In re Landon S. , 171 A.3d 186 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 199Docket: Kno-17-176
Submitted
On Briefs: September 27, 2017
Decided: October 5, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE LANDON S.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The mother of Landon S. appeals from a judgment of the District
Court (Rockland, Sparaco, J.) terminating her parental rights to Landon
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv)
(2016).1 She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
judgment and the court’s discretionary determination of the child’s best
interest. Specifically, the mother argues that the Department of Health and
Human Services did not comply with 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016) and that the
court did not “consider any positive aspects of the [m]other’s efforts to
reunify.” We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unwilling or unable to
1 The child’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights on February 14, 2017,
and is not a party to this appeal.
2
protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to
change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs; she is
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time
reasonably calculated to meet his needs; and she has failed to make a good
faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055
(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv); In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 15, 966 A.2d 894. It
also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s
best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(B)(2)(a); In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18,
¶ 15, 966 A.2d 894. The court based this determination on the following
findings of fact:
[The Department] became involved with [the mother] on
February 20, 2016[,] after it was notified by staff at Pen Bay
Hospital that [the child was] born with marijuana in his system,
and that [the mother] had told staff that she had been using
Vicodin and alcohol during her pregnancy.
. . . .
. . . [The child] has been in [Department] custody for over one
year. Throughout this case, he has lived with resource parents . . .
with whom he has bonded. . . . [The child’s] placement . . . is safe
and appropriate.
. . . [The child] was born with a nasal condition that affects his
breathing. He has had one surgery and likely will have to have
more surgeries. [His resource parents] have ensured that [his]
medical needs are being met and have provided him with
excellent care. [The child] needs permanency now and [his
3
resource parents] are prepared to provide . . . such permanency
through adoption.
[¶3] The court further found that the mother, in violation of the
reunification plan, “has failed to maintain meaningful contact with [the child],”
has participated in the child’s medical care in a “minimal” way, “still does not
have stable or safe housing,” has lost access to the transportation services
provided to her by the Department due to her “no shows,” “has not followed
through with substance abuse and mental health counseling,” and “continues
to struggle with substance abuse.”2 The court also found that the mother’s
testimony regarding her participation in Alcoholics Anonymous was not
credible.
[¶4] Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact,
all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did
not err in its unfitness determination nor did it err or abuse its discretion in
determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with a
permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest. See In re
Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
2 During the pendency of this child protective case, the mother was admitted to the emergency
room for alcohol poisoning, consumed alcohol only a few weeks before the termination hearing,
and tested positive for marijuana, even though the reunification plan clearly stated that she must
“remain sober from drugs and alcohol.”
4
[¶5] The mother contends that the court’s findings are nevertheless
unsupported by the record because the Department failed to provide her with
“all of the services it was required to provide,” which, she claims, would have
enabled her to “continue[] on a positive path to alleviate jeopardy.” To the
contrary, the record shows that the Department developed a reunification
plan that clearly outlined the safety goals and services the mother needed to
engage in, offered the mother ample reunification services,3 and made a good
faith effort to cooperate with and seek the participation of the mother
throughout these proceedings. See 22 M.R.S. § 4041. Despite the
Department’s reunification efforts and the aid of a case manager from a
community organization, the mother was still unsuccessful in reunifying with
the child. See supra ¶¶ 2-3.4
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
3 These services included, among others, transportation services, mental health and substance
abuse counseling, supervised visitation with the child, family team meetings, and the aid of a
permanency social worker.
4 The remainder of the mother’s arguments concern the weight and credibility assigned to the
evidence, which fall squarely within the court’s province as the trier of fact. See In re I.S., 2015 ME
100, ¶ 11, 121 A.3d 105. We find these arguments unpersuasive and do not address them further.
5
Vanessa A. Bartlett, Esq., Law Offices of Vanessa A. Bartlett, Portland, for
appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Rockland District Court docket number PC-2016-03
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY