Mosier v. State , 235 So. 3d 957 ( 2017 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    PHILIP MOSIER,                     )
    )
    Appellant,              )
    )
    v.                                 )                            Case No. 2D16-5457
    )
    STATE OF FLORIDA,                  )
    )
    Appellee.               )
    ___________________________________)
    Opinion filed October 13, 2017.
    Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
    9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
    Manatee County; Deno G. Economou,
    Judge.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
    Appellee.
    Philip Mosier, pro se.
    PER CURIAM.
    Philip Mosier appeals the order denying his motion to correct illegal
    sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The State
    properly concedes that Mosier is entitled to reversal and remand for resentencing.
    In his motion, Mosier argued that his concurrent sentences of thirty years'
    imprisonment followed by ten years' sexual offender probation for felony offenses he
    committed when he was sixteen years of age are unconstitutional under Graham v.
    Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010), and Henry v. State, 
    175 So. 3d 675
    (Fla. 2015). In denying
    Mosier's motion, the postconviction court found that Mosier would be released at age
    forty-six at the latest and that he had the opportunity for earlier release through the
    accrual of gain time. Based on those findings, the court concluded that Mosier's
    sentences were not unconstitutional.
    Since the issuance of the postconviction court's order, the supreme court
    has squarely refuted the postconviction court's conclusion:
    [P]ursuant to Henry, we must consider three factors when
    reviewing a juvenile nonhomicide offender's term-of-years
    sentence. Post–Henry, we must ensure that a juvenile
    nonhomicide offender does not receive a sentence that
    provides for release only at the end of a sentence (e.g. a 45–
    year sentence with no provision for obtaining early release
    based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation
    before the expiration of the imposed term, such as in Kelsey
    [v. State, 
    206 So. 3d 5
    (Fla. 2016)]). Secondly, we must
    ensure that a juvenile nonhomicide offender who is
    sentenced post-Henry does not receive a sentence which
    includes early release that is not based on a demonstration
    of rehabilitation and maturity (i.e. gain time or other
    programs designed to relieve prison overpopulation). Last,
    we must ensure that a juvenile nonhomicide offender who is
    sentenced post-Henry does not receive a sentence that
    provides for early release at a time beyond his or her natural
    life (e.g. a 1,000-year sentence that provides parole-eligibility
    after the offender serves 100 years). To qualify as a
    "meaningful opportunity for early release," a juvenile
    nonhomicide offender's sentence must meet each of the
    three parameters described in Henry.
    Johnson v. State, 
    215 So. 3d 1237
    , 1243 (Fla. 2017).
    -2-
    Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court's order and remand for
    Mosier to be resentenced under the juvenile sentencing guidelines codified in sections
    775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2016). See 
    Johnson, 215 So. 3d at 1243
    .
    Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
    KELLY, KHOUZAM, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2D16-5457

Citation Numbers: 235 So. 3d 957

Filed Date: 10/13/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023