State of Maine v. Rondon Athayde , 2022 ME 41 ( 2022 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                      Reporter of Decisions
    Decision:  
    2022 ME 41
    Docket:    Oxf-21-302
    Argued:    May 11, 2022
    Decided:   July 5, 2022
    Panel:          STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.*
    STATE OF MAINE
    v.
    RONDON ATHAYDE
    CONNORS, J.
    [¶1] Rondon Athayde appeals from a judgment of conviction of murder,
    17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B) (2018),1 entered by the trial court (Oxford County,
    Stokes, J.) after a jury trial, and from his sentence of fifty years in prison. He
    argues that (A) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress upon
    concluding that his statements to law enforcement while walking them through
    his home were voluntary, (B) the court erred in denying Athayde’s motion for
    *   Although Justice Humphrey participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was
    certified.
    1  Because of statutory amendments enacted since the relevant time, see, e.g., P.L. 2019, ch. 462,
    § 3 (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 201(4) (2022)); P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, A-2
    (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (repealing and replacing sentencing statutes), in this opinion we cite the
    substantive statutes, including the statutes governing the imposition of the sentence, that were in
    effect at the time of the victim’s death, which occurred in December 2018. See State v. Hardy, 
    489 A.2d 508
    , 512 (Me. 1985) (holding that “the wrongdoer must be punished pursuant to the law in effect at
    the time of the offense”).
    2
    judgment of acquittal because a jury could not rationally find that his conduct
    was sufficient to cause the victim’s death, (C) the court committed obvious
    error by failing to instruct the jury on concurrent causation, and (D) the court
    misapplied legal principles or abused its sentencing power in considering a
    history of domestic violence between Athayde and the victim in determining
    his basic sentence. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] Viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
    the State, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See State v. Dorweiler, 
    2016 ME 73
    , ¶ 6, 
    143 A.3d 114
    .
    [¶3] On the night of December 12, 2018, and in the early morning hours
    of December 13, 2018, Rondon Athayde struck the victim2 at least forty-three
    times using metal curtain rods and a wooden coat hanger while they were in
    their shared home with their two daughters, ages three and four. As a result of
    the injuries that Athayde inflicted at that time and the aggravation of injuries
    that he had previously inflicted on the victim, the victim lost roughly two-thirds
    During police interviews, Athayde referred to the victim as his wife, but the two were not legally
    2
    married.
    3
    of her blood through both internal and external bleeding, which caused her
    death.
    [¶4] On December 14, 2018, the State charged Athayde by complaint
    with intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A). He was later
    charged by indictment with intentional or knowing murder or depraved
    indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B).
    A.    Motion to Suppress
    [¶5] On November 4, 2019, Athayde moved to suppress statements that
    he made as he walked through his home with the police on December 13, 2018,
    and described to them, over the course of an hour and a half, what had
    happened. The court held a hearing on the motion on August 27, 2020. The
    only issue before the court was the voluntariness of Athayde’s statements to
    the police at Athayde’s home.
    [¶6] During the suppression hearing, the court admitted in evidence
    audio recordings of Athayde’s police interviews and a video recording of
    Athayde’s walk-through of his home with the police.         It also admitted
    transcripts of the interviews and heard testimony from three detectives about
    their interactions with Athayde on December 13 after his arrest.
    4
    [¶7] The court entered an order on October 16, 2020, in which it found
    the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. These findings are all supported
    by competent evidence, including the video and audio recordings of police
    interviews with Athayde, which we have reviewed in full. See State v. Fleming,
    
    2020 ME 120
    , ¶ 25, 
    239 A.3d 648
    ; State v. Akers, 
    2021 ME 43
    , ¶ 46,
    
    259 A.3d 127
    .
    [¶8]      Athayde called 9-1-1 from his home after midnight on
    December 13, 2018, and police arrived at about 1:00 a.m. Athayde was placed
    in police custody and brought to the Oxford Police Department. There, two
    detectives interviewed him beginning at 4:13 a.m. At the outset, one of the
    detectives administered Miranda3 warnings, and Athayde acknowledged that
    he understood his rights. He was able to describe in his own words what the
    warnings meant. Athayde signed a written waiver of his rights and indicated
    that he wanted to cooperate.
    [¶9] The officers were professional, respectful, and nonconfrontational
    in their interview. They did not raise their voices, and Athayde thanked them
    for their treatment of him. At times, Athayde became emotional and sobbed,
    overwhelmed by the enormity of the events, but he was able to refocus quickly
    3   Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 478-79 (1966).
    5
    and describe what had happened. The detectives allowed Athayde to express
    his feelings, and they did not interrupt him, instead waiting for him to be able
    to control his feelings and continue with the conversation. The detectives
    frequently offered Athayde food, water, or coffee, but Athayde declined their
    offers, except that he did eat some crackers.
    [¶10] With Athayde’s consent, the detectives brought him to his home at
    approximately 4:24 p.m. that same day, after evidence technicians had
    processed the scene. One of the detectives reminded Athayde of his Miranda
    rights before beginning a walk-through. The officer informed him that he did
    not have to participate and could refuse to do so. Athayde indicated that he
    understood and that he would participate.
    [¶11] In the presence of four detectives, Athayde walked from room to
    room describing and showing what had happened. As Athayde explained the
    events, the lead detective redirected him if he strayed from the subject or was
    unclear. The walk-through ended at about 5:53 p.m.
    [¶12] During the totality of his time with the detectives, Athayde said
    that he had performed CPR on the victim and that it had made him tired. He
    said that he was fatigued and overwhelmed at times. He was in handcuffs
    during the walk-through; it is not clear whether he was wearing handcuffs at
    6
    the police station. Athayde did not sleep during the entire time he was with the
    detectives. A detective offered him the opportunity to rest, but he appeared to
    want to continue to speak with the detective. No bed or cot was available, and
    he was only able to sit in a chair or lie down on the floor. He probably had not
    slept since waking up on December 12.
    [¶13] Athayde told the detectives that he felt sick. This feeling of illness
    resulted from his emotional reaction to what had happened between him and
    the victim, and he remained able to appreciate and understand what was
    happening. One of the detectives offered to call an ambulance, but Athayde
    declined.
    [¶14] Based on these findings, the court denied Athayde’s motion to
    suppress, concluding that, in the totality of the circumstances, Athayde made
    the statements during the walk-through voluntarily.
    B.    Trial and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
    [¶15] The court held a jury trial on June 15, 16, and 17, 2021. The court
    admitted the video of the walk-through in evidence. The State did not offer any
    of the audio recordings from the interviews at the police station in evidence,
    although it did offer a detective’s testimony about the interviews. At the close
    of the State’s evidence, Athayde moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court
    7
    denied the motion. Athayde did not testify and called no witnesses in his
    defense.
    [¶16] The jury found Athayde guilty.
    C.       Sentencing
    [¶17] The court held a sentencing hearing on August 31, 2021. The
    victim’s sister and Athayde each spoke to the court, and the court heard
    arguments from both parties before delivering its sentence.                           The court
    considered the purposes of sentencing and conducted the requisite two-part
    sentencing analysis.4 See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1201(1)(A), 1252-C (2018); State v.
    Bentley, 
    2021 ME 39
    , ¶ 10, 
    254 A.3d 1171
    . Considering the nature of the crime
    in setting the basic sentence, the court focused on the serious domestic
    violence, describing it as “one of the most brutal, savage and vicious beatings”
    the court had seen as an attorney or judge—an assault that involved the use of
    hard objects, lasted for hours, and was not the first act of domestic violence that
    Athayde had perpetrated against the victim.5 The court set the basic sentence
    at forty-five years based in part on these considerations.
    There is no third step in murder sentencing because no period of probation is authorized.
    4
    See 17-A M.R.S. § 1201(1)(A) (2018).
    5 The testimony, photographs, and autopsy findings of the medical examiner strongly support this
    characterization. The medical examiner concluded that forty-three separate injuries were inflicted
    with metal rods and that there were roughly seventy-five additional injuries—some older than
    others—to the victim’s head, neck, back, side, arms, legs, and pubic area. The victim had suffered a
    8
    [¶18] The court then considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The
    court found as mitigating factors that Athayde had no criminal history, had
    prior work history and education, and had cooperated with the police and
    expressed remorse, though he did minimize his role and misrepresented how
    the victim was injured. As aggravating factors, the court considered the impact
    on the parties’ young daughters, who were present in the home throughout
    these events and saw or heard some of what happened, and the conscious pain
    and suffering of the victim during the hours of abuse. The court concluded that
    the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and set a maximum
    and final sentence of fifty years in prison. The court also ordered Athayde to
    pay $35 to the Victims’ Compensation Fund and $3,198.47 to the Victims’
    Compensation Program.
    [¶19] Athayde timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and
    successfully applied to the Sentence Review Panel for review of his sentence.
    15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151-2152 (2022); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20.
    large excoriation (loss of hair and skin) on the scalp days to weeks before her death. That injury had
    partially healed, but it reopened, and fresh blood in the wound showed that the victim had bled from
    the wound soon before her death.
    9
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.    Although the question is close under the Maine Constitution, the
    court did not err in denying Athayde’s motion to suppress the video
    recording of his walk-through of what happened in his home.
    [¶20] Athayde relies on both the Maine and United States Constitutions
    in challenging the finding that his statements made during the walk-through
    were voluntary.     We therefore analyze this claim applying the primacy
    approach. See State v. Reeves, 
    2022 ME 10
    , ¶ 41, 
    268 A.3d 281
    ; State v. Cadman,
    
    476 A.2d 1148
    , 1150 (Me. 1984). This means that we first examine the merits
    of the state constitutional claim, independently of the federal constitutional
    claim. See Reeves, 
    2022 ME 10
    , ¶ 41, 
    268 A.3d 281
    . We proceed to review the
    application of the federal Constitution only if the state constitution does not
    settle the issue. See id. ¶ 48; Cadman, 
    476 A.2d at 1151
    . In analyzing the Maine
    Constitution, we consider federal interpretations of any analogous provisions
    of the United States Constitution only if we deem those interpretations
    persuasive, giving them weight similar to the weight we might give to
    interpretations of analogous provisions in other states’ constitutions. See
    Reeves, 
    2022 ME 10
    , ¶ 41, 
    268 A.3d 281
    .
    [¶21] We use the primacy approach for three reasons. First, there is no
    federal violation if the state constitutional provision provides the relief sought
    10
    by the defendant. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 
    466 U.S. 727
    , 736 (1984)
    (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law,
    including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim.
    This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because
    the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when
    the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.” (quotation marks
    omitted)). Second, we exercise judicial restraint to avoid issuing unnecessary
    opinions on the United States Constitution. Cadman, 
    476 A.2d at 1150
     (“Just as
    it is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure to avoid expressing opinions on
    constitutional questions when some other resolution of the issues renders a
    constitutional ruling unnecessary, a similar policy of judicial restraint moves us
    to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional issues before consulting our
    state constitution.” (citation omitted)). Third, the primacy approach enables us
    to satisfy our duties under our federalist system.        See Jeffrey S. Sutton,
    51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law
    179 (2018) (“A state-first approach to litigation over constitutional rights
    honors the original design of the state and federal constitutions.”); State v.
    Larrivee, 
    479 A.2d 347
    , 349 (Me. 1984) (“We must test that claim initially by
    11
    our state constitution. That document, after all, has been the primary protector
    of the fundamental liberties of Maine people since statehood was achieved.”).
    1.      Although a close case, Athayde’s statements were voluntary
    under the Maine Constitution.
    a.      The Maine Constitution requires consideration of factors
    internal and external to the defendant to determine
    voluntariness.
    [¶22]        Under the Maine Constitution, we assess voluntariness by
    examining both internal and external factors to determine whether a
    defendant’s statements are the product of the free choice of a rational mind,
    and not a product of coercive police conduct; and whether, under all the
    circumstances, the admission of the statements would be fundamentally fair.
    State v. Dodge, 
    2011 ME 47
    , ¶ 12, 
    17 A.3d 128
    .
    [¶23] A challenge to the admission in evidence of a confession on the
    ground that the confession is involuntary implicates the right against
    self-incrimination contained in article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution
    (“The accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself
    or herself . . . but by judgment of that person’s peers or the law of the land.”)
    and the right to due process under that same section and article I, section 6-A.
    See State v. Collins, 
    297 A.2d 620
    , 626-27 (Me. 1972) (right against
    self-incrimination); State v. Heald, 
    314 A.2d 820
    , 828-29 (Me. 1973) (same);
    12
    State v. Caouette, 
    446 A.2d 1120
    , 1122 (Me. 1982) (same); Dodge, 
    2011 ME 47
    ,
    ¶ 11, 
    17 A.3d 128
     (sections 6 and 6-A of article I).
    [¶24] The prohibition against the admission of involuntary statements
    protects multiple interests.      Excluding statements that were not made
    voluntarily vindicates truth-seeking by guarding against the admission of
    testimony that is untrustworthy or doubtful. See State v. Grant, 
    22 Me. 171
    , 174
    (Me. 1842) (“[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by
    the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered
    as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it . . . .” (quotation
    marks omitted)); State v. O’Donnell, 
    131 Me. 294
    , 299 (1932) (stating that
    involuntary statements are inadmissible because they are “liable to be
    influenced, by the hope of advantage, or fear of injury, to state things which are
    not true”), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brewer, 
    505 A.2d 774
    ,
    777 & n.5 (Me. 1985).
    [¶25] Excluding involuntary statements also protects the fundamental
    fairness of the criminal justice system by deterring police misconduct and
    protecting human integrity. See State v. Hunt, 
    2016 ME 172
    , ¶ 19, 
    151 A.3d 911
    (requiring consideration of whether, even in the absence of coercion, the
    admission of the statements would “create an injustice”); Collins, 
    297 A.2d at
    13
    626 (stating that we “go beyond the objective of deterrence of lawless conduct
    by police and prosecution” to concentrate as well on “the right of an individual,
    entirely apart from his guilt or innocence, not to be compelled to condemn
    himself by his own utterances” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Rees,
    
    2000 ME 55
    , ¶ 8, 
    748 A.2d 976
     (reaffirming Collins); Akers, 
    2021 ME 43
    , ¶ 47,
    
    259 A.3d 127
     (citing Rees).
    [¶26] Hence, even when police conduct is exemplary, a confession may
    be excluded to safeguard the other values protected under the Maine
    Constitution. See Collins, 
    297 A.2d at
    626 n.5 (“The value to which reference is
    now being made extends significantly beyond the deterrence of police, or
    prosecution, brutality or lawlessness. There are countless instances in which
    official conduct in procuring the confession is exemplary, and yet the utterances
    of the accused, for other reasons, will not be in fact the product of his free will
    and rational intellect.”); e.g., Rees, 
    2000 ME 55
    , ¶¶ 2, 9, 
    748 A.2d 976
     (affirming
    the suppression of statements made by the defendant based on his mental
    condition and not any improper police activity).
    [¶27] Additionally, to ensure the voluntariness of a confession and
    protection of these values, we, unlike the Supreme Court with respect to the
    United States Constitution, require the State to prove voluntariness beyond a
    14
    reasonable doubt to satisfy the Maine Constitution. See Collins, 
    297 A.2d at 636-37
    ; Heald, 
    314 A.2d at 828-29
    ; Akers, 
    2021 ME 43
    , ¶ 47, 
    259 A.3d 127
    ; cf.
    Lego v. Twomey, 
    404 U.S. 477
    , 489 (1972) (requiring, for purposes of the United
    States Constitution, that the prosecution prove voluntariness by a
    preponderance of the evidence).
    [¶28] In sum, we take care to ensure that a confession is the product of
    free will and intellect and untainted by pressure, either external or internal. See
    also State v. Gilman, 
    51 Me. 206
    , 215, 224-25 (1862) (opining that to be
    admissible, a confession must be made without compulsion, undue influence,
    or extortion by the exercise of inquisitorial power); Caouette, 
    446 A.2d at 1123-24
     (holding, in affirming the suppression of a confession, that although
    “proof that a defendant’s statement is spontaneous and unsolicited will often
    result in a finding of voluntariness, such proof does not compel a finding that
    the defendant was free from compulsion of whatever nature” (quotation marks
    omitted)); Dodge, 
    2011 ME 47
    , ¶ 12, 
    17 A.3d 128
     (“If a criminal defendant
    challenges the voluntariness of a confession, a court must determine if the
    confession resulted from the free choice of a rational mind, was not a product
    of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its admission
    would be fundamentally fair.” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Williams,
    15
    
    2020 ME 128
    , ¶ 42, 
    241 A.3d 835
     (identifying the values of discouraging
    objectionable police practices, protecting the mental freedom of the individual,
    and preserving a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system).
    b.      In the totality of the circumstances in which Athayde
    made his statements, the statements were voluntary.
    [¶29]        In reviewing the voluntariness of statements made to law
    enforcement, we review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error but the
    ultimate determination of whether a statement should be suppressed de novo.
    State v. Kierstead, 
    2015 ME 45
    , ¶ 14, 
    114 A.3d 984
    . Neither the State nor
    Athayde contests the accuracy or authenticity of the audio and video recordings
    admitted at the suppression hearing, and we may, in our appellate capacity,
    listen to and view the recordings in their entirety as we review the court’s
    findings and conclusions. See State v. King, 
    2016 ME 54
    , ¶ 3, 
    136 A.3d 366
    (relying on a video recording played at a suppression hearing, in addition to the
    court’s findings, when setting forth the facts of the case).
    [¶30] To determine whether statements were voluntarily made, we look
    at the totality of the circumstances, including “the details of the interrogation;
    duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the
    interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of
    officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats,
    16
    promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s age,
    physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.”           Akers,
    
    2021 ME 43
    , ¶ 47, 
    259 A.3d 127
     (quotation marks omitted).
    [¶31] Considering the totality of the circumstances reflected in the
    record, this is a close case.
    [¶32]    Circumstances potentially suggesting involuntariness include,
    first, the total length of the interrogations by the police.     Athayde was
    handcuffed and taken into custody at approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 13.
    Police detectives interrogated him starting at 4:13 a.m., with a short break to
    fingerprint him, followed by continued questioning until 12:04 p.m., and the
    resumption of questioning during the ninety-minute walk-through, which
    began after 4:00 p.m.
    [¶33] Second, Athayde was at times highly emotional, as evidenced by
    him praying, feeling sick, and saying that he wanted to die. At times he
    presented his narrative of events in a rambling and somewhat incoherent
    manner, straying from the subject.
    17
    [¶34]     Third, at the time of the walk-through—after 4:00 p.m. on
    December 13—Athayde probably had not slept since he awoke on the morning
    of December 12.6
    [¶35] On the other hand, the police exerted no pressure beyond taking
    Athayde into custody and interacting with him so that he could speak as he
    wished. The detectives specifically asked him multiple times while he was in
    custody whether he wanted to stop. They offered him food and drink. They
    attempted to draw the interview to an end at one point, but when Athayde
    continued to talk, they simply continued the conversation.
    [¶36] Although Athayde was clearly emotionally distressed at times, this
    did not interfere with his ability to recall what had happened or to speak from
    the free choice of a rational mind. See State v. Thibodeau, 
    496 A.2d 635
    , 640-41
    6  Sleep deprivation has been held to undermine the voluntariness of confessions, in no small part
    because it undermines the reliability of confessions. See Spano v. New York, 
    360 U.S. 315
    , 322-23
    (1959) (disfavoring police techniques in which “slowly mounting fatigue does, and is calculated to,
    play its part”); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 
    322 U.S. 143
    , 153-54 (1944) (holding that a confession was not
    voluntary when the defendant had been held incommunicado and subjected to questioning for
    thirty-six hours without sleep or rest); State v. Perea, 
    322 P.3d 624
    , 640, 642 (Utah 2013) (“Recent
    laboratory-based studies have identified several factors,” including sleep deprivation, “that increase
    the likelihood of false confessions.”); Steven J. Frenda et al., Sleep Deprivation and False Confessions,
    113 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 2047, 2048 (2016). As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “‘It has
    been known since 1500 at least that deprivation of sleep is the most effective torture and certain to
    produce any confession desired.’” Ashcraft, 
    322 U.S. at
    150 n.6 (quoting Report of Committee on
    Lawless Enforcement of Law made to the Section of Criminal Law and Criminology of the American
    Bar Association (1930)); see also Mark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep Deprivation on
    Interrogative Suggestibility, 2 J. Experimental Psych. 48 (1996); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced
    Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & Hum. Behav. 3, 16 (2010).
    18
    (Me. 1985). Although he sobbed at times, crying alone does not negate the
    voluntariness of statements. State v. Durepo, 
    472 A.2d 919
    , 921 (Me. 1984); see
    also State v. Cyr, 
    611 A.2d 64
    , 66 (Me. 1992).
    [¶37]      Athayde waived his Miranda rights both at the start of his
    interview at the police station and at the beginning of the walk-through of his
    home.7 There is no argument that he lacked intellectual capacity,8 suffered
    from any mental disorder, or was under the influence of any substances. He
    was consistently eager to tell the authorities what had happened, and when the
    interview appeared to be drawing to a close, he instigated continued
    conversation.
    7 In applying article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution, we have not, to date, made the delivery
    of Miranda warnings a requisite for a statement made in a custodial interrogation to be admissible.
    See State v. McKechnie, 
    1997 ME 40
    , ¶ 7 n.1, 
    690 A.2d 976
     (citing State v. Gardiner, 
    509 A.2d 1160
    ,
    1162-1163 (Me. 1986)). That said, informing (or not informing) defendants of their right against
    self-incrimination has always been considered an important factor under Maine law in assessing the
    voluntariness of their statements or testimony. See State v. Gilman, 
    51 Me. 206
    , 225 (1862) (“Great
    care should undoubtedly be taken to protect the rights of the accused. . . . He should be fully informed
    of his legal rights, when called upon or admitted to testify as a witness in a matter in which his guilt
    is involved.”); 
    id. at 223-24
     (“[W]hen [a defendant] is fully apprised of his rights, and informed that
    he is under no legal obligation to disclose any facts prejudicial to himself, or to give evidence against
    himself, and then deliberately makes statements under oath, no good reason is perceived why such
    statements should not be given in evidence against him. He may testify as freely as he may speak.”).
    A purpose of Miranda warnings is, notably, to counteract the presumptively coercive context of
    custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 
    384 U.S. at 467-469
    ; Duckworth v. Eagan, 
    492 U.S. 195
    , 202
    (1989); Salinas v. Texas, 
    570 U.S. 178
    , 184-85 (2013). It follows, therefore, that the recitation of the
    defendant’s rights followed by waivers are cogent factors supporting the conclusion that a confession
    is voluntary. See State v. Akers, 
    2021 ME 43
    , ¶ 47, 
    259 A.3d 127
     (listing “the recitation of Miranda
    warnings” as one consideration in the totality of the circumstances to be considered in assessing the
    voluntariness of a defendant’s statement (quotation marks omitted)).
    8   There is evidence that Athayde told police that he had a college degree.
    19
    [¶38]    Given that the Maine Constitution rejects confessions as
    involuntary even in the absence of police misconduct, and that a person
    suspected of a serious crime is frequently emotionally agitated, there can come
    a point in the course of police interrogation when the police may need to cut off
    discussion—even when the suspect is mentally competent, has signed multiple
    Miranda waivers, and wants to keep talking—and insist that the person rest or
    take other steps to ensure a confession meets our high standards. But although
    the duration of the interrogations, amount of sleep deprivation, and emotional
    state of the defendant here raise serious questions, the police were not required
    to terminate the conversation with Athayde under the totality of the
    circumstances presented. None of the values protected under the Maine
    Constitution were undermined by the admission of Athayde’s statements. The
    circumstances surrounding his statements supply no reason to conclude that
    his statements are untrue: the statements were not coerced by police
    misconduct; he was not under any condition that negated his capacity to decide
    whether to speak; and his right to speak or not speak, as he chose, was
    protected. See Grant, 
    22 Me. at 174
    ; Dodge, 
    2011 ME 47
    , ¶ 12 & n.5, 
    17 A.3d 128
    ;
    Rees, 
    2000 ME 55
    , ¶ 8, 
    748 A.2d 976
    . The court did not err in reaching its
    20
    findings beyond a reasonable doubt and concluding that Athayde made his
    statements voluntarily.
    2.    Athayde’s statements were also voluntary under the United
    States Constitution.
    [¶39] Because we have concluded that Athayde’s argument does not
    succeed under the Maine Constitution, we must review whether the statements
    were involuntary under the Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the
    United States Constitution. A federal constitutional analysis of voluntariness
    focuses on the presence of police misconduct and not on individual
    characteristics or circumstances that can undermine voluntariness. Colorado v.
    Connelly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 163-67 (1986). As we summarized above, we discern
    no police misconduct in the interviews and walk-through with Athayde. Thus,
    there is no violation of the United States Constitution.
    B.    The court properly denied Athayde’s motion for judgment of
    acquittal.
    [¶40] Athayde contends that the court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence that the injuries inflicted
    on the victim on December 12 and 13 alone caused the victim’s death and it
    would be improper for the jury to regard evidence of those injuries as evidence
    that Athayde inflicted the older injuries.
    21
    [¶41] “We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine
    whether a jury could rationally have found each element of the crime proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Adams, 
    2015 ME 30
    , ¶ 19, 
    113 A.3d 583
    (quotation marks omitted).
    [¶42] The medical examiner testified that the cause of the victim’s death
    was “acute and chronic physical abuse with extensive internal and external
    hemorrhage.” Notwithstanding the reference to “chronic” physical abuse, he
    clearly testified that the “mechanism” of death was the victim’s loss of
    two-thirds of her blood. The exsanguination occurred on December 12 and 13,
    when, as the medical examiner testified, “she bled out.” The prior injuries or
    abuse played a role in her death because the abuse she suffered on
    December 12 and 13 aggravated her existing injuries, adding another source of
    fresh blood loss. As with the blood loss that resulted from new injuries, the
    blood loss from the aggravation of the victim’s previous injuries was caused by
    the abuse inflicted on the victim on December 12 and 13.
    [¶43] Based on the admitted evidence, the jury could rationally find that
    Athayde, by severely beating the victim on December 12 and 13, inflicted new
    22
    injuries and aggravated existing injuries, causing her fatal blood loss. The court
    did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
    C.    The court did not commit obvious error in not instructing the jury
    on concurrent causation.
    [¶44] Athayde argues that an instruction on concurrent causation should
    have been delivered to the jury because there was evidence that the victim had
    other medical issues and there was insufficient evidence that Athayde inflicted
    the older injuries that contributed to her death.
    [¶45] Because Athayde did not request a jury instruction on concurrent
    causation, we review the court’s jury instructions for obvious error. See State v.
    Lajoie, 
    2017 ME 8
    , ¶ 13, 
    154 A.3d 132
    . “To prevail under the obvious error
    standard, [a defendant] must demonstrate that (1) there is an error, (2) that is
    plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and, if so, (4) that it is error that
    seriously affects the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.” 
    Id.
     “In reviewing for obvious error, our ultimate task is to
    determine whether the defendant received a fair trial.” Id. ¶ 15.
    [¶46] To determine whether there was error, we review whether the
    jury instruction was generated by the evidence, see State v. Leon, 
    2018 ME 70
    ,
    ¶ 1 n.1, 
    186 A.3d 129
    , reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the
    defendant to determine if the record would have allowed the jury to find facts
    23
    that would make concurrent causation a reasonable hypothesis. See State v.
    Carrillo, 
    2021 ME 18
    , ¶ 32, 
    248 A.3d 193
    .9
    [¶47] “Unless otherwise provided, when causing a result is an element
    of a crime, causation may be found when the result would not have occurred
    but for the conduct of the defendant, operating either alone or concurrently
    with another cause.” 17-A M.R.S. § 33(1) (2018). “In cases in which concurrent
    causation is generated as an issue, the defendant’s conduct must also have been
    sufficient by itself to produce the result.” Id. § 33(2). As the Legislature
    summarized, the relatively recent addition of subsection 2 was to provide “a
    simplified test to be applied in the event concurrent causation is generated as
    an issue. It provides that, when a defendant’s conduct may have operated
    concurrently with another cause, in addition to satisfying the ‘but for’ test the
    defendant’s conduct must have been sufficient by itself to produce the result
    . . . .” L.D. 1091, Summary, at 8 (128th Legis. 2017); see State v. Limary,
    
    2020 ME 83
    , ¶ 31 n.6, 
    235 A.3d 860
    .
    9 Although in State v. Carrillo, 
    2021 ME 18
    , ¶¶ 32-33, 
    248 A.3d 193
    , we considered whether the
    evidence generated an instruction on a defense, the same standard of review applies as to instructions
    on elements of crimes because “[t]he State’s obligation to disprove a defense generated by the
    evidence is the functional equivalent of the State’s burden to prove all of the elements of the offense,”
    State v. Begin, 
    652 A.2d 102
    , 106 (Me. 1995); see State v. Pratt, 
    2020 ME 141
    , ¶ 12, 
    243 A.3d 469
    .
    24
    [¶48] Here, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Athayde, the
    evidence does not make it a reasonable hypothesis that the victim’s heart or
    thyroid issues caused her to exsanguinate—the event identified by the medical
    examiner as the cause of her death. Nor is it a reasonable hypothesis generating
    a requirement to give a concurrent causation instruction that the victim’s
    earlier injuries were caused by someone other than Athayde. See State v. Allen,
    
    606 A.2d 778
    , 780 (Me. 1992) (holding that when there is “no rational basis for
    the jury to conclude that the death resulted from any cause independent of the
    injuries inflicted by the defendant,” a concurrent causation instruction is not
    required).   The record includes uncontroverted evidence that Athayde
    admitted that he had previously fought with the victim. He said, “[T]here were
    other fights, but they were not violence extreme thing, you know. . . . [T]oday
    was totally out of control.” During the walk-through, too, Athayde alluded to
    previous domestic violence. He stated that although the victim had kicked him,
    “she’s not a bad person. We are just like that inferno that moment that we do.”
    Referring to lulls in the violence on December 12 and 13, he said, “that’s the
    thing, like, the spark goes, and but most of the time we ah, ah, act together and
    love each other, and help each other,” and “we are good at this, when we have
    trouble, we get together, you know?” Finally, some of the preexisting injuries
    25
    were inflicted in personal places on the victim’s body, such as her pubic bone
    and perineum.
    [¶49] Given this evidence and the medical examiner’s testimony that
    fresh bleeding from the events of December 12 and 13 caused the victim’s
    death, the omission of a concurrent causation instruction regarding the
    preexisting injuries did not amount to obvious error.10
    D.        The court did not misapply legal principles or abuse its sentencing
    power in setting the basic sentence.
    [¶50] Lastly, Athayde argues that the court misapplied legal principles in
    considering a history of domestic violence in determining the nature and
    seriousness of the offense. Rather, he contends, that was a factor to consider at
    step two of the sentencing analysis regarding the character of the individual,
    effect on the victim, and protection of the public interest.
    We further note that Athayde may have made a strategic choice by not seeking a concurrent
    10
    causation instruction. The State submitted its proposed instructions two weeks before the trial
    began, and a request for an instruction on concurrent causation could have induced the State to offer
    additional inculpatory statements that Athayde made to police during his interviews at the police
    station. For instance, from the evidence at the suppression hearing, we know that Athayde told the
    police, “some amount of times, ah, went out of hand, and pushing and cursing, falling and, and then
    ah, you hit splattering blood like,” and, “we had fights, we fight, you know?” Although we cannot say
    definitively from this record that Athayde made a strategic choice not to seek a concurrent causation
    instruction, we note that such a strategic choice—if it were apparent from the record—would
    preclude appellate review. State v. Rega, 
    2005 ME 5
    , ¶ 17, 
    863 A.2d 917
     (“We do not review alleged
    errors that resulted from a party’s trial strategy.”); see also State v. Ford, 
    2013 ME 96
    , ¶ 15, 
    82 A.3d 75
    (“[O]bvious error review is precluded when a defendant expressly waives a jury instruction.”
    (quotation marks omitted)).
    26
    [¶51] We review the determination of the basic sentence de novo for
    misapplication of legal principles and for an abuse of the court’s sentencing
    power. Bentley, 
    2021 ME 39
    , ¶ 10, 
    254 A.3d 1171
    . “In a murder case, the
    sentencing court employs a two-step process.” 
    Id.
     First, “the court determines
    the basic term of imprisonment based on an objective consideration of the
    particular nature and seriousness of the crime.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted).
    Next, “the court determines the maximum period of incarceration based on all
    other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate
    to that case, including the character of the offender and the offender’s criminal
    history, the effect of the offense on the victim[,] and the protection of the public
    interest.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted).
    [¶52] The court is required by statute to consider, in sentencing for
    murder, “[t]hat the victim is a family or household member as defined in
    Title 19-A, section 4002, subsection 4 who is a victim of domestic violence
    committed by the convicted individual.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1251(2)(C) (2018); see
    19-A M.R.S. § 4002(4) (2018) (defining “family or household members” to
    include “parents of the same child”). The statute does not indicate at which step
    in the sentencing process this fact should be considered. Thus, a court must
    determine how domestic violence factors into the sentencing in the particular
    27
    case. If the murder was committed as an act of domestic violence, that is an
    “objective factor properly considered in the first step of the sentencing
    analysis.” State v. Nichols, 
    2013 ME 71
    , ¶ 29, 
    72 A.3d 503
    ; see also State v.
    Sweeney, 
    2019 ME 164
    , ¶ 18, 
    221 A.3d 130
     (holding that in its first-step
    analysis, “the court properly and correctly considered the objective elements of
    domestic violence in the crime itself”). There may also be evidence of previous
    domestic violence apart from the acts constituting the crime itself. See, e.g.,
    id. ¶ 19. In such circumstances, that history of domestic violence would be
    considered as an aggravating factor in step two of the sentencing analysis.
    See id.; Bentley, 
    2021 ME 39
    , ¶ 10, 
    254 A.3d 1171
    .
    [¶53] Here, the domestic violence that occurred before December 12
    and 13 was properly considered as part of the objective nature and seriousness
    of the crime itself because the cause of death articulated by the medical
    examiner was “acute and chronic physical abuse with extensive internal and
    external hemorrhage.” (Emphasis added.) The court, in evaluating “the nature
    and circumstances of the crime itself,” found that “this was not the first time”
    that Athayde had beaten the victim, who had suffered “clearly chronic injuries”
    that contributed to the victim’s blood loss and death. The court did not
    misapply legal principles or abuse its sentencing power in considering the
    28
    chronic and acute domestic violence when determining the basic sentence in
    this case because here it was the cumulative effect of the victim’s injuries that
    caused her blood loss and death.
    The entry is:
    Judgment and sentence affirmed.
    Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Rondon
    Athayde
    Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.
    (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
    Oxford County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2018-745
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2022 ME 41

Filed Date: 7/5/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/5/2022

Authorities (41)

State of Maine v. Dustan J. Bentley , 2021 ME 39 ( 2021 )

State of Maine v. Sharon Carrillo , 2021 ME 18 ( 2021 )

State of Maine v. Meggan M. Pratt , 2020 ME 141 ( 2020 )

State v. Leon , 186 A.3d 129 ( 2018 )

State of Maine v. Bruce Akers , 2021 ME 43 ( 2021 )

State v. Grant , 22 Me. 171 ( 1842 )

State v. Cadman , 476 A.2d 1148 ( 1984 )

State of Maine v. Brian Nichols , 72 A.3d 503 ( 2013 )

State v. Hardy , 489 A.2d 508 ( 1985 )

State v. Larrivee , 479 A.2d 347 ( 1984 )

State of Maine v. James E. Sweeney , 2019 ME 164 ( 2019 )

State of Maine v. Carine Reeves , 2022 ME 10 ( 2022 )

State of Maine v. Philip Fleming , 2020 ME 120 ( 2020 )

State v. Gilman , 51 Me. 206 ( 1862 )

State of Maine v. Jerry Lee Adams , 113 A.3d 583 ( 2015 )

State of Maine v. Andrew J. Kierstead , 2015 ME 45 ( 2015 )

State v. Rees , 748 A.2d 976 ( 2000 )

State of Maine v. Timothy M. Hunt , 151 A.3d 911 ( 2016 )

State v. Durepo , 472 A.2d 919 ( 1984 )

State of Maine v. Moses King , 136 A.3d 366 ( 2016 )

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