State of Maine v. James A. Reynolds , 193 A.3d 168 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 124 Docket: Oxf-17-468
Argued: June 13, 2018
Decided: August 21, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JAMES A. REYNOLDS
JABAR, J.
[¶1] James A. Reynolds appeals from a judgment of conviction for four
counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) (Supp.
1997);1 five counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 255(1)(C) (Supp. 1997);2 and two counts of sexual abuse of a minor
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(3)(A) (Supp. 2001),3 entered in the trial court
1 Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) has since been amended, but not in any way that affects this
appeal. See P.L. 2001, ch. 383, § 14 (effective Jan. 31, 2003); P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-2 (effective
July 30, 2004).
2 The unlawful sexual contact statute then in effect has since been repealed and replaced. P.L.
2001, ch. 383, §§ 22-23 (effective Jan. 31, 2003) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A (2017), as later
amended by, e.g., P.L. 2011, ch. 464, § 9 (effective July 1, 2012)).
3 Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(3)(A) has since been repealed and its contents incorporated into
17-A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A-2) (2017). P.L. 2001, ch. 383, §§ 21, 156 (effective Jan. 31, 2003). As
Reynolds observes, the indictment and judgment and commitment refer to different statutory
provisions for these counts. Both counts of the indictment refer to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(1)(A),
(3)(A) (2001)—which applied only when the actor was more than ten years older than the victim—
while the judgment and commitment refers to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(1)(A) (2001), which applied to
2
(Oxford County, Clifford, J.) after a jury trial. Reynolds contends that (1) the
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on eight of the
eleven counts because “a rational jury could not have unanimously found that
those counts were supported by evidence of particular instances of sexual acts
or contact”; (2) he was unfairly prejudiced by the court’s admission into
evidence of uncharged sexual abuse; and (3) the court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal as to the 1997 and 1998 unlawful sexual
contact charges because those charges were subject to a six-year limitations
period and the State failed to commence prosecution within that time period.
We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminary Proceedings
[¶2] In December 2016, Reynolds was indicted on four counts of gross
sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B); six counts of unlawful sexual
contact, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C); and two counts of sexual abuse of a minor,
17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(3)(A). The indictment alleged a period of ongoing abuse
against the victim on or about April 1 of every year from 1997 to 2002. In
circumstances where the actor was at least five years older than the victim, not ten. Because the
evidence at trial demonstrated a greater-than-ten-year age gap between Reynolds and the victim,
and because the court instructed the jury using “more than 10 years older” language, it appears that
Reynolds was instead convicted pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(3)(A) (Supp. 2001). The judgment
and commitment must be corrected to reflect the proper conviction.
3
Count 1 through Count 8, Reynolds was charged with committing one count of
gross sexual assault and one count of unlawful sexual contact against the
victim on or about April 1 of every year from 1997 to 2000. In Count 9
through Count 12, Reynolds was charged with committing one count of sexual
abuse of a minor and one count of unlawful sexual contact against the victim
on or about April 1 of 2001 and 2002.4
B. Motion In Limine Proceedings
[¶3] After jury selection in June 2017, the State moved in limine,
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 404(b), to permit the admission of evidence of
uncharged sexual abuse alleged to have taken place outside of Oxford County.
According to the State, evidence of this conduct was admissible to
“demonstrate [Reynolds’s] opportunity to commit the sexual abuse, the
relationship between the parties, as well as the intent to commit the ongoing
abuse.” Reynolds opposed the motion, arguing that admission of the alleged
abuse violated both Rule 404(b) and M.R. Evid. 403.
[¶4] A hearing on the motion in limine was held before trial on July 17,
2017. The State clarified that although the “[t]he majority of the sexual abuse
occurred in an apartment in . . . Paris [Oxford County],” incidents also
4 Before trial, pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 48(a), the State dismissed Count 12 due to insufficient
evidence.
4
occurred “on the road and while out camping. And so the [S]tate would like to
make reference to those in [its] testimony.” Reynolds continued to argue
against the admissibility of the uncharged abuse, contending that “[the victim]
is claiming about 100 incidents, 80 percent of those happened at the house, at
the apartment. . . . What is the purpose of bringing in uncharged incidents?”
The court concluded that the proposed evidence was properly admissible
under Rule 404(b) pursuant our decision in State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803,
805-06 (Me. 1986), because it was probative to demonstrate that “the
relationship between the parties is that this defendant . . . considered this, you
know, his – his sexual toy. I mean he did this – he did this as a matter of
course wherever he went.” However, in order to limit the prejudicial effect of
these uncharged incidents, the court specified that the victim would not be
permitted to describe the uncharged conduct “in detail.”
[¶5] Reynolds preserved his objection to the evidence pursuant to
Rule 403, claiming the unfair prejudice created by that evidence substantially
outweighed its probative value. However, after Reynolds was given the
opportunity to request a limiting instruction regarding the proper use of the
uncharged conduct, he stated that he did not wish to do so. Specifically, in
5
response to the court’s statement, “You’re entitled to [a limiting instruction]
. . . [a]nd you affirmatively waive that,” Reynolds replied, “Yes.”
C. Factual History
[¶6] The case then proceeded to trial. Viewing the trial record in the
light most favorable to the State, the jury could rationally have found the
following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Haag, 2012 ME 94, ¶ 2,
48 A.3d 207. The victim was born in April 1987 and was nine years old when
she first met Reynolds, who was born on March 30, 1969. At the time, the
victim was living with her grandparents in Oxford, but she subsequently
moved into an apartment in South Paris with her mother, brother, and
Reynolds.
[¶7] The victim was sexually abused by Reynolds for “most of [her]
childhood.” The first incident occurred when she was nine and Reynolds
touched her genitals while he was driving with her in his work vehicle.5 From
that point on, Reynolds touched her genitals weekly, “more times than [she]
can count,” until she was sixteen. Starting when the victim was ten years old,
Reynolds also forced her to put her hands on his genitals. The abuse typically
5 Because this conduct occurred when the victim was nine years old, and the indictment charged
Reynolds with committing the sexual abuse beginning on the victim’s tenth birthday, this was
ostensibly one of the uncharged incidents that the court admitted pursuant to M.R. Evid. 404(b) and
M.R. Evid. 403.
6
began by Reynolds saying “something like he wanted to play[,] and then just
do what he wanted from there.” The abuse occurred after the victim got home
from school but before her mother got home from work, or on weekend
mornings when her mother was either at work or grocery shopping.
[¶8] When the victim was ten years old, Reynolds forced her to put her
mouth on his genitals while they were alone in the South Paris apartment.
Starting when she was twelve years old, Reynolds removed the victim’s pants
and put his tongue on her genitals. Also when the victim was twelve,
Reynolds touched her genitals with his genitals.
[¶9] In addition to her testimony regarding specific incidents of abuse,
the victim also testified that Reynolds either (1) touched her genitals with his
hand or mouth; or (2) forced her to touch his genitals with her hand or mouth
on a weekly basis until she was sixteen years old.
[¶10] At no time were the victim and Reynolds married. When the
abuse began, Reynolds told her that she would be in trouble if she said
anything, and she never told anyone about the abuse while it was happening.
In 2015, the victim finally told her then-fiancé what had happened to her.
7
D. Specific Unanimity Instruction
[¶11] At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Reynolds moved for a
judgment of acquittal pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(a), which the court
denied. After the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury on
specific unanimity. See State v. Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶¶ 11-12, 152 A.3d
632. Reynolds objected to the court’s initial instruction, stating that it was “a
bit of a summary” and requesting that the court read the unanimity
instruction “exactly as it’s written.” The court agreed to do so and recited the
specific unanimity instruction to the jury, generally tracking the language
suggested in the Maine Jury Instruction Manual. See Alexander, Maine Jury
Instruction Manual § 6-65 at 6-133 (2017-2018 ed.). There was no objection
to this instruction.
E. Conviction and Sentencing Proceedings
[¶12] The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and a sentencing
hearing was held in October 2017. The court sentenced Reynolds to fifteen
years’ imprisonment, all but ten years suspended, with six years’ probation for
each count of gross sexual assault, to be served concurrently with one
another. In addition, the court sentenced Reynolds to five years’
imprisonment for each of the unlawful sexual contact and sexual abuse of a
8
minor charges, also to be served concurrently with the other sentences. This
appeal followed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1); 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2017).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Specific Unanimity
[¶13] Reynolds contends that because the victim testified only to “three
discrete occasions of sexual acts or contact . . . only three convictions could
possibly have been the result of unanimous findings.”6 According to Reynolds,
because the victim testified that there were “hundreds of sexual acts and
incidents of sexual contact” but “only mentioned three in enough detail to
distinguish one from any other,” the jury could not have unanimously found
that he committed the additional eight offenses charged in the indictment.
[¶14] “We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine
whether a jury could rationally have found each element of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 29, 995 A.2d
243.
6 Reynolds argues that the jury could have rationally agreed on only three specific incidents of
sexual abuse—when Reynolds (1) touched her genitals in his work vehicle, (2) forced her to put her
mouth on his genitals while in the apartment, and (3) touched her genitals with his genitals in the
living room. However, because the abuse in the work vehicle occurred outside of Oxford County’s
jurisdiction and when the victim was nine years old—rather than ten, as alleged in the first count of
the indictment—the jury could not have rationally agreed that the work vehicle incident
constituted one of the incidents alleged.
9
[¶15] The Maine Constitution provides that “unanimity, in indictments
and convictions, shall be held indispensable.” Me. Const. art. I, § 7. As we have
previously explained, “[c]ourts regularly encounter indictments that may
aggregate, in one count of the indictment, several identical crimes committed
against one or more victims.” State v. Fortune, 2011 ME 125, ¶ 26, 34 A.3d
1115. This is especially common in cases where, as here, there are allegations
of “multiple sex acts committed against a minor child.” Id.; see, e.g., Hanscom,
2016 ME 184, ¶¶ 2, 9, 152 A.3d 632; State v. Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, ¶ 11, 712
A.2d 504; State v. Cloutier, 1997 ME 96, ¶ 2, 695 A.2d 550. Thus, when
separate but similar incidents “are the evidence supporting a single charge,
the jury must unanimously find that one specific incident occurred.” Fortune,
2011 ME 125, ¶ 31, 34 A.3d 1115; see Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶ 12, 152 A.3d
632 (“[T]he specific unanimity instruction merely requires the State to
persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime at issue was
committed on some particular occasion.”).
[¶16] Our previous opinions in this area, however, have not directly
addressed the specificity of the evidence required to support a unanimous jury
verdict of guilty on multiple sexual offenses. See generally, e.g., Hanscom,
2016 ME 184, 152 A.3d 632; Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, 712 A.2d 504; Cloutier,
10
1997 ME 96, 695 A.2d 550. For example, in Hanscom, we reviewed a trial
court’s denial of a request for a specific unanimity instruction where the
defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful sexual contact involving
two victims. 2016 ME 184, ¶¶ 2, 6, 152 A.3d 632. In that case, one of the
victims testified that the defendant abused her “like every day we slept [at the
defendant’s house],” and the other victim testified that the abuse occurred
“more than once but it didn’t always happen.” Id. ¶ 4 (quotation marks
omitted). In concluding that the court erred in declining to give the requested
specific unanimity instruction, we explained that
because the State presented evidence that Hanscom committed
the same crime against each victim on different occasions, and any
one of those occasions could have led to a guilty verdict on that
particular charge . . . the specific unanimity instruction [would]
prevent[] jury confusion and . . . ensure that a guilty verdict is
based on the jury’s unanimous conclusion that the State proved a
single criminal episode.
Id. ¶ 12. [¶17] Thus, although we suggested in Hanscom that a properly
instructed jury could have relied on the victims’ testimony to unanimously
find the defendant guilty on both counts, our holding was limited to the issue
of whether the court erred in denying the requested specific unanimity
instruction. See id.
11
[¶18] In Shulikov, a case in which the defendant did not request a
specific unanimity instruction, we considered an issue closely related to the
one at hand—whether the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to
rationally find that the defendant committed gross sexual assault against a
victim on eight particular occasions. 1998 ME 111, ¶ 11, 712 A.2d 504. There,
the victim specifically testified as to two instances of sexual assault by the
defendant, her father, in early 1993 and 1995, and also testified that she
endured an “overall pattern of sexual abuse by her father” during which he
had sexually assaulted her three times a week between January 1, 1993, and
December 31, 1994. Id. ¶¶ 3, 11, 12.
[¶19] Relevant to this case, we rejected the defendant’s contention that
the trial record was sufficient only to sustain convictions based on the two
specific acts she described—but not the eight counts alleged during the
“overall pattern of sexual abuse” between January 1, 1993, and December 31,
1994—concluding that
the jury reasonably could have believed the victim’s testimony
that [the defendant] engaged in sexual intercourse with her at
least once a week during the time periods charged in the
indictment. This testimony is sufficient for the jury to find every
element of gross sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. There
is no requirement that each count must be substantiated by details
as to time, place, and location . . . .
12
Id. ¶¶ 11-13 (emphasis added).
[¶20] As such, although only by implication, our case law has
recognized that specific evidence of particular incidents of sexual abuse is not
required to support a unanimous jury verdict of guilty for multiple sexual
crimes.
[¶21] In cases involving allegations of multiple acts of sexual abuse
committed against children, the victims, who claim to have been abused over
a substantial period of time, “may have no practical way of recollecting,
reconstructing, distinguishing or identifying by specific incidents or dates all
or even any such incidents.” People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643, 648 (Cal. 1990)
(quotation marks omitted). As the Washington Court of Appeals has
observed, “The more frequent and repetitive the abuse, the more likely it
becomes that the victim will be unable to recall specific dates and places.
Moreover, because the molestation usually occurs outside the presence of
witnesses, and often leaves no permanent physical evidence, the state’s case
rests on the testimony of a victim whose memory may be clouded by a blur of
abuse and a desire to forget.” State v. Brown, 780 P.2d 880, 885 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989).
13
[¶22] For this reason, these types of cases present challenges involving
questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence and the defendant’s right
to due process. Acknowledging such challenges in Jones, the Supreme Court of
California reasoned,
The victim, of course, must describe the kind of act or acts
committed with sufficient specificity, both to assure that unlawful
conduct indeed has occurred and to differentiate between the
various types of proscribed conduct (e.g., lewd conduct,
intercourse, oral copulation or sodomy). Moreover, the victim
must describe the number of acts committed with sufficient
certainty to support each of the counts alleged in the information
or indictment (e.g., “twice a month” or “every time we went
camping”). Finally, the victim must be able to describe the general
time period in which these acts occurred (e.g., “the summer before
my fourth grade,” or “during each Sunday morning after he came
to live with us”) to assure the acts were committed within the
applicable limitation period. Additional details regarding the
time, place or circumstance of the various assaults may assist in
assessing the credibility or substantiality of the victim’s
testimony, but are not essential to sustain a conviction.
792 P.2d at 655-56.
[¶23] We agree that the State is not required to present specific
evidence of separate and discrete incidents of abuse for the jury to convict a
defendant of every charged offense, so long as the jury is properly instructed
on specific unanimity, see Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶ 12, 152 A.3d 632, and we
concur with the Jones court that “the particular details surrounding a child
molestation charge are not elements of the offense and are unnecessary to
14
sustain a conviction,” Jones, 792 P.2d at 655; see Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick,
668 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Mass. 1996).
[¶24] Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Reynolds’s assertion that
jury unanimity on multiple counts of sexual abuse is unattainable where
evidence of that abuse is supported by “generic” testimony. Although the
constitutional right to specific unanimity requires a jury to find that a crime
was committed on “some particular occasion,” Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶ 12,
152 A.3d 632, “even generic testimony describes a repeated series of specific,
though indistinguishable, acts of molestation,” Jones, 792 P.2d at 658. Despite
the fact that a jury “may not be able to readily distinguish between the various
acts, it is certainly capable of unanimously agreeing that they took place in the
number and manner described.” Id. Indeed, “a jury will either believe that a
consistent and repetitive pattern of abuse has occurred, of necessity
encompassing a number of discrete acts, or they will disbelieve it.”
Kirkpatrick, 668 N.E.2d at 794; see State v. Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d
121 (evidence that a crime was committed may be presented by way of the
victim’s testimony which, “by itself, is sufficient to support a guilty verdict for
a sex crime . . . if the testimony addresses each element of the crime and is not
inherently incredible” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Marden, 673 A.2d
15 1304, 1312 (Me. 1996) (“The weight to be given to the evidence and the
determination of witness credibility are the exclusive province of the jury.”).
So long as a victim’s testimony is both credible and sufficiently definite to
address every element of the offenses charged, a jury is not precluded from
unanimously finding a defendant guilty on those charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[¶25] In this case, the victim testified that beginning when she was nine
years old and continuing weekly until she was sixteen, Reynolds touched her
genitals, in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C). The victim further testified
that by the time she was ten years old and continuing “probably once a week”
thereafter, Reynolds began forcing her to touch his genitals, also in violation of
17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C). In addition, the victim testified that when she was
ten years old, Reynolds forced her to put her mouth on his genitals, and when
she was twelve years old, Reynolds put his tongue on her genitals, both in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B). According to the victim, this conduct
also occurred “probably once a week” until she was sixteen years old, in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 253(1)(B) and 254(3)(A). Thus, although the
jury may have been unable to distinguish among many of the various acts
described during this pattern of consistent abuse, it was “certainly capable of
16
unanimously agreeing” that the victim’s testimony was credible, that this
pattern of abuse occurred, and that discrete acts comprising this pattern of
abuse took place on or about the dates alleged in the indictment. See Jones,
792 P.2d at 658.
B. Uncharged Conduct
[¶26] Reynolds next argues that the court erred in admitting evidence
of uncharged sexual abuse because “[t]he jury was essentially encouraged to
punish [him] for a pattern of alleged, yet uncharged behavior.”
[¶27] As a preliminary matter, we note that Reynolds’s theory on
appeal differs from the one he advanced before the trial court. In opposing
the State’s motion in limine, Reynolds argued only against the victim’s
references to sexual abuse occurring outside of Oxford County—“on the road
and while out camping”—and not conduct that occurred in the family’s Paris
apartment. Here, however, Reynolds argues that the uncharged conduct
included not only each act outside of Oxford County, but also every referenced
act of sexual abuse beyond the eleven acts specifically alleged in the
indictment. According to Reynolds, this means that “the jury’s verdict on eight
of the eleven counts is necessarily based on . . . generalized evidence
overwhelmingly comprised of uncharged conduct.”
17
[¶28] Because Reynolds, having been unsuccessful in his alternative
argument before the trial court, has now changed his theory on appeal, we
deem his current argument waived. See Teel v. Colson, 396 A.2d 529, 534
(Me. 1979). Even if Reynolds had preserved this issue, however, it would be
unavailing. Rather than charging Reynolds with upwards of 300 counts of
sexual abuse—according to the victim’s testimony, she was abused at least
once weekly over the course of six years—the State, in exercising its
prosecutorial discretion, elected to charge him with only one act of abuse per
year within that period of time. See State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 301
(Me. 1978) (“[A] reasonable prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of
criminal laws is inherent in our criminal justice system . . . .”). The court
properly determined that evidence of Reynolds’s ongoing abuse was
admissible to show the relationship between him and the victim. See M.R.
Evid. 404(b); DeLong, 505 A.2d at 805-06.
[¶29] Moreover, Reynolds’s argument that he was unfairly prejudiced
by the admission of this evidence is unpersuasive for three reasons. First,
when a defendant believes he has been unfairly prejudiced by the
consolidation of several identical crimes into one count of an indictment, he
may move for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 8(d).
18
Fortune, 2011 ME 125, ¶ 27, 34 A.3d 1115. Reynolds failed to do so.
Moreover, although Reynolds argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by “the
generic testimony and lack of discrete events in this case,” he did not request a
bill of particulars pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) and is therefore
presumed to have known which crimes he was required to defend against at
trial. See Cloutier, 1997 ME 96, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d 550. Finally, Reynolds expressly
waived his right to a limiting instruction regarding uncharged conduct, and is
thereby precluded from now contending that the jury could have decided the
case on an improper basis. See State v. Roman, 622 A.2d 96, 99 (Me. 1993)
(“[I]n the absence of a request to the court to provide a limiting instruction,
we can assume that counsel concluded that a limiting instruction would have
overemphasized the importance of the evidence and decided to forego the
request for strategic reasons.” (quotation marks omitted)).
C. Statute of Limitations
[¶30] Finally, Reynolds argues that the court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2 and 4—which alleged
unlawful sexual contact on or about April 1, 1997, and April 1, 1998,
respectively—because those counts were subject to a six-year statute of
19
limitations and the State failed to commence prosecution within that time
period.
[¶31] We disagree. Reynolds is correct that, before 1999, the criminal
code provided for a six-year statute of limitations for unlawful sexual contact.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 8(1), (2)(A) (Supp. 1997); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 8(1), 2(A) (Supp.
1998), amended by P.L. 1999, ch. 438, §§ 1-2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999).
However, the Legislature amended the Criminal Code in 1999 to remove the
previous limitations period in 1999, and that amendment applied
retroactively to the prosecution of crimes where the victim was younger than
sixteen years old and where prosecution under the previous six-year
limitations period had not yet been barred. P.L. 1999, ch. 438, § 3 (effective
Sept. 18, 1999). Because the victim was under sixteen years old when
Reynolds committed unlawful sexual contact in 1997 and 1998, and the
six-year limitations period for those crimes had not yet expired when the
Legislature removed the statute of limitations defense in 1999, the State was
not prohibited from initiating prosecution for those offenses in 2016.7 See
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611, 616-19 (2003).
7 Because the 1999 amendment only applied retroactively to offenses where the original
six-year limitations period had not yet expired, we are unpersuaded by Reynolds’s additional
contention that the 1999 amendment constitutes an ex post facto law, in violation of Me. Const. art.
I, § 11. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003) (reasoning that an ex post facto violation
20
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. Remanded for correction of
the statutory references in the judgment and
commitment on Counts 9 and 11.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant James
A. Reynolds
Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Alexandra W. Winter, Asst. Dist.
Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, South Paris, for appellee State of
Maine
Oxford County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2016-714
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
occurs where a limitations period is extended “after the State has assured a man that he has become
safe from its pursuit” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)).