Jane Doe v. Glen Plourde , 211 A.3d 1153 ( 2019 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                     Reporter of Decisions
    Decision:    
    2019 ME 109
    Docket:      Ken-18-479
    Submitted
    On Briefs: June 26, 2019
    Decided:     June 11, 2019
    Panel:        SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
    JANE DOE1
    v.
    GLEN PLOURDE
    HUMPHREY, J.
    [¶1] Glen Plourde appeals from a protection from harassment order
    entered against him in the District Court (Waterville, R.A. French, J.) on the
    complaint of Jane Doe. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4653, 4655(1) (2018). Plourde argues
    that the court abused its discretion in consolidating the hearing on his motion
    to dissolve the temporary protection from harassment order and the final
    hearing on Doe’s complaint, and in issuing a scheduling order that limited the
    time for the consolidated hearing to two hours. He also argues that the court
    1 To comply with federal law, we do not identify the plaintiff in this protection from harassment
    action and limit our description of events and locations to avoid revealing “the identify or location of
    the party protected under [a protection] order.” 
    18 U.S.C.S. § 2265
    (d)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No.
    116-19).
    2
    erred in finding credible the testimony of two witnesses and in finding that he
    intentionally sought to harass Doe. We affirm the court’s judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] In May 2018, Doe first noticed Plourde watching her as she left her
    home. He made kissing movements and moved his head and body to follow her
    as she drove by him three times that day. Doe then noticed Plourde smoking
    while he observed and walked by her home multiple times each day from May
    to August. This caused her to be fearful, feel uncomfortable, and change her
    daily routine to avoid being outdoors. Plourde later requested copies of the
    blueprints to her home from the town office. Plourde was arrested after
    entering Doe’s driveway and observing her through the glass portion of her
    door.
    [¶3] On August 30, 2018, Doe filed a complaint for protection from
    harassment against Plourde in the Waterville District Court. 5 M.R.S. § 4653(1)
    (2018).     The court (Mathews, J.) issued a temporary protection from
    harassment order that same day. Id. § 4654(2) (2018). On September 18, 2018,
    Plourde filed a motion to dissolve, which was scheduled for a hearing on
    September 27, 2018. Id. § 4654(6) (2018). Because Doe was not served with
    the motion to dissolve until the night before the hearing, the court (Davis, J.)
    3
    continued the hearing to October 1, 2018, consolidating it with the final hearing
    on Doe’s complaint. On October 1, the court (Stanfill, J.) continued the hearing
    on both motions due to the court’s schedule. Between October 12 and 23, 2018,
    Plourde served witness subpoenas on numerous individuals and filed many
    letters with the court. After reviewing Plourde’s materials, the court issued a
    scheduling order limiting the time allotted for the consolidated hearing to two
    hours—each party was “limited to one hour for both cross-examination and
    direct presentation of his or her case.”
    [¶4] On October 31, 2018, the court (R.A. French, J.) held the consolidated
    hearing and issued a one-year protection from harassment order on the basis
    that Doe “established stalking” and “established three or more acts of
    intimidation that caused her fear and, in fact, were done with the intent to
    intimidate.”   Plourde timely appealed without filing a motion for further
    findings. M.R. App. P. 2B(c); M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶5] Plourde first challenges the court’s decision to consolidate the final
    hearing on Doe’s complaint and the hearing on his motion to dissolve the
    temporary protection from harassment order.            We review the court’s
    procedural decision to consolidate the hearings for an abuse of discretion. See
    4
    M.R. Civ. P. 42(a); Maietta v. Int’l Harvester Co., 
    496 A.2d 286
    , 290-91 (Me.
    1985).
    ¶[6]   Contrary to Plourde’s argument, the court did not abuse its
    discretion in consolidating the hearings. First, the court did not improperly
    continue the hearing on Plourde’s motion to dissolve, which had been
    scheduled to be heard on September 27, 2018, after Doe was served only the
    night before. See 5 M.R.S. § 4654(6). Second, pursuant to section 4654(6), the
    court has discretion with regard to when to hold the hearing on the motion to
    dissolve. See id. In this case, the court quickly rescheduled the hearing to two
    business days later—October 1, 2018—when the parties were already
    scheduled to appear in court for the final hearing on Doe’s complaint. It is
    within the court’s discretion to consolidate hearings where, as here, there is a
    common question of law or fact. M.R. Civ. P. 42(a). In this case, the hearings
    involved common questions of law and fact, namely, whether Doe could
    demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plourde harassed her.
    5 M.R.S. § 4654(1), (6) (2018). Finally, the court’s decision to consolidate the
    hearings did not disadvantage Plourde. At both a hearing on a motion to
    dissolve and a final hearing on a complaint for protection from harassment, it
    is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate to the court, by a preponderance of the
    5
    evidence, that a protection order is appropriate. Id. The court’s decision to
    consolidate the hearings did not relieve Doe of her burden or otherwise
    disadvantage or prejudice Plourde. Therefore, the court did not abuse its
    discretion. See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a); Maietta, 
    496 A.2d at 290-91
    .
    [¶7] Plourde next challenges the court’s (Stanfill, J.) scheduling order
    limiting the consolidated hearing to two hours, allotting one hour to each party
    to cross-examine and present its case. We review a trial court’s scheduling
    order for an abuse of discretion. M.R. Civ. P. 16A(a). Contrary to Plourde’s
    argument, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a scheduling order
    limiting the duration of the consolidated hearing and the issues to be
    considered. See 
    id.
     Pursuant to Rule 16A(a), “the court may issue a scheduling
    order, trial management order, or other order directing the future course of the
    action.” 
    Id.
     Moreover, the “trial court has broad discretion to control the order
    and timing of presentation of evidence and to set and enforce reasonable time
    limits on testimonial hearings.” Dolliver v. Dolliver, 
    2001 ME 144
    , ¶ 10, 
    782 A.2d 316
    . Based on prior court-related experiences with Plourde, the number of
    subpoenas Plourde filed (few, if any, of which were likely to generate relevant
    evidence), and the relative simplicity of the issues to be decided at the hearing,
    the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the total time for the hearing
    6
    to two hours, nor in explicitly restricting the scope of inquiry to issues relevant
    to the protection from harassment order. See M.R. Civ. P. 16A(a); Bank of Am.,
    N.A. v. Camire, 
    2017 ME 20
    , ¶¶ 1, 8-10, 
    155 A.3d 416
     (determining that the trial
    court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time where the court
    provided advance notice to the parties that the trial would be limited to two
    hours on a claim involving outstanding credit card debt).
    [¶8] Finally, Plourde argues that the court erred in relying on the
    testimony of two particular witnesses and in finding that he intentionally
    harassed Doe. We review challenges to a witness’s credibility and the court’s
    factual findings for clear error. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(c); Allen v. Rae, 
    2019 ME 53
    ,
    ¶ 9, 
    206 A.3d 902
    ; Sloan v. Christianson, 
    2012 ME 72
    , ¶ 29, 
    43 A.3d 978
    . We find
    Plourde’s arguments unpersuasive for two reasons. First, “[b]ecause a trial
    court is not bound to accept testimony and evidence as fact, and because
    determinations of the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence are
    squarely in the province of the fact-finder, we will not second-guess the trial
    court’s credibility assessment of conflicting testimony.” Allen, 
    2019 ME 53
    , ¶ 9,
    
    206 A.3d 902
     (quotation marks omitted).          Second, contrary to Plourde’s
    contention, there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he
    engaged in a pattern of behavior that caused Doe fear and was performed with
    7
    the intent to intimidate her. 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A) (2018). Therefore, the court
    did not err in issuing the protection from harassment order. Id. § 4655.
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    Glen Plourde, appellant pro se
    Melissa L. Martin, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellee Jane
    Doe
    Waterville District Court docket number PA-2018-329
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY