William F. Gallagher v. Penobscot Community Healthcare , 209 A.3d 106 ( 2019 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                             Reporter of Decisions
    Decision: 
    2019 ME 88
    Docket:   Pen-18-456
    Argued:   May 16, 2019
    Decided:  June 4, 2019
    Panel:          SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
    WILLIAM F. GALLAGHER
    v.
    PENOBSCOT COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE et al.
    JABAR, J.
    [¶1]     William F. Gallagher, M.D., appeals from the Superior Court’s
    (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Penobscot Community Healthcare, Robert P. Allen, M.D., Noah Nesin, M.D.,
    Terry White, and Lori Dwyer, Esq. (collectively, PCH). He argues that the court
    abused its discretion by not, on its own accord, granting him accommodations,
    appointing him a guardian ad litem, or ordering that his mental health be
    evaluated when the court “knew [or] should have known, based on the material
    that [he] had submitted to the [c]ourt, that he was suffering from a mental
    disability that significantly impaired his mental health.”                 We affirm the
    judgment.
    2
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] As established in the summary judgment record, in April 2014,
    Gallagher, a licensed physician, was terminated from his position as a
    dermatology specialist at Penobscot Community Healthcare due to numerous
    staff and patient complaints of rudeness, bullying, inattentiveness, and other
    unprofessional behavior. Gallagher brought suit against PCH in late March
    2016, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, breach of contract and various
    other torts, seeking, among other remedies, reinstatement to his position at
    Penobscot Community Healthcare.1 Although initially represented by two
    different attorneys at points throughout this case, Gallagher was proceeding
    without counsel as of January 2018.
    [¶3] In July 2018, PCH filed a motion for summary judgment on all of
    Gallagher’s claims. Gallagher requested a sixty-day extension of the deadline to
    file his opposition to the motion, which the court granted. As the deadline
    approached, however, Gallagher filed another motion requesting a further
    1 Prior to this action, Gallagher filed a similar complaint in the United States District Court for the
    District of Maine, alleging federal age discrimination and retaliation claims as well as state law tort
    claims. See Gallagher v. Penobscot Cmty. Healthcare, No. 1:15-CV-244-DBH, 
    2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33465
    (D. Me. Mar. 15, 2016). However, because Gallagher failed to file a claim with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission prior to filing suit, the federal court dismissed his age
    discrimination and retaliation claims. 
    Id. at *7-8.
    The court declined to exercise supplemental
    jurisdiction over the remaining state law tort claims and dismissed the entirety of Gallagher’s action.
    
    Id. at *17-18.
                                                                                   3
    extension, citing the “challenges of organization[], preparation, typing, [and]
    analysis [of] a vast amount of documents and audio transcripts[,]
    . . . compounded by an injury to [his] hip,” depression, and “suicidal thought in
    the past,” referring to November 2017. The court again granted Gallagher’s
    request, but warned that it would be the “final continuance/extension” granted.
    Despite this, Gallagher again requested an extension of his deadline on
    October 4, 2018.    The court granted the extension to “accommodate his
    asserted disability,” but also reminded Gallagher that “compliance with the
    Rules of Civil Procedure [was] required.”
    [¶4] On October 15, 2018, Gallagher filed his opposition to PCH’s motion
    for summary judgment. His filing included a document entitled “MEMO in
    Opposition to SJ” and what is denoted on the docket record as a “box of
    documents.” Gallagher’s “MEMO” did not include any statements of material
    fact or citations to supporting evidence. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2). The court,
    stating that “[i]t is not the [c]ourt’s responsibility to sift through the box of
    documents filed by [Gallagher] to determine if there might be genuine issues of
    material fact therein,” concluded that all of PCH’s asserted material facts were
    supported by record evidence, deemed them admitted, and granted summary
    judgment in favor of PCH on all claims.
    4
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶5] At the outset, we note that the court did not err by granting
    summary judgment in favor of PCH on all of Gallagher’s claims. Because they
    were properly supported by record evidence, the court correctly deemed all of
    PCH’s statements of material fact admitted by Gallagher because of his failure
    to deny them as required by Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h)(2). See also
    M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4); Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 
    2001 ME 77
    , ¶ 9, 
    770 A.2d 653
    (“The court is neither required nor permitted to independently search a record
    to find support for facts offered by a party.”); Richards v. Bruce, 
    1997 ME 61
    ,
    ¶ 8, 
    691 A.2d 1223
    (“[P]ro se litigants are held to the same standards as
    represented litigants.”). Because a de novo review of the record reveals “no
    genuine issues of material fact,” PCH is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
    on all claims. Berry v. Mainestream Fin., 
    2019 ME 27
    , ¶ 6, 
    202 A.3d 1195
    (quotation marks omitted); see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), h(4).
    [¶6] We write further only to address Gallagher’s argument that the
    court failed to properly accommodate his asserted disability.2 As we have
    2Gallagher also contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to order a mental health
    evaluation, see M.R. Civ. P. 35(a), or appoint a guardian ad litem, see M.R. Civ. P. 17(b). Because
    Gallagher raises this issue for the first time on appeal, it is not preserved. See Foster v. Oral Surgery
    Assocs., P.A., 
    2008 ME 21
    , ¶ 22, 
    940 A.2d 1102
    . Regardless, because neither of the Rules cited by
    Gallagher is applicable to this situation, we find no merit to his contention. See M.R. Civ. P. 17(b)
    (allowing for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for unrepresented incompetent persons); 35(a)
    5
    previously noted, “[a]n individual with a disability may request special
    accommodations to ensure an equal opportunity to participate in a court
    proceeding.” Blackhouse v. Doe, 
    2011 ME 86
    , ¶ 8, 
    24 A.3d 72
    (emphasis added);
    see also Me. Judicial Branch, Policy on Access for People with Disabilities,
    https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/admin/ada/policy.html;                            Me.
    Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request Procedure, https://www.courts.
    maine.gov/maine_courts/admin/ada/accommodation.html.                         If the judge or
    court official denies the requested accommodation, then a written explanation
    for the denial must be provided along with a copy of the Judicial Branch’s
    grievance procedure.           See Me. Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request
    Procedure;          Me.        Judicial         Branch,         Grievance           Procedure,
    https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/admin/ada/grievance.html.
    [¶7] In this case, the only “accommodations” Gallagher requested from
    the court were three extensions of the deadline to file his opposition to PCH’s
    motion for summary judgment.                The court granted each of his requests,
    extending his deadline by almost three months.                    The record contains no
    (permitting a court to order a mental health evaluation upon a “motion for good cause shown” when
    mental health of a party is in controversy (emphasis added)).
    6
    indication that Gallagher requested any other accommodations at any time
    prior to this appeal or that the court denied any accommodation requests.
    [¶8] Further, although proceeding unrepresented at the time of PCH’s
    motion for summary judgment, Gallagher was represented between the filing
    of his complaint in 2016 and October 2017, and then again between late
    December 2017 and mid-January 2018. Neither attorney raised any issue of
    incompetence or the need for accommodations. See In re Child of Mercedes D.,
    
    2018 ME 149
    , ¶ 17, 
    196 A.3d 888
    (“[A]n attorney bears the responsibility to
    alert a court to his or her client’s possible incompetence.” (alterations and
    quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we find no error or abuse of discretion
    in the court’s handling of Gallagher’s requested accommodations.
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    Gene Sullivan Jr., Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant William F. Gallagher
    Karen Frink Wolf, Esq., and Rachel M. Wertheimer, Esq. (orally), Verrill Dana
    LLP, Portland, for appellees Penobscot County Healthcare, Robert P. Allen, Noah
    Nesin, Terry White, and Lori Dwyer
    Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2016-54
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY