State of Maine v. John E. Sasso , 143 A.3d 124 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 95
Docket: Han-14-400
Argued: October 7, 2015
Decided: June 28, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JOHN E. SASSO
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] John E. Sasso appeals from the judgment of conviction entered in the
Unified Criminal Docket (Hancock County, R. Murray, J.) following his
conditional plea of nolo contendere, pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), to the
crime of operating after suspension (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(B)
(2015). Sasso argues that the court (Mallonee, J.) erred in denying his motion to
suppress, contending that the officer’s decision to stop his vehicle was pretextual
and that the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. We
affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order
denying Sasso’s motion to suppress, the record supports the following facts. See
2
State v. Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 2, 48 A.3d 218. On March 28, 2014, an Ellsworth
police officer, who was also part of an underage drinking task force, was on patrol.
The officer watched Sasso, who was eighteen at the time, leave a convenience
store, get into the driver’s seat of a car, and drive away from the store. The night
was rainy, and the roads were wet. The officer followed Sasso for a short distance
and did not observe any problems with the operation of the vehicle. He did,
however, notice a problem with the brake lights on Sasso’s car. One of the brake
lights appeared to be “stuck on.”1 The officer described the problem of the brake
light as “a safety violation.” He turned on his blue lights and effected a stop of
Sasso’s car. Sasso pulled over without incident. Sasso was driving with a license
that had been suspended as a result of an OUI conviction, and he was arrested for
operating after suspension.
[¶3] Sasso was charged by criminal complaint with operating after
suspension (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(B). He entered a not guilty
plea and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the officer’s stop of the
vehicle, arguing that the stop was pretextual and that there was no reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the stop. Regarding the alleged pretext, Sasso
1
Sasso argued that although one of his taillights was much brighter than the other, causing the
appearance that his brake light was stuck on, his brake light was not actually stuck on. Whether or not the
brake light was actually stuck on is irrelevant because the record supports a finding that at the time of the
stop, the officer believed Sasso’s brake light was stuck on and cited the offending brake light as the
reason for initiating the stop.
3
argued that the officer thought that Sasso had purchased alcohol at the convenience
store, and he hoped to find evidence of underage drinking by stopping the car.
[¶4] Three people testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress: (1) the
officer who stopped Sasso; (2) Sasso’s mother, who confirmed that one of the
taillights was a bit brighter than the other, perhaps because it was canted at a
slightly different angle; and (3) another individual regarding a potential reason for
the brighter taillight. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion.
The court made very brief findings on the record, including the finding that
“there’s clearly something out of whack with this car.” The court made no explicit
finding on pretext, determining that the State was correct that in these
circumstances the officer’s suspicion regarding underage possession of alcohol was
“neither here nor there.”
[¶5] Neither party moved for further findings and conclusions. See M.R.
Crim. P. 41A(d). Although Sasso had argued that the stop was pretextual, he did
not seek specific findings at the hearing or seek further findings after the hearing.
[¶6] Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Sasso entered a
conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The court
found Sasso guilty and sentenced him to the mandatory seven days in jail to be
satisfied by completion of ten days in an alternative sentencing program, a $600
4
fine, and a one-year license suspension. Sasso then timely appealed. See
15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2015).
II. OVERVIEW
[¶7] “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 5 of the Maine Constitution protect motorists from being unreasonably
stopped by police.” State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 8, 43 A.3d 961. For a traffic
stop to be constitutional, “a police officer must have an objectively reasonable,
articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to
public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.” State v. Sylvain,
2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984 (footnote omitted). “Safety reasons alone can be
sufficient” to support a stop “if they are based upon ‘specific and articulable
facts.’” State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989).
[¶8] A “pretext” challenge refers to an allegation that, although an officer
has proffered a legal justification to stop a vehicle, the stop was effectuated for
some unrelated purpose for which no articulable suspicion or probable cause
existed. Sasso argues that, because there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion
for the stop, the stop must have been pretextual. As set out in part IV of this
opinion, we conclude that the officer did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion
for the stop, and we move to the next question: whether the separate, subjective
motivation of the officer renders a stop “unreasonable,” even in circumstances
5
where there is a valid criminal, civil, or safety basis for the stop. For the following
reasons, we conclude that it does not.
III. PRETEXT
[¶9] In 1996, the United States Supreme Court addressed pretextual vehicle
stops in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).2 In Whren, District of
Columbia vice-squad officers, operating in a “high drug area,” observed a motor
vehicle that was stopped at a stop sign. Id. at 808. Although they suspected drug
trafficking activity, they had no initial basis, specific to that vehicle or its
occupants, to stop the car. See id. The officers then observed the vehicle remain at
the stop sign for an unusually long time, make a right-hand turn without a proper
signal, and speed off at an unreasonable speed. Id. The officers stopped the
vehicle, at which point they saw in plain view two large plastic bags of what
appeared to be crack cocaine. Id. at 808-09. They arrested the motor vehicle’s
occupants. Id. at 809.
[¶10] The defendants in Whren argued that the stop was unconstitutional
because the officers did not have probable cause3 to believe that the vehicle’s
2
Although Whren was based on civil traffic violations of a municipal ordinance, see Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), the United States Supreme Court has indicated that its holding extends
to criminal traffic violations as well, see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996).
3
We note that although the standard used by the officers to effectuate the stop in Whren was probable
cause rather than a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the analysis regarding pretext applies uniformly. See
Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
6
occupants were engaging in drug-related activity, and the asserted basis for
stopping the vehicle—the traffic violations—was pretextual. Id. They argued that
because of “the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law
violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists,” the
fact that the officers had probable cause to believe that the traffic infractions were
occurring was not enough, and a different standard was necessary to analyze the
situation. Id. at 810.
[¶11] In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected
this argument and upheld the stop. Id. at 819. It clarified that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual, subjective
motivations of the individual officers involved. Id. at 813. When a stop is based
on an objectively justifiable basis, a separate motive does not strip the officer’s
actions of the legal justification. Id. The Court specifically rejected the inquiry
into the subjective motivation of the officer, stating: “Not only have we never held,
outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . , that an
officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.” Id. at 812.
[¶12] The Supreme Court holding announced in Whren is consistent with
Maine’s standard for evaluating whether a traffic stop passes constitutional muster.
In State v. Haskell, 645 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 1994), decided before the Supreme
7
Court announced its decision in Whren, we described a pretextual stop as occurring
“when an officer uses a legal justification to stop a vehicle to search for evidence
of an unrelated serious crime for which he did not have the reasonable articulable
suspicion necessary to support a stop.”
[¶13] Additional language in Haskell did, however, reference the officer’s
subjective motivation. We stated in Haskell that “[t]he test is not whether the
officer lawfully could have stopped defendant, but whether a reasonable officer
would have made the stop absent the invalid purpose.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, Haskell could reasonably have been read to overlay a second test on the
basis for the stop—in other words, even if the stop was undertaken on an
objectively reasonable basis, the stop may be invalidated if the officer had a
separate, subjective motivation for the stop.
[¶14] We have, however, more recently clarified that the subjective
motivation of the officer is not relevant on the ultimate determination of a
reasonable, articulable suspicion, which requires an objective analysis. As we
announced in State v. Bolduc, decided after Whren, “[w]hether a reasonable police
officer would normally have stopped [the defendant] . . . is not important to the
analysis.” 1998 ME 255, ¶ 6, 722 A.2d 44 (emphasis added); see also State v.
Taylor, 1997 ME 81, ¶ 9 n.6, 694 A.2d 907. Consistent with the standard
established by the United States Supreme Court in Whren, the standard to be used
8
is whether an officer has “an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that
either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred,
is occurring, or is about to occur.” Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984
(footnote omitted).
[¶15] In sum, to the extent that other language in Haskell suggested a
different analysis, we now clarify that the officer’s subjective motivation is not
relevant to the determination of the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary for
a valid traffic stop. The critical analysis, even when pretext is asserted, requires an
objective review of the basis for the stop. Thus, an illegal pretextual stop is one
that occurs when an officer asserts an allegedly legitimate reason to stop a vehicle
in order to obtain evidence of an unrelated crime when the officer did not actually
have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a stop.
See Haskell, 645 A.2d at 621.
[¶16] We note, however, that evidence of an officer’s subjective motivation
for a stop, seizure, or search may well be relevant on matters of credibility,
observer bias, or context. Thus, the relevance of alleged pretext or subjective
motivation, because it may bear on credibility of witnesses, context, or reliability
of the evidence presented, will be determined on a case-by-case basis. See M.R.
Evid. 401.
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IV. ANALYSIS
[¶17] With that background, we review Sasso’s challenges to the court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. As always, we apply two standards of review to
the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigatory
traffic stop. State v. Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶ 16, 932 A.2d 1169. We first
determine whether the record supports the factual findings made by the motion
court. State v. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 881. We then “review de
novo the motion court’s conclusion that the officer’s subjective suspicion was
objectively reasonable as a matter of law.” Id.
[¶18] The court’s findings on the record at the conclusion of the motion
were very brief. In ruling on a motion to suppress, “the court shall make findings
of fact and conclusions of law either on the record or in writing. If the court fails
to make such findings and conclusions, a party may file a motion seeking
compliance with the requirement.” M.R. Crim. P. 41A(d). If no facts are found or
the factual findings are not sufficient to disclose the basis for the court’s decision,
“the party responsible for an adequate record, the appellant, has the burden to
request the court to make findings if none are made, or to expand on inadequate
findings in order for the record to be meaningful for appellate review.” State v.
Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).
10
[¶19] This responsibility is critical in the context of this appeal because
neither party moved for further findings. Thus, we “infer that the court found all
the facts necessary to support its judgment if those inferred findings are
supportable by evidence in the record.” State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977
A.2d 1003. We “consider the evidence, and reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment
to determine if the evidence rationally supports the trial court’s decision.” 4 Id. In
other words, we assume that the court found facts necessary to support the denial
of the motion.
[¶20] The court believed the officer’s testimony regarding the taillight
malfunction and found that “there’s clearly something out of whack with this
car . . . . It’s clear there’s something irregular here.” It did not specify in its
decision whether it found that the officer stopped Sasso’s vehicle due to criminal
conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety. Because the State did not
argue that the malfunctioning brake light constituted a crime and did not offer or
4
Here, the court, in denying the motion to suppress, did not expressly find that the stop was initiated
on an improper basis, such as a suspicion of underage possession of alcohol. The court stated in its
findings on the record: “Now, it may well be true that if he hadn’t suspected underage drinking, he
wouldn’t have bothered to stop the car. I think [the prosecutor] is right that that’s neither here nor here.”
Because, in the absence of a motion for further findings of fact, we “infer that the court found all the facts
necessary to support its judgment,” State v. Connor, 2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003, and we also read
the facts in the light most favorable to the court’s ultimate determination, id., we assume that the court did
not find that the officer’s motivation rendered his testimony less than credible.
11
rely on the motor vehicle inspection regulations,5 this record would not support a
finding that the officer had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that a
crime or traffic infraction was occurring. Thus, the only finding that would
provide a constitutional basis for the stop would be that the officer had a
reasonable concern for the safety of the driver or the public. See State v. Gulick,
2000 ME 170, ¶ 14, 759 A.2d 1085.
[¶21] The record supports the court’s inferred finding that the basis for the
stop was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of a threat to public
safety. The record demonstrates that it was a rainy night and the light malfunction
could confuse other motorists. The officer testified that the malfunctioning
taillight was “a hazard for other people. They might see that and think the person’s
braking. Or the other light might be out.” Thus, the court could determine that the
officer had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of a safety concern that
supported the stop. Cf. McPartland, 2012 ME 12, ¶¶ 13, 17, 36 A.3d 881. Again,
“[s]afety reasons alone can be sufficient if they are based on ‘specific and
articulable facts.’” Pinkham, 565 A.2d at 319. Given the officer’s credited
testimony describing a malfunctioning brake light on a dark and wet street, the
safety concern was objectively reasonable. Furthermore, the court’s finding that
5
A malfunctioning brake light could preclude a successful inspection of a vehicle under Maine’s
inspection laws. See 9 C.M.R. 16 222 001-18 § 9 (2012).
12
any separate motivation was “neither here nor there” reflected its legally accurate
conclusion that, even if the officer had a separate motivation for the stop, the
objectively reasonable safety basis for the stop was sufficient to demonstrate that it
was “reasonable” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. The court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Ezra A.R. Willey, Esq., Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for
appellant John E. Sasso
Matthew J. Foster, District Attorney, and Delwyn E. Webster,
Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. VII, Ellsworth, for
appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Ezra A.R. Willey, Esq., for appellant John E. Sasso
Delwyn E. Webster, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of
Maine
Hancock County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2014-297
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY