State of Maine v. Neil D. Salisbury , 173 A.3d 146 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 215 Docket: Han-17-135
Submitted
On Briefs: October 24, 2017
Decided: November 14, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
NEIL D. SALISBURY
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Neil D. Salisbury appeals from a judgment of conviction of
operating after suspension (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) (2016),
operating without a license (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(1)(A) (2016), and
operating an unregistered vehicle (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 351(1)(B) (2016),
entered by the trial court (Hancock County, Mallonee, J.) after a jury found him
guilty. On appeal, he primarily challenges the court’s jurisdiction. We affirm
the judgment.
[¶2] Contrary to Salisbury’s contentions, as a matter of law, the court
had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. See
15 M.R.S. § 1(1) (2016); 17-A M.R.S. §§ 7(1)(A), (5) (2016); State v. Pelletier,
2015 ME 129, ¶ 5, 125 A.3d 354; State v. St. Onge, 2011 ME 73, ¶ 13, 21 A.3d
2 1028. During the course of the trial and on appeal, Salisbury also raised other
arguments, though he forfeited most of these issues on appeal by failing to
offer any legal argument with citation to proper authority. See Mehlhorn v.
Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290. To the extent that he has adequately
presented these arguments, we find them without merit. Specifically,
• The court did not err or abuse its discretion in quashing Salisbury’s
subpoena of the assistant district attorney, who had no relevant
evidence to provide, see M.R. Evid. 401, 402; M.R.U. Crim. P. 17; State v.
Watson, 1999 ME 41, ¶ 5, 726 A.2d 214;
• The judge was properly appointed, see Laprel v. Going, 2014 ME 84,
¶¶ 15-20, 96 A.3d 67;
• The court did not abuse its discretion in reasonably limiting the duration
of Salisbury’s opening argument, cf. State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 260
(Me. 1985);
• The court properly denied Salisbury’s requested jury instructions and
instructed the jury fully on the applicable law, see State v. Hofland, 2012
ME 129, ¶ 18, 58 A.3d 1023;
• There was no basis for the court to hear a trespass “claim” in the context
of a criminal trial, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(a) (providing a list of
permissible pleadings in a criminal case that does not include
counterclaims); cf. M.R. Civ. P. 80F(d)(2) (disallowing counterclaims
even in civil traffic infraction matters); and
• There was no interstate travel here, but even if there had been, the right
to travel may properly be limited by states to ensure public safety, see
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); Pelletier, 2015 ME 129, ¶¶ 6-7,
125 A.3d 354; State v. Elliott, 2010 ME 3, ¶ 18, 987 A.2d 513; State v.
Quinnam, 367 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1977).
3
We discern no error or abuse of discretion and therefore affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Neil D. Salisbury, appellant pro se
Toff Toffolon, Dept. Dist. Atty., District Attorney’s Office, Ellsworth, for
appellee State of Maine
Hancock County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2016-624
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY