Harey-Jones v. Coronel , 239 Md. App. 145 ( 2018 )

Raychel Harvey-Jones v. Susan Coronel, No. 1232, September Term, 2017. Opinion by
Beachley, J.
COMENSATORY DAMAGES—DAMAGES PRESUMED WHEN
STATEMENT IS DEFAMATORY PER SE AND MADE WITH ACTUAL MALICE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES—MARYLAND COMMON LAW—GRAVITY OF
WRONG—ABILITY TO PAY—DETERRENCE—EXTANT LEGISLATIVE
SANCTIONS—COMPARISON TO OTHER AWARDS—RELATIONSHIP TO
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES—FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE
PROCESS—DEGREE OF REPREHENSIBILITY—RATIO OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES—COMPARABLE SANCTIONS
FOR CONDUCT
Michael Scott began receiving anonymous harassing text messages and e-mails
while dating appellant Raychel Harvey-Jones. Ms. Harvey-Jones told Mr. Scott that the
culprit was Mr. Scott’s ex-girlfriend, appellee Susan Coronel. To show that Ms. Coronel
was the harasser, Ms. Harvey-Jones sent Mr. Scott a text message which purported to show
that Ms. Coronel had been previously charged with harassment as a course of conduct,
electronic mail harassment, and telephone misuse.
It was later revealed that Ms. Coronel had never been charged with any of the above-
stated offenses. Indeed, it was Ms. Harvey-Jones who had been charged with those
offenses. Apparently, Ms. Harvey-Jones had edited her own statement of charges to frame
Ms. Coronel.
When she learned about the fake statement of charges, Ms. Coronel sued Ms.
Harvey-Jones for defamation. Ms. Coronel received a default judgment, and following a
hearing on damages, the circuit court awarded her $10,000 in compensatory damages and
$200,000 in punitive damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones appealed.
Held: Judgment affirmed. Compensatory damages are presumed when statement
is defamatory per se and made with actual malice. Because Ms. Harvey-Jones conceded
that her defamatory statements were made with actual malice, the award of $10,000 in
presumed damages was not error.
Under lens of Maryland common law, punitive damages award was not error. The
$200,000 award was not disproportionate to the gravity of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s wrong. The
court heard reliable evidence that Ms. Harvey-Jones had the ability to pay the award. The
record showed that Ms. Harvey-Jones inferentially continued to post defamatory
statements on the internet following Ms. Harvey-Jones being criminally charged for
defaming Ms. Coronel. The $200,000 award was comparable to other punitive damages
awards in Maryland.
Under federal constitutional law, the punitive damages award was not error. Given
the high degree of reprehensibility of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s conduct, the 20:1 ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages did not offend due process.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-16-008542
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1232
September Term, 2017
RAYCHEL HARVEY-JONES
v.
SUSAN CORONEL
Graeff,
Kehoe,
Beachley,
JJ.
Opinion by Beachley, J.
Filed: November 1, 2018
*Judge Kevin F. Arthur and Judge Matthew J.
Fader did not participate in the Court’s decision
to designate this opinion for publication pursuant
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document " authentic.
to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
2018-11-01
14:37-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Acting Clerk
In August 2016, Susan Coronel, appellee, filed a claim in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County against appellant Raychel Harvey-Jones, alleging defamation per se.
Because Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to timely answer, the court, upon Ms. Coronel’s request,
issued an Order of Default. Following Ms. Harvey-Jones’s unsuccessful motions to stay
and vacate the Order of Default, the court scheduled a hearing to determine damages. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded Ms. Coronel $10,000 in compensatory
damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones timely appealed and
presents three questions for our review:
1. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding $10,000 in compensatory damages?
2. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding $200,000 in punitive damages
where it was grossly excessive and violated due process?
3. Did the Circuit Court err in awarding an excessive monetary judgment
where it was based on unverified admissions by default?
We discern no error, and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
According to the testimony at the hearing on damages, Ms. Coronel dated a man
named Michael Scott “off and on from 2012 to 2015.” The conclusion of that relationship
coincided with Ms. Coronel seeking $110,000 from Mr. Scott in unrelated litigation in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In late 2015, Mr. Scott met and subsequently began
dating Ms. Harvey-Jones.
At some point thereafter, someone began to harass Mr. Scott by anonymously
sending him e-mails and text messages. Believing the culprit was Ms. Coronel, Mr. Scott
hired Steve Brown, a private investigator. In late February 2016, Ms. Harvey-Jones sent
Mr. Scott a text message stating that Ms. Coronel was the person who had been harassing
him, and that Ms. Coronel had also sent over 300 e-mails to the local NBC news affiliate,
resulting in her owing NBC $17,000 in damages. Ms. Harvey-Jones’s text message also
contained a statement of charges which purported to show that Ms. Coronel had been
charged with harassment as a course of conduct, electronic mail harassment, and telephone
misuse. Believing the text message to be true, Mr. Scott forwarded it to his private
investigator. Mr. Brown then met with Baltimore County Police Detective Larry Rogers,
the officer who purportedly authored the charging document, to verify the contents of the
text message.
When Detective Rogers saw the charging document, he suspected it to be
counterfeit. He noted that the charging language, dates, and some of the applicable
criminal codes were missing, and he also knew that he had never charged Ms. Coronel with
harassment. Detective Rogers reviewed the tracking number from the charging document
and determined that the tracking number and harassment charges matched a statement of
charges he had filed in 2015 against Ms. Harvey-Jones. To be certain, Detective Rogers
then searched Ms. Coronel’s criminal record, and verified that she had never been charged
with harassment.
Near the end of March 2016, Mr. Brown informed Mr. Scott that Ms. Harvey-
Jones’s text was inaccurate, that the charging document was fake, and that Ms. Coronel
had neither harassed NBC with 300 e-mails, nor did she ever owe NBC $17,000 in
damages.
2
Detective Rogers arrested Ms. Harvey-Jones in July 2016, and charged her with
forgery of a public document. A local news website, Eye on Annapolis, posted a story
about Ms. Harvey-Jones’s arrest. In the comments section of the article, a person named
“Jane Shims” claimed that “someone [was] lying or misrepresenting” what had transpired
and that Ms. Coronel was “a bitter ex.” Detective Rogers traced the IP address for Jane
Shims, as well as other “people” who had commented on the article. He determined that
the IP addresses for Jane Shims and several other commenters all belonged to a computer
in Ms. Harvey-Jones’s home.
In August 2016, Ms. Coronel filed a complaint against Ms. Harvey-Jones, alleging
defamation per se. The complaint alleged that Ms. Harvey-Jones sent Mr. Scott a text
message which contained a counterfeit charging document, as well as a false story that Ms.
Coronel had sent NBC 300 e-mails and consequently owed $17,000 in damages. When
Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to timely respond to the complaint, Ms. Coronel requested an
Order of Default, which the court entered on October 7, 2016. Ms. Harvey-Jones
subsequently filed an untimely motion to vacate, as well as a motion for reconsideration.
The court denied both motions. Ms. Coronel then requested a hearing to determine
damages.
At the hearing on damages, the circuit court received testimony from Ms. Coronel
and Detective Rogers, as well as excerpts from Mr. Scott’s deposition. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the court awarded Ms. Coronel $10,000 in compensatory damages and
$200,000 in punitive damages. As stated above, Ms. Harvey-Jones timely appealed.
3
DISCUSSION
I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
“When an action has been tried without a jury, we ‘review the trial court’s decision
on both the law and the evidence, upholding factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but
subjecting its legal conclusions to de novo review.’” Thomas v. Capital Med. Mgmt.
Assocs., LLC, 189 Md. App. 439, 453 (2009) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regency
Furniture, Inc., 183 Md. App. 710, 722 (2009)).
Ms. Harvey-Jones contends that the circuit court erred by awarding $10,000 in
compensatory damages because the “evidence was speculative.” Essentially, Ms. Harvey-
Jones argues that the circuit court was required to base its award of compensatory damages
on evidence of actual harm. However, her position is contrary to Maryland law, which
allows for the presumption of damages when a plaintiff establishes that a statement was
defamatory per se and made with actual malice:
[W]hen a plaintiff establishes that a statement was defamatory per se and, by
clear and convincing evidence, demonstrates that it was made with actual
malice, a “presumption of harm to reputation . . . arises from the publication
of words actionable per se. A trier of fact is not constitutionally barred from
awarding damages based on that presumption in [an actual] malice case.”
Hanlon v. Davis, 76 Md. App. 339, 356, 545 A.2d 72 (1988) (citation
omitted). In other words, if the statement is defamatory per se, damages are
presumed when a plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice, by clear and
convincing evidence, even in the absence of proof of harm.
Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App. 483, 549-50 (2000).
We initially note that Ms. Harvey-Jones apparently concedes that her defamatory
statements were made with actual malice. Instead, Ms. Harvey-Jones asserts that there was
insufficient evidence to “presume the damage to justify the compensation awarded here.”
4
Although Ms. Coronel requested $50,000 in compensatory damages, the circuit
court determined that $10,000 was the appropriate award. In our view, the court did not
err. In making this determination, the court stated that:
[T]here isn’t any showing of lost income so I find it difficult to presume
$50,000 worth of damage. So the Court will award $10,000 in compensatory
damages because I think that there probably is good reason to think, more
likely than not, that [Ms. Coronel] diverted time from her business to meet
with the detective and her lawyer, to prepare for this lawsuit and I have little
doubt that she was upset by this turn of events, with having this information
on the internet where it really can’t be erased. So I think $10,000 is a
reasonable and fair amount to award for compensatory damages.
The record reflects that Ms. Harvey-Jones’s actions impacted Ms. Coronel’s
reputation on social media, Yelp, and among her acquaintances. Ms. Coronel testified that
she devoted time to “set the story straight,” which included meetings with her attorney and
with Detective Rogers. In light of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s defamatory statements, made with
actual malice, we see no error in the trial court’s compensatory damages award.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Ms. Harvey-Jones next argues that the circuit court’s award of punitive damages
was “grossly excessive and violated due process.” As an initial matter, we note that the
basis for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument is unclear. Although Ms. Harvey-Jones primarily
cites to United States Supreme Court cases applying federal constitutional law, she also
cites to Bowden v. Caldor, 350 Md. 4 (1998), a case in which the Court of Appeals
discussed excessive punitive damages in the context of Maryland common law. We will
therefore address Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument under both Maryland common law and
federal constitutional law.
5
A. Maryland Common Law
The Court of Appeals has identified nine legal principles that inform a court’s
determination of whether punitive damages are excessive. Khalifa v. Shannon, 404 Md.
107, 142 (2008) (citing Bowden, 350 Md. at 27-41). In setting forth this list of
considerations, the Court clarified that the list was “not intended to be exclusive or all-
encompassing[,]” and that “not all of the above-summarized principles or factors are
pertinent in every case involving court review of punitive damages.” Bowden, 350 Md. at
41. Here, six of the nine Bowden factors are relevant: 1) gravity of the wrong, 2) ability to
pay, 3) deterrence value, 4) legislative sanctions, 5) comparison to other awards, and 6)
relationship to compensatory damages.1 See id. at 27-41. Because the factors limiting an
award of punitive damages are principles of law, we review them de novo. Khalifa, 404
Md. at 142. We shall address each of the six relevant Bowden factors in turn.
1. Gravity of the Wrong
“The most important legal rule in this area, applicable to every punitive damages
award, is that the amount of punitive damages ‘must not be disproportionate to the gravity
of the defendant’s wrong.’” Bowden, 350 Md. at 27 (quoting Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B.,
337 Md. 216, 242 (1995)). “Accordingly, in determining whether the amount of the award
is disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, it is the degree of the
1
The other three Bowden factors are: 1) “other final and satisfied punitive damages
awards against the same defendant for the same conduct”; 2) “[w]hen the total amount of
punitive damages awarded against the defendant is based on separate torts . . . whether the
separate torts all grew out of a single occurrence”; and 3) “[t]he plaintiff’s reasonable costs
and expenses.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 34-36 (1998).
6
heinousness which is important.” Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones, while on probation for criminal cyber harassment,
maliciously engaged in conduct designed to harm and defame Ms. Coronel. Ms. Harvey-
Jones made defamatory statements about Ms. Coronel and falsified a Baltimore County
criminal charging document in an attempt to establish Ms. Coronel’s criminal character.
Even after being charged with criminal forgery, Ms. Harvey-Jones inferentially used
fictitious names to post online comments claiming that the falsified charging document
was genuine. We note that, in awarding punitive damages, the circuit court expressly
considered Ms. Harvey-Jones’s “level of malice.”
In Merritt v. Craig, 130 Md. App. 350 (2000), we considered whether punitive
damages of $150,000 were excessive when compared with the actions of Craig, a home
seller who willfully misrepresented the condition of the home’s water system, and then
interfered with and diverted the water system following inspection and sale of the property.
We held that “Craig’s conduct toward appellants was reprehensible and fully warranted
punitive damages[,]” and further held that $150,000 was not disproportionate to the harm
caused by Craig’s actions. Id. at 371-72.
Moreover, although it is difficult to quantify the extent of the harm caused by Ms.
Harvey-Jones’s conduct, the potential criminal penalties for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s actions
substantiate the seriousness of her conduct. Under Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) § 8-
605(b) of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”), the counterfeiting of a public document is
classified as a felony and is punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of two years and
7
a maximum of ten years. Considering the nature of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s conduct, which in
our view was more serious than the conduct at issue in Merritt, a punitive damages award
of $200,000 is not “disproportionate to the gravity of [appellant’s] wrong.” Bowden, 350
Md. at 27.
2. Ability to Pay
“A second very important principle, long recognized under Maryland law, is that
the amount of punitive damages ‘should not be disproportionate to . . . the defendant’s
ability to pay.’” Bowden, 350 Md. at 28 (quoting Ellerin, 337 Md. at 242). In Ms. Harvey-
Jones’s view, the court’s punitive damages award was unjust because no “reliable
evidence” on her ability to pay was presented at the “one-sided” hearing on damages. We
disagree.
We initially note that the Court of Appeals has stated that “[s]ound reasoning
supports our view that a plaintiff has no obligation to establish a defendant’s ability to pay
punitive damages.” Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 275
(2004) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:
Compelling a plaintiff seeking punitive damages to present evidence of a
defendant’s financial condition could, on the one hand, require a plaintiff
with limited financial resources to wage a complicated discovery campaign
against a monetarily sated defendant. On the other hand, it would license the
plaintiff to conduct extensive pre-trial discovery of the defendant’s finances
to support a measure of damages that may never be awarded. Not only could
the latter result in a severe invasion of the defendant’s privacy, but it could
also unnecessarily cost the defendant a great deal of time and money to
compile all of its financial information.
Id. at 275-76. Our appellate courts have upheld punitive damages awards in several cases
similar to the instant case, where the defendants apparently elected not to present
8
documentation of their assets or net worth, but where the record suggested that they had
the ability to pay. See Merritt, 130 Md. App. at 372 (holding that $150,000 was not
disproportionate to defendant school teacher’s ability to pay where defendant owned a
home and a partnership interest in a resort area in Garrett County, even though there was
no evidence of the value of these interests); Darcars, 379 Md. at 278 (holding that plaintiff
had no obligation to establish that defendant car dealership had the ability to pay a $25,000
award of punitive damages); Khalifa, 404 Md. at 144-45 (holding that punitive damages of
$2,000,000 were not disproportionate to defendants’ ability to pay where plaintiff testified
that defendants owned multiple properties in various parts of the world, and holding that
plaintiff was not required to prove that the properties were titled in defendants’ names or
that defendants had the ability to pay).
Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to take advantage of multiple opportunities to present
evidence regarding her assets or her ability to pay punitive damages. Not only did Ms.
Harvey-Jones fail to respond to Ms. Coronel’s request for admissions, she also failed to
appear at her deposition or at the hearing on damages before the circuit court. Although
Ms. Harvey-Jones declined to provide any information about her finances, her deemed
admissions resulting from her failure to object to Ms. Coronel’s requests for admissions
pursuant to Rule 2-424 permitted the court to consider that her net worth exceeded
$1,000,000. In addition, there was evidence that, following the denial of Ms. Harvey-
Jones’s motion to vacate the order of default, she had transferred an unencumbered
property worth over $200,000 to her sibling for no consideration.
9
In light of the record and relevant case law, we reject Ms. Harvey-Jones’s argument
that the punitive damages award must be vacated because there was no “reliable evidence”
that she had the ability to pay.2
3. Deterrence Value
“Since one of the purposes of punitive damages is to deter the defendant from
engaging in the type of conduct forming the basis for the award, the deterrence value of
the amount awarded by the jury, under all of the circumstances of the case, is relevant.”
Bowden, 350 Md. at 29. The Bowden Court further stated that,
A defendant’s taking of remedial or corrective action, promptly after
the misconduct giving rise to the award of punitive damages, obviously
should be a mitigating factor. On the other hand, repeated or frequent
misconduct of the same nature, misconduct of long duration, attempts to
conceal or cover-up the misconduct, failure to take corrective action, and
similar circumstances, support the deterrence value of a significant award.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones failed to take any corrective action following her
misconduct, and inferentially continued to post false comments under fake names in
response to an online news article even after she was criminally charged with forgery of a
public document. In short, the deterrence value of a punitive damages award is a relevant
consideration under the circumstances of this case.
2
We recognize, however, that “merely because a defendant may be able to pay a
very large award of punitive damages, without jeopardizing the defendant’s financial
position, does not justify an award which is disproportionate to the heinousness of the
defendant’s conduct.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 28.
10
4. Legislative Sanctions
“[I]n determining whether an award of punitive damages is proportionate to the
defendant's misconduct, a court may consider, inter alia, the legislative policy reflected in
statutes setting criminal fines.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 30 (quoting Ellerin, 337 Md. at 242-
43 n.13). Comparison to criminal fines is not pertinent in all cases.
Under some circumstances, the maximum criminal fine for
comparable conduct should not be given very much weight in reviewing a
punitive damages award for excessiveness. There are many serious criminal
offenses chiefly aimed at individuals, rather than corporate entities, where
the principal sanction is imprisonment, and the monetary penalty is relatively
small. In this situation, the criminal fine for similar misconduct is not very
pertinent in reviewing an award of punitive damages.
Id. at 31. As discussed above, a person convicted of counterfeiting a public document
under CR § 8-605 is subject only to a term of imprisonment; no fine or other monetary
penalty is prescribed. Because the legislature elected not to impose a monetary fine for
this criminal offense, the lack of a monetary penalty is of minimal relevance in our analysis.
5. Comparison to Other Awards
“Another appropriate consideration in judicially reviewing an award of punitive
damages is to compare the award with other final punitive damages awards in the
jurisdiction, and particularly with awards in somewhat comparable cases.” Bowden, 350
Md. at 31. The Bowden Court summarized the cases in which it had upheld awards of
punitive damages:
Apparently the largest award of punitive damages which has ever been
upheld by this Court was $700,000, and in that case the size of the award was
not an issue before this Court. Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md.
615, 617–618, 569 A.2d 693, 694–695 (1990). The next ten highest awards
of punitive damages upheld by us seem to be as follows: $107,875 (St. Luke
11
Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990)); $100,000 each for two
plaintiffs, based on two separate acts of fraud (Nails v. S. & R., 334 Md. 398,
639 A.2d 660 (1994)); $82,000 (Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 647 A.2d
429 (1994)); $50,000 (Macklin v. Logan, 334 Md. 287, 639 A.2d 112
(1994)); $40,000 (Embrey v. Holly, supra, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966);
$36,000 (Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392
(1971)); $35,000 (General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d
16 (1977)); $30,000 (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261
A.2d 731 (1970)); $25,000 (Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275
Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975)); $25,000 (American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229
Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962)). Moreover, in most of these cases no argument
was made that the punitive awards were excessive.
Id. at 32-33. Notably, the Court recognized that the awards in the older cases would be
larger in terms of present dollars if adjusted for inflation. Id.
Although the court’s award of $200,000 in punitive damages here appears to be
significantly larger than the awards summarized by the Court in Bowden, we note that those
awards become comparable once they are adjusted for inflation. For example, the punitive
damages award of $105,875 against a single party in St. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 341
(defamation case) equates to $209,787.91 today; the punitive damages award of $35,000
in Embrey, 293 Md. at 132 (defamation case) equates to $93,495.93 today; the punitive
damages award of $30,000 in Great Atl., 256 Md. at 645 (assault and battery, slander, and
false imprisonment case) equates to $199,293.95 today; and the $25,000 punitive damages
award in Am. Stores, 229 Md. at 7 (slander case) would be $208,972.68 in today’s dollars.3
Put simply, the punitive damages award of $200,000 in 2018 for Ms. Harvey-Jones’s
3
All inflation-adjusted calculations were performed with the Consumer Price Index
(“CPI”) Inflation Calculator from the date (month and year) of opinion publication to
September 2018, the most recent date for available data. U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of
Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
12
defamatory conduct is not significantly larger than awards that have been upheld in earlier
defamation cases.
6. Relationship to Compensatory Damages
“Whether a punitive damages award bears a reasonable relationship to the
compensatory damages awarded in the case . . . should be a consideration when a court
reviews an award of punitive damages for excessiveness.” Bowden, 350 Md. at 39. This
factor is not dispositive, however, as the Bowden Court noted that:
[T]here are situations in which little or no consideration should be given to
the relationship which punitive damages awards bear to compensatory
damages awards. For example, where the defendant engages in extremely
heinous conduct having great potential for harm, but because of fortuitous
circumstances the plaintiff does not suffer a great deal of compensatory
harm, the amount of the compensatory damages award furnishes a poor guide
to the amount of an appropriate punitive damages award.
Id. at 40; see also Shabazz v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 163 Md. App. 602, 639-41 (2005)
(noting that nominal compensatory damages may support an award for punitive damages,
and summarizing cases in which punitive damages were upheld even though no actual
damages were proven); cf. Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md. App. 403, 424-25 (2000)
(stating that case involving multi-million dollar compensatory award for purely economic
loss was not one in which the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages
was an important factor, and holding that punitive damages approximately equal to
compensatory award was excessive).
We are convinced that this case presents one of those situations contemplated by the
Bowden Court where the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages is
13
outweighed by other factors such as the gravity of the wrong and the need for deterrence.4
Here, Ms. Harvey-Jones orchestrated, and perpetuated, a defamatory attack on Ms.
Coronel’s character. Although Ms. Coronel did not sustain any physical injury, Ms.
Harvey-Jones’s statements falsely suggested that Ms. Coronel was involved in criminal
conduct. Our review of punitive damages awards in similar cases supports our conclusion
that the circuit court’s award of $200,000 in punitive damages was not excessive under
Maryland law. See, e.g., Am. Stores, 229 Md. 5 (upholding punitive damages of $25,000
in slander case where plaintiff was accused of stealing $117 from a grocery store and where
there was no proof plaintiff had suffered any special damages).
Accordingly, the punitive damages award in this case comports with Maryland
common law.
B. Federal Constitutional Law
Although technically a distinct analysis, the determination of whether a punitive
damages award violates due process under federal constitutional law is largely subsumed
by the Bowden factors. In Gore, the United States Supreme Court set forth three guideposts
to aid courts in determining whether a punitive damages award violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 1) degree of reprehensibility, 2) ratio [between
punitive damages and actual harm], and 3) sanctions for comparable misconduct. 517 U.S.
4
We are also cognizant that the purpose of punitive damages is not to recompense
the victim, but rather “to punish the wrongdoer and to deter such conduct by the wrongdoer
or others in the future.” Shabazz, 163 Md. App. at 638-39 (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden,
330 Md. 632, 661 (1993)).
14
at 574-85. Notably, these guideposts are substantively identical to some of the factors
identified by the Court of Appeals in Bowden, 350 Md. at 27-41. Like the Maryland
common law analysis, the federal constitutional analysis provides for de novo review of an
allegedly excessive punitive damages award. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001). Although we have substantially discussed these factors above,
we will briefly address each of the guideposts articulated by the Supreme Court in Gore.
1. Degree of Reprehensibility
“Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
“This principle reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others. Thus, we have said that ‘nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by
violence or the threat of violence.’” Id. at 575-76 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
292-93 (1983)). The Supreme Court further stated that, “Similarly, ‘trickery and deceit’
are more reprehensible than negligence.” Id. at 576 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)) (internal citation omitted). Because the
considerations inherent in this factor are comparable to those associated with the Bowden
factor for “gravity of the wrong,” our earlier analysis of that factor is also applicable here.
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
2. Ratio
“The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or
excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”
Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. This guidepost is linked to the Bowden factor for “relationship to
15
compensatory damages.” See discussion supra Part II.A.6. Although the Supreme Court
has declined to impose “a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed[,]” the Supreme Court noted that
Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate,
however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process. In Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we
concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety. 499 U.S., at 23–24, 111 S. Ct. 1032. We cited that 4–to–1 ratio
again in Gore. 517 U.S., at 581, 116 S. Ct. 1589. . . . While these ratios are
not binding, they are instructive. . . .
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive
damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously
upheld may comport with due process where “a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” Ibid.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). The Supreme Court
further noted that “a higher ratio might be necessary where ‘the injury is hard to detect or
the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.’” Id.
(quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). In short, although the Supreme Court observed that a
single-digit ratio between compensatory and punitive damages generally satisfies due
process, higher ratios may pass constitutional muster when the compensatory or economic
damages are low, when the injury is hard to detect, or when the value of noneconomic harm
is difficult to determine. Id.
We hold that the 20 to 1 ratio here represents the type of case envisioned by the
Supreme Court that would satisfy due process. In defamation cases, actual harm is often
difficult to prove, resulting in lower compensatory damages awards. Additionally, it can
be challenging to detect the injury and determine the value of noneconomic harm. In these
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situations, a larger punitive damages award may be constitutionally sustainable,
particularly as the degree of reprehensibility increases. Accordingly, the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages here satisfies constitutional due process.
3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
“Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of excessiveness.”
Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. This factor loosely parallels the Bowden factor for “legislative
sanctions,” which, as noted above, allows a court to consider the legislative policy reflected
by statutory criminal fines. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. In comparison, the Supreme
Court discussed the importance of examining legislative sanctions such as civil fines or
imprisonment. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583-84. As we have noted, counterfeiting a public
document is a felony under Maryland law carrying a penalty of two to ten years’
imprisonment. Given the seriousness of Ms. Harvey-Jones’s misconduct, we decline to
disturb the circuit court’s award of punitive damages under this factor. See discussion
supra Part II.A.4.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s punitive damages award was not
excessive under federal constitutional law.5
5
We express no opinion as to whether the punitive damages award violates Article
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. That argument was neither briefed nor argued
by the parties.
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III. EQUITY DEMANDS
In the final section of her appellate brief, Ms. Harvey-Jones argues that the circuit
court’s judgment should be vacated “because the grossly excessive amount was based on
unreliable evidence” and because “[appellant’s] ability to pay is relevant in determining
whether an award of punitive damages is excessive.” However, these contentions have
already been addressed above in our discussion of the Bowden factor for “ability to pay.”
See discussion supra Part II.A.2. We therefore disagree with Ms. Harvey-Jones’s
contention that the circuit court’s judgment was “unjust.”
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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