In re James C. , 2018 ME 9 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 9Docket: And-17-349
Submitted
On Briefs: January 11, 2018
Decided: January 23, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE JAMES C.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of James C. III appeals from a judgment of the District
Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) terminating his parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2017).1 He argues that the court
erred by finding by clear and convincing evidence that he is unfit as a parent
pursuant to section 4055(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iv), and that it abused its
discretion by determining that termination of his parental rights now is in the
child’s best interest. The court’s findings that he is unfit as a parent have
support from competent evidence in the record, and the court acted well within
its discretion by determining that termination of the father’s parental rights is
in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm.
1 The court terminated the mother’s parental rights in the same judgment, and she did not appeal.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The court’s findings concerning the father’s unfitness as a parent
and its determination of the child’s best interest were grounded in the following
findings of fact from the termination hearing:
As for the father, the jeopardy order identified “risks of
serious physical harm, serious emotional harm and/or serious
neglect due to the father’s extensive mental health issues, patterns
of domestic violence, impulse control issues, and anger
management issues.”
. . . .
In describing the incident that caused the mother to seek a
temporary protection from abuse order against the father, the
father blames the mother for the fact that he “love-tapped her” on
the back of the head because “she pushed me to it. . . .”
The father described his history of “snapping” in his
relationship with the child’s mother, with his own mother, and with
former job supervisors. He also complains about service providers
“not doing their job.” In the father’s view, [the local hospital]
messed up medical care for [the child], necessitating the baby’s
move to [a specialized hospital in] Boston. In the father’s view, [his
initial] case management [provider] didn’t do its job, setting up
med[ication] management services for him. The [Court Ordered
Diagnostic Evaluation (CODE)] evaluator failed to work with him,
DHHS failed to make referrals for him and failed to return his calls,
the visit supervisor failed to get in touch with him, the driver didn’t
do his job, etc.
. . . [T]he father has developed no insight and has accepted no
responsibility for the jeopardy he poses to the child. His testimony
was one of the most offensive examples of domestic violence
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blaming, denying, justifying, and minimizing that the Court has
ever heard. . . .
The father is unable to manage his own finances. He
acknowledges a history of impulsive spending. His father is his
representative payee for Social Security. . . .
At the time of trial, the father had only recently begun the
process of setting up case management through the hospital. He
was also looking for his own place, separate from his alcoholic
mother. The visit supervisor found that [the] father had shown
some limited progress in interacting with the child at visits. . . .
[The CODE evaluator] was not able to complete a full-scale
evaluation of the father due to the father’s failure to attend a second
evaluation session, but . . . he determined that “[the father] does not
possess the intellectual, emotional, or maturational skills
necessary to parent a child.”
. . . .
[The child] was born at [thirty-five] weeks[’] gestation. He
was born in Lewiston, but promptly transferred to hospitals in
Portland, then Boston. He is under treatment of a nephrologist. He
has complex dietary needs. His caregivers need training and skill,
and caregivers must pay careful attention to the food preparation
process. [The child] requires occupational therapy and speech
therapy. He is in therapeutic foster care. The right permanent
caregivers for [him] will be smart, attentive, patient, and nurturing.
[The child] absolutely needs permanency. He is not currently
in a pre-adoptive placement, so termination of parental rights is
necessary for him to be available to move toward the permanency
of adoption.
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II. DISCUSSION
[¶3] There is more than sufficient competent evidence in the record that
supports the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that, on three
independent grounds, the father is unfit as a parent. See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79,
¶¶ 5-6, 8, 10, 118 A.3d 812; In re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶¶ 21-23,
809 A.2d 1245.
[¶4] The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his unfitness
as a parent by pointing to evidence that he loves and shares a bond with the
child. He argues that he only needs more time to achieve reunification and that,
given their bond, this additional time for reunification is in the child’s best
interest. Contrary to the father’s contention, the court did not err by finding
that he has had an adequate time—slightly over a year—to engage in the
required services, attempt to rehabilitate himself, and reunify with the child
within a timeframe that was reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4052(2-A) (2017) (mandating that department file a
termination petition after “a child has been in foster care for [fifteen] of the
most recent [twenty-two] months.”). The Legislature clearly intended to
expeditiously move a child toward permanency and to avoid needlessly
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extended foster care placements. See 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3), (4) (2017); In re
Alana S., 2002 ME 126, ¶¶ 20-24, 802 A.2d 976.
[¶5] As for the child’s best interest, we have said that a child’s bond with
his or her natural parent is “only one of several factors” and does not preclude
a determination that terminating an unfit parent’s rights is in that child’s best
interest. In re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶¶ 26, 31, 809 A.2d 1245; In re David G.,
659 A.2d 859, 862 (Me. 1995). This child has extensive medical needs that the
court found will require “smart, attentive, patient, and nurturing” permanent
caregivers; the father is unable to manage his own mental health and
day-to-day needs, let alone those of his son. The court acted well within its
discretion in concluding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate the
father’s parental rights so as to allow for the child’s adoption. See In re Joseph V.,
2017 ME 172, ¶¶ 2-4, 169 A.2d 389; In re Jeffrey E., 557 A.2d 954, 955-57
(Me. 1989).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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Richard Charest, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2016-6
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY