In re Child of Maranatha K. , 2018 ME 135 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 135Docket: Ken-18-127
Submitted
On Briefs: September 26, 2018
Decided: October 4, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF MARANATHA K.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Maranatha K. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Augusta, Fowle, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.1 After
reviewing the evidence, we affirm.
[¶2] The Department of Health and Human Services filed a child
protection petition in August 2016, when the child was eleven years old. See
22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017). In December 2016, the court (E. Walker, J.) entered a
jeopardy order, by agreement, placing the child with a relative. The
Department filed a petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights on
July 7, 2017. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2017). On March 9, 2018, the court
(Fowle, J.) held a hearing on the Department’s petition for termination of the
1
The child’s father died before this child protective action began; therefore, the following
procedural history and factual findings concern only the mother.
2
mother’s parental rights. Notwithstanding proper notice being provided to her,
the mother failed to appear at the hearing.
[¶3] On March 15, 2018, the court granted the Department’s petition to
terminate the mother’s parental rights. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017).
Based on the testimony presented at the hearing and other competent evidence
in the record, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the
mother is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably
calculated to meet the child’s needs; (2) the mother is unwilling or unable to
take responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to
meet the child’s needs; (3) the child was abandoned by the mother; (4) the
mother failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the
child; and (5) termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest
of the child. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-A), 4041, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iv)
(2017). In addition, the court found that jeopardy would still exist if the child
was returned to the mother. See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2) (2017).
[¶4] The court based its decision on the following factual findings, which
are supported by competent evidence in the record:
3
Jeopardy as to the mother was [her] inability and
unwillingness to manage her substance abuse and mental health
issues, and failure to identify how those issues negatively impacted
her ability to safely parent [the child]. . . . [D]espite being offered
substance abuse and mental health services including Family
Treatment Drug Court, [the mother] did not participate in any of
those services other than the Discovery House. According to the
Discovery House records, the mother continued to test positive for
heroin and cocaine throughout her time in treatment there. The
court also heard testimony from . . . the relative foster care
placement that [the child] is doing extremely well living with them,
that [the child] is on the honor roll . . . and plays on several of the
school sports teams. . . . The GAL testified it was in the best interest
of [the child] that the Court terminates the mother’s parental
rights. . . .
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the
family and has made reasonable efforts to identify and pursue an
alternative permanency plan . . . .
The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that
throughout the case the mother made no progress in reunification
efforts . . . and that jeopardy would still exist if the child was
returned to [the] mother’s care due in part to the mother’s lack of
participation in any reunification services.
The Court also finds that it is in the child’s best interest for
[the] mother’s parental rights to be terminated for him to be
adopted.
[¶5] The mother timely appealed. See 22 M.R.S. § 2006 (2017). On
May 29, 2018, pursuant to the process outlined in In re M.C., 2014 ME 128,
¶¶ 6-7, 104 A.3d 139, counsel for the mother filed a brief containing the factual
and procedural history of the case, stating that she believed there are no
4
meritorious issues for appeal. In an order dated May 31, 2018, we granted the
mother an enlargement of time to file a supplemental brief. The mother did not
file a supplemental brief, and we granted the Department’s motion to consider
the appeal without briefing from the Department.
[¶6] The record evidence in this case supports the court’s factual findings
of parental unfitness as well as its discretionary determination that termination
of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See In re Children
of Alice R., 2018 ME 33, ¶ 5, 180 A.3d 1085. Accordingly, the court did not err
or abuse its discretion in finding, to the clear and convincing standard, at least
one ground of parental unfitness and that termination of the mother’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interest. See In re M.C., 2014 ME 128, ¶ 8, 104 A.3d
139.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Elizabeth S. Gray, Esq., The Law Office of Elizabeth S. Gray, Esq., Augusta, for
appellant Mother
The Department of Health and Human Services did not file a brief.
Augusta District Court docket number PC-2016-60
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY