In re Braxton M. , 2017 ME 197 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 197Docket: Yor-17-128
Submitted
On Briefs: September 27, 2017
Decided: October 5, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE BRAXTON M.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The parents of Braxton M. appeal from a judgment of the District
Court (Biddeford, Foster, J.) terminating their parental rights to Braxton
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv)
(2016). The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s finding of parental unfitness. Counsel for the mother filed a brief
indicating that there are no arguable issues with merit in this appeal and, by
order dated May 22, 2017, we afforded the mother the opportunity to file a
supplemental brief. The mother did not file any supplemental materials.
Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary
determinations, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the parents were unable to protect the
child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time
2
reasonably calculated to meet his needs, that they had failed to make a good
faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and that termination of
their parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv); In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 15,
966 A.2d 894. The court based this determination on the following findings of
fact.
[¶3] “[The father] was charged with Domestic Violence Assault; the
victim was [the mother]. The incident had occurred in the presence of [the
child].” The mother “detailed a series of incidents during which [the father]
verbally and/or physically assaulted her, including a claim that he attempted
to choke her on one occasion prior to the Department’s involvement.”
[¶4] There were also “several reports made to the Department which
alleged [the mother] had begun a relationship with [a sex offender] . . . . The
concern was that [the mother] was allowing [the child] to have contact with
[the sex offender].”
As to [the sex offender], [the mother] explained that it had taken
some time to extricate herself from the relationship she had with
[the sex offender], one that she described as abusive and marked
by constant fighting. Yet it is clear that [the mother] continued to
be involved with [the sex offender] through the summer of 2016,
over a year after she was told of [the sex offender’s] history.
3
[¶5] The court also found that neither parent has engaged in services
needed to ameliorate jeopardy to the child or as required by their
reunification plans. “Throughout the fall of 2015 and the first half of 2016,
neither parent was very active in reunification services.”
[The mother] rejects the proposition that she has a substance
abuse problem that has affected her ability to raise her child. At
trial, she indicated she would “definitely consider” stopping her
use of marijuana if [the child] was placed with her. The
implication is that she does not see the need to stop for her own
individual benefit. Yet substance abuse is one of the factors cited
by the Court in the Jeopardy Order of August 7, 2015. Since the
entry of that order, [the mother] has continued to use marijuana
on a regular basis, continued to drink alcohol, and tested positive
for cocaine and benzodiazepines in August of 2016. Her use has
been implicated in a traffic accident, resulted in a civil
adjudication and fine for the use of alcohol as a minor, and been
an element in altercations with [the father]. She has not yet begun
treatment for substance abuse.
[The father] shows a disconcerting tendency to minimize or
rationalize his behavior. One example is the incident of
November of 2015, which resulted in his arrest for assault and for
which he currently is on a Deferred Disposition. [The father]
characterized the incident as one of self-defense, explaining that
[the mother] had not been willing to leave their apartment and
had struck him before he physically removed her. He declined to
classify it as domestic violence, explaining he had not intended to
harm [the mother]. Similarly, he acknowledged he had been
angry in June 2016 when he had thrown a drink in the car in
which [the mother] had been riding. [The father] agreed that
“technically” that constituted offensive physical contact.
However, he continued, it had not been intentional but rather a
violent outburst. Those characterizations are at odds with the
4
textbook recitation by [the father] of what constitutes domestic
violence.
[¶6] Although, “after an inconsistent start [the father] had begun
attending weekly group meetings at Violence No More[,]” he has not fully
engaged in the services required by the reunification plan and needed to
ameliorate jeopardy.
[¶7] Finally, the child “has been in at least four placements since the
Department became involved with his family in the spring of 2015.” “[The
maternal great Aunt] has made a positive connection with [the child] and is
ready to provide a permanent home for him in a manner that suits his needs.
The sooner that can be accomplished, the better for [the child].”
[¶8] These findings are sufficient to support the court’s determinations
that the parents are unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take
responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet his
needs, that they had failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and
reunify with the child, and that termination of their parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) & (iv);
In re Bradyn B., 2017 ME 168, ¶ 6, --- A.3d ---. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that that the parents are
unfit and that termination of their parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
5
See id.; see also In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court
finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative
bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A.,
Biddeford, for appellant father
Pamela S. Holmes, Esq., Holmes Legal Group, LLC, Wells, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2015-38
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY