Donald J. Williams v. Linda Williams , 161 A.3d 710 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 94 Docket: Ken-16-161
Submitted
On Briefs: February 23, 2017
Decided: May 11, 2017
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Concurrence/
Dissent: JABAR, J.
DONALD J. WILLIAMS
v.
LINDA WILLIAMS
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] Donald J. Williams appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Augusta, R.A. French, J.) awarding Linda Williams $8,100 in interim spousal
support and $6,000 in attorney fees. In its judgment, the court concluded,
first, that Donald should reimburse Linda for spousal support paid to her from
funds later set aside to her in the divorce and, second, that Donald was in a
better financial position than Linda to bear the cost of Linda’s attorney fees.
As to the issue of interim spousal support, we disagree and vacate that portion
of the judgment. As to the issue of attorney fees, we agree and affirm.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Donald and Linda Williams were married on February 14, 2006.1
On November 1, 2010, Donald instituted divorce proceedings in the District
Court. See 19-A M.R.S. § 902(1)(H) (2016). Over the next five and a quarter
years, in proceedings that wound their way through the District Court and the
Business and Consumer Docket, the court issued a series of eight orders or
judgments relevant to this appeal.
[¶3] On March 27, 2012, the court (Mullen, J.) ordered Donald to pay
$300 per week in interim spousal support to Linda. In April of 2013, the court
(Horton, J.) ordered the parties to sell their farm property located in
Monmouth and ordered that the proceeds were to be divided into thirds. One
third of the sale proceeds was awarded to each party, and one third was
placed in an escrow account that could only be disbursed upon further court
order. Because Donald was already delinquent in his payment of interim
spousal support, however, the court deducted $5,100 from Donald’s third and
awarded that directly to Linda. Within weeks, Linda was again complaining
that Donald continued to refuse to pay the ordered spousal support. The
court next entered an order dated June 11, 2013, authorizing Linda to
1 This was their second marriage to each other. The first marriage also ended in a divorce.
3
withdraw any unpaid interim spousal support from the escrow account.2
After conducting a judicial settlement conference, the court (Portland, Cole, J.)
entered a divorce judgment dated August 16, 2013, that, relevant to this
appeal, ended Donald’s obligation to pay any spousal support and awarded
Linda the “remaining net proceeds of [the farm sale] in the proximate amount
of $36,662.88 held in [the escrow account].”
[¶4] Donald appealed the divorce judgment. Linda immediately filed a
motion asking that, during the appeal, Donald be required to pay interim
spousal support out of his own funds, pointing out that the escrow account
from which she had been receiving spousal support payments had been set
aside to her in the divorce judgment. On October 10, 2013, the court
(Dobson, J.) issued an order stating that Linda could continue to withdraw
interim spousal support from the escrow account but noting that the order
was “without prejudice to either party” and stating that Linda “may request
recovery of interim spousal support amounts paid from [the escrow] account
from other funds set aside to [Donald] . . . and [Donald] may assert his position
regarding this issue as well.”
2 This was an amended order that corrected a clerical error in an order entered the previous
day.
4
[¶5] On February 7, 2014, in anticipation of the dismissal of the appeal,
Linda signed a general release stating:
IN CONSIDERATION OF Donald Williams’s dismissal of the
currently pending appeal of the Divorce Judgment in KEN-13-480,
and his payment to me of $50,000.00, which is the amount of
money he would owe me pursuant to the Divorce Judgment as of
February 6, 2014, had the said Divorce Judgment not been
appealed, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, I, Linda Williams, also agree to
dismiss said appeal in docket no. KEN-13-480, and agree to
execute any documents necessary to perfect a dismissal of that
appeal, and further release and forever discharge Donald Williams,
of and from any damages, costs, fees, attorney[] fees, or any other
thing whatsoever on account of, or in any way growing out of or
associated with the appeal filed by Donald Williams in KEN-13-480.
(Emphasis added.) On February 12, 2014, the parties voluntarily dismissed
the appeal. By that time, Linda had withdrawn $8,100—reflecting
twenty-seven payments of $300—in interim spousal support payments from
the escrow account.
[¶6] In April of 2015, Donald filed a motion for contempt or to enforce,
seeking to recover a horse trailer and title to a vehicle. While that motion was
still pending, in September of 2015, Linda filed a motion for post-judgment
relief seeking the recovery of the $8,100 she had withdrawn from the escrow
account during the appeal. Although it held a consolidated hearing on both
5
motions on November 12, 2015, the court (R.A. French, J.) issued separate
orders.
[¶7] First, the court entered an order dated December 23, 2015,
granting Linda’s request based on its findings that Donald had not paid
interim spousal support while the appeal was pending; the court had
authorized Linda to take past due payments out of the escrow account; the
interim support orders had not been stayed by the appeal; the court had
expressly stated that Linda could request spousal support from Donald’s
funds; and Linda had withdrawn $8,100, diminishing the value of the property
eventually awarded to her in the divorce judgment. Then, in an order dated
December 28, 2015, the court denied Donald’s motion and granted Linda
$6,000 in attorney fees based on its finding that Donald—who earned more
per month than Linda and owned a company that paid some of his bills—was
in a better financial position to bear the cost of the attorney fees.3
[¶8] On Donald’s motion, the court issued further findings and
conclusions of law on February 16, 2016, stating that Linda’s testimony at the
hearing on both motions was credible; Donald’s company had paid his
3 The court found that Linda’s income was $950 per month, although Linda testified that it was
$970 per month. This apparent clerical error is not, however, the basis for Donald’s argument on
appeal, and, in any event, constitutes harmless error. See M.R. Civ. P. 61.
6
attorney fees in the divorce proceedings; and the general release had not
relieved Donald of his obligation to pay interim spousal support because,
among other reasons, Linda had not believed that the release pertained to
spousal support and would not have signed it if she had. Donald appealed
from the February 16, 2016, judgment, challenging portions of both
judgments entered in December of 2015.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Interim Spousal Support
[¶9] We first address Donald’s contention that the court erred in
granting Linda’s motion for post-judgment relief and awarding her $8,100
because Linda waived her right to be reimbursed for the decrease in the value
of the escrow account when she signed the release. Where the language of a
contract is unambiguous, we review that contract de novo as a question of
law. Brochu v. McLeod, 2016 ME 146, ¶ 39, 148 A.3d 1220. Contractual
language is “ambiguous [only] when it is reasonably susceptible of different
interpretations.” Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶ 11,
814 A.2d 989 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶10] Because the language of the general release that Linda signed is
unambiguous, the court erred in considering Linda’s intent in signing it. The
7
document released Donald in plain and broad language from “any damages,
costs, fees, attorney[] fees, and any other thing whatsoever on account of, or in
any way or growing out of or associated with the appeal.”4 (Emphasis added.)
The $8,100 in interim spousal support payments in question occurred as a
direct result of Donald’s appeal. His appeal stayed the effect of the divorce
judgment and resulted in the extension of the interim spousal support order.
See M.R. Civ. P. 62(a); Laqualia v. Laqualia, 2011 ME 114, ¶¶ 27-28,
30 A.3d 838. By its plain terms, the general release relieved Donald of any
obligation to compensate Linda for those interim spousal support payments
because they “grew out of” and were directly “associated with” the appeal. We
therefore vacate that portion of the judgment.
B. Attorney Fees
[¶11] Donald also challenges the court’s award of $6,000 in attorney
fees to Linda because the court based its decision, in part, on its finding that
Linda’s income is less than $1,000 per month, a finding that he contends is
erroneous. We review the award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion,
recognizing that “the court may consider the parties’ relative ability to pay
4 The document is also clear that Linda’s release was given “IN CONSIDERATION OF Donald
Williams’s dismissal of the currently pending appeal of the Divorce Judgment in KEN-13-480, and
his payment to me of $50,000.00, which is the amount of money he would owe to me pursuant to
the Divorce Judgment as of February 6, 2014.” Linda signed the release five days before the appeal
was dismissed.
8
and overall fairness given the totality of the circumstances” in making such an
award. Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 16, 976 A.2d 949.
[¶12] In awarding attorney fees to Linda on Donald’s failed motion for
contempt, the court credited Linda’s testimony that she had miscalculated her
income on a financial statement submitted to the court and that she in fact
earned less than $1,000 per month working two part-time jobs as a
bookkeeper. See supra n.3. Although the financial statement and Linda’s
estimate as to the wages she lost due to Donald’s motion for contempt
contradicted her testimony as to her monthly income, it was “squarely in the
province” of the court as fact-finder to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence before it. Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 33, 43 A.3d 978.
[¶13] Nevertheless, even if the court erred in its finding as to Linda’s
monthly income, that finding was not the sole basis for the award of attorney
fees. The court’s conclusion that Donald was better able to bear the financial
burden of the attorney fees was also supported by record evidence that Linda
is in debt and has no savings or financial assets to speak of and that Donald
owns valuable real estate and a company that has paid his attorney fees and
his living expenses including his mortgages. Thus, given the totality of the
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees
9
to Linda. See Starrett v. Starrett, 2014 ME 112, ¶¶ 16-17, 101 A.3d 435 (holding that a factual error made by the trial court was harmless where the
appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from it). We therefore
affirm that portion of the judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated in part and affirmed in part.
JABAR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶14] I concur with the Court’s opinion to the extent that it concluded
that Donald was in a better financial position than Linda to bear the costs of
Linda’s attorney fees. I respectfully dissent, however, from the Court’s
conclusion that the release in question is a general release relieving Donald of
his obligation to pay Linda spousal support that accrued during the appeal.
Court’s Opinion ¶ 10. Because the trial court properly considered the
testimony of the parties in determining the scope of the release, I would affirm
the trial court’s order awarding Linda $8,100 in interim spousal support.
[¶15] The Court agrees with Donald’s argument that the release signed
by Linda prevented her from recovering the $8,100 interim spousal support
which accrued during the pendency of the appeal. Court’s Opinion ¶ 10. The
10
Court states that “[b]ecause the language of the general release that Linda
signed is unambiguous, the [trial] court erred in considering Linda’s intent in
signing it.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 10. I disagree with the Court because neither
the content of the release, which is ambiguous, nor Linda’s testimony about it
support the Court’s conclusion that it was a general release.
[¶16] Pursuant to Maine contract law, to be enforceable, an agreement
must be “sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine its exact
meaning and fix exactly the legal liabilities of the parties.” Barr v. Dyke,
2012 ME 108, ¶ 13, 49 A.3d 1280 (quotation marks omitted). “If a release is
‘absolute and unequivocal’ in its terms, it ‘cannot be explained by parol
evidence and must be construed according to the language that the parties
have seen fit to use.’” 2301 Cong. Realty, LLC v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 2014 ME
147, ¶ 10, 106 A.3d 1131 (quoting Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 253
(Me. 1966)). “Once an ambiguity is found then extrinsic evidence may be
admitted and considered to show the intention of the parties.” Portland Valve,
Inc. v. Rockwood Sys. Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983). Language in a
contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different
interpretations. Id. “[T]he interpretation of ambiguous language is a question
for the factfinder.” Id. Any ambiguity in a contract should be construed
11
strictly against the drafter. See State v. Palmer, 2016 ME 120, ¶ 14, 145 A.3d
561; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bryant, 2012 ME 38, ¶ 9, 38 A.3d 1267.
[¶17] Because the language of the release drafted by Donald’s attorney
is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations, the release is
ambiguous. Several factors lead to this conclusion. First, the title of the
document indicates that it is a “RELEASE OF ALL DEMANDS WITH REGARD
TO APPEAL.” This title is not in any way indicative of a “general release.”
Second, the first two lines narrow the scope of the release to “the currently
pending appeal of the Divorce Judgment in KEN-13-480.” Finally, the
document releases Donald “from any damages, costs, fees, attorney[] fees, or
any other thing whatsoever on account of, or in any way growing out of or
associated with the appeal.” This language—considered narrowly and
construed against the drafter—is ambiguous in scope, because it does not
define what claims or demands are “growing out of or associated with the
appeal.” Because the judgment awarding interim spousal support that Donald
was obligated to pay was not appealed, it is not clear whether the accrued
spousal support is included within the scope of the release. For these reasons,
the release is ambiguous as to its scope.
12
[¶18] When a contract is ambiguous, the trial court is permitted to
consider parol evidence to interpret it. Portland Valve, Inc., 460 A.2d at 1387.
We then review the trial court’s determination for clear error. Brochu v.
McLeod, 2016 ME 146, ¶ 39, 148 A.3d 1220 (stating that “if [a] contract is
ambiguous, then its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder, in
which case we review the trial court’s conclusion for clear error” (quotation
marks omitted)).
[¶19] Although it did not specifically find that the release was
ambiguous, the trial court did consider parol evidence in determining the
scope of the release. The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
the release did not bar Linda’s claim for spousal support. Linda testified that
in executing the release she never intended to release her right to spousal
support payments, and did not believe that the release pertained to spousal
support. During his testimony at the hearing, Donald did not refute Linda’s
contentions or make any statement as to the scope of the release.
Additionally, Donald’s attorney acknowledged that the only issue raised in
Donald’s appeal of the divorce judgment concerned a stock pledge agreement.
The trial court found Linda’s testimony to be credible and concluded that the
13
release did not apply to Donald’s obligation to pay spousal support during the
pendency of the appeal.
[¶20] In conclusion, the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment
ordering $8,100 in interim spousal support be paid to Linda. Therefore, I
would affirm the court’s decision in its entirety, including its award of
attorney fees.
J. Mitchell Flick, Esq., Winthrop, for appellant Donald J. Williams
Karen M. Burke, Esq., Law Office of Karen M. Burke, Winthrop, for appellee
Linda Williams
Augusta District Court docket number FM-2010-496
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY