Angell Family 2012 Prouts Neck Trusts v. Town of Scarborough Kenyon C. Bolton III v. Town of Scarborough , 149 A.3d 271 ( 2016 )


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  • MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT	                                       Reporter	of	Decisions
    Decision:	 
    2016 ME 152
    Docket:	   BCD-15-112
    Argued:	   December	8,	2015
    Decided:	  October	13,	2016
    Panel:	    SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HJELM,	JJ.
    ANGELL	FAMILY	2012	PROUTS	NECK	TRUST	et	al.
    v.
    TOWN	OF	SCARBOROUGH	et	al.
    ******
    KENYON	C.	BOLTON	III	et	al.
    v.
    TOWN	OF	SCARBOROUGH	et	al.
    HJELM,	J.
    [¶1]	 	 In	 our	 recent	 decision	 in	 Petrin	 v.	 Town	 of	 Scarborough,
    
    2016 ME 136
    ,	---	A.3d	---,	we	considered	challenges	to	increases	in	municipal
    property	 taxes	 for	 parcels	 located	 in	 several	 neighborhoods	 in	 the	 Town	 of
    Scarborough.	 	 We	 determined	 that	 although	 the	 Scarborough	 Board	 of
    Assessment	 Review	 did	 not	 err	 by	 concluding	 that	 a	 partial	 revaluation
    conducted	 by	 the	 Town	 was	 proper,	 the	 Town’s	 practice	 of	 undervaluing
    2
    separate	 but	 abutting	 lots	 held	 in	 common	 ownership	 resulted	 in
    discriminatory	tax	treatment.		See	
    id. ¶ 45.
    [¶2]	 	 In	 this	 separate	 action,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 a	 separate	 record,	 we
    address	similar	challenges	brought	by	Kenyon	C.	Bolton	III	and	other	owners
    of	residential	waterfront	properties1	located	in	Prouts	Neck,	which	is	an	area
    of	Scarborough	that	was	not	at	issue	in	Petrin.		The	plaintiffs	(collectively,	the
    Taxpayers)	 appeal	 from	 a	 judgment	 entered	 in	 the	 Business	 and	 Consumer
    Docket	(Horton,	J.)	concluding	that	they	do	not	have	standing	to	pursue	one	of
    their	 challenges	 but	 otherwise	 affirming	 the	 Board’s	 denial	 of	 their	 tax
    abatement	petitions.		For	reasons	similar	to	those	in	Petrin,	we	determine	that
    the	 Taxpayers	 in	 this	 case	 have	 standing	 to	 pursue	 all	 of	 their	 challenges.
    Additionally,	 although	 we	 affirm	 the	 Board’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 partial
    revaluation	 was	 proper,	 we	 conclude	 that	 the	 Board	 erred	 by	 denying	 the
    Taxpayers’	 requests	 for	 abatement	 based	 on	 the	 Town’s	 practice	 of
    undervaluing	 abutting	 lots,	 which	 resulted	 in	 discriminatory	 assessments.
    1	 	 The	 appellants	 are	 Kenyon	 C.	 Bolton	 III;	 Bolton	 Juniper	 Ledge	 Trust;	 Matford	 Holding,	 Inc.;
    Eileen	D.	Gillespie	Trust;	Edward	P.	Maynard	Trust;	Martha	F.	Hallward;	Nan	T.	McEvoy	1997	GRAT;
    Boyle	 Trust	 and	 Investment	 Company;	 Frank	 A.	 and	 Sarah	 Olson;	 CPC	 Maine,	 LLC;	 Angell	 Family
    2012	 Prouts	 Neck	 Trust;	 JG	 Bartol	 Trust	 FBO	 Anne	 Butterfield;	 JB	 Bartol	 FBO	 T.C.	 Bartol;	 CBS
    Family	 Trust	 FBO	 Anne	 Butterfield;	 CBS	 Family	 Trust	 FBO	 T.C.	 Bartol;	 Mandalay	 Realty	 LLC;
    30	Saccarappa	 LLC;	 Lee	 T.	 Sprague;	 J.	 Hunter	 Walton	 Jr.	 1979	 Family	 Trust;	 and	 26	 Jocelyn	 Road
    Nominee	Trust.
    3
    We	therefore	vacate	the	judgment	and	remand	to	the	Business	and	Consumer
    Docket	with	instructions	to	remand	to	the	Board	for	further	proceedings.
    I.		BACKGROUND
    [¶3]		After	holding	a	hearing,	the	Board	made	the	following	findings	of
    fact,	 which	 are	 based	 on	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record.	 	 See	 Terfloth	 v.
    Town	of	Scarborough,	
    2014 ME 57
    ,	¶	10,	
    90 A.3d 1131
    .
    [¶4]		Scarborough	last	conducted	a	valuation	of	all	properties	located	in
    the	 Town	 for	 purposes	 of	 municipal	 tax	 assessments	 in	 2005.	 	 The	 Town
    Assessor,	 however,	 continually	 monitors	 hundreds	 of	 sales	 of	 Scarborough
    property	 and	 conducts	 studies	 to	 ensure	 that	 assessment-to-sales	 ratios—
    both	in	individual	neighborhoods	and	town-wide—are	as	close	as	possible	to
    100%.	 	 In	 2012,	 based	 on	 an	 ongoing	 analysis	 of	 sales	 data,	 then-Town
    Assessor	 Paul	 Lesperance	 reassessed	 parcels	 of	 land	 in	 certain	 Scarborough
    neighborhoods.		The	partial	revaluation	resulted	in	increased	assessments	for
    waterfront	 properties	 in	 three	 areas,	 including	 Prouts	 Neck,	 and	 for	 interior
    properties	in	a	fourth	neighborhood.		Each	of	those	neighborhoods	constitutes
    a	distinct	market	that	cannot	be	compared	to	other	areas	in	the	Town.
    [¶5]		For	Prouts	Neck,	the	data,	which	consisted	of	eight	property	sales,
    showed	 that	 waterfront	 properties	 were	 selling	 for	 significantly	 more	 than
    4
    their	 assessed	 values.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 revaluation,	 assessments	 of	 those
    properties	increased	by	10-15%.		Prouts	Neck	is	a	unique	neighborhood	with
    amenities,	including	a	golf	course,	beach	club,	and	yacht	club,	that	enhance	the
    value	of	properties	located	there.		Lesperance	did	not	increase	assessments	of
    waterfront	properties	in	a	separate	neighborhood,	Piper	Shores,	which	is	not
    comparable	to	Prouts	Neck	because	it	is	a	significant	distance	from	the	Prouts
    Neck	amenities	and	because	the	parcels	there	are	generally	larger.
    [¶6]	 	 In	 early	 2013,	 the	 Taxpayers,	 who	 separately	 own	 seventeen
    parcels	of	land	in	Prouts	Neck,	each	applied	for	a	tax	abatement	pursuant	to
    36	M.R.S.	 §	841(1)	 (2015).2	 	 In	 their	 applications,	 the	 Taxpayers	 alleged	 that
    the	partial	revaluation	unjustly	discriminated	against	them	because	it	resulted
    in	 increased	 assessments	 for	 their	 properties	 but	 not	 for	 other	 similarly
    situated	 properties.3	 	 Lesperance	 denied	 the	 applications,	 and	 the	 Taxpayers
    appealed	 to	 the	 Board.	 	 See	 36	 M.R.S.	 §	 843(1)	 (2015).	 	 By	 agreement	 of	 the
    parties,	the	Board	consolidated	the	appeals	and	held	a	two-day	public	hearing
    in	 December	 2013	 and	 January	 2014.	 	 The	 evidence	 at	 the	 hearing	 focused
    both	on	the	partial	revaluation	and	an	“excess	land”	policy,	which	affects	the
    2	 	 Owners	 of	 a	 total	 of	 twenty	 parcels	 filed	 abatement	 applications	 and	 appealed	 to	 the	 Board
    after	 Lesperance	 denied	 them.	 	 Of	 those	 taxpayers,	 the	 owners	 of	 seventeen	 parcels	 pursue	 their
    challenges	here.
    3	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 also	 alleged	 that	 their	 properties	 were	 substantially	 overvalued.	 	 On	 this
    appeal,	the	Taxpayers	pursue	only	their	challenge	based	on	unjust	discrimination.		See	infra	n.4.
    5
    Town’s	 valuation	 of	 lots	 larger	 than	 one	 acre	 and	 abutting	 lots	 in	 common
    ownership.
    [¶7]		In	a	written	decision	issued	in	March	2014,	the	Board	denied	the
    Taxpayers’	consolidated	appeals.		The	Board	endorsed	the	Town’s	practice	of
    assessing	 a	 lot	 in	 common	 ownership	 with	 a	 second	 abutting	 lot	 “at	 a
    significantly	lower	rate,”	finding	that	the	impact	of	the	“policy	was	minor	and
    did	 not	 make	 the	 assessments	 discriminatory.”	 	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 partial
    revaluation,	the	Board	found	that	Lesperance’s	reliance	on	the	eight	property
    sales	 in	 Prouts	 Neck	 was	 reasonable	 and	 that	 the	 data	 confirmed	 that	 the
    assessment-to-sales	 ratio	 there	 was	 “significantly	 less”	 than	 100%,	 justifying
    the	 increased	 assessments.	 	 The	 Board	 further	 concluded	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to
    Prouts	 Neck,	 there	 was	 an	 insufficient	 number	 of	 sales	 in	 Piper	 Shores	 to
    justify	 an	 increase	 in	 assessments	 there	 and	 that	 in	 any	 event,	 the	 two
    neighborhoods	are	not	comparable.		The	Board	also	noted	that	Maine	Revenue
    Services	 (MRS)	 had	 reviewed	 the	 market	 data	 for	 the	 waterfront	 areas
    affected	 by	 the	 revaluation	 and	 had	 “concluded	 that	 the	 Town’s	 assessment
    methodology	was	sound	and	acceptable.”
    [¶8]	 	 Overall,	 the	 Board	 concluded	 that	 Lesperance’s	 “appraisal
    techniques	 were	 thorough	 and	 well-grounded	 in	 expert	 assessing
    6
    methodology”	and	that	the	Taxpayers	had	not	met	their	burden	of	establishing
    that	the	assessments	were	“manifestly	wrong”	or	discriminatory.
    [¶9]	 	 In	 two	 groups,	 the	 Taxpayers	 filed	 complaints	 in	 the	 Superior
    Court	 (Cumberland	 County)	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80B(a)	 and	 36	 M.R.S.
    §	843,	 appealing	 the	 Board’s	 decision	 denying	 their	 requests	 for	 tax
    abatements.	 	 The	 two	 actions	 were	 consolidated	 and	 transferred	 to	 the
    Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket.	 	 In	 February	 2015,	 the	 court	 entered	 a
    judgment	 affirming	 the	 Board’s	 decision.	 	 The	 court	 concluded	 that	 the
    Taxpayers	 did	 not	 have	 standing	 to	 challenge	 the	 Town’s	 excess	 land
    programs	and	affirmed	the	Board’s	decision	on	the	remaining	challenges.		The
    Taxpayers	appealed	to	us.		See	14	M.R.S.	§	1851	(2015).
    II.		DISCUSSION
    [¶10]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 argue	 that	 they	 have	 standing	 to	 challenge	 the
    Town’s	“excess	land”	assessment	practices	and	that	the	evidence	in	the	record
    compelled	the	Board	to	find	that	those	practices	have	a	discriminatory	impact
    that	 is	 adverse	 to	 their	 interests.	 	 They	 then	 argue	 that	 they	 are	 entitled	 to
    abatements	 because	 the	 assessments	 resulting	 from	 the	 2012	 partial
    revaluation	 were	 based	 on	 flawed	 data	 and	 arbitrarily	 focused	 on	 certain
    waterfront	properties.
    7
    [¶11]	 	 When	 considering	 an	 appeal	 from	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 Superior
    Court
    in	 an	 action	 seeking	 review	 of	 a	 tax	 assessment,	 we	 review	 the
    Board’s	decision	directly	for	abuse	of	discretion,	errors	of	law,	and
    sufficient	 evidence.	 	 That	 the	 record	 contains	 evidence
    inconsistent	with	the	result,	or	that	inconsistent	conclusions	could
    be	drawn	from	the	evidence,	does	not	render	the	Board’s	findings
    invalid	if	a	reasonable	mind	might	accept	the	relevant	evidence	as
    adequate	to	support	the	Board’s	conclusion.
    Terfloth,	 
    2014 ME 57
    ,	 ¶	 10,	 
    90 A.3d 1131
     (alterations	 omitted)	 (citation
    omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).
    [¶12]	 	 The	 legal	 standards	 we	 identified	 in	 Petrin	 as	 applying	 to
    municipal	property	tax	assessments	also	govern	our	analysis	here,	and	we	do
    not	 reiterate	 them	 in	 full.	 	 We	 do	 note,	 however,	 that	 “[a]	 town’s	 tax
    assessment	 is	 presumed	 to	 be	 valid.”	 	 Ram’s	 Head	 Partners,	 LLC	 v.	 Town	 of
    Cape	 Elizabeth,	 
    2003 ME 131
    ,	 ¶	 9,	 
    834 A.2d 916
    .	 	 A	 taxpayer	 bears	 the
    affirmative	burden	of	rebutting	that	presumption	by	proving	that	the	assessed
    value	of	his	or	her	property	is	“manifestly	wrong”	because	it	was	affected	by
    “unjust	 discrimination.”4	 	 
    Id. (quotation marks
     omitted);	 see	 also	 Allegheny
    Pittsburgh	Coal	Co.	v.	Cty.	Comm’n,	
    488 U.S. 336
    ,	343	(1989)	(stating	that	the
    4		A	taxpayer	may	also	seek	to	prove	that	an	assessment	is	“manifestly	wrong”	by	demonstrating
    that	 the	 property	 was	 substantially	 overvalued	 or	 that	 the	 assessment	 was	 affected	 by	 fraud,
    dishonesty,	or	illegality.		Terfloth	v.	Town	of	Scarborough,	
    2014 ME 57
    ,	¶	12,	
    90 A.3d 1131
    .		In	this
    action,	the	Taxpayers	do	not	assert	such	challenges.
    8
    Equal	 Protection	 Clause	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	 requires	 a	 “rough
    equality	 in	 tax	 treatment	 of	 similarly	 situated	 property	 owners”).	 	 This
    requires	 the	 taxpayer	 to	 establish	 “that	 the	 assessor’s	 system	 necessarily
    results	in	unequal	apportionment.”		Ram’s	Head,	
    2003 ME 131
    ,	¶	10,	
    834 A.2d 916
    (quotation	marks	omitted).
    [¶13]	 	 Because	 the	 Board	 concluded	 that	 the	 Taxpayers	 failed	 to	 meet
    their	 burden	 of	 proving	 unjust	 discrimination,	 we	 will	 vacate	 the	 Board’s
    decision	“only	if	the	record	compels	a	contrary	conclusion	to	the	exclusion	of
    any	 other	 inference.”	 	 Terfloth,	 
    2014 ME 57
    ,	 ¶	 13,	 
    90 A.3d 1131
     (quotation
    marks	omitted).
    [¶14]	 	 We	 address	 the	 Taxpayers’	 challenge	 to	 the	 Town’s	 excess	 land
    programs	 before	 considering	 their	 remaining	 contention	 that	 the	 partial
    revaluation	was	improper.
    A.	   The	Town’s	Large	Lot	and	Abutting	Property	Programs
    [¶15]		As	we	explained	in	Petrin	and	as	shown	in	the	present	record,	the
    Town	 engages	 in	 two	 distinct	 practices	 that	 the	 Board	 and	 the	 Taxpayers
    describe	as	the	“excess	land”	program.		The	first	practice	concerns	the	Town’s
    method	 for	 valuing	 single	 residential	 lots	 that	 are	 larger	 than	 one	 acre
    (the	“large	 lot”	 program),	 and	 the	 second	 involves	 the	 Town’s	 practice	 of
    9
    permitting	 owners	 of	 multiple	 contiguous	 lots	 to	 combine	 those	 lots	 for
    assessment	purposes	(the	“abutting	property”	program).
    [¶16]		As	Lesperance	testified,	under	the	large	lot	program,	the	first	acre
    of	a	larger	single	parcel	is	valued	at	one	rate,	and	the	remainder	is	assessed	at
    a	lower	rate,	because	the	portion	of	the	parcel	in	excess	of	the	one-acre	“home
    site”	 contributes	 proportionally	 less—and	 sometimes	 even	 nothing—to	 the
    lot’s	overall	value.		The	abutting	property	program,	on	the	other	hand,	allows
    a	taxpayer	who	owns	multiple	abutting	lots	to	elect	to	have	the	separate	lots
    assessed	 as	 a	 single	 unit.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 same	 principle	 that	 results	 in	 a
    reduced	 valuation	 of	 a	 single	 lot,	 the	 abutting	 property	 program	 results	 in	 a
    lower	 overall	 valuation	 of	 the	 two	 lots	 than	 if	 they	 were	 assessed
    independently	of	each	other.
    [¶17]		Focusing	on	the	abutting	property	program,	the	court	concluded
    that	 because	 that	 valuation	 practice	 is	 applied	 throughout	 the	 Town,	 the
    Taxpayers	 have	 not	 demonstrated	 the	 “particularized	 injury”	 necessary	 to
    support	standing	to	seek	remedial	relief.		As	we	explained	in	Petrin,	however,
    taxpayers	 whose	 properties	 do	 not	 qualify	 for	 the	 large	 lot	 or	 abutting
    property	 programs	 do	 have	 standing	 to	 challenge	 those	 programs	 because
    they	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 the	 favorable	 tax	 treatment	 that	 the	 Town	 gives	 to
    10
    owners	of	qualifying	lots.		
    2016 ME 136
    ,	¶	21	&	n.6,	---	A.3d	---.		None	of	the
    Taxpayers	 owns	 property	 that	 qualifies	 for	 the	 abutting	 property	 program,
    and	 they	 have	 standing	 to	 challenge	 that	 practice.	 	 Further,	 because	 at	 least
    some	of	the	Taxpayers’	properties	at	issue	here	are	smaller	than	one	acre,	we
    reach	the	merits	of	the	Taxpayers’	challenge	to	the	large	lot	program.
    1.	    Abutting	Property	Program
    [¶18]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 first	 challenge	 the	 abutting	 property	 program,
    which	results	in	a	cumulative	lower	assessment	of	abutting,	commonly-owned
    parcels	than	if	the	parcels	were	assessed	separately.		As	Lesperance	testified
    before	the	Board,	when	this	methodology	is	used,	the	taxpayer	gets	a	“major
    benefit”	and	a	“break.”
    [¶19]		Pursuant	to	Maine	law,	an	individual	parcel	of	real	estate	must	be
    assessed	 separately	 according	 to	 just	 value.	 	 See	 Me.	 Const.	 art.	 IX,	 §	 8
    (“All	taxes	 upon	 real	 and	 personal	 estate,	 assessed	 by	 authority	 of	 this	 State,
    shall	be	apportioned	and	assessed	equally	according	to	the	just	value	thereof.”
    (emphasis	added));	36	M.R.S.	§	708	(2015)	(stating	that	for	each	tax	year,	the
    assessor	 “shall	 estimate	 and	 record	 separately	 the	 land	 value,	 exclusive	 of
    buildings,	 of	 each	 parcel	 of	 real	 estate”	 (emphasis	 added)).	 	 For	 the	 same
    reasons	 we	 explained	 in	 Petrin,	 the	 Town’s	 abutting	 property	 program
    11
    violates	 the	 requirement,	 established	 in	 Maine	 law,	 that	 each	 parcel	 be
    assessed	 separately	 according	 to	 its	 just	 value.	 	 
    2016 ME 136
    ,
    ¶¶	27-28,	---	A.3d	---.5
    [¶20]		Further,	on	this	record,	the	Board	was	compelled	to	conclude	that
    the	 abutting	 property	 program	 resulted	 in	 an	 unequal	 apportionment	 of	 the
    tax	burden.		See	Ram’s	Head,	
    2003 ME 131
    ,	¶	10,	
    834 A.2d 916
    .		The	Taxpayers
    have	made	this	showing	through	Lesperance’s	testimony	that	other	taxpayers
    receive	 a	 “major	 benefit”	 and	 a	 “break”	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 abutting	 property
    program.	 	 “This	 necessarily	 means	 that	 those	 who	 do	 not	 own	 abutting	 lots
    are	subjected	to	taxes	that	are	not	imposed	on	owners	of	lots	that	happen	to
    be	 abutting	 .	 .	 .	 [and]	 contravenes	 the	 Taxpayers’	 rights	 of	 equal	 protection.”
    Petrin,	
    2016 ME 136
    ,	¶	31,	---	A.3d	---.		Additionally,	the	Taxpayers	presented
    evidence	of	specific	examples	where	an	owner	of	a	qualifying	parcel	pays	less
    property	taxes	than	does	an	owner	of	a	comparable,	non-qualifying	parcel.
    [¶21]	 	 Because	 the	 abutting	 property	 program	 “subject[s]	 [the
    Taxpayers]	to	taxes	not	imposed	on	others	of	the	same	class,”	Hillsborough	v.
    Cromwell,	 
    326 U.S. 620
    ,	 623	 (1946),	 it	 necessarily	 results	 in	 an	 unequal
    5		Pursuant	to	36	M.R.S.	§	701-A	(2015),	a	municipality	is	authorized	to	combine	contiguous	lots
    for	purposes	of	tax	assessments	but	only	under	specified	circumstances,	including	a	minimum	lot
    size	of	five	acres.		This	statute	is	inapplicable	here.
    12
    apportionment	 of	 the	 tax	 burden,	 and	 the	 Taxpayers	 are	 entitled	 to	 an
    abatement	for	the	2012	tax	year,	see	Petrin,	
    2016 ME 136
    ,	¶	32,	---	A.3d	---.
    2.	      Large	Lot	Program
    [¶22]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 also	 contend	 that	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	 record
    compelled	the	Board	to	find	that	the	large	lot	program—which	applies	to	the
    valuation	 of	 a	 single	 parcel	 that	 is	 larger	 than	 one	 acre—is	 unjustly
    discriminatory.
    [¶23]		As	we	explained	in	Petrin,	“[s]o	long	as	an	assessment	represents
    a	 fair	 and	 just	 determination	 of	 value	 for	 the	 parcel	 as	 a	 whole,	 no
    constitutional	harm	has	occurred.”		
    Id. ¶ 36
    (quotation	marks	omitted).		The
    Board	was	entitled	to	find,	based	on	Lesperance’s	testimony,	that	the	large	lot
    program	results	in	assessments	that	reflect	just	value	and	that	the	Taxpayers
    therefore	 did	 not	 meet	 their	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 the	 program	 is	 unjustly
    discriminatory.6
    B.	     The	2012	Partial	Revaluation
    [¶24]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 next	 challenge	 the	 2012	 partial	 revaluation,
    asserting	 that	 the	 evidence	 compelled	 the	 Board	 to	 find	 that	 it	 resulted	 in
    6		As	in	Petrin,	the	Board’s	decision	in	this	case	explicitly	addressed	only	the	abutting	property
    program.	 	 The	 Board’s	 general	 finding	 that	 Lesperance	 “did	 not	 use	 systematic	 or	 intentional
    methods	 to	 create	 a	 disparity	 in	 valuations,”	 however,	 constitutes	 at	 least	 an	 implied	 finding	 that
    the	large	lot	valuation	methodology	was	proper.
    13
    inequitable	 assessments	 of	 certain	 waterfront	 properties	 in	 Prouts	 Neck
    because	Lesperance	(1)	failed	to	present	a	legitimate	justification	for	targeting
    that	 area,	 and	 (2)	 improperly	 determined	 that	 assessments	 of	 waterfront
    properties	in	Piper	Shores	should	not	be	increased.7
    [¶25]		As	we	reiterated	in	Petrin,	“although	townwide	revaluations	are
    perhaps	 the	 best	 method	 of	 maintaining	 equal	 apportionment	 of	 the	 tax
    burden,	assessors	are	not	precluded	from	adjusting	assessments	for	selected
    properties	 between	 townwide	 revaluations	 if	 such	 adjustments	 will	 achieve
    greater	 equality.”	 	 
    Id. ¶ 38
     (alterations	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).
    Revaluations	 “need	 not	 attain	 absolute	 equality	.	 .	 .	 ;	 rather,	 only	 rough
    equality	 is	 required.”	 	 
    Id. (quotation marks
     omitted);	 see	 also	 
    Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 343
     (“[T]he	 constitutional	 requirement	 is	 the	 seasonable
    attainment	of	a	rough	equality	in	tax	treatment	of	similarly	situated	property
    owners.”).
    7	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 also	 complain,	 in	 a	 footnote,	 that	 the	 Board	 was	 compelled	 to	 find	 that
    Lesperance	arbitrarily	failed	to	increase	assessments	for	four	waterfront	properties	in	Prouts	Neck,
    and	 therefore	 discriminated	 against	 the	 Taxpayers.	 	 This	 argument	 is	 not	 persuasive	 because	 the
    Board	 was	 entitled	 to	 find,	 based	 on	 Lesperance’s	 testimony,	 that	 the	 assessments	 for	 these
    properties	did	not	establish	unjust	discrimination.		See	Kittery	Elec.	Light	Co.	v.	Assessors	of	the	Town
    of	 Kittery,	 
    219 A.2d 728
    ,	 740	 (Me.	 1966)	 (stating	 that	 “[s]poradic	 differences	 in	 valuations	 do	 not
    spell	invidious	discrimination,	intentional	or	constructive”).
    14
    1.	    Justification	for	Increased	Assessments
    [¶26]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 argue	 that	 Lesperance	 increased	 assessments	 of
    certain	 waterfront	 properties	 in	 Prouts	 Neck	 based	 solely	 on	 his
    determination	 that	 the	 economic	 downturn	 of	 2008	 did	 not	 affect	 that	 area,
    which,	 they	 argue,	 is	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence.	 	 Contrary	 to	 their
    contention,	however,	Lesperance’s	decision	to	revalue	Prouts	Neck	properties
    was	 legitimately	 grounded	 in	 his	 ongoing	 analysis	 of	 sales	 data	 and	 was	 not
    based	solely	on	his	opinion	about	the	effect	of	the	recession.
    [¶27]	 	 As	 Lesperance	 testified,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 revaluation,	 the
    assessments	of	residential	properties	in	most	areas	of	the	Town	were	close	to
    100%	 of	 their	 market	 value.	 	 In	 contrast,	 market	 data—consisting	 of	 eight
    property	 sales—revealed	 that	 on	 average,	 since	 2005,	 waterfront	 properties
    in	 Prouts	 Neck	 had	 been	 selling	 for	 significantly	 more	 than	 their	 assessed
    values.	 	 Lesperance	 therefore	 increased	 the	 assessments	 of	 Prouts	 Neck
    waterfront	 properties	 to	 bring	 the	 average	 assessment-to-sales	 ratio	 there
    closer	 to	 100%.	 	 A	 post-valuation	 study	 conducted	 by	 Lesperance	 confirmed
    that	 the	 revaluation	 achieved	 the	 intended	 effect:	 the	 average	 assessment
    ratio	 in	 the	 Prouts	 Neck	 waterfront	 increased	 from	 83%	 before	 the
    revaluation	to	93%	afterwards.		Additionally,	the	Director	of	the	Property	Tax
    15
    Division	 for	 MRS	 testified	 that	 MRS	 had	 reviewed	 the	 market	 data	 for	 the
    waterfront	 areas	 affected	 by	 the	 revaluation	 and	 had	 concluded	 that	 the
    revaluation	improved	the	equity	of	the	Town’s	assessments.
    [¶28]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 argue	 that	 for	 two	 reasons	 the	 eight	 property
    sales	 on	 which	 Lesperance	 relied	 do	 not	 adequately	 support	 his	 decision	 to
    increase	 assessments	 in	 Prouts	 Neck.	 	 First,	 they	 argue	 that	 four	 of	 the	 sales
    do	 not	 provide	 reliable	 evidence	 of	 current	 fair	 market	 value	 because	 they
    occurred	 before	 the	 2008	 recession.	 	 Contrary	 to	 their	 contention,	 however,
    the	evidence	supports	the	Board’s	conclusion	that	waterfront	property	values
    in	 Prouts	 Neck	 “remained	 strong	 between	 the	 years	 2006-2011,”	 and	 that
    therefore	it	was	proper	for	Lesperance	to	rely	on	pre-2008	sales	data.
    [¶29]	 	 Second,	 the	 Taxpayers	 argue	 that	 three	 of	 the	 four	 remaining
    sales	 failed	 to	 reflect	 fair	 market	 value	 because	 they	 were	 not	 arm’s	 length
    transactions.	 	 As	 we	 have	 previously	 explained,	 municipalities	 have	 a
    constitutional	obligation	to	assess	real	estate	at	“just	value,”	Me.	Const.	art.	IX,
    §	 8,	 which	 is	 equivalent	 to	 “market	 value,”	 Weekley	 v.	 Town	 of	 Scarborough,
    
    676 A.2d 932
    ,	 934	 (Me.	 1996).	 	 “Market	 value”	 is	 the	 “price	 a	 willing	 buyer
    would	 pay	 a	 willing	 seller	 at	 a	 fair	 public	 sale.”	 	 Frank	 v.	 Assessors	 of
    Skowhegan,	 
    329 A.2d 167
    ,	 173	 (Me.	 1974),	 superseded	 by	 statute	 on	 other
    16
    grounds	by	P.L.	1977,	ch.	694,	§	694	(effective	July	1,	1978);	see	also	Shawmut
    Inn	v.	Town	of	Kennebunkport,	
    428 A.2d 384
    ,	395	(Me.	1981)	(stating	that	in
    determining	 market	 value,	 “[t]he	 weight	 to	 be	 given	 to	 the	 sale
    price	.	.	.	depends	upon	the	petitioner’s	ability	to	show	that	the	sale	price	was
    indicative	of	the	price	a	willing	buyer	would	pay	in	a	free	and	open	market”).
    [¶30]		Here,	the	Board	accepted	the	testimony	of	one	of	the	Taxpayers’
    experts	 that	 several	 sales	 in	 Prouts	 Neck	 were	 “private,”	 but	 rejected	 the
    expert’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 sales	 were	 not	 arm’s	 length	 transactions.	 	 The
    Board	reasoned	that	 the	witness	“did	not	present	credible	evidence	that	any
    private	 sales	 were	 entered	 into	 unwillingly	 or	 [were]	 the	 result	 of	 undue
    pressure.”		Although	these	sales	lacked	one	of	the	characteristics	of	an	arm’s
    length	 transaction,	 the	 evidence	 does	 not	 establish	 that	 the	 prices	 were	 not
    “typical	 of	 [those]	 arrived	 at	 in	 the	 open	 market	 where	 willing	 buyers	 and
    sellers	meet	on	equal	terms.”		Arnold	v.	Me.	State	Highway	Comm’n,	
    283 A.2d 655
    ,	659	(Me.	1971).		The	Board	was	therefore	not	required	to	conclude	that
    the	resulting	sale	prices	were	not	reflective	of	fair	market	value.
    [¶31]		Because	the	Board	was	entitled	to	find	that	Lesperance’s	reliance
    on	 the	 eight	 waterfront	 property	 sales	 in	 Prouts	 Neck	 was	 reasonable,	 and
    because	those	sales	showed	that	the	assessment-to-sales	ratio	there	was	less
    17
    than	in	other	residential	areas,	the	Board	was	not	compelled	to	conclude	that
    Lesperance	 lacked	 a	 legitimate	 basis	 for	 increasing	 assessments	 of	 the
    Taxpayers’	properties.
    2.	    Piper	Shores	Properties
    [¶32]	 	 The	 Taxpayers	 next	 contend	 that	 the	 evidence	 compels	 the
    conclusion	 that	 Lesperance’s	 decision	 to	 increase	 assessments	 of	 waterfront
    properties	in	Prouts	Neck,	but	not	of	comparable	properties	in	Piper	Shores,
    constitutes	unjust	discrimination.		The	basis	for	this	argument	is	evidence	of
    the	 sale	 of	 one	 Piper	 Shores	 parcel	 for	 a	 price	 that	 was	 approximately
    15%	above	 its	 assessed	 value,	 which	 Lesperance	 excluded	 from	 his
    calculations.
    [¶33]	 	 Municipalities	 have	 a	 constitutional	 obligation	 to	 achieve	 “a
    rough	 equality	 in	 tax	 treatment	 of	 similarly	 situated	 property	 owners.”
    
    Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 343
     (emphasis	 added).	 	 As	 the	 Board	 found	 based	 on
    competent	 evidence,	 however,	 the	 waterfront	 properties	 in	 Piper	 Shores	 are
    not	 similarly	 situated	 to	 those	 in	 Prouts	 Neck.	 	 The	 Piper	 Shores	 properties
    18
    are	 generally	 larger8	 and	 are	 located	 a	 significant	 distance	 from	 the	 Prouts
    Neck	amenities.9
    [¶34]	 	 Additionally,	 the	 new	 Town	 Assessor	 testified	 that	 the	 single
    Piper	 Shores	 sale	 was	 “questionable”	 and	 was	 not	 a	 reliable	 indicator	 of
    market	value,	because	it	was	enrolled	in	a	tax	program	that	limited	the	use	of
    the	 parcel	 and	 that	 disqualified	 the	 property	 from	 being	 included	 in	 the
    annual	 sales	 ratio	 studies	 submitted	 to	 MRS.	 	 Both	 assessors	 testified	 that,
    moreover,	a	single	sale	was	an	insufficient	basis	for	revaluing	the	Piper	Shores
    neighborhood,	 and	 Lesperance	 stated	 that	 the	 sale	 was	 transacted	 after	 the
    April	1,	2012,	cutoff	date	that	he	had	adopted	for	the	revaluation.
    [¶35]		Based	on	this	cumulative	evidence,	the	Board	was	not	compelled
    to	 conclude	 that	 the	 Town	 unjustly	 discriminated	 against	 the	 Taxpayers	 in
    favor	of	landowners	in	Piper	Shores.		See	Terfloth,	
    2014 ME 57
    ,	¶	13,	
    90 A.3d 1131
    .
    8	 	 The	 Board	 was	 presented	 with	 evidence	 that	 Piper	 Shores	 encompasses	 twenty	 large,
    waterfront	parcels	along	approximately	two	miles	of	coastline,	while	Prouts	Neck	includes	fifty-one
    waterfront	parcels	along	a	coastline	that	is	roughly	the	same	length.
    9		The	Taxpayers	argue	that	there	is	no	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	the	Board’s	finding	that
    the	 amenities	 in	 Prouts	 Neck—including	 a	 golf	 course,	 beach	 club,	 and	 yacht	 club—“enhance	 the
    values	 of	 the	 properties	 located	 there.”	 	 Contrary	 to	 their	 contention,	 however,	 one	 of	 the
    Taxpayers’	own	experts	wrote	in	an	appraisal	document	that	was	admitted	in	evidence	that	“Prouts
    Neck	is	a	unique	market”	with	a	beach	club,	yacht	club,	and	country	club,	and	that	values	of	certain
    waterfront	properties	there	“still	appear[ed]	to	be	strong”	even	following	the	economic	downturn
    of	2008.
    19
    III.		CONCLUSION
    [¶36]		The	Board	did	not	err	by	concluding	that	the	Taxpayers	failed	to
    meet	 their	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 the	 2012	 partial	 revaluation	 was	 unjustly
    discriminatory.	 	 As	 in	 Petrin,	 however,	 the	 evidence	 here	 “compels	 the
    conclusion	that	the	Town’s	method	of	assessing	separate	but	abutting	parcels
    held	 in	 common	 ownership	 resulted	 in	 unequal	 apportionment	 because	 that
    methodology	 necessarily	 deprives	 the	 Taxpayers	 of	 a	 rough	 equality	 in	 tax
    treatment	 of	 similarly	 situated	 property	 owners.”	 	 
    2016 ME 136
    ,
    ¶	45,	---	A.3d	---	(quotation	marks	omitted).		We	therefore	remand	this	action
    to	 the	 Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket	 with	 instructions	 to	 remand	 to	 the
    Board	for	a	determination	of	the	appropriate	abatements.
    The	entry	is:
    Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 Business
    and	 Consumer	 Docket	 with	 instructions	 to
    remand	 to	 the	 Scarborough	 Board	 of
    Assessment	 Review	 for	 further	 proceedings
    consistent	with	this	opinion.
    20
    On	the	briefs:
    William	 H.	 Dale,	 Esq.,	and	 Tudor	 N.	 Goldsmith,	 Esq.,	 Jensen
    Baird	 Gardner	 &	 Henry,	 Portland,	 for	 appellants	 Kenyon	 C.
    Bolton	III	et	al.
    Jonathan	 A.	 Block,	 Esq.,	 and	 Kris	 Eimicke,	 Esq.,	 Pierce
    Atwood	 LLP,	 Portland,	 for	 appellants	 Angell	 Family	 2012
    Prouts	Neck	Trust	et	al.
    Robert	 J.	 Crawford,	 Esq.,	 and	 N.	 Joel	 Moser,	 Esq.,	 Bernstein
    Shur,	Portland,	for	appellee	Town	of	Scarborough	et	al.
    At	oral	argument:
    William	H.	Dale,	Esq.,	for	appellants	Kenyon	C.	Bolton	III	et
    al.	and	Angell	Family	2012	Prouts	Neck	Trust	et	al.
    Michael	 A.	 Hodgins,	 Esq.,	 Bernstein	 Shur,	 Portland,	 for
    appellee	Town	of	Scarborough	et	al.
    Business	and	Consumer	Docket	docket	number	CV-2014-59
    FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY