature of evidence against its probative value is
    entrusted to trial court.
    CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE
    FACTS IN ISSUE AND RELEVANCE
    RELEVANCY IN GENERAL
    EVIDENCE CALCULATED TO CREATE PREJUDICE
    AGAINST OR SYMPATHY FOR ACCUSED
    Evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial to an accused, but the mere fact that such
    evidence is powerful because it accurately depicts the gravity and atrociousness of the
    crime or the callous nature of the defendant does not thereby render it inadmissible.
    Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
    Case No. CT171444X
    REPORTED
    IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
    OF MARYLAND
    No. 1318
    September Term, 2020
    ______________________________________
    SEAN URBANSKI
    v.
    STATE OF MARYLAND
    ______________________________________
    Berger,
    Arthur,
    Reed,
    JJ.
    ______________________________________
    Opinion by Reed, J.
    Concurring Opinion by Arthur, J.
    ______________________________________
    Filed: December 7, 2022
    Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
    Government Article) this document is authentic.
    2022-12-08 10:32-05:00
    Gregory Hilton, Clerk
    Sean Urbanski (“Appellant”) stabbed and killed Second Lieutenant Richard Collins,
    III (“Lt. Collins”) at a bus stop on the University of Maryland (“UM”) campus on May 20,
    2017. Appellant was charged with first- or second-degree murder (“Count One”) and a hate
    crime under Maryland Criminal Law § 10-304 (“Count Two”). During trial, the State of
    Maryland (“State”) introduced evidence of racially offensive memes1 stored on the
    Appellant’s cell phone and Appellant’s membership in a white supremacist Facebook
    group named “Alt-Reich Nation”2 (hereinafter, “contested evidence”). During trial,
    Nicholas Clampitt (“Clampitt”), a friend, former high school classmate, co-worker of the
    Appellant who is also a member of the Facebook group stated that the group was based on
    the “Third Reich” of Nazi Germany.3 Clampitt testified that the racist memes that were
    1
    This Court was not able to locate if the term “meme” has been defined in a Maryland
    case. However, other Courts have defined a meme: “As the term is generally used in our
    current information age culture, a ‘meme’ is typically an image or video, that enough
    people find amusing or interesting, that it is spread widely through sites on the internet.”
    Fields v. Commonwealth, 
    73 Va. App. 652
    , 662 n.4 (2021). The United States Tenth Circuit
    has defined a meme as “pictures with text over them or pictures of text.” United States v.
    Alfred 
    982 F.3d 1373
    , 1276 (2020).
    2
    A crime analyst for the University of Maryland Police Department testified that the “Alt-
    Reich Nation” Facebook group page had been taken down approximately forty-four hours
    after it was discovered on Appellant’s phone.
    3
    Although the existence of the Alt-Reich, a white supremacist organization, was deemed
    “common-knowledge” by the circuit court, the Alt-Reich, as a group, has yet to be defined
    by the Maryland Court. “Altreich”, in its origins, is a German word for “Old Realm” and
    generally refers to Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler. See generally PETER WITTE, TWO
    DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL SOLUTION TO THE JEWISH QUESTION: DEPORTATIONS
    TO LODZ AND MASS MURDER IN CHELMNO, 9 Holocaust & Genocide Stud. 318 (1995); cf.
    Reich, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
    tionary/Reich (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022); Timeline of the Holocaust: 1933-1945, MUSEUM
    OF TOLERANCE, https://www.museumoftolerance.com/assets/documents/timeline-of-the-
    holocaust.pdf (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022). Adolf Hitler and Nazi supporters in Germany
    1
    admitted into evidence were consistent with materials that were posted on the Alt-Reich
    Nation Facebook group.
    On December 17, 2019, Appellant was acquitted by the Circuit Court of Prince
    George’s County of Count Two charging the hate crime because, as the hate crime statute
    was written, the crime must have been “because of”4 the victim’s race and the court stated
    the State had not met this high evidentiary burden. However, the court believed that the
    admitted evidence was relevant to Appellant’s motive in Count One charging Murder. The
    killed six million Jews, along with five million other victims, during the Holocaust because
    they believed that Germans were “racially superior” to Jewish people and that Jewish
    people were an alien threat to the German racial community. The Holocaust, National
    WWII Museum, The Holocaust, National WWII Museum, https://www.nationalww2muse
    um.org/war/articles/holocaust (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022); accord Frequently Asked
    Questions about the Holocaust: What was the Holocaust?, United States Holocaust
    Memorial Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/teach/fundamentals/holocaust-questions (last
    visited: Nov. 9, 2022). The Alt-Reich (also commonly referred to as “Alt-Right”) is a group
    of individuals whose membership believes that “‘white identity’ is under attack by
    multicultural forces . . . to undermine white people and ‘their’ civilization. Characterized
    by heavy use of social media and memes, they eschew establishment conservatism and
    promote the goal of a white ethnostate.” The Alt-Right On Campus, SOUTHERN POVERTY
    LAW CENTER (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/20170810/alt-right-campus-
    what-students-need-know (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022). The “Alt-Reich Nation” Facebook
    group was reportedly a social media group where members would post disparaging
    material about Black, Latino, and Jewish people. What is the ‘Alt-Reich: Nation’ Facebook
    Group, USA Today (May 22, 2017, 12:15pm), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nat
    ion-now/2017/05/22/what-alt-reich-nation-facebook-group-fbi-investigating-possible-hat
    e-crime-university-maryland/335961001/ (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022).
    4
    The statute was later amended by the Maryland General Assembly in 2020 to replace
    “because of” with “motivated either in whole or in substantial part by” the protected
    characteristics. 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-304
     (West 2020).
    2
    following day, the jury was instructed on the remaining first- and second-degree murder
    charges. On December 19, 2019, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and
    Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
    In bringing his appeal, Appellant presents two questions for appellate review,
    rephrased for clarity:5
    I.     Did the circuit court err in admitting the racially offensive evidence
    in violation of the First Amendment?
    II.    Did the circuit court err in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial?
    For the following reasons, we answer both questions in the negative and affirm the
    circuit court’s holdings.
    FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On May 20, 2017, Appellant stabbed and killed Lt. Collins, a Bowie State
    University student and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps candidate, at a bus stop on the
    UM campus. During the stabbing, Blake Bender (“Bender”) and Amanda Lee (“Lee”)
    5
    In his brief, Appellant presented the two following questions:
    I.     Whether the trial court erred in admitting racially offensive material
    found on Appellant’s phone in violation of the First Amendment, the
    Constitutional guarantee of due process and contrary to the Maryland
    Rules of Evidence, absent any nexus between the racially offensive
    material on the phone and the crime.
    II.    Whether the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after
    granting a judgment of acquittal on Count Two.
    3
    (collectively, “eyewitnesses”)6 were at the bus stop with Lt. Collins. Both Bender and Lee
    testified to witnessing Appellant murdering Lt. Collins.
    Prior to the incident, Bender was out with Lt. Collins at the local bars near UM and
    ended up at a bus stop where Lee was also waiting for the bus but, because of the late hour,
    proceeded to call a taxi-car rideshare. At some point, Bender recalled hearing angry
    screaming coming from “in the woods, further up the walk” from the bus stop. Shortly after
    hearing the screaming, Appellant approached the group at the bus stop and ordered each
    person to “step left, if you know what’s best for you,” “step left, step left if you know
    what’s good for you.” Lt. Collins said “what?” asking Appellant what he was talking about
    and Appellant repeated himself. Bender and Lee stepped out of Appellant’s way.
    Appellant moved forward with the blade of the knife drawn in his hand. Appellant
    approached Lt. Collins. Bender testified that Lt. Collins was not threatening, nor did he act
    aggressively in any manner to Appellant. Lt. Collins responded, “no,” to Appellant’s
    orders. Appellant stabbed Lt. Collins in the chest.
    The first officer on the scene, Michael Thomas (“Ofc. Thomas”), found Lt. Collins
    lying on his back suffering from a stab wound to the chest and unresponsive to questioning
    at approximately 3:04 a.m. Ofc. Thomas identified individuals depicted on the surveillance
    footage, including Appellant, Lt. Collins, and the two eyewitnesses. Ofc. Thomas noticed
    6
    Since race is considered as a factor to this case, it is notable that at the time of the incident,
    Bender presented outwardly as a white male and Lee presented outwardly as an Asian
    woman.
    4
    Appellant sitting at the bus stop while Lt. Collins was loaded into an ambulance. Appellant
    was arrested at the bus stop where the stabbing occurred.
    Appellant was taken into custody. Appellant agreed to a blood test for alcohol and
    drugs. Appellant surrendered his cell phone and consented to its search. The folding knife
    that was used to stab Lt. Collins was found in Appellant’s pocket after being taken into
    custody.
    At trial, the eyewitnesses to the stabbing testified and identified the Appellant as the
    perpetrator. Next, a stipulation was read into the record that a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
    analysis and comparison showed that the DNA from the blade of the knife found in the
    Appellant’s pocket matched Lt. Collins’s DNA. The medical examiner testified that the
    stab wound was approximately three-and-a-half inches deep and the location indicated that
    the knife cut through Lt. Collins’s pulmonary artery and caused severe internal bleeding.
    During the trial, the State argued that Appellant stabbed Lt. Collins as a result of his
    bigoted views. In support of that theory regarding Appellant’s motive, the State introduced,
    inter alia, memes into evidence that the Appellant saved on his cell phone and evidence of
    Appellant’s membership to a racist Facebook group title “Alt-Reich Nation,” based on
    Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. The circuit court admitted thirteen racially offensive memes
    from the Appellant’s cellphone into evidence. The memes used racially offensive language
    with accompanying pictures, such as: 1) a trading card that was altered to say, “Hines Heist:
    The card allows the player to nab 200 life points from the other player when the n…a ain’t
    looking,” 2) a black and white photograph of children playing under a sign that says “Hit
    5
    the N…r Baby” with an accompanying caption reading, “Remember back when games
    used to have a great plot,” 3) a picture of television personality and scientist, Bill Nye
    stating, “Consider the Following” with pictures of a noose, a handgun, and poison, and 4)
    a picture uses the literary character, Harry Potter’s, logo and says, “Harry Potter and the
    Final Solution: You’re a Grand Wizard, Harry.”7
    Michael Waski (“Waski”), a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) computer
    forensic examiner’s expert, testified that 4,000 out of 17,000 pictures on the Appellant’s
    phone were stored in the digital camera image folder (DCIM). Waski stated images stored
    in the DCIM must be manually saved in the DCIM folder and cannot be saved in the folder
    by mistake. Waski explained that the user must “interact with the image somehow,” either
    by “taking pictures with your camera or saving them from a text message, or e-mail, or
    web browser.” The memes were all saved within five months of the murder.
    Another crime analyst testified that a screenshot of the Appellant’s Facebook page
    from the date of the stabbing listed him as a member of the group “Alt-Reich Nation.” As
    previously mentioned, Clampitt, testified that the group was based on the “Third Reich” of
    Nazi Germany. Clampitt also testified that he was a member of the “Alt-Reich Nation”
    7
    This meme alludes to both the Nazi’s Final Solution, a euphemism used by Nazi
    Germany’s leaders of mass murdering Europe’s Jews, and the Ku Klux Klan’s Grand
    Wizard, a head leader of the Ku Klux Klan. “Final Solution”: Overview, UNITED STATES
    HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/fina
    l-solution-overview (last visited: Nov. 9, 2022); cf. Grand Wizard, GOOGLE ARTS AND
    CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/grand-wizard/m05hzpm?hl=en (last
    visited: Nov. 9, 2022).
    6
    Facebook group and that the memes submitted in evidence are consistent with the material
    posted on the Facebook group’s member page. A crime analyst for the UM Police
    Department testified that the “Alt-Reich Nation” Facebook group had been taken down
    approximately forty-four hours after it was discovered on Appellant’s phone. At the end of
    the State’s case, Appellant made a motion for judgment of acquittal and the circuit court
    denied the motion for both Count One and Count Two. The court stated,
    [I]n this case there is evidence that the defendant had on his phone manually,
    took manual action to save these memes. I think it would be fair to call these
    memes racist. The memes in question are of (sic) particularly addressed to
    [B]lack people. Clearly the defendant is white. We have the death of
    Lieutenant Collins. The question is are these two related.
    At this juncture the State has rested and the court takes the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the State. So with that regard I will deny the defense
    motion with regard to the hate crime. I will also deny it with regard to the
    murder.
    However, the circuit court later granted the Appellant’s motion for a judgment of
    acquittal for Count Two, citing the construction of the statute as written. Maryland’s hate
    crime statute under § 10-304 at the time of Appellant’s trial stated:
    Because of another’s race, color. . ., a person may not:
    (1)(i) commit a crime or attempt to commit a crime against that person. . . .
    or
    (2) commit a violation of item (1) of this section that:
    (i) except as provided in item (ii) of this item, involves a separate
    crime that is a felony; or
    (ii) results in the death of the victim.
    Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law, § 10-304 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
    7
    In granting the motion in this case the court stated the following:
    I analyze the evidence in the case and I find out whether the State has met
    their burden, and whether a trier of fact, the jury in the case, could find the
    defendant guilty in these cases.
    With regard to the murder cases, it is very clear that certainly the State has
    met their burden.
    The focus on the court would be with the hate crime charges. [sic] Now, I
    also think it is important to read the statute. 10-304 says because of another
    person’s race, it is race in this case, because of another person’s race a person
    may not commit or attempt to commit a crime against that person. It says
    because of that person, meaning because of that person’s race, meaning that
    was the sole cause of what happened.
    In this case we have some evidence of the defendant’s ideology or belief as
    it pertains to [B]lack people. No need to go over that again. He is a member
    of that group. In fact he didn’t just look over this group, he actually thought
    enough, for whatever reason, to save it, actually save it to his phone. Taking
    an action in his phone to save it in his phone.
    In this case he is — at least in this case he is outside of another bar. His
    friend, Mr. Akshay, sees him punching a sign or something. Then he walks
    him up to the bus stop. He leaves him.
    The State’s witnesses hear loud yelling of some nature. Essentially this
    defendant comes up to them, the three of them, and at some point posed the
    question “step left, step left.” The other two don’t respond. I guess they
    respond by their body because they step away. Lieutenant Collins does not,
    he said “what,” or “no,” and then the defendant strikes him in the chest with
    the knife. The issue is did he strike him in the chest because he was [B]lack,
    or I should say did he strike him in the chest only because he was [B]lack?
    So he could have had — him being [B]lack could have made him I’ll say
    from his perspective more likely that he would inflict harm upon him in that
    the memes would indicate that he viewed [B]lack people as something less
    than I will say white people in this case, but the State has to link up on that
    day, at that time that question that a racist, a homophobe, antisemitic could
    commit a crime against that other particular group without it being hate based
    in this case.
    8
    In this case the court doesn’t believe that the State has met their burden with
    regard to the hate crime charge and, therefore, I will grant the defense motion
    for a judgment of acquittal for that charge only.
    Appellant moved for a mistrial based on the court’s ruling for Count Two. Appellant
    argued that the race evidence in the case would have been inadmissible had Count Two not
    been charged, and since Count Two no longer remained the evidence was inadmissible and
    was prejudicial. However, the circuit court declined stating,
    The court made its ruling yesterday based on the statute, as I indicated. I
    believe I indicated that I believe race still could’ve been a factor in it based
    upon those memes, both the Alt-[R]eich website, that it could’ve been a
    factor [in] the actions he took. So I believe that it’s still relevant to a murder
    charge as far as a possible motive.
    I guess I want to be clear, if I wasn’t yesterday, that I was not saying that his
    memes or the [Alt-Reich] Facebook[ group] [did not] at all play[ ] a role in
    what happened on May 20, 2017 and in light of the specific intent of the
    statute. I do believe it’s probative.
    I do believe it’s fair for the State to argue that those views affected the actions
    he took that day and I don’t believe the prejudice outweighs the probative
    value in this case and as well as to I don’t believe it fits within the other
    crimes. I mean, again, it goes to intent in this matter.
    On December 18, 2019, the jury was instructed on the remaining charges of first-
    and second-degree murder. The court explained to the jury that voluntary intoxication is a
    defense to specific intent murder, but not a defense to second-degree depraved heart
    murder. On December 19, 2019, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder.
    On January 14, 2021, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of
    parole. Additional facts will be discussed below as relevant.
    I.      ADMISSIBILITY OF CONTESTED EVIDENCE
    9
    A. Standard of Review
    Appellant erroneously stated in his brief and during oral argument that the proper
    standard of review is de novo, citing Ayers v. State, 
    335 Md. 602
     (1994). We disagree. In
    Ayers, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a portion of Maryland’s hate crime
    statute as it stood at the time of the case, which would require a de novo standard of review.
    
    Id. at 626
    . In the case before us, Appellant instead challenges the admissibility of the
    contested evidence at trial.
    Our review of the circuit court’s decision to admit evidence involves a two-step
    analysis. First, without deference to a trial court’s conclusion, an appellate court reviews
    whether the evidence is legally relevant. Ford v. State, 
    462 Md. 3
    , 46 (2018). Pursuant to
    Maryland Rule 5-402, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or the
    [Maryland R]ules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with the [Maryland R]ules, all
    relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” See Sifrit
    v. State, 
    383 Md. 116
    , 129 (2004); Dorsey v. State, 
    276 Md. 638
    , 643 (1976). Although
    relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
    the danger of unfair prejudice. MD Rule 5-403.
    Once the evidence is deemed relevant, the circuit court’s decision to admit or
    exclude evidence is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard.
    Merzbacher v. State, 
    346 Md. 391
    , 404 (1997) (citing Md. Rule § 5-402); Taneja v. State,
    
    231 Md. App. 1
    , 11 (2016), cert denied, 
    452 Md. 549
     (2017). “Abuse of discretion [exists]
    where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [circuit] court, or when
    10
    the court acts without reference to [ ] guiding rules or principles.” State v. Robertson, 
    463 Md. 342
    , 364 (2019) (quoting Alexis v. State, 
    437 Md. 457
    , 478 (2014)). “If the trial court’s
    ruling is reasonable . . . we will not disturb the ruling on appeal.” Taneja, 231 Md. App. at
    12 (citing Peterson v. State, 
    196 Md. App. 563
    , 585 (2010)).
    B. Parties’ Contentions
    i. Appellant’s Contentions
    Appellant contends that the racially offensive memes and evidence of Appellant’s
    membership to the “Alt-Reich” Facebook group presented in trial should have been
    excluded from consideration by the jury after Count Two regarding the hate crime was
    dismissed. Citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Ayers, Appellant argues that only if the
    State can prove a “tight nexus” to the murder, should the evidence in question be
    admissible. Next, Appellant asserts the contested evidence is speech protected by the First
    Amendment.
    Appellant argues that the circuit court failed to conduct a proper analysis and erred
    in its determination the contested evidence was admissible under Maryland Rules of
    Evidence 5-403 and 5-404(b) because the jury was empaneled after voir dire questioning
    concentrating heavily on the impact of racial motivation and impartiality. Finally,
    Appellant argues that because he was intoxicated and could not have formed the specific
    intent necessary to be sentenced to first-degree murder.
    ii. State’s Contentions
    The State contends the contested evidence was relevant and did not violate the First
    11
    Amendment. The State asserts that the evidence was not “other crimes” evidence because
    it was intrinsic to the charged crimes. Alternatively, if it was “other crimes” evidence, the
    State argues it was admissible for purposes other than showing criminal propensity.
    The State cites the Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. 476
     (1993),
    explaining
    [i]n Mitchell, the defendant’s sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced
    under a penalty enhancement provision because he “intentionally selected his
    victim on account of the victim’s race.” Mitchell argued the statute violated
    the First Amendment because it not only punished criminal conduct, but
    enhanced the punishment for a crime because of his bigoted beliefs. The
    Supreme Court observed that a defendant’s motive for committing an offense
    has long been relevant to determining an appropriate sentence. In addition,
    the Court had long upheld federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which
    look to actions taken “because of” (i.e., motivated by) factors such as “race,
    color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
    See Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. at 479-487
    . The State’s argues that in light of Mitchell and following
    Supreme Court cases that upheld the constitutionality of various hate crime statutes from
    around the country, see, e.g., People v. Rokicki, 
    718 N.E. 2d 333
    , 335, 339 (Ill. App. 1999)
    (upholding conviction of man who directed gay epithets at a restaurant server while
    committing disorderly conduct); State v. Wyant, 
    624 N.E.2d 722
     (Ohio 1994) (reversing
    earlier decision in light of Mitchell and upholding constitutionality of ethnic intimidation
    statute),8
    8
    The State also noted,
    The fact that Mitchell involved a penalty-enhancement statute and many
    states, including Maryland, have created separate hate crime offenses has not
    altered the analysis used by other state courts. Under Mitchell’s reasoning, a
    12
    the First Amendment offers protection for the expression of offensive views,
    [but] it does not shield [Appellant] from the legislatively proscribed
    consequences of engaging in criminal conduct based on animus toward
    statutorily enumerated cases of protected persons. The Court of Appeals in
    Ayers v. State, 
    335 Md. 602
    , 627 (1994), acknowledged that this legislative
    response to crimes motivated by specific bias complies with Supreme Court
    doctrine.
    The State concludes that the First Amendment does not protect violence, citing NAACP v.
    Claiborne Hardware Co., 
    458 U.S. 886
    , 916 (1982), and the contested evidence provides
    relevant context of the Appellant’s speech to establish the existence of motive in murdering
    Lt. Collins.
    C. Analysis
    First, this Court must weigh whether the evidence at issue is relevant. Relevant
    evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
    that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
    than it would be without the evidence.” MD Rule 5-401. “Evidence which is thus not
    penalty enhancement statute is not analytically different from a separate hate
    crime offense. See State v. McKnight, 
    511 N.W.2d 389
    , 395-96 (Iowa 1994),
    cert denied, 
    511 U.S. 1113
     (1994). In McKnight, the Supreme Court of Iowa
    upheld its hate crime law under Mitchell, observing that a defendant lost First
    Amendment protection “when his racial bias toward [B]lacks drove him to
    couple [his] words with assaultive conduct towards [the victim], who is
    [B]lack.” 
    Id. at 395
    . The Court rejected the notion that the state’s law was
    distinguishable from Mitchell because it defined a new offense rather than
    adding a penalty enhancement to an existing offense, noting that neither a
    separate statute nor a penalty enhancement statute “proscribes speech or
    thought alone[.]” 
    Id. at 395-96
    .
    13
    probative of the proposition at which it is directed is deemed irrelevant.” Sifrit, 
    383 Md. at 129
     (quoting Dorsey, 
    276 Md. at 643
    ).
    In the case before this Court, the contested evidence is highly probative of Count
    One because it showed possible motive and intent and Count Two because it goes to the
    crux of the alleged hate crime. Appellant was charged for a hate crime under Maryland
    Code, Criminal Law (“CL”) § 10-304(1)(i) (West 2019), which stated,
    Because of another person’s or group’s race, color, religious beliefs, sexual
    orientation, gender, disability, or national origin, or because another person
    or group is homeless, a person may not:
    (1)(i) commit a crime or attempt to commit a crime against that person or
    group . . .
    Id. (emphasis added).9 The crime required proof that the act was committed because of
    someone’s race. Lipp v. State, 
    246 Md. App. 105
    , 121 (2020). In this case, the State used
    the contested evidence to argue Appellant murdered Lt. Collins based on his race.
    This Court finds that the facts are clear: Appellant was a member of a group that
    had bigoted beliefs against inter alia, Black people. The other two eyewitnesses were of
    white and Asian descent. He ordered each person to “step left.” Lt. Collins, a Black man,
    was stabbed by a person that had bigoted beliefs against Black people. Those bigoted
    beliefs aligned with and were encouraged by the membership to the “Alt-Reich” Facebook
    9
    In 2020, named Lt. Collins’s Law, the statute was changed by the Maryland General
    Assembly to state “Motivated either in whole or in substantial part by another person’s or
    group’s race . . . a person may not commit a crime or attempt or threaten to commit a crime
    against that person.” 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-304
    (1)(i) (West 2020) (emphasis
    added).
    14
    group, as testified to by Clampitt — a friend, former high school classmate, and co-worker
    of Appellant who is also a member of the group. Clampitt also stated that the group was
    based on the “Third Reich” of Nazi Germany. The memes that were admitted into evidence
    were testified as consistent with materials that were posted on the Alt-Reich Nation
    Facebook group page.
    Appellant argues that since Count Two was dismissed, the evidence presented was
    prejudicial to his case. Under Maryland Rule 5-403, the circuit court is entrusted with the
    discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
    danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
    considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
    evidence.” However, even if evidence is prejudicial, “that does not mean that it was
    ‘unfairly’ prejudicial such that the probative value of the evidence was substantially
    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ford, 462 Md. at 58. In balancing probative
    value against prejudice, the Court of Appeals explains
    “the fact that evidence prejudices one party or the other, in the sense that it
    hurts his or her case, is not the undesirable prejudice referred to in [Maryland]
    Rule 5-403.” Rather, “[e]vidence may be unfairly prejudicial if it might
    influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence regarding the
    particular crime with which he [or she] is being charged.”
    Id. at 58-59 (quoting Odum, 412 Md. at 615 (cleaned up)). “The responsibility for
    conducting this balancing is entrusted in the first instance to the trial court.” Johnson, 
    332 Md. 456
    , 473 (1993).
    15
    Summarily, the nature of the evidence must be such that it generates such a strong
    emotional response from the jury such that the inflammatory nature of the evidence makes
    it unlikely for the jury to make a rational evaluation of the evidentiary weight. The
    inflammatory nature of the evidence must be such that the “shock value” on a layperson
    serving as a juror would prevent the proper evaluation or weight in context of the other
    evidence. However, the contested evidence presented in this case did not contain content
    that would inherently prevent jurors from rationally considering and weighing the
    contested evidence with all other evidence presented during trial, such as, inter alia, the
    surveillance footage, the murder weapon found on the Appellant’s person with the victim’s
    blood, and the testimony of the eyewitnesses. Thus, this Court finds no abuse of discretion
    in the circuit court’s decision to admit the contested evidence.
    Notably, Appellant relies heavily on Ayers v. State, 
    335 Md. 602
     (1994). In Ayers,
    the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the hate crimes statute which
    make it a crime to “harass or commit a crime upon a person . . . because of
    that person’s race, color, religious belief or national origin.” Ayers argued
    that a state cannot constitutionally enact a content-based law which prohibits
    free speech. He maintained that content-based regulations are presumptively
    invalid and that bias-motivated speech, no matter how reprehensible, “does
    not justify selectively silencing speech on the basis of content.”
    
    Id. at 609
    . Ultimately, the constitutionality of the statute was upheld. Unlike in Ayers, the
    constitutionality of the statute is not in question in the case at bar.
    In his brief, Appellant states that in Ayers, “the Court of Appeals made clear that the
    hate crime statute survives an as-applied challenge under the First Amendment only when
    16
    there is a tight nexus between the otherwise protected speech and the crime.” We disagree
    with Appellant’s interpretation of the Ayers case. Appellant’s proposed standard under
    Ayers reaches further from the actual standard set forth in the case and this Court declines
    to expand the reach of Ayers. The Ayers Court held:
    only speech actually connected with the offense should be used as evidence
    of motivation. Because there was such a “tight nexus” between [previous]
    incidents, we hold that admitting the evidence regarding the 7-Eleven
    incident did not violate the First Amendment, nor did it violate the rule which
    generally prohibits the introduction of other crimes evidence.
    Ayers, 
    335 Md. at 637
     (emphasis added). By the plain language of the holding in Ayers,
    the issues implicated were possible violations of the First Amendment and, separately, the
    evidence rule that generally prohibits the introduction of other crimes evidence. To be sure,
    the Court stated that there was a “tight nexus” between the incidents but did not create a
    standard requiring a tight nexus between the speech and the hate crime to be used as
    evidence of motivation for the hate crime.
    First, regarding the issue of speech and the hate crime as charged, this Court has
    previously stated that the Ayers Court held “that circumstantial proof of racial motivation
    was of ‘vital importance’ to proving the defendant committed a hate crime.” Sewell v. State,
    
    239 Md. App. 571
    , 612 (2018) (emphasis added). Inherently, racially motivated evidence
    must be connected in some way to the hate crime charged as stated in Ayers. Indeed, the
    Ayers Court quoted the ACLU of Maryland and ACLU of National Capital Area’s Brief of
    Amicus Curiae stating that:
    17
    “At a minimum, any speech or association that is not contemporaneous with
    the crime must be part of the chain of events that led to the crime. Generalized
    evidence concerning the defendant’s racial views is not sufficient to meet
    this test.”
    Ayers, 
    335 Md. at 636
     (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Maryland and ACLU of
    National Capital Area at 13 n. 9). However, this Court does not read the holding of the
    Ayers case to require a “tight nexus” between the incidents (as Appellant repeatedly
    iterates), but rather that the racially motivated speech, when weighed in context and for
    motivation of a charged hate-crime under 
    Md. Code Ann., CL § 10-304
    , has to be
    connected in some way with the hate crime offense to be used as evidence of motivation
    of the hate crime. See Sewell v. State, 
    239 Md. App. 571
    , 612 (2018). This Court reads this
    standard to only apply to the theory of motivation of charged hate crimes and not the
    charged first-degree murder charge.
    Appellant was acquitted of the hate crime because the circuit court could not find
    that the Appellant murdered Lt. Collins solely “because of” his race. Despite holding that
    the State had not passed the high evidentiary bar set to convict Appellant of a hate crime,
    the circuit court still found the contested evidence relevant to motivation for first-degree
    murder. This Court holds that the circuit court did not err in doing so and is not inconsistent
    with Ayers. The Ayers Court reiterated the Supreme Court’s standard set forth in Mitchell.
    The prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence
    of those beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he commits a serious
    offense against person or property . . . is simply too speculative a hypothesis
    ...
    The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of
    speech to establish elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Evidence
    18
    of a defendant’s previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted
    in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy,
    reliability, and the like.
    Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. at 489
    . This Court in Lipp, further explained Mitchell, stating that bias-
    motivated speech, coupled with non-verbal, proscribed conduct, is not protected by the
    First Amendment. Lipp, 246 Md. App. at 121.
    Notably, the memes were not just racially offensive. In addition to being racist, the
    memes encouraged and promoted violence against Black people by “nab[bing] . . . life
    points . . . when the n…a ain’t looking[,]” “Hit[ting] the N…r Baby[,]” and images stating
    to “consider” nooses, which has a historical significance in the killing of Black people in
    American history. Because Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, the State had
    to prove that the killing had been a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to kill the
    victim, and that he committed some overt act towards that end. Martin v. State, 
    218 Md. App. 1
    , 40-41 (2014) (citations omitted). “An intent to kill often must be proved by
    circumstantial evidence and found by inference. Absent an admission by the accused, it
    rarely can be proved directly.” Burch v. State, 
    346 Md. 253
    , 273 (1997) (citing State v.
    Earp, 
    319 Md. 156
    , 167 (1990)). Memes depicting violence against Black people
    constituted relevant evidence that was probative of Appellant’s intent to violently harm Lt.
    Collins. Thus, this Court holds that the contested evidence was admissible to prove motive
    for first-degree murder and does not violate the Appellant’s First Amendment rights.
    i. Evidence of “Other Crimes”
    In Ayers, the defendant maintained that evidence of a prior criminal altercation was
    19
    improperly admitted because it constituted evidence of “other crimes.” Id. at 629-30. This
    Court does not perceive being part of a white supremacist group or having racist memes
    on your cell phone as a per se crime. However, this Court must weigh, under Maryland
    Rule 5-404(b), whether the evidence is admissible under the “other crimes” legal
    framework for its admissibility as motive or intent evidence. Under Maryland Rule 5-
    404(b):
    Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or other acts . . . is not admissible to prove
    the character of a person in order to show action in the conformity therewith.
    Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
    of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan,
    knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or in conformity with
    Rule 5-413.
    Id. (emphasis added); see also Nelson v. State, 
    5 Md. App. 109
    , 121 (1968) (generally
    citing Dobbs v. State, 
    148 Md. 34
     (1925)) (emphasis added). In addition to the rules of
    evidence regarding relevancy and prejudice, as previously addressed, to be admissible
    evidence of motive or intent, the evidence must have some special relevance to the
    contested issue and the defendant must have been found to actually have committed the
    crimes. Cf. Odum v. State, 
    412 Md. 593
    , 610 (2010); Streater v. State, 
    352 Md. 800
    , 806
    (1999).
    The contested evidence was relevant to prove Appellant’s motive or intent to harm
    Lt. Collins. Motive or intent evidence can show special relevance to the case and can be
    proven by prior conduct. Cf. Odum, 
    412 Md. at 610
    ; Johnson v. State, 
    332 Md. 456
    , 470
    (1993). Such evidence is admissible, even if not directly concurrent, when the subject acts
    20
    are obviously connected to the charge. 
    Id.
     As previously stated, Appellant was charged
    with first-degree murder and the State had to prove the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
    nature of Appellant’s actions. The memes depicted violence against Black people like Lt.
    Collins. It was uncontested that the memes were saved to the Appellant’s phone and
    Appellant joined the white supremacist Facebook group in the months leading up to Lt.
    Collins’ murder. Thus, although the State could not prove the act was solely because of10
    Lt. Collins’s race and Count Two was ultimately dismissed by the circuit court, this Court
    holds that the contested evidence to show motive or intent to harm Lt. Collins was highly
    probative and has special relevance to Count One charging murder.
    ii. Harmless Error
    Though, arguendo, if the evidence was not properly admitted, on review, we would
    apply the longstanding principle that improperly admitted evidence must be prejudicial to
    warrant reversible error. See Maryland Rule 5-103(a) (stating generally that “[e]rror may
    not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is
    prejudiced by the ruling”). “[P]rejudice is not presumed ‘when the jury considers evidence
    admitted by the trial court which is later determined to have been erroneously admitted.’”
    Merritt v. State, 
    367 Md. 17
    , 33 (2001) (citing State Deposit v. Billman, 
    321 Md. 3
    , 16
    (1990)). Rather, it is well settled in Maryland that we will review prejudice through the
    10
    Notably, supra fn. 4, 9, in 2020, the General Assembly changed the statute to replace
    “because of” with “motivated either in whole or in substantial part by” the protected
    characteristics. 
    Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-304
     (West 2020).
    21
    lens of harmless error:
    when an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing
    court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a
    belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the
    verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated.
    Dorsey v. State, 
    276 Md. 638
    , 659 (1976). Furthermore,
    In a criminal jury trial, the jury is the trier of fact. For this reason, it is
    responsible for weighing the evidence and rendering the final verdict.
    Therefore, any factor that relates to the jury’s perspective of the case
    necessarily is a significant factor in the harmless error analysis. Thus,
    harmless error factors must be considered with a focus on the effect of
    erroneously admitted, or excluded, evidence on the jury.
    Dionas v. State, 
    436 Md. 97
    , 109 (2013) (emphasis added); Beckwitt v. State, 
    249 Md. App. 333
    , 400–01, cert. granted, 
    474 Md. 720
     (2021), and aff’d, 
    477 Md. 398
     (2022),
    reconsideration denied (Mar. 25, 2022).
    Appellant was charged with first degree murder and acquitted of Count Two.
    Appellant contends that:
    When the Appellant was acquitted of the hate crime, a mistrial was required
    as the entire trial had been about the memes. There was a likely possibility
    that the jury would convict Appellant of the murder because they had been
    told [Appellant] was a racist – a bad person.
    However, there was an overwhelming amount of non-racially charged evidence before the
    jury that Appellant intended to kill or seriously injure Lt. Collins, such as: 1) the two
    eyewitnesses at the scene that: a) witnessed the Appellant approach the group, wield his
    knife, and stab Lt. Collins and b) identified the Appellant as the perpetrator of Lt. Collins’
    murder; 2) the knife with Lt. Collins’s blood on the weapon found on the Appellant’s
    22
    person when he was arrested; 3) the surveillance evidence of the Appellant stabbing Lt.
    Collins; and 4) the nature of the assault and location of the stab wound in the chest cavity.
    See generally Wood v. State, 
    209 Md. App. 246
    , 325 (2012). Thus, this Court does not find
    the Appellant’s argument about the “likely possibility that the jury would convict Appellant
    of the murder” because of the contested evidence convincing. Most certainly, this Court
    does not find the contested evidence prejudicial enough to warrant reversible error.
    II.    MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
    Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial after
    granting the renewed motion for judgment of acquittal for Count Two. Appellant presented
    evidence during trial that Appellant may have been intoxicated when he stabbed Lt.
    Collins. The circuit court explained to the jury that voluntary intoxication is a defense to
    specific intent murder, but not a defense to second-degree depraved heart murder. On
    December 19, 2019, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder. Appellant
    suggests that absent the contested evidence, the “jury would have been left a genuine debate
    of whether Appellant’s intoxication left him unable to act willfully or deliberately.”
    The State, in response, contends that Appellant is wrong because the circuit court
    declared that the judgment of acquittal “was not a repudiation of its evidentiary ruling (and
    that evidence was still relevant to the jury’s consideration of the murder charge), but rather
    on the specific statutory language of the hate crime statute . . . ” Moreover, the State cites
    this Court’s previous holding in McIntyre v. State, 
    168 Md. App. 504
    , 524 (2006)
    explaining that a “mistrial is an extreme sanction” that is necessary only “when such
    23
    overwhelming prejudice has occurred that no other remedy will suffice to cure the
    prejudice.”
    We agree with the State. In Barrios v. State, 
    118 Md. App. 384
    , 396-97 (1997)
    (internal citations and quotations omitted), this Court stated:
    [T]he declaration of a mistrial is an extraordinary act which should only be
    granted if necessary to serve the ends of justice. The granting of a motion for
    a mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We will not
    reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial unless the defendant was
    so clearly prejudiced that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion. The
    reviewing court should not determine whether less stringent security
    measures were available to the trial court, but rather whether the measures
    applied were reasonable and whether they posed an unacceptable risk of
    prejudice to the defendant.
    For the reasons previously stated, this Court holds that the Appellant was not so
    clearly prejudiced by the circuit court’s decision to deny the motion for a mistrial, thus the
    circuit court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Thus, this Court declines to reverse
    the circuit court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial.
    Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court judgment.
    JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
    FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
    AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
    APPELLANT.
    24
    Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
    Case No. CT171444X
    REPORTED
    IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
    OF MARYLAND
    No. 1318
    September Term, 2020
    ______________________________________
    SEAN URBANSKI
    v.
    STATE OF MARYLAND
    ______________________________________
    Berger,
    Arthur,
    Reed,
    JJ.
    ______________________________________
    Concurring Opinion of Arthur J.
    ______________________________________
    Filed: December 7, 2022
    I respectfully concur in the judgment. I write separately to explain my reasoning.
    There is no question that Sean Urbanski murdered Lt. Richard Collins: two
    eyewitnesses testified that Urbanski stabbed Lt. Collins, the police found the bloody knife
    in Urbanski’s pocket, and the crime was captured on surveillance video. By the time this
    case went to the jury, the only question was whether Urbanski was guilty of first-degree
    premeditated murder or of second-degree murder. Urbanski introduced a considerable
    amount of evidence tending to show that he was so drunk at the time of the incident that
    he could not have formed the requisite state of mind for first-degree murder.1
    Yet, as the State acknowledges, “[t]he main issue at trial” was not premeditation,
    but the admissibility of the racist memes on Urbanski’s phone and Urbanski’s
    membership in the Alt-Reich Facebook group. The circuit court admitted that evidence
    on the premise that it was relevant to whether Urbanski had committed a hate crime – i.e.,
    to whether Urbanski had murdered Lt. Collins “[b]ecause of” his race, within the
    meaning of § 10-304 of the Criminal Law Article. At the close of all the evidence,
    1
    For example, Urbanski’s friend, Akshay Lingayat, testified that as he was
    leaving a bar at 2:00 a.m., about an hour before the murder, he saw Urbanski, who was
    punching a lightpost and seemed to be extremely intoxicated and unable to express
    anything other than random thoughts. The eyewitnesses heard angry, nonsensical
    screaming from the woods just before Urbanski emerged from them. A toxicologist
    testified that, based on a blood sample taken hours after the arrest, Urbanski’s blood-
    alcohol concentration at the time of the murder was between .17 and .24 grams of alcohol
    per milliliter of blood, or between two and three times the legal limit for driving. After
    stabbing Lt. Collins to death, Urbanski did not leave the scene; instead, he sat down at the
    nearby bus stop, where the eyewitnesses pointed him out to the police. And video
    footage from the police station shows Urbanski singing to himself and urinating into a
    drain in his cell at some point shortly after 4:00 a.m.
    however, the court correctly granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on the hate-
    crimes charge. See generally Ayers v. State, 
    335 Md. 602
    , 637 (1994).2
    Having acquitted Urbanski of the hate-crimes charge, the court was confronted,
    after more than a week of trial, with a problem concerning the considerable amount of
    evidence that it had admitted concerning Urbanski’s racist beliefs. Although the court
    had admitted that (highly inflammatory) evidence in support of the now-defunct hate-
    crimes charge, it reasoned that the evidence was relevant to Urbanski’s “motive” for
    stabbing Lt. Collins or to Urbanski’s “intent.” On that basis, the court denied Urbanski’s
    motion for a mistrial.
    Had I been called upon to make those same decisions, I would have concluded that
    the probative value of the racist memes and of Urbanski’s membership in a neo-Nazi
    organization was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, in a case
    that now involved only a charge of murder. Thus, I would have concluded that that
    2
    The court granted the motion for judgment of acquittal on the premise that
    Urbanski could be guilty of a hate crime only if he had acted solely “because of” race. I
    question whether that interpretation was correct. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton County,
    Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, 
    140 S. Ct. 1731
    , 1741 (2020) (under Title VII of the Civil Rights
    Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination “because of” sex, race, and other enumerated
    factors, an employer is liable if it intentionally fires an employee “based in part” on a
    prohibited factor; “[i]t doesn’t matter if other factors . . . contributed to the decision”). In
    this case, the hate-crimes charge was not flawed because of the presence of motivating
    factors other than race; it was flawed because the State could not show the requisite “tight
    nexus” between Urbanski’s racist views and his criminal conduct. Ayers v. State, 
    335 Md. at 637
    . In contrast to this case, the Ayers Court upheld a hate-crimes conviction
    against a white defendant who assaulted Black victims, where the defendant had said that
    he wanted to go “n****r hunting” because of another racially-charged altercation a few
    days earlier. 
    Id.
     In Ayers, unlike this case, the State established a “tight nexus” between
    the defendant’s conduct in the earlier altercation and the subsequent assault.
    2
    evidence was inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-403. I find it incongruous that the State
    must establish a “tight nexus” between the defendant’s racist attitudes and the
    defendant’s criminal conduct in order to prove that a crime was also a hate crime (Ayers
    v. State, 
    335 Md. at 637
    ), but that the State is relieved of that obligation when it seeks to
    use the defendant’s racial attitudes only to prove that the defendant committed the
    underlying crime itself. I am concerned that the jury may have convicted Urbanski of
    first-degree murder because he is a racist, and not because the State proved the element of
    premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. I find it difficult to believe that the court
    would have admitted the evidence of Urbanski’s racist attitudes had the State not
    overcharged this case by indicting Urbanski for a hate crime that it was ultimately unable
    to prove.
    Having determined that the memes and the evidence of Urbanski’s membership in
    a neo-Nazi organization were inadmissible in a case that involved only a charge of
    murder, I would have declared a mistrial. The mistrial would have enabled the State to
    retry Urbanski for Lt. Collins’s murder and to secure a murder conviction based on the
    evidence of his criminal conduct, rather than on his inflammatory, racist views.
    I concur in the judgment because I recognize that an appellate court must afford an
    enormous degree of deference to the trial court judge’s discretionary determinations
    about whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
    of undue prejudice (see, e.g., Walter v. State, 
    239 Md. App. 168
    , 198-99 (2018)) and
    about whether to grant a mistrial. See, e.g., Nash v. State, 
    439 Md. 53
    , 67-68 (2014).
    Those decisions are not mine; they are entrusted to the trial judge. This Court can reverse
    3
    those decisions only if it finds an abuse of discretion, which is said to occur when no
    reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; when the court acts
    without reference to guiding rules or principles; or when the ruling appears to have been
    made on untenable grounds, or is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    inferences before the court, or constitutes an untenable judicial act that defies reason and
    works an injustice. See, e.g., North v. North, 
    102 Md. App. 1
    , 13-14 (1994). “[A] ruling
    reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the
    appellate court would not have made the same ruling.” 
    Id. at 14
    .
    I cannot see an abuse of discretion in this case. I see difficult decisions by a
    conscientious trial judge. For that reason, I respectfully concur in the judgment.
    4
    The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:
    https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/1318s20cn.pdf