In re Children of Dani B. , 2018 ME 62 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 62 Docket: Cum-17-532
Submitted
On Briefs: April 25, 2018
Decided: May 3, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF DANI B.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Dani B. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Portland,
Powers, J.) terminating her parental rights to her two children.1 She argues that
the record cannot support the finding of parental unfitness. We affirm the
judgment.
[¶2] The Department filed a child protection petition with respect to the
younger child in November 2011 when that child was nine months old. See
22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017). The petition alleged that the mother, who was abusing
substances, left the child with a relative while evading arrest on charges of
burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In January 2012, the court (Goranites, J.)
entered a jeopardy order, with the parties’ agreement, that granted the
1 The children’s fathers do not appeal from the termination of their parental rights, and we focus
on the procedural history and findings regarding the mother.
2
Department custody of the child and placed the child with his paternal
grandmother. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035(2), 4036(1)(F) (2017).
[¶3] In March 2012, the mother’s older child, who had been residing with
his father, came into the Department’s custody through a preliminary
protection order entered by the court (Mulhern, J.) when his father left him with
a relative while the mother was incarcerated. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(2) (2017).
The court (Goranites, J.) entered a jeopardy order with respect to that child,
upon the parties’ agreement, in May 2012, granting the Department custody
and placing the child, then age six, with his paternal grandmother. See id.
§§ 4035, 4036.
[¶4] The Department provided, and the mother participated in, multiple
services, culminating in a trial placement of both children with the mother
beginning in late January 2013. The placement was suspended for ten days in
September 2013 and then terminated in November 2013. The children entered
foster care, and the mother continued to pursue reunification.
[¶5] The children were again placed in the mother’s home in a second
trial placement that began in the summer of 2014 for the older child and the
early fall of 2014 for the younger child. In February 2015, custody of the two
children was formally returned to the mother. All parties anticipated that the
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case would be dismissed in April 2015, but the mother admitted that she had
used cocaine at the end of March, and the matter remained open.
[¶6] In February 2016, the Department petitioned for preliminary
protection orders for the children after a brick was thrown through the window
of their home, possibly by the mother’s recent boyfriend, a man who was
involved with drugs and had threatened to shoot at her home after she broke
up with him. The court (Powers, J.) signed preliminary protection orders
placing the children in the custody of the Department.
[¶7] The Department petitioned for termination of the mother’s parental
rights as to both children in June 2016. The court held a trial on that petition
over the course of three days between October 12 and 16, 2017. It then entered
a judgment granting the petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights after
reaching extensive findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence. 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195. All
of those facts are supported by competent evidence in the record. See In re A.M.,
2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463.
[¶8] Based on the facts that it found, the court reached the following
ultimate findings.
This is a tragic case regarding [the mother], who has made
some recent progress toward resolving her serious parenting
4
deficits. It is, however, a situation of too little progress, too late in
the process. She still cannot meet her children’s needs or protect
them from jeopardy in any reasonable time. . . .
[The mother] still suffers from mental health issues and
remains on suboxone to assist her from relapsing on opioids. She
has a history of getting involved with poor parental figures who
also engage in violent behaviors. Her latest male friend is an
unknown regarding the above, though [the mother] thinks he is
fine. She remains having three weekly supervised contact with the
two boys, one of whom has significant medical needs and the other
has considerable emotional issues. They need attentive and
reliable caregiving that she cannot be counted on to provide. [The
mother] cannot yet be trusted to care for these boys and keep them
safe in light of the family’s history. She has had two failed, though
lengthy, trial placements, and the prospect of a third would entail
at least months more of uncertainty. [The mother]’s lack of proper
judgment regarding her partners remains a serious concern, as she
has historically put her needs before the boys’ needs.
[The mother] clearly loves the boys and is willing to become
a proper parent. She has already had 5 years for one child and 6
years for the second without still being ready to be their capable
and safe parent. This is unfortunate and devastating to [the
mother], but the facts clearly show her inability to function as the
boys’ parent now or in the near future.
. . . .
. . . [T]hese cases have been pending for 5 and 6 years
respectively, well longer than is typical in child protection matters.
Both boys have special needs that require capable and attentive
parenting. The boys show concern over their ongoing living
situation, and understandably so.
These boys require a permanent routine, and stable home
life. The uncertainty, including the court process, which has
surrounded their lives has already lasted too long and needs to end.
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These boys’ special needs are considerable, and they will need
ongoing services as they grow up. They need parents who are
attentive and reliable. They also require parents who will make
their care a high priority and not expose them to unsafe people or
home situations, unlike in the past.
The current resource parents for each boy have provided and
can continue to provide the care the boys desire and deserve. . . .
Too much of the boys’ lives has already passed without a stable and
predictable home for them. This can change if termination occurs,
followed by adoption. All of this is certainly in these boys’ best
interest.
This is so even if their mother is not their legal parent any
longer. She may well be allowed to participate in their lives to some
degree based on the foster parents’ current plans.
. . . .
DHHS has made reasonable efforts to prevent removal from
the home by providing services such as caseworker services, case
management, supervised visits, counseling, drug screening, and
parent education.
[¶9] Based on the facts that the court found, all of which have evidentiary
support, the court did not err in finding that, despite many years of effort by the
mother and the Department, the instability, chaos, and observation of violence
to which the children have been subjected must end if they are to have any
chance for healthy lives. As the court found, the mother remains unable to
protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for them within a time
that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs. See 22 M.R.S.
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§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.
Although the mother argues, somewhat paradoxically, that the duration of the
proceedings, and therefore the multiple opportunities for her to provide safe
and stable care for the children, demonstrated a lack of urgency on the
Department’s part, the court did not err in finding that the long period of
uncertainty has in fact been detrimental to the children and that they now
desperately need permanency. Nor did the court err or abuse its discretion in
determining that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in each
child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H., 2005
ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Nathan Seth Levy, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant Mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Portland District Court docket numbers PC-2011-76, PC-2012-26
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY