State of Maine v. Richard A. Larsen Jr. , 65 A.3d 1203 ( 2013 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2013 ME 38
Docket: Aro-12-64
Argued: February 12, 2013
Decided: March 28, 2013
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR,
JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
RICHARD A. LARSEN JR.
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] We are called upon here to determine whether an out-of-court
statement that incriminates both the nontestifying declarant and a defendant in a
criminal trial is admissible in the defendant’s trial when the declarant asserts the
privilege against self-incrimination and is unavailable to testify.
[¶2] Richard A. Larsen Jr. appeals from a judgment entered by the trial
court (Hunter, J.) after a jury found him guilty of burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 401(1)(A) (2012), and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C), 17-A
M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4) (2012), for taking building materials worth more than
$1,000 from the Presque Isle Snowmobile Club without authorization. During
Larsen’s trial, Larsen’s adult son, who had told the police that he helped his father
take the materials from the Club, asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and refused to testify. See U.S. Const. amend. V. Larsen
2
contends that the court erred when it admitted redacted versions of two statements
that Larsen’s son had earlier made to police that incriminated both Larsen and his
son.1 Because we conclude that the court erred in admitting the statements of
Larsen’s son and that the error was not harmless, we vacate the judgment of
conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] In August 2009, Larry Allen, a contractor who had been hired to build
a new clubhouse for the Presque Isle Snowmobile Club, died before the project
was finished. Richard A. Larsen Jr., who had been Allen’s employee, was not
hired to complete the construction; instead, the Club hired another construction
company.
[¶4] On September 8, 2009, employees of the new construction company
alerted the Club that building supplies and materials worth a total of $11,000 or
more were missing. There was no evidence of forced entry. Larsen had been in
possession of a key to the groomer building in which these items had been stored.
About ten people had keys to the building, and Larsen was the only key holder
who was not a Club member. At some point, many of the missing supplies were
found dumped and scattered along a road in the Beaver Brook area.
1
Larsen also argues that he did not have effective assistance of counsel. We do not consider this
argument on direct appeal. See 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (2012); State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20, 32 A.3d 1019.
“[S]uch claims will only be considered after a certificate of probable cause has been issued following a
hearing on a post-conviction petition.” Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20, 32 A.3d 1019.
3
[¶5] In October 2010, Larsen was charged by complaint with burglary
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4). In January 2011, he was indicted for those
two crimes and two additional crimes of which he was ultimately acquitted:
tampering with a witness or informant (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1)(A)(2)
(2012), and violation of a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A)
(2012).
[¶6] Larsen pleaded not guilty to all of the charges, and he was tried alone
before a jury in January 2012. The jury heard testimony from officers of the Club,
the supplier of the building materials for the new clubhouse, several of Larsen’s
relatives and acquaintances, a friend on whose property Larsen had stored a variety
of materials, the man who discovered the discarded building materials, law
enforcement officers, and a Department of Corrections sergeant who testified about
Larsen’s son’s telephone and mail correspondence while the son was in jail.
[¶7] Although Larsen’s son was called as a witness at the trial, he invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify.
The State then moved for the admission of two written statements that the son had
signed, after being interviewed by the Presque Isle Police, as statements against the
son’s penal interest pursuant to M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Larsen objected that the
admission of those statements would impinge on his constitutional right to confront
4
and cross-examine an adverse witness. The court admitted redacted versions of the
statements, which were read into the record by the officer who took the
statements.2
[¶8] As redacted, the son’s statements did not mention Larsen by name, but
they included a detailed account of how Larsen’s son and a “person” had taken the
building supplies from the Club. The son’s statements explained in detail how he
and that person met at what had been Allen’s garage, drove to the Club building
site in the person’s truck, used a key to enter a Club building, carried away
building supplies from that building in the truck, and took the supplies to the
person’s friend’s house for storage.
[¶9] The jury considered the son’s statements in combination with
additional evidence that Larsen’s son had received a phone call and absented
himself from his other family members and girlfriend on the night of August 28,
2009; that Larsen had told his daughter, his ex-wife, and his son’s girlfriend that he
had been involved in stealing windows and storing them on his friend’s property;
that Larsen had in fact stored items on that friend’s property; that Larsen had
threatened to slit his ex-wife’s throat if she turned him in; and that Larsen had told
his son’s girlfriend that he would kill anybody who ratted on him.
2
The prosecutor thrice mistakenly referred to Larsen’s son as “the defendant” during direct
examination of the officer who authenticated the son’s statements and read them, as redacted, to the jury.
Larsen did not object, and this misstatement was not corrected.
5
[¶10] The jury found Larsen guilty of burglary and theft, and not guilty of
tampering with a witness or violating a condition of bail. For the burglary
conviction, the court sentenced Larsen to thirty-six months in prison, all but
eighteen months suspended, with two years of probation that included conditions
that Larsen have no contact with his ex-wife, her husband, his son’s girlfriend, or
his daughter. The court also ordered him to pay $11,044.58 to the Club in
restitution and $25 to the victims’ compensation fund. For the theft conviction, the
court imposed a concurrent sentence of eighteen months in prison and ordered
Larsen to pay $25 to the victims’ compensation fund. Larsen timely appealed. See
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2012); M.R. App. P. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] The State argues that Larsen’s son’s statements were admissible as
statements against interest, see M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3), and cites to our opinion in
State v. Platt, 1997 ME 229, 704 A.2d 370, in support of its position that the
redaction of the statements effectively prevented any constitutional violations. The
State also argues that, if there was any error, that error was harmless. Because
Platt may have led to confusion regarding the admissibility of such statements, we
address both the evidentiary issue and the constitutional issue in detail.
6
A. Admissibility of Statements Against Interest
[¶12] “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” M.R. Evid. 801(c). In other words, hearsay is an out-of-court statement
offered at trial to prove a relevant fact. See id. Subject to certain exceptions,
hearsay is inadmissible in a court proceeding. M.R. Evid. 802. One of the
exceptions to this rule applies when a party offers in evidence certain statements of
an unavailable witness when those statements are against the declarant’s interest:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness [as provided in M.R. Evid. 804(a)]:
....
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against
another or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or
disgrace, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A
statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal
case, made by a defendant or other person implicating both the
declarant and the accused, is not within this exception.
M.R. Evid. 804(b) (emphasis added).
7
[¶13] Here, the statements of Larsen’s son were not made in court and were
offered to prove the truth of the matters that he asserted in those statements: that he
and another person met on property that had been owned by Larsen’s former
employer, used a key to enter a Club building, took away materials from that
building, and stored them at the home of Larsen’s friend. See M.R. Evid. 801(c).
Accordingly, the statements constituted hearsay and were not admissible unless an
exception to the hearsay rule applied. See M.R. Evid. 802.
[¶14] To determine whether the statement-against-interest exception to the
hearsay rule could apply, the threshold question is whether Larsen’s son was
unavailable as a witness. See M.R. Evid. 804(a), (b). On this point, the parties do
not dispute that, because he asserted his privilege against self-incrimination, see
U.S. Const. amend. V, Larsen’s son was unavailable for purposes of this hearsay
exception, see M.R. Evid. 804(a)(1) (“‘Unavailability as a witness’ includes [a]
situation in which the declarant is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement.”).
[¶15] Next, we consider whether the statement-against-interest exception
applies in the circumstances of this case. The plain language of the exception
provides that the exception does not apply if, in a criminal case, the statement
implicates both the unavailable declarant and the defendant: “A statement or
8
confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a[n] . . . other
person implicating both the declarant and the accused, is not within this
exception.” M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The proffered statements of Larsen’s son fall
directly within that description. Thus, the statements were not admissible against
Larsen pursuant to the Maine Rules of Evidence. See State v. Guyette, 2012 ME 9,
¶ 17, 36 A.3d 916.
[¶16] Because Larsen did not draw the court’s attention to this evidentiary
basis for exclusion, however, and instead argued that the admission of the
statements would violate his constitutional right of confrontation, see Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), we next address the constitutional
considerations that formed the basis for the court’s evidentiary ruling.
B. Constitutional Right of Confrontation
[¶17] “We review constitutional interpretations de novo.” State v. Mitchell,
2010 ME 73, ¶ 41, 4 A.3d 478. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Me. Const. art. I, § 6.
9
[¶18] In specific circumstances, when two or more defendants are being
tried together, a nontestifying co-defendant’s redacted confession3 may be admitted
in a joint trial. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Such a
confession is admissible against that co-defendant because it is not hearsay as to
the co-defendant. See M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a statement is not
hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is the party’s own
statement”). In addition, because the statement is the co-defendant’s own
statement, there are no Confrontation Clause concerns. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
[¶19] A nontestifying co-defendant’s confession is not admissible against
the nondeclarant defendant, however, even in a joint trial. See Richardson, 481
U.S. at 211; Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-37.4 The redaction undertaken in a joint trial
is specifically designed to ensure that the content of that confession relates only to
the defendant who made the confession. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
Accordingly, even if redacted, a confession of a witness who invokes the Fifth
3
To be admissible in a joint trial, the court must provide a limiting instruction, and the confession
must be carefully redacted to remove not only any identification of the jointly tried nondeclarant
defendant but also any reference to that person’s existence. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211
(1987). The redaction in these instances cannot be obvious or suggestive to the jury; substituting the
defendant’s name with the word “deleted,” for instance, too strongly implicates a defendant. Gray v.
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192-95 (1998); see also State v. Boucher, 1998 ME 209, ¶¶ 15-16, 718 A.2d
1092.
4
As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Bruton v. United States, a hearsay statement
inculpating a defendant is not ordinarily admissible pursuant to traditional rules of evidence. 391 U.S.
123, 128 n.3 (1968). Thus, the problem created by the admission of such a statement will arise only when
the government offers the statement in a joint trial against the co-defendant who made the statement. Id.
10
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify is ordinarily
inadmissible as evidence of the nondeclarant defendant’s guilt when that defendant
is tried alone. Cf. id.
[¶20] In the matter before us, Larsen was tried alone. Thus, contrary to the
State’s assertion, the Bruton analysis and the rule of redaction adopted in
Richardson have no application in the matter. To the extent that we earlier held
that a nontestifying accomplice’s redacted out-of-court statement is admissible
against a defendant who was tried alone, see Platt, 1997 ME 229, ¶¶ 3-6, 704 A.2d
370, we overrule that holding.
[¶21] Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified in Crawford v. Washington,
statements such as those made by Larsen’s son during police interrogation well
after the events that led to the burglary and theft charges are testimonial statements
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, and such testimonial statements of an
unavailable declarant cannot be admitted in evidence of a defendant’s guilt unless
the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine that declarant. 541 U.S. 36,
51-52, 59, 65, 68-69 (2004); see also State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 11, 957
A.2d 89. The redacted testimonial statements of Larsen’s son could not be
admitted because Larsen’s son refused to testify and Larsen lacked the opportunity
for cross-examination either at trial or in any earlier proceeding. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 59, 68-69.
11
[¶22] Having determined that the trial court erred in admitting the
statements of Larsen’s son based on both the Rules of Evidence and the United
States Constitution, we will vacate the judgment entered against Larsen unless the
error in admitting the evidence is harmless.
C. Harmless Error
[¶23] “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.” M.R. Crim. P. 52(a). “A constitutional
error made at trial may be deemed harmless if we are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt,” based on the trial record as a whole, “that the error did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.” State v. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 17, 50 A.3d 544 (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶24] We are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in
admitting the statements of Larsen’s son did not contribute to the verdict. See id.
The improperly admitted statements from Larsen’s son were the only pieces of
evidence offered by the State that communicated the means by which the building
supplies were removed from the Club property. The details contained in the
statements clearly implicate Larsen as the “person” who, with the help of his son,
drove to the Club’s property from what had been Allen’s garage, unlocked the
Club’s groomer building, took the building supplies, and concealed them on
property owned by a friend of Larsen’s who testified at trial about Larsen’s storage
12
of materials on his property. We are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the properly admitted evidence alone would have persuaded the jury of Larsen’s
guilt. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless, and
we vacate the judgment of conviction.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On the briefs:
Tammy Ham-Thompson, Esq., Farris Law, P.A., Gardiner, for appellant
Richard A. Larsen Jr.
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Carrie L. Linthicum, Asst. Dist.
Atty., Presque Isle, for appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Tammy Ham-Thompson, Esq., for appellant Richard A. Larsen Jr.
Carrie L. Linthicum, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
Aroostook County Superior Court (Caribou) docket number CR-2010-436
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY