Phillips v. Chang ( 2023 )

Solon Phillips v. Alyssa Chang, et al., No. 482, September Term, 2022. Opinion by
Harrell, J.
ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SERVICES – POWER TO REGULATE AND
CONTROL IN GENERAL
ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SERVICES – POWER TO ADMIT AND LICENSE
COURTS – EXCLUSIVE OR CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Maryland possesses exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law. That includes not only the decision whether to admit an applicant, but also the
process by which he or she qualifies for admission. A local character committee’s
examination of an applicant is a part of that process. Consequently, any alleged tortious
conduct that occurs as part of that examination is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to address. Appellant could not circumvent that exclusive jurisdiction by
suing the members of a local character committee personally in a circuit court for the
allegedly tortious conduct of not recommending his admission to the Bar of Maryland. The
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County correctly ruled it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No.: CAL2116864
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*
No. 482
September Term, 2022
______________________________________
SOLON PHILLIPS
v.
ALYSSA CHANG, ET AL.
______________________________________
Friedman,
Albright,
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
2023-03-28 ______________________________________
15:11-04:00
Gregory Hilton, Clerk Filed: March 28, 2023
*At the 8 November 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the
Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on 14 December 2022.
Volunteer Maryland attorneys, serving on local character committees, play an
important role in vetting Maryland Bar applicants. Unfortunately, if an ultimately
unsuccessful applicant takes umbrage at the local character committee’s handling of, and
recommendation regarding, his or her application, the applicant might seek legal redress
against the local character committee member or members. Although there exists strong
indication to believe that such a civil claim brought in a circuit court lacked a jurisdictional
basis to proceed, we could find no reported Maryland case holding explicitly that local
character committee members were immune from such an action.1 This case fills that void.
BACKGROUND
Solon Phillips, appellant, applied for admission to the Bar of Maryland 3 times in
the last 15 years. He withdrew voluntarily his first application. The Supreme Court of
Maryland2 denied his second because he “failed to meet his burden of proving that he
possesses the good moral character and fitness for the practice of law.” In re Phillips, 457
Md. 113, 131 (2017). The present case flows from his third application. Although Phillips
withdrew his latest application before resolution of this appeal, the record reflects that he
1
There are, however, two unreported federal-court opinions, both of which reach
the same conclusion we do here: that such cases are outside their jurisdiction. See Martin
v. Court of Appeals of Md., No. 88-1749, 1989 WL 21402, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 1989);
Sibley v. Hergenroeder, Civil Action No. DKC 2006-1222, 2006 WL 3354137, at *3-5
(D. Md. Nov. 17, 2006).
2
On 14 December 2022, the name of the Court of Appeals was changed to the
Supreme Court of Maryland.
at least believed it would fail for the same reason the Supreme Court denied his second
application.3
Acting on this belief, Phillips sued Alyssa Chang, Brent Ahalt, and Arthur Horne,
appellees and volunteer members of the Character Committee for the Fourth Appellate
Judicial Circuit (collectively, “the Committee Members”), in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County. In a complaint that begins by analogizing the Committee Members to
Adolf Hitler and southern slave owners, Phillips alleged that they committed a tortious act
against him when they found that he “failed to meet his burden that he presently possesses
the requisite moral character and fitness to practice law in Maryland.”
Phillips’s complaint advanced two counts. The first, titled “Violation of Md Rule
Attorneys, 19-204, Character Review,” alleged that the Committee Members “violated”
the provisions outlined in Maryland Rule 19-204(a). It also alleged that the Committee
Members’ “findings shock the conscience—literally because there is no record or pattern
of unscrupulous behavior, but on the contrary, the record is filled with patterns spanning
over 30 years of [Phillips] consistently helping men, women, and children—even as an
attorney.”
The second count, titled “Gross Negligence,” alleged that the Committee Members
“failed to perform a manifest duty in a total disregard to [Phillips’s] life” when, “[w]ith a
3
With limited exception, “the proceedings before . . . a Character Committee, and
the Board [of Law Examiners], including related papers, evidence, and information, are
confidential and shall not be open to public inspection or subject to court process or
compulsory disclosure.” Md. Rule 19-105(a). The facts pertaining to Phillips’s application
are mined from his circuit court complaint in the present case.
2
straight moral face, they issued an immoral finding that has absolutely no connection to
the record before them or reality.” (Emphasis in original.) Both counts complain only of
matters related to the Committee Members’ roles as members of the character committee
and their acts as such related to Phillips’s Bar application.
Phillips did not request any specific relief in his complaint. Instead, he “le[ft] it to
the [circuit court] to decide how [the Committee Members] should recompense [him] for
the damages they have caused him.”
The Committee Members moved to dismiss Phillips’s complaint on three grounds:
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted; and (3) judicial immunity. After supplemental briefing and a hearing, the circuit
court granted the Committee Members’ motion because each ground independently
justified dismissal. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a circuit court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Unger v. Berger, 214 Md. App. 426, 432 (2013). Dismissal on
this ground is proper when “the facts and allegations [in the complaint] establish a lack of
subject[-]matter jurisdiction.” Id.The Supreme Court of Maryland has “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of,
and admission to, the practice of law.” In re Application of Kimmer, 392 Md. 251, 269
(2006). “That exclusivity has existed unabated and unassailed since 1898.” Id. at 278. In
the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction, the Court adopted also rules governing the
necessary standards and procedures for admission to the Bar of Maryland. Among these
3
are procedures related to examining each applicant’s character. Md. Rules 19-204, 19-205.
As part of those procedures, the Court appoints a State Board of Law Examiners and a
character committee for each state appellate circuit to review each applicant’s character.
Md. Rules 19-102, 19-103.
When character-related issues arise, they are examined separately by the Supreme
Court, the applicable character committee, and the Board. A committee’s examination of
an applicant’s character is governed, in part, by Rule 19-204(a):
(a) Investigation and Report of Character Committee.
(1) On receipt of a completed character questionnaire forwarded by the Board
pursuant to Rule 19-205(d), the Character Committee, in accordance with
procedural guidelines established by Board Rule, shall (A) interview the
applicant (B) consider the facts stated in the character questionnaire and the
submissions made by the applicant’s references, and make any further
investigation it finds necessary or desirable, which may include verification
of facts asserted by the applicant or the applicant’s references, (C) evaluate
the applicant’s character and fitness for the practice of law, and (D) transmit
to the Board a report of its investigation and a recommendation as to the
approval or denial of the application for admission.
(2) If the Committee concludes that there may be grounds for recommending
denial of the application, it shall notify the applicant in writing and schedule
a hearing. The hearing shall be recorded verbatim. The applicant shall have
the right to testify, to present other testimony and evidence, and to be
represented by an attorney. The Committee shall prepare a report and
recommendation setting forth findings of fact on which the recommendation
is based and a statement supporting the conclusion. A transcript of the
hearing shall be transmitted by the Committee to the Board along with the
Committee’s report. The Committee shall transmit a copy of its report to the
applicant, and a copy of the hearing transcript shall be furnished to the
applicant upon payment of reasonable costs.
Md. Rule 19-204(a).
4
Acting under this Rule, local character committees provide an invaluable service to
the Bar of Maryland and public at large. No duty ranks higher than the obligation to ensure
that applicants “possess the requisite moral character fitness to conduct the affairs of others
both in and out of court.” Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 689 (1978). And “[n]o
attribute in a lawyer is more important than good moral character; indeed, it is absolutely
essential to the preservation of our legal system and the integrity of the courts.” Id. Thus,
a committee’s report and recommendation are indispensable parts of the bar-admission
process. Consequently, disputes arising from the formulation of a committee’s report and
recommendation are solely within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Yet, Phillips insists that his suit falls outside this exclusive jurisdiction because it
“is not over ‘the bar[-]admission process’” itself. He contends, “[h]is complaint concerns
gross negligence, intentional tortious acts, and violations of Maryland law.” Phillips cannot
elude, however, the fact that the allegedly tortious acts he pleads occurred as part of the
bar-admission process. That alone places this case squarely within the Supreme Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction. See Kimmer, 392 Md. at 278.
As the circuit court recognized correctly, In re Application of Kimmer controls
here.4 The issue in Kimmer was whether the circuit court possessed subject-matter
jurisdiction to order an applicant be granted accommodation under the Americans with
Disability Act when taking the bar exam. Id. at 254-55. The substance of the applicant’s
4
The defendants in Kimmer sought a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
directed to the State Board of Law Examiners. Kimmer, 392 Md. at 259-60. The suit did
not name as defendants or implicate the duties of any local character committee members.
5
argument there is the same as Phillips’s—his case was not about the bar-admission process,
but rather “he merely used [an] appropriate legal process to obtain ‘valid enforcement of
his [legal] rights[.]’” Id. at 270. The Supreme Court rebuffed this argument. The Court
observed that permitting circuit courts to decide any issue “in the bar[-]admission context,
. . . would be participating in the undermining of [its] jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 278. It refused
explicitly to do so. Id.To avoid the same result, Phillips attempts to distinguish this case from Kimmer by
arguing that the captions are different. This superficial distinction is wholly unpersuasive.
See Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Malone, 477 Md. 225, 271 n.16 (2022) (“[T]he
nature of a filing is determined by its substance, rather than its caption.”). Kimmer holds
that the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction covers not only the decision whether to
admit an applicant, but also the process by which he or she may qualify for admission.
Kimmer, 392 Md. at 269. That process includes a character committee’s examination. See
Md. Rules 19-204, 19-205. It follows, then, that any alleged tortious conduct that occurs
as part of that examination is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See
Kimmer, 392 Md. at 278.
In essence, the applicant in Kimmer and Phillips both sought to use other laws—the
ADA there, and state tort law here—as a Trojan horse to smuggle their complaints about
bar-admission-related matters into a circuit court. The Supreme Court stated clearly that it
has “no intention of relinquishing [its jurisdiction] to any degree or extent.” Id. The circuit
court here recognized correctly that allowing an applicant to sue personally the members
of a local character committee for acts performed as part of that role would be participating
6
in the undermining of the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. It did not err by refusing
to do so.5
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
5
Because we affirm based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we need not
address the remaining grounds for the circuit court’s ruling. See Forster v. State, Off. of
Pub. Def., 426 Md. 565, 580-81 (2012).
7