Steven Rutherford v. United States District Court , 425 F. App'x 400 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-30951 Document: 00511479911 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 17, 2011
    No. 10-30951
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    STEVEN L. RUTHERFORD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT; JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR., United
    States Magistrate Judge,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-2801
    Before DAVIS, SMITH and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Steven L. Rutherford has applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
    (IFP) in this appeal from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint, in which he
    named as defendants the United States District Courts and United States
    Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.                  Rutherford complained that
    Magistrate Judge Wilkinson violated his constitutional rights by refusing to
    grant his application for leave to proceed IFP in another case.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-30951 Document: 00511479911 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/17/2011
    No. 10-30951
    “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies
    in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” § 1915(a)(3); Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th
    Cir. 1997). A court’s inquiry into whether the appeal is taken in good faith “is
    limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and
    therefore not frivolous).’” Howard, 
    707 F.2d at 220
     (citation omitted).
    District courts are required to dismiss IFP complaints upon determining
    that such complaints are frivolous, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted, or seek monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
    relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Wilkinson is absolutely immune from suit because he a
    judicial officer and his ruling denying Rutherford’s request for leave to proceed
    IFP was an act performed in the exercise of his judicial function. See Mireles v.
    Waco, 
    502 U.S. 9
    , 11-12 (1991); 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 636
    (b) & 1915(a)(1); LR 72.1(B)(1).
    As a unit of the judicial branch of the federal government, the United States
    District Court is entitled to sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked
    jurisdiction to entertain Rutherford’s claims against it. See FDIC v. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. 471
    , 475 (1994).
    Rutherford suggests that the district court was unfairly biased in denying
    his requests for leave to proceed IFP on appeal. There is no reason to believe
    that the district court’s rulings were based on an extrajudicial source, nor do
    they demonstrate such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment
    impossible. See Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).
    Rutherford has filed two additional motions: (1) a “writ of habeas corpus”
    requesting that the defendants be compelled to answer his complaint; and (2) an
    “injunction of relief ” asking this court to “excuse” itself and to refer the case to
    the United States Supreme Court. These motions are DENIED.
    Because the appeal is frivolous, leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED
    and the appeal is DISMISSED. See Howard, 
    707 F.2d at 220
    ; 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2.
    We WARN Rutherford that the continued filing of frivolous motions and other
    2
    Case: 10-30951 Document: 00511479911 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/17/2011
    No. 10-30951
    documents in this court and/or in the district court will invite the imposition of
    a sanction.
    3