Mark A. Amero v. Maria C. Amero , 2016 ME 150 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 150 Docket: Fra-15-609
Argued: September 13, 2016
Decided: October 13, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
MARK A. AMERO
v.
MARIA C. AMERO
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Maria C. Amero appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Farmington, Dow, J.) terminating a prior spousal support award based on its
finding that Maria was cohabiting with an adult partner, which triggered
termination of the support pursuant to the parties’ divorce judgment. Maria
contends that there was insufficient evidence supporting the court’s finding of
cohabitation. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Mark and Maria divorced in 2006 after over thirty years of
marriage. The court (McElwee, J.) entered a divorce judgment in September
2006 that ordered Mark to pay Maria general spousal support in the amount
of $1,100 per month. The award was subject to certain conditions, including
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that it “shall terminate upon . . . [Maria]’s remarriage or cohabitation with an
adult partner.”1
[¶3] In April 2015, Mark filed a motion to modify the spousal support
award, alleging that Maria was cohabiting with an adult partner, thereby
triggering termination of the support award pursuant to the terms of the
parties’ divorce judgment. Mark amended his motion to modify in September
2015, reiterating his assertion that Maria was cohabiting with an adult
partner and citing an impending change in his financial circumstances due to
his upcoming retirement. The court held a testimonial hearing in November
2015 at which Mark and Maria were the only witnesses.
[¶4] The trial court issued an order in November 2015 finding “by a
preponderance of the evidence [that Maria] has cohabitated with an adult
partner . . . since some time in 2010,” but it did not elaborate on the basis for
this finding. Because the court determined that Maria was cohabiting with an
adult partner, it ordered termination of the spousal support award pursuant
to the divorce judgment. The court declined to analyze the alternative
1 The full spousal support provision in the divorce judgment provides:
Upon consideration of the relevant factors of 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951-A(5), the plaintiff
shall pay general spousal support to the defendant in the amount of $1,100 per
month commencing on September 1, 2006, which shall be tax deductible to the
plaintiff, taxable to the defendant, shall not be increased, and shall terminate upon
the death of either party or upon the defendant’s remarriage or cohabitation with an
adult partner, subject to a minimum period of three years.
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question of whether a substantial change in circumstances warranted
modification because it deemed the finding of cohabitation a sufficient basis
on which to terminate support.
[¶5] Neither party moved for further findings of fact pursuant to
Rule 52(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Maria timely appealed,
challenging the court’s determination that she was cohabiting with an adult
partner.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error, which
exists if “there is no competent evidence in the record to support the finding,
the finding is based on a clear misapprehension by the trial court of the
meaning of the evidence, or if the force and effect of the evidence, taken as a
total entity, rationally persuades to a certainty that the finding is so against
the great preponderance of the believable evidence that it does not represent
the truth and right of the case.” Violette v. Violette, 2015 ME 97, ¶ 15, 120 A.3d
667 (quotation marks omitted). We will not overturn a factual finding “simply
because an alternative finding also finds support in the evidence[, and w]e
defer to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and its
resolution of conflicts in testimony.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). As noted
4
above, there was no motion for further findings of fact, so “we must assume
the trial court made all findings necessary to support its judgment, but only to
the extent that those findings are supported by competent record evidence.”
McLeod v. Macul, 2016 ME 76, ¶ 9, 139 A.3d 920 (quotation marks omitted);
see also M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).
[¶7] We review the trial court’s ultimate decision to modify spousal
support for an abuse of discretion. Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11,
930 A.2d 1074.
[¶8] The court found that Maria was cohabiting with an adult partner
since some time in 2010, triggering cessation of the support pursuant to the
terms of the parties’ divorce judgment. Maria’s own testimony about her
living circumstances provides some support for this finding. Specifically, she
testified that, in 2010, she began a sexual relationship with an adult partner
that lasted for approximately a year. She rented housing at that time, and her
partner was homeless. That year, Maria purchased a “big rig” truck, which she
registered in her partner’s name. Maria “lived across the states” in the truck
for about one year, and her partner was the sole driver of the truck. After that,
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Maria and her partner moved into a condominium where they lived together
for three to four years.2
[¶9] Maria explained that she and her partner now live in another
condominium, where they maintain separate living quarters; Maria lives on
the first floor and her partner lives on the lower level. She told the court that
the two have separate beds and bathrooms but that the home has only one
shower, which they share. Maria testified that she attends to her partner’s
personal healthcare needs, shops for his groceries, and provides care for his
son with special needs when he visits, including taking him to school. Finally,
Maria told the court that her partner gives her money for his portion of the
rent and does not contribute to her food or housing expenses.
[¶10] The parties’ divorce judgment does not specifically define
“cohabitation,” but it was not required to do so. See Wandishin v. Wandishin,
2009 ME 73, ¶ 15, 976 A.2d 949 (“The term[ ‘cohabitation’] . . . does not
require further definition in a divorce order. Application of the term after
entry of the divorce may depend on discrete factual situations that may be
difficult to predict and anticipate through a more specific definition.”). We
have defined “cohabitation” as “maintaining a relationship with another
2 The record is not entirely clear as to the specific dates that Maria and her partner lived at each
of their residences.
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person that is the practical equivalent of marriage.”3 Charette v. Charette,
2013 ME 4, ¶ 10, 60 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks omitted); Levy, Maine Family
Law § 8.4[1] at 8-21 (8th ed. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] There is competent evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding that Maria was, and is, cohabiting with an adult partner in a
marriage-like relationship. Notably, Maria admitted that she and her partner,
with whom she had an intimate relationship in the past, lived with one
another in the same condominium for a period of several consecutive years
and continue to live together in another condominium. As to the time before
they began living in the condominiums, the record supports the inference that
Maria and her partner lived in a truck together for about a year, as Maria
testified that she “lived across the states” in the truck while her partner drove
it.
[¶12] Furthermore, the record and appropriate inferences support the
notion that Maria and her partner maintained a marriage-like relationship.
The two had a year-long sexual relationship beginning in 2010 and have
3 In her brief, Maria references 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(12) (2015), which provides that “an order
awarding spousal support is subject to modification to terminate spousal support when it can be
shown that the payee and another person have entered into a mutually supportive relationship that
is the functional equivalent of marriage that has existed for at least 12 months of a period of
18 consecutive months.” We note that this statute is not implicated in this case because the court’s
termination of spousal support was based on a provision in the parties’ divorce judgment—not on
the statutory basis for cessation of spousal support due to cohabitation.
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maintained at least a close, interpersonal relationship since then,
demonstrated by how Maria tends to her partner’s personal healthcare needs,
shops for his groceries, and provides care for his son. Furthermore, despite
their allegedly separate living spaces, the record supports the inference that
Maria and her partner have access to each other’s areas in the residence at
which they currently reside. There is also evidence in the record that Maria
and her partner have some level of financial dependence on one another: the
two are invested in a truck, which was paid for by Maria and registered in her
partner’s name; and Maria pays rent to the landlord on behalf of them both,
though she testified that her partner reimburses her for his portion. Finally,
the court could have inferred financial dependence and a marriage-like
relationship from the fact that Maria and her partner elected to move together
to at least two different homes and have lived with each other for a period of
several consecutive years.
[¶13] Although Maria contended at the modification hearing that she
and her partner no longer have a romantic relationship and that they maintain
separate living quarters and finances, “the court, as fact-finder and sole
arbiter of witness credibility, was free to selectively accept or reject portions
or all of” her testimony. Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 12, 982 A.2d
8 339; see also Pelletier v. Pelletier, 2012 ME 15, ¶ 13, 36 A.3d 903 (“Determinations of witness credibility are uniquely within the fact-finder’s
authority, and the fact-finder is free to discount or entirely ignore testimony
the fact-finder finds incredible.” (quotation marks omitted)). In light of this
level of discretion and the absence of a motion for further findings pursuant to
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), we conclude that the court’s finding that
Maria and her partner were cohabiting was not clearly erroneous.4
[¶14] The plain language of the parties’ divorce judgment provides that
the spousal support award terminates if Maria cohabits with an adult partner,
and the finding of cohabitation provided a sufficient basis for the court’s
decision to terminate the support award. Accordingly, the court did not abuse
its discretion when it terminated the spousal support award.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
4 Any error in regard to when the cohabitation began is harmless and does not provide grounds
for vacating the court’s order. See M.R. Civ. P. 61. That Maria cohabited with an adult partner at any
time after the divorce judgment was issued is sufficient to trigger termination of spousal support
pursuant to the divorce judgment, subject only to the judgment’s prescribed minimum of three
years of support. See supra note 1. The court declined to terminate the support retroactively, so
the specific date when cohabitation began is not of consequence.
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On the briefs and at oral argument:
James P. Howaniec, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Maria C. Amero
David M. Sanders, Esq., Sanders & Hanstein, P.A., Farmington, for
appellee Mark A. Amero
Farmington District Court docket number FM-2005-160
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY