In re Children of Christopher S. , 2019 ME 31 ( 2019 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 31 Docket: Som-18-376
Submitted
On Briefs: February 20, 2019
Decided: February 28, 2019
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF CHRISTOPHER S.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Christopher S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Skowhegan, Benson, J.) terminating his parental rights to two of his children1
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2018).2 He challenges
the court’s determination that termination of his parental rights provides the
children with “permanency” and is in the children’s best interests. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). We affirm the judgment.
1 The father has an older child who was the subject of a separate child protection proceeding. He
also has two other children who are now adults.
2 The Department sought termination of the father’s rights only. The children have been in the
sole custody of the mother since this action was commenced.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts, which are supported by competent record
evidence, are drawn from the court’s findings and the procedural record. See
In re Children of Corey W., 2019 ME 4, ¶ 2, --- A.3d ---.
[¶3] On December 4, 2017, the Department of Health and Human
Services filed a petition for a child protection order and preliminary protection
order, requesting that the court place the children in the sole custody of the
mother.3 See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032, 4034(1) (2018). The petition alleged that
between April of 2009 and January of 2016 the Department received many
reports of concerns that the father had been physically and emotionally abusive
and that the parents were not meeting the children’s medical, educational,
dental, and mental health needs. The court (Benson, J.) issued a preliminary
protection order and placed the children in the custody of the mother.
[¶4] In January of 2018, the court entered an agreed jeopardy order
against the father based on “serious abuse and neglect [of the children], as
3 Although not contained in its findings, the court was presented with testimony that in 2016,
prior to the commencement of this action, the Department instituted a “safety plan” with the mother,
under which she agreed to temporarily move with the children to a friend’s home while the
Department attempted to assist the father in stabilizing his mental health. After the father agreed to
take medication and began to participate in medication management, the mother and the children
returned to the family home. In late 2017, however, the father threatened to assault the mother, and
the mother and the children, with assistance from the Department, moved out of state.
3
evidenced by the threat of serious harm posed by the father’s unmanaged
mental health problems and domestic violence, as well as his deprivation of
adequate food, clothing, shelter, supervision, care, and education.” See
22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2018). Although the court also found jeopardy as to the
mother based on past concerns about her parenting capabilities and the risks
posed by the father, the court ordered that the children remain in her custody.
The jeopardy order required the father to participate in a court-ordered
diagnostic evaluation,4 dialectical behavior therapy, and medication
management.
[¶5] Several months later, the father moved for the court to order the
mother to allow him to have contact with the children. After a contested
hearing, the court denied the motion, and shortly thereafter the Department
petitioned for termination of his parental rights. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).
In August of 2018, the court held a hearing on the petition, where the mother,
two departmental caseworkers, and the paternal grandmother testified. The
father chose not to testify. The court subsequently entered a judgment
4 At the termination hearing, the court was presented with evidence that in February of 2018 the
father underwent the evaluation. The psychologist who conducted the examination diagnosed the
father with antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance use disorder, and concluded that the
father would be “very unlikely” to “provide a safe and stable environment for a child even in a highly
structured and supportive environment” and that the father’s “prognosis for treatment compliance
and change is poor.”
4
terminating the father’s parental rights. In the judgment, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the father was unwilling or unable to protect
the children from jeopardy and was unwilling or unable to take responsibility
for the children, and that these circumstances were unlikely to change within a
time that is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; and that he had
failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv). The court also determined that
termination of the father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
[¶6] The court made the following factual findings, all of which are
supported by competent record evidence. See In re Child of Jonathan D.,
2019 ME 14, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---.
Between this case and a prior one, the Department has been
making every effort to work with [the father] for years. It has
offered him access to all the tools he could possibly have required
to rehabilitate and reunify, but, for whatever reason, he has refused
to avail himself of the services offered. Finally, he has run out of
time to begin trying in time to meet his children’s need for
permanence and stability.
. . . The Department has waited patiently for [the father] to
avail himself of services, any services, and only now, at the eleventh
hour, does he appear to be making a half-hearted effort to do so.
There is nothing more the Department can do in discharging its
responsibilities under Title 22 when a parent like [the father]
5
whose serious, unmanaged mental health problems threaten child
safety simply won’t participate.
To date, the Department’s repeated referrals of [the father]
to rehabilitative services have come to nothing. The last counselor
he actually participated with quit out of fear for her own safety
earlier this year after he made chilling remarks about “body bags,”
and it has been months since he participated in any of the services
outlined in the agreed Jeopardy Order. Given that background, the
Court simply cannot seriously conclude that there is any real
likelihood that he will follow through with the counseling that he
has not even started yet. . . . Given his staunch refusal to engage in
services, it is unsurprising that his mental health status appears to
have worsened throughout the life of this case.
. . . .
. . . [T]he last time [the father] testified, [] he did so in a hostile
and frightening manner that strongly suggested he was “about to
attack the people around him.” . . . [H]e was not then “engaged in
any of the required or recommended services . . . .” He has made
but the faintest of gestures toward that end since that time, and as
the guardian ad litem has reported he has continued intermittently
to publish threatening commentary on Facebook. The Court found
after his last testimony that “until he stabilizes, contact between
the father and the children would subject them to an unacceptable
level of risk to their wellbeing and would, therefore, be contrary to
the best interests.” That finding is just as accurate today as when it
was made, and it is not possible on this record to envision a time in
the future when it would be inaccurate.
. . . .
. . . [T]he court finds (again by clear and convincing evidence)
that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of both
children. As their guardian ad litem has recommended, they need
safety, permanence, and stability.
6
. . . [The father] must be legally excised from this family to
keep the children safe and afford them permanency. Without the
treatment he needs, he represents a constant and extreme threat
to their welfare. He is highly unlikely to successfully complete such
treatment in the foreseeable future, and [the children] have already
been subjected to far too much of his dangerous combustibility.
The court ultimately ordered that the children remain in the mother’s custody
but that the father’s parental rights would be terminated. The father filed a
timely appeal from the judgment. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2018); M.R.
App. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] The father does not challenge the court’s factual findings or its
determination of parental unfitness, but argues only that the court erred by
concluding that termination of his parental rights will provide the children with
“permanency” and is in their best interests. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
“We review the court’s factual findings related to the child’s best interest for
clear error, and its ultimate conclusion regarding the child’s best interest for an
abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through
the trial court’s lens.” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 12, 187 A.3d 1 (alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
[¶8] Once a court determines that a parent is unfit, it must determine
whether termination of the parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See
7
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Child of Domenick B., 2018 ME 158, ¶ 9, 197
A.3d 1076. In doing so, the court is required to consider “the needs of the child,
including the child’s age, the child’s attachments to relevant persons, periods of
attachments and separation, the child’s ability to integrate into a substitute
placement or back into the parent’s home and the child’s physical and
emotional needs.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2018); see also In re Child of
Mercedes D., 2018 ME 149, ¶ 21, 196 A.3d 888. “Also relevant to the best
interests determination is the harm the children may suffer if the parent’s
rights are not terminated, as well as the children’s need for permanence and
stability.” Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 49, 175 A.3d 639. Therefore,
even though parental unfitness and a child’s best interest are separate elements
of a termination case, the court’s findings that bear on parental unfitness may
also be relevant to the question of whether termination is in the child’s best
interest. In re Ashley A., 679 A.2d 86, 89 (Me. 1996).
[¶9] Contrary to the father’s assertion, the court was presented with
considerable evidence regarding the children’s best interests; much of that
evidence was also probative on the issue of the father’s parental unfitness. As
is reflected in the court’s supported findings, the record includes evidence that
the father has refused to accept and participate in services that would give him
8
the opportunity to rehabilitate and reunify with his children, and there is no
reason to expect that he will become receptive to meaningful intervention; that,
by all accounts, as a result of his unwillingness to participate in services, his
mental health has deteriorated during the pendency of this case; that his
conduct toward those around him is volatile, unpredictable, vindictive, and
threatening—even in a courtroom setting; and that the prognosis for treatment
compliance and improvement in his mental health is poor. These and other
findings, which are germane to the assertion that he is parentally unfit, also
provide support for the court’s conclusion that the risks posed by the father and
his refusal to meaningfully participate in services constitute “a constant and
extreme threat” to the welfare of the children, who “have already been
subjected to far too much of his dangerous combustibility.” In short, the
evidence provided the court with considerable support for the conclusion that
termination of the father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
[¶10] Finally, the father argues that termination of his parental rights is
not necessary to promote the children’s best interests because the children
could remain in the mother’s care and custody without terminating his parental
rights and that the court therefore should have issued a parental rights and
responsibilities order rather than a termination order. See 22 M.R.S.
9
§ 4036(1-A) (2018). The father’s contention, however, does not account for the
continuing and escalating risk that the court found he poses to the children
because of his choice not to engage in services and interventions that would
have given him the opportunity to try to become a safe and nurturing parent.
Further, although the court acknowledged that it may not be altogether
common to terminate one parent’s rights to a child while preserving the other
parent’s parental rights, the court concluded that the circumstances of this case
warranted that outcome. Given the evidence presented to the court, this
determination was not erroneous. See In re Child of Emily K., 2018 ME 79, ¶ 10,
187 A.3d 595 (affirming a judgment terminating the parental rights of one
parent while preserving the parental rights of the other parent); In re Child of
Jonathan D., 2019 ME 14, ¶¶ 1 n.1, 7, --- A.3d --- (same).
[¶11] For these reasons, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in
determining that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H.,
2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
10
Wayne Doane, Esq., Exeter, for appellant Father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Skowhegan District Court docket number PC-2017-60
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY