Pamela Haskell v. Dusty Haskell , 2017 ME 91 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 91 Docket: Wal-16-252
Submitted
On Briefs: April 27, 2017
Decided: May 9, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
PAMELA HASKELL
v.
DUSTY HASKELL
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Dusty Haskell appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the
District Court (Belfast, Worth, J.) and from the denial of his motion for relief
from that judgment. He argues that the court should have conducted a new
trial because he did not attend the hearing that resulted in the divorce
judgment and the evidence admitted at that hearing was insufficient to
demonstrate his ability to pay spousal support of $6,000 per month. We
discern no error and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Pamela Haskell filed a complaint for divorce in June 2015 after
thirty-nine years of marriage to Dusty. The standard family matter summons
served on Dusty with the complaint stated that court notices would be sent by
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mail and informed Dusty, “It is your own responsibility to be sure that the
Court has your correct address. Any change of address must be in writing and
delivered to the Clerks office by hand or regular mail.”
[¶3] Pamela filed an emergency motion for an interim order of support
and allocation of property. Dusty retained counsel and filed an answer, a
counterclaim, and an objection to the emergency motion. The home mailing
address that Dusty provided to the court was the address of the marital home,
and Dusty never notified the court of any other address. The court ordered
that complete financial statements be submitted by July 28, 2015, and it sent
both parties notice of a hearing set for August 10.
[¶4] Before July 28, Dusty’s counsel moved to withdraw as counsel on
the grounds that Dusty would not follow advice and was non-responsive when
asked if he would agree to counsel’s withdrawal from the matter. The court
granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and ordered that counsel send a copy of
its order to Dusty’s last known address. The court specifically ordered that
the hearing would be held as scheduled on August 10, 2015.
[¶5] The hearing on the emergency motion for an interim order was
held as scheduled, but Dusty, who still had not filed a financial statement, did
not attend. Dusty had been receiving mail at the marital home, and Pamela
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had been stacking it on the table for him, but he had not been looking through
it, opening it, or reading it despite his almost daily visits to the home. In
Dusty’s absence, the court entered an interim order based on the evidence
that Pamela provided at the hearing. Among other provisions, the order gave
Pamela exclusive possession of the marital home and of marital and business
accounts, required Dusty to document his business dealings, ordered Dusty to
pay $10,000 in attorney fees, and awarded Pamela interim spousal support of
$1,000 per week beginning on August 14.
[¶6] On August 17, 2015, the court scheduled a final hearing for
September 28, 2015, and sent notice to both parties. On September 13,
Pamela packed up some things that Dusty had left in the marital home,
including his mail, and clipped a copy of the interim order onto the outside of
a box. She took these things to a location where Dusty could get them. Dusty
looked at the interim order about a week later and did not agree with its
terms, though he did nothing about it.
[¶7] The final divorce hearing was held as scheduled, but Dusty did not
appear. The court took testimony from Pamela and, on October 13, 2015,
entered the judgment that Pamela proposed through counsel. The court
divided the parties’ real and personal property and awarded Pamela $6,000
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per month in spousal support for the rest of her life, absent modification. The
court reached this decision based on evidence of her age, her lack of college or
other education after high school, her work for Dusty’s businesses over the
preceding eleven years, and Dusty’s multiple profitable businesses. After the
judgment was entered, Pamela personally delivered a copy of the judgment to
the camp where Dusty was by then staying.
[¶8] Fifteen days after the divorce judgment was entered, on
October 28, 2015, Dusty, through newly retained counsel, moved for a new
trial, M.R. Civ. P. 59, and for relief from the divorce judgment, M.R.
Civ. P. 60(b). He asserted that his mail had been going to the parties’ marital
home, which was in Pamela’s possession; that he did not learn of the date for
the final hearing through correspondence or through his daily conversations
with Pamela; and that in two prior divorce proceedings, the parties had
reached agreements to dismiss the matters.
[¶9] Pamela opposed Dusty’s motions, and after unsuccessful efforts to
resolve the matter through mediation, an evidentiary hearing was held. Both
Pamela and Dusty testified. Dusty testified that he did not attend to the
proceedings because he did not think “that it would ever go to this extent,”
given the parties’ previous dismissals of prior divorce actions by agreement.
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[¶10] The court entered a judgment denying Dusty’s motions. The
court found that Dusty had established no prejudicial error or substantial
injustice in the divorce judgment, see M.R. Civ. P. 59; Ringuette v. Ringuette,
594 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Me. 1991), and that no mistake, surprise, or excusable
neglect justified relief from judgment because Dusty’s own lack of diligence
and neglect of the matter—including the failure to update his mailing address,
attend hearings, or file a financial affidavit—resulted in the entry of the
divorce judgment, see M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Dusty timely appealed from both the
divorce judgment and the judgment denying his motions. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901
(2016); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2.1
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] Dusty argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for relief from judgment because Pamela contributed to his ignorance
of the court dates and he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard. He
further argues that the factors for determining whether to award spousal
support include the ability of the obligor to pay—a determination
unsupported by any evidence admitted at the divorce hearing that the court
held in his absence.
1 In his brief on appeal, Dusty does not challenge the court’s ruling on his Rule 59 motion for a
new trial.
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A. Motion for Relief from Judgment
[¶12] “We review the denial of a M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion.” Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2008 ME 11, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1082.
“Review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions:
(1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear
error standard; (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise
of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was
the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of
reasonableness.” McLeod v. Macul, 2016 ME 76, ¶ 6, 139 A.3d 920 (quotation
marks omitted). A party who moves for relief from a judgment bears “the
burden of producing competent evidence to support his motion,” and we will
vacate factual findings that are “adverse to the party with the burden of proof
only if the record compels a contrary conclusion.” Foley v. Adam, 638 A.2d
718, 719 (Me. 1994).
[¶13] “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; . . . (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . .
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or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”
M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). “To obtain relief from a default judgment under Rule
60(b)(1) for excusable neglect, a party must show (1) a reasonable excuse for
her inattention to the court proceedings, and (2) a meritorious defense to the
underlying action. We afford parties who were self-represented at trial no
special consideration.” Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 22, 955 A.2d 202 (citation omitted).
[¶14] Although Dusty argues that Pamela knew that he had not
received notice of the hearing, the evidence did not compel that finding or any
other findings of fact that would amount to fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct, see M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); Foley, 638 A.2d at 719, or mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, see M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); Ezell,
2008 ME 139, ¶ 22, 955 A.2d 202. The record fully supports the court’s
findings that Dusty never changed his mailing address from the address of the
family home and that he failed to attend to his mail and monitor the
proceedings throughout, despite receiving notice from the court that he was
required to do so to preserve his rights.
[¶15] The court did not, in these circumstances, misapply the law, and
it acted within the bounds of reasonableness in deciding to deny the motion
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for relief. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (3), (6); McLeod, 2016 ME 76, ¶ 6, 139 A.3d
920. “Notice and the opportunity to be heard”—the “two essential elements
of due process of law”—were provided here, though Dusty elected not to heed
the notices supplied to him; he appears to have had and yet ignored advice of
counsel; and he failed to take advantage of any of his opportunities to be
heard. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 15
(Me. 1973); see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶ 8, 155 A.3d 416.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dusty’s motion for relief.
B. Spousal Support
[¶16] “We review a decision regarding spousal support for abuse of
discretion.” Dube v. Dube, 2016 ME 15, ¶ 10, 131 A.3d 381. “Review for an
abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual
findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard;
(2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion;
and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s
weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of
reasonableness.” McLeod, 2016 ME 76, ¶ 6, 139 A.3d 920 (quotation marks
omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no competent
evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly misapprehends
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the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to the credible
evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”
Guardianship of Hailey M., 2016 ME 80, ¶ 15, 140 A.3d 478 (citations omitted)
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶17] “General support may be awarded to provide financial assistance
to a spouse with substantially less income potential than the other spouse so
that both spouses can maintain a reasonable standard of living after the
divorce.” 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A) (2016). In determining an award of
spousal support, a court must consider several factors, including “[t]he ability
of each party to pay.” 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5) (2016).
[¶18] The facts in the divorce judgment are supported by evidence that
Pamela submitted at the final hearing, which Dusty failed to attend. Based on
the parties’ most recent joint tax return offered in evidence, the parties’
after-tax annual income is more than double the $72,000 per year that the
court ordered in spousal support. The court explicitly referenced the
applicable law, including the statutory factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5); it
referenced the factors that informed its decision; and its resulting award of
support was within the bounds of reasonableness. McLeod, 2016 ME 76, ¶ 6,
139 A.3d 920.
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The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Joseph W. Baiungo, Esq., Belfast, for appellant Dusty Haskell
C.H. Spurling, Esq., Gardiner, for appellee Pamela Haskell
Belfast District Court docket number FM-2015-100
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY