State of Maine v. Danny L. Adams , 2018 ME 60 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 60 Docket: And-17-319
Argued: March 7, 2018
Decided: April 26, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DANNY L. ADAMS
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Danny L. Adams appeals from a judgment of conviction of
manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2017), entered by the trial
court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J.) following his unconditional open
guilty plea.1 Adams contends that his plea was involuntary because he was
coerced, in violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination,2 to
accept the truth of all of the facts recited by the State at the plea hearing held
1 An unconditional guilty plea is tendered when, as here, a defendant does not reserve the right
to seek appellate review of a specified ruling of the court. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). A plea is
“open” “when there is no proposed sentence agreement between the State and the defendant and the
sentence is determined by the court after argument from the parties.” State v. Stevens, 2017 ME 30,
¶ 2 n.1, 156 A.3d 131; see also State v. Bean, 2018 ME 58, ¶ 14, --- A.3d ---.
2 The United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V; the Maine Constitution provides that a
person accused of a crime “shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or
herself,” Me. Const. art. I, § 6.
2
pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11. He further contends that he should not be
required to show cause as to why his appeal should not be dismissed pursuant
to State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d 501 (Me. 1996), and its progeny, which hold that a
defendant may not appeal from a conviction entered upon his plea of guilty
except in certain circumstances. Adams did not move to withdraw his
unconditional plea before the court imposed the sentence and does not assert
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that it imposed an excessive, cruel, or
unusual sentence. We dismiss the appeal. See id. at 503; State v. Plummer,
2008 ME 22, ¶ 3, 939 A.2d 687.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The relevant facts are procedural and are not disputed. In
February 2015, Adams was charged by indictment with murder, 17-A M.R.S.
§ 201(1)(B) (2017), and manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A),
following the death of his infant son. Two attorneys were appointed to
represent him. Following pretrial motions, a jury trial was scheduled for
February 17, 2017.
[¶3] On February 8, 2017, Adams appeared with counsel and entered an
unconditional open guilty plea to the manslaughter count; the State later
dismissed the murder charge. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11. At the Rule 11 hearing,
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after Adams explicitly waived his right to remain silent and the court
admonished him to “listen carefully,” the State recited the evidence that it
expected to present at trial, which included Adams’s statements to police
officers that numerous bruises on the child’s forehead and around his mouth
likely resulted from him (Adams) forcefully putting the baby’s pacifier in his
mouth two or three times, holding it there by putting the palm of his hand on
the pacifier and spreading his fingers across the child’s face, and then putting
the child face down in his crib with the pacifier inserted and holding him down
against the mattress.
[¶4] Adams’s counsel told the court that the State’s recitation was
consistent with the discovery. The court then engaged in a colloquy with
Adams:
COURT: And do you have anything that you would like to correct
about what was just said?
ADAMS: No. No, Your Honor.
Q: And have you had enough time to speak with your attorney
about this matter?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Has he done the things that you have asked him to do in terms
of representing you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
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Q: Are you satisfied with his services?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Are you pleading guilty today because you are guilty?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
The court found that the plea was made voluntarily and accepted it. It set the
matter for sentencing following its receipt of sentencing memoranda from the
parties.
[¶5] In chambers at the sentencing hearing almost five months later, the
court shared the State’s concern that Adams’s sentencing memorandum
differed significantly from the State’s recitation of facts at the Rule 11 hearing,
principally in suggesting that the bruises on the baby’s face were the result of
Adams’s resuscitation efforts and not his death-producing conduct. Following
a discussion about the specific conduct for which Adams was accepting
responsibility and whether his admitted conduct continued to support his
guilty plea to a charge of manslaughter, the court recessed the chambers
conference so that Adams’s attorneys could speak to him before returning for
further discussions.
[¶6] When the chambers conference resumed, Adams’s attorney said
that after meeting with him, “we confirmed again today what we understood
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before today, that Danny Adams is taking responsibility for causing his son’s
death. He indeed has pled guilty to this charge. He is responsible for his son’s
death. He did cause his son’s death . . . as he agreed to the facts presented in the
Rule 11 previously. . . . To the extent that [a medical] report implies . . . in any
kind of way at all that Danny Adams’s conduct was not the cause of the child’s
death, then we would reject that . . . .” After confirming with defense counsel
that Adams wished to proceed with sentencing, the court convened a hearing
in the courtroom.
[¶7] At that hearing, asserting that “[a]t the time of the Rule 11, the
defendant admitted to the following facts,” the State again recited that Adams
had inflicted the bruises on the child when he caused the child’s death,
concluding by saying that “those injuries, contrary to the defendant’s claim in
his sentencing memo, were not the result of resuscitative efforts,” but rather
“conduct that the defendant pled guilty [to].” The State pointed to Adams’s
conduct as one factor in support of its recommended sentence of twenty-five
years to the Department of Corrections, with all but seventeen years
suspended, and six years of probation. Defense counsel made an extensive
presentation of mitigating facts, but acknowledged that Adams “was, as the
State has described . . . completely negligent, completely reckless,” although
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“[h]e didn’t intend to cause [the child’s] death.” Addressing the court directly,
Adams said, “I did do it. I’m not denying any of that. I take full responsibility
for what I did. Everything I did that night and the night before was horrible.”
[¶8] As it began its sentencing analysis the court asked rhetorically,
“[W]hat is it that the defendant did?” and then outlined in detail its
understanding of the evidence. After confirming its accuracy with defense
counsel, the court addressed Adams:
COURT: Mr. Adams, at the time you entered your guilty plea to the
charge of manslaughter, were you aware that was the information
the State would . . . provide to the Court?
ADAMS: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Mr. Adams, having heard again the evidence the State would
present if this matter were to go to trial, is there anything that you
would like to correct?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: [D]id anyone make any threats or promises to you to get you to
change your plea from not guilty to guilty?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: [A]re you pleading guilty today because you are guilty?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And having pled guilty, do you wish to maintain your guilt and
go forward with sentencing today?
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A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Are you making that decision voluntarily?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Meaning that it is of your own free will?
A: Yes, ma’am.
[¶9] The court completed its sentencing analysis, arriving at a basic
sentence of eighteen years; a maximum sentence of twenty years; and a final
sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but fifteen years suspended,
and six years of probation. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C (2017).
[¶10] Adams timely appealed and filed an application to appeal from the
sentence. On July 27, 2017, citing Huntley, 676 A.2d at 503, we ordered Adams
to show cause within fourteen days as to why his direct appeal from a guilty
plea should not be dismissed. After Adams filed a response, we ordered that
the appeal would proceed in the usual course and directed the parties to
address in their briefs whether a criminal defendant has any constitutional,
statutory, or rule-based right to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea
where the defendant knows of no valid basis for such an appeal.3 By order
3 We also directed the parties to address the question of whether an indigent defendant has a
right to the appointment of new appellate counsel to review the record to determine whether any
valid basis for appeal following a guilty plea exists.
8
dated August 24, 2017, the Sentence Review Panel denied Adams leave to
appeal from the sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] In Huntley, we said that
[a] conviction after a guilty plea involves no decision by the court
regarding the defendant’s criminal guilt and therefore provides no
source of decisional error by the court regarding criminal guilt.
No direct appeal pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115 (Supp. 1995)[4]
asserting errors in the determination of criminal guilt may be taken
from a conviction after a guilty plea (other than a conditional guilty
plea entered pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)[5]), except on
grounds of jurisdiction or excessive, cruel or unusual punishment,
because there is no decision by the court to appeal from.
Challenges to a conviction after a guilty plea on grounds of
involuntariness of the plea, lack of knowledgeability on the part of
the defendant regarding the consequences of his plea, ineffective
assistance of counsel, misrepresentation, coercion or duress in
securing the plea, the insanity of the pleader, or noncompliance
with the requirements of M.R. Crim. P. 11 are collateral and may be
pursued only by post-conviction review . . . .
676 A.2d at 503; see State v. Gach, 2006 ME 82, ¶ 9, 901 A.2d 184 (same). In
this case, Adams pleaded guilty unconditionally, did not move to withdraw his
4 The statute has been amended twice since Huntley was decided; neither amendment affects this
appeal. P.L. 1999, ch. 731, § ZZZ-17 (effective Jan. 1, 2001); P.L. 2007, ch. 475, § 5
(effective June 30, 2008).
5 The substance of the current rule is identical to its predecessor. Compare M.R.U.
Crim. P. 11(a)(2) with M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) (West 1996).
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plea,6 and does not contend that the court lacked jurisdiction or that it imposed
an unconstitutional sentence. Accordingly, his direct appeal must be dismissed.
[¶12] Huntley applies even when, as here, a defendant contends that the
court violated his constitutional rights at the time he entered a guilty plea.7 In
Plummer, considering the defendant’s contention that the trial court violated
his due process rights in accepting his guilty plea and imposing sentence, we
held that
Plummer alleges neither a jurisdictional infirmity, nor excessive,
cruel, or unusual punishment. His guilty plea was entered
unconditionally, and he made no motion to withdraw his plea prior
to his sentencing. Plummer’s contentions are thereby not
preserved for appellate review, and Plummer is barred from
pursuing this direct appeal of his conviction.
2008 ME 22, ¶¶ 1, 3, 939 A.2d 687. See also State v. Stevens, 2017 ME 30, ¶¶ 1, 6,
156 A.3d 131 (applying Huntley analysis to defendant’s claim that the court did
not establish that his plea was voluntary; dismissing appeal); Gach,
2006 ME 82, ¶ 8-9, 901 A.2d 184 (applying Huntley analysis to a claim that
defendant “did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to
6 When the court offered Adams a chance to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing, asking
him, “[H]aving pled guilty, do you wish to maintain your guilt and go forward with sentencing today?”
Adams answered, “Yes, ma’am.”
7 This is distinct from an assertion that the statute a defendant is convicted of violating is
unconstitutional; that claim is reviewable on direct appeal. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ---,
138 S. Ct. 798, 802-03 (2018). Adams does not contend that 17-A M.R.S. § 203 (2017), criminalizing
manslaughter, is unconstitutional.
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counsel”; dismissing appeal). Adams’s remedy, if any, for his claim that the
court coerced his plea through self-incrimination by compelling him to accept
the State’s recitation of facts in toto lies in the post-conviction review process.
See Huntley, 676 A.2d at 503 (“Challenges to a conviction after a guilty plea on
grounds of involuntariness of the plea . . . [or] coercion or duress in securing the
plea . . . are collateral and may be pursued only by post-conviction review . . . .”);
15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132 (2017).
[¶13] Adams provides us no persuasive reason to depart from our
long-standing jurisprudence strictly limiting direct appeal following a guilty
plea, nor are we persuaded that a show cause order is an impermissible method
of requiring an appellant to make a prima facie demonstration that a direct
appeal following a guilty plea is not subject to dismissal.
[¶14] Adams asserts that an appeal in the usual course, potentially with
the assistance of “fresh eyes” or specialized appellate counsel, is always
required in such cases in order to preserve a defendant’s rights. As a practical
matter, however, if one of the rare grounds for appeal set out in Huntley exists—
i.e., a lack of jurisdiction in the trial court or a sentence imposing
unconstitutional punishment—then effective trial counsel would very likely
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recognize that issue.8 A defendant need only identify the argument in his
response to a show cause order for his appeal to proceed in the usual course. If
trial counsel were ineffective in failing to preserve a valid ground for appeal by
failing to adequately respond to the show cause order, that defect could be
corrected on post-conviction review. See 15 M.R.S. § 2130 (providing that a
post-conviction court may “grant[] the right to take an appeal from the criminal
judgment”). We note that Adams himself, utilizing our established procedure,
has received a full review of his arguments on appeal.9
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed.
8 Adams correctly notes that a direct appeal following a guilty plea may also be taken from an
illegal sentence, but that is so only “if a constitutional or statutory violation is apparent from the
record.” State v. Davenport, 2016 ME 69, ¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1205 (analyzing a defendant’s direct appeal
following a guilty plea); see also Bean, 2018 ME 58, ¶ 16, --- A.3d ---. No facial illegality appears on
this record. Adams’s bold assertions of fact in his brief that might support his argument—“Defendant
was told by counsel that the court had determined that defendant was required to admit all of the State’s
incriminating evidence. Indeed, the fact that counsel advised defendant he had no right to insist on his
version of events heightens the effect of the pressure on defendant to testify involuntarily.” (Emphasis
added.)—are no more than bare speculation, as the record is devoid of any mention of what Adams
and his trial counsel actually discussed during any private conversations. At oral argument, Adams’s
appellate counsel acknowledged that these asserted facts in the appellant’s brief are actually
speculative “inferences.” Accepting such “facts” would require us to make findings based on the kind
of evidence that would be developed at a post-conviction hearing, where Adams and trial counsel
would presumably testify. That is a clear rationale for our requirement that a sentencing illegality
be “apparent from the record” before it will be considered on direct appeal. Davenport, 2016 ME 69,
¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1205.
9 At oral argument, Adams agreed that “in this case, everything worked perfectly.”
12
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant Danny
L. Adams
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CR-2015-13
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY