State of Maine v. Eric Hamel , 60 A.3d 783 ( 2013 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2013 ME 16
Docket: SRP-11-539
Argued: January 16, 2013
Decided: February 5, 2013
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR,
JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ERIC HAMEL
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] In this sentence review appeal, Eric Hamel challenges the concurrent
forty-five-year prison sentences imposed by the court (Clifford, J.) on Hamel’s
judgment of conviction for two counts of intentional or knowing murder,
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2012), entered on his guilty pleas. Hamel argues that
the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a longer prison term than that
of his two co-conspirators. We disagree and affirm the sentences.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In 2009, Gayla Sheldon asked her boyfriend, Richard Moulton, to
either kill her estranged husband, Victor Sheldon, or arrange for someone else to
kill him. Moulton contacted Hamel, a high school friend, who agreed to murder
Victor in exchange for payment. After one failed attempt to lure Victor to a
location where Hamel was to kill him, Gayla, Moulton, and Hamel agreed that
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Hamel would kill Victor and, at the same time, kill Victor’s roommate, Robert
Day. On August 3, 2009, Hamel went to the home Victor and Day shared in
Rumford and shot and killed them both.
[¶3] Gayla, Moulton, and Hamel all pleaded no contest or guilty to various
charges. In July of 2011, Gayla pleaded no contest to conspiracy to commit
murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 151(1)(A), 201(1)(A) (2012), and solicitation to
commit murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 153(1)(A), 201(1)(A) (2012), in
exchange for the State’s dismissal of three other charges against her. Based on an
agreement between Gayla and the State that the court accepted, the court sentenced
Gayla to twenty-five years in prison with all but fifteen years suspended and four
years of probation for each count, to run concurrently. In August of 2011, pursuant
to an agreement with the State that was accepted by the court, Moulton pleaded
guilty to two counts of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A).
The court sentenced Moulton to forty years in prison, the maximum allowed
pursuant to Moulton’s agreement with the State.
[¶4] Finally, Hamel also pleaded guilty to two counts of intentional or
knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A). Also pursuant to an agreement with
the State that was accepted by the court, Hamel’s sentence could be no more than
fifty years in prison, but he was free to argue for a reduced term of years. The
court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of forty-five years in prison. We
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granted Hamel’s application for leave to appeal his sentence. See 15 M.R.S.
§ 2151 (2012); M.R. App. P. 20(h).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] Hamel challenges only the sentence imposed by the court. Pursuant to
15 M.R.S. § 2155 (2012), we consider (1) “[t]he propriety of the sentence, having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of
the public interest, the effect of the offense on the victim and any other relevant
sentencing factors recognized under law,” and (2) “[t]he manner in which the
sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information
on which it was based.” In determining “whether the sentencing court disregarded
the statutory sentencing factors, abused its sentencing power, permitted a manifest
and unwarranted inequality among sentences of comparable offenders, or acted
irrationally or unjustly” in fashioning a sentence, we afford the trial court
considerable discretion. State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 21, 991 A.2d 806;
see 15 M.R.S. § 2154 (2012); State v. Koehler, 2012 ME 93, ¶ 32, 46 A.3d 1134;
State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 14, 21 A.3d 91.
[¶6] In calculating Hamel’s murder sentence, the court undertook the
appropriate two-step procedure outlined in 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1), (2) (2012).
See Koehler, 2012 ME 93, ¶ 33, 46 A.3d 1134. First, the court considered the
basic term of imprisonment “based on an objective consideration of the particular
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nature and seriousness of the crime, taking into account the sentencing principles”
outlined in 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2012). Koehler, 2012 ME 93, ¶ 33, 46 A.3d
1134; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). The court calculated Hamel’s basic sentence
at fifty years for committing two premeditated murders for pecuniary gain.
Second, the court considered as aggravating factors that both victims were most
likely aware of their imminent deaths and the impact these deaths had on the
victims’ families. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). As mitigating factors, the court
considered Hamel’s youth (he was twenty-one years old at the time of sentencing),
his difficult childhood, his lack of a criminal record, that the murders were not
initially his idea, and that he accepted responsibility for the crimes and pledged his
cooperation with the State. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). The court ultimately
sentenced Hamel to forty-five years for each count, a term that complies with the
statutory requirements for murder cases, namely, a minimum of twenty-five years
in prison and up to life in prison. 17-A M.R.S. § 1251 (2012).
[¶7] Hamel contends, however, that his sentence violates one particular goal
of sentencing—“[t]o eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to
legitimate criminological goals”—because he received a longer term of years than
either Gayla or Moulton. 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(5).
[¶8] Although section 1151 provides a list of sentencing goals, “the
selection for appropriate emphasis among these disparate purposes rests in the
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discretion of the court.” State v. Mudie, 508 A.2d 119, 121 (Me. 1986). Here, the
sentencing court explicitly considered the apparent inequality in sentences among
the three individuals involved in the killings pursuant to section 1151, and
accounted for it by sentencing Hamel to only forty-five years instead of the
fifty-year capped sentence the court stated it otherwise would have imposed.
[¶9] The differences among the three sentences reflects the differences in
the conduct of each of the defendants and the resulting convictions. Pursuant to an
agreement with the State, Gayla, although the mastermind of the plot to kill her
husband, was ultimately convicted of only conspiracy and solicitation charges;
unlike Hamel, she was not convicted of murder. Moulton was convicted of murder
for his role in furthering Gayla’s plan, but he did not kill either victim. Hamel
alone shot both victims, thereby carrying out the premeditated murder of two
people for pecuniary gain. The distinctions between Moulton’s and Hamel’s
actions support the differences in their respective sentences. See State v. Corrieri,
654 A.2d 419, 423-24 (Me. 1995) (affirming a sentence that was longer than that
of two co-defendants because the defendant lacked remorse, refused to
acknowledge his responsibility for the act, and had a conviction for similar conduct
in his juvenile record).
[¶10] Given the court’s thoughtful consideration of the purposes of
sentencing, proper completion of the two-step sentencing procedure for murder,
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articulation of the reasons for the sentence, and explicit discussion of and
adjustment for the sentencing inequality at issue, we affirm Hamel’s sentence. See
Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 15, 21 A.3d 91 (discussing the importance of the
sentencing court articulating its process and rationale); State v. Dalli, 2010 ME
113, ¶ 14, 8 A.3d 632 (affirming a sentence based on the court’s explicit
consideration of the purposes of sentencing); cf. State v. Houston, 534 A.2d 1293,
1297 (Me. 1987) (vacating an assault sentence for “punishing more harshly a
man’s unprovoked assault upon a woman than a similar attack upon a victim who
is an equally defenseless male”).
The entry is:
Sentences affirmed.
On the briefs:
George A. Hess, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Eric Hamel
William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Lauren F. LaRochelle, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
George A. Hess, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Eric Hamel
Lauren F. LaRochelle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for appellee State of
Maine
Oxford County Superior Court docket number CR-2009-309
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY