Charles M. Martin v. Department of Corrections , 190 A.3d 237 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 103 Docket: Kno-17-51
Argued: March 6, 2018
Decided: July 24, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
CHARLES M. MARTIN
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
JABAR, J.
[¶1] This case calls for us to consider whether in Maine, pursuant to the
“prisoner mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s civil petition for review of a
decision by the Department of Corrections should be deemed “filed” on the
date it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded to the clerk of court
rather than the date it is received by the clerk of court. We conclude that in
circumstances where, as here, (1) a prisoner is forced to rely on the
Department of Corrections to ensure that his Rule 80C petition—challenging
the Department’s administrative action against him—is filed; (2) that prisoner
places the petition into the “control” of the Department; and (3) the
Department fails to timely deliver his petition to the clerk of court, the open
courts provision and due process clause of the Maine Constitution require that
2
the prisoner mailbox rule apply and the petition be deemed timely filed.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are undisputed. See Ewing v. Me. Dist. Court,
2009 ME 16, ¶ 3 & n.2, 964 A.2d 644. On May 16, 2016, Charles M. Martin, a
prisoner incarcerated at the Maine State Prison, signed a petition pursuant to
5 M.R.S. § 11002 (2017) for judicial review of a Department decision finding
that he had committed a disciplinary infraction. Two days later, on May 18,
2016, he submitted that petition to prison authorities for forwarding to the
Superior Court. However, the clerk of court did not receive the petition until
May 26, 2016.
[¶3] After accepting service of the petition, the State moved to dismiss
it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See M.R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). According to the State, because Martin’s petition did not
specify “any date related to the action being challenged,” he failed to “make
the factual allegations necessary” to show that he filed the petition within the
thirty-day period prescribed by 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). Martin responded with a
motion to amend the petition, a supporting affidavit, and a proposed amended
petition specifying that he was notified of the Department decision on
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April 25, 2016. The Superior Court (Knox County, Stokes, J.) granted that
motion.1
[¶4] Consequently, the State filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing
that because the clerk of court received Martin’s petition on May 26, 2016—
thirty-one days after Martin was notified of the Department’s decision and
therefore one day outside the thirty-day statutory window—the Superior
Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Martin
opposed the State’s motion to dismiss, submitting an affidavit averring that he
signed the petition on May 16, 2016, and that he gave the petition to a unit
sergeant to mail on May 18, 2016. Citing the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), Martin urged the Superior
Court to apply the “prisoner mailbox rule,” whereby the court would consider
his petition filed on the date he deposited it with prison officials for
forwarding to the clerk of court, May 18, rather than when it was received by
the clerk of court, May 26.
[¶5] The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
the thirty-day time limit pursuant to section 11002(3) is “jurisdictional and
mandatory” and that “Maine has not yet adopted the so-called federal mailbox
1 The court did not explicitly rule on the State’s motion to dismiss. However, we infer that the
court did so by granting Martin’s motion to amend.
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rule.” Martin then filed a M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment,
which the court denied. This appeal followed. See 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2017);
M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).2
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] Citing Houston v. Lack, Martin argues that the court’s failure to
apply the prisoner mailbox rule violated his constitutional right to meaningful
access to the judicial process because he “had no opportunity to bypass the
prison personnel and ensure that his petition was mailed in a more reliable
fashion.” According to Martin, his “only option, beyond breaking out of jail to
hand deliver the package himself, was to give his mail to the prison
authorities, the representatives of the very agency against whom he was
seeking an appeal.” In response, the State contends that Martin was not
denied access to the courts because even accounting for the jail’s delay in
delivering his petition for review to the court, he was still provided the “ample
time” of 23 days to prepare his petition and ensure that it was timely received.
[¶7] We review de novo a court’s denial of a motion pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(4)3 to set aside a judgment because of a constitutional violation.
See Reliable Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty, 2011 ME 127, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1041.
2 The restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because this appeal was filed
before September 1, 2017. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).
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A. Statutory Provisions
[¶8] The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Maine Rules of
Civil Procedure govern the commencement of an appeal from a state agency’s4
decision. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008 (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 80C(b).
Rule 80C(b) provides, “The time within which a review of final agency action
or the failure or refusal of an agency to act may be sought shall be as provided
by 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002(3).” Section 11002(3) of the APA provides, “The
petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after receipt of notice if taken
by a party to the proceeding of which review is sought.” Although the APA
does not define the term “filed,” section 11002(1) specifies that the petition
for review must be filed “in the Superior Court.” 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1).
B. Houston v. Lack
[¶9] In Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court articulated the unique
obstacles facing pro se prisoners in exercising their right to access the courts.
487 U.S. at 270-71. There, the Court considered whether a prisoner’s civil
appeal was timely filed where it was delivered to prison authorities three
3 Although Martin specified M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) as the grounds for the
motion, his argument—that “[i]t was a mistake to believe that I could count on the respondent[s]
. . . to take responsible and prompt action, in regards to the actual mailing of the petition for
review”—can reasonably be read as a contention that the Department violated his right of access to
the courts by failing to deliver his petition to the clerk of court in a timely manner.
4 As used here, “agency” includes the Department of Corrections. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(2) (2017).
6
days before the expiration of the thirty-day filing period established by
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1),5 but was received by the clerk of
court one day after the filing period expired. Houston, 487 U.S. at 268-69. The
Court concluded that for purposes of then Rule 4(a)(1), the petitioner’s appeal
was filed at the moment it was delivered to prison authorities, and the Court’s
reasoning in so creating this prisoner mailbox rule warrants quotation at
some length—
The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of
counsel is unique. Such prisoners cannot take the steps other
litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of
appeal and to ensure that the court clerk receives and stamps
their notices of appeal before the 30-day deadline. Unlike other
litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the
courthouse to see that the notice is stamped “filed” or to establish
the date on which the court received the notice. Other litigants
may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and
the clerk’s process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro
se prisoner is forced to do so by his situation. . . . Worse, the pro
se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his
notice of appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot control or
supervise and who may have every incentive to delay. No matter
how far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers his notice to the
5 When the Supreme Court decided Houston v. Lack, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)
provided,
In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the
clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from . . . .
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (1992) (amended 1993).
7
prison authorities, he can never be sure that it will ultimately get
stamped “filed” on time.
Id. at 270-71. [¶10] Because Houston v. Lack involved the interpretation of a federal
rule of procedure and did not invoke the United States Constitution, the
Supreme Court’s decision is not binding on the states. See State ex rel. Tyler v.
Alexander, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (Ohio 1990). However, since Houston,
numerous states have addressed the issue—twenty-two states have adopted a
variation of the prisoner mailbox rule through court decision,6 and two states
have adopted the Rule through state rules of procedure.7 Although many
states, following Houston’s example, have adopted the Rule by interpreting
state statutes and/or court rules, see, e.g., Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681,
6 These states are Alabama, Ex parte Williams, 651 So. 2d 569 (Ala. 1992); Arizona, Mayer v.
State, 908 P.2d 56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); California, In re Jordan, 840 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1992); Florida,
Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992); Georgia, Massaline v. Williams, 554 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. 2001);
Hawaii, Setala v. J.C. Penney Co., 40 P.3d 886 (Haw. 2002); Idaho, Munson v. State, 917 P.2d 796 (Idaho 1996); Indiana, Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 2010); Kansas, Taylor v. McKune,
962 P.2d 566 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); Kentucky, Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. 2011);
Louisiana, Tatum v. Lynn, 637 So. 2d 796 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v.
Hartsgrove, 553 N.E.2d 1299 (Mass. 1990); Mississippi, Sykes v. State, 757 So. 2d 997 (Miss. 2000);
Nevada, Kellogg v. Journal Commc’ns, 835 P.2d 12 (Nev. 1992); Oklahoma, Woody v. State ex rel.
Dep’t of Corrs., 833 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1992); Oregon, Hickey v. Or. State Penitentiary, 874 P.2d 102 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Pennsylvania, Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996); South
Carolina, Mose v. State, 803 S.E.2d 718 (S.C. 2017); Texas, Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2004); Vermont, In re Bruyette, 136 A.3d 575 (Vt. 2016); Washington, State v. Hurt,
27 P.3d 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); and Wisconsin, State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle,
620 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
7 These states are Colorado, Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(f); and Tennessee, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.06.
8
682 (Tex. 2004); State v. Hurt, 27 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001),
other states have adopted the Rule by tolling the applicable statutes of
limitations, see Taylor v. McKune, 962 P.2d 566, 570 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); Mose
v. State, 803 S.E.2d 718, 721-23 (S.C. 2017); State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle,
620 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
[¶11] The circumstances of this case, however, preclude us from
following either approach. In Houston, as here, the prisoner’s appeal was
subject to both a rule of procedure and a statute establishing the filing
deadline. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); 28 U.S.C.S. § 2107(a) (LEXIS through
Pub. L. No. 115-196). Nevertheless, unlike this case, the statutory filing
deadline in Houston did not specify where a notice of appeal was required to
be filed. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (providing a deadline to file but not
specifying which court to file in), with 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1) (2017) (specifying
that petitions for review must be filed “in the Superior Court”). As such,
whereas the Houston Court held that the absence of such a specification
permitted its interpretation that a different meaning of the word “filed” could
apply to pro se prisoners, 487 U.S. 266 at 272, we are unable to reach the
same conclusion here due to section 11002(1)’s clear directive that filing must
occur “in the Superior Court,” see Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co., 1998 ME 232,
9
¶ 5, 719 A.2d 111 (“When interpreting a statute, we seek to give effect to the
intent of the Legislature by examining the plain meaning of the statutory
language . . . .”). Accordingly, we cannot consider this case in the same manner
as did the Houston Court.
[¶12] Nor can we, as other states have done, permit Martin’s petition to
proceed by tolling the thirty-day filing deadline provided in 5 M.R.S.
§ 11002(3). Although “[s]tatutory filing deadlines are presumptively subject
to equitable tolling,” that presumption is rebutted when those deadlines
“define the court’s jurisdiction,” Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 (1st
Cir. 2004), and we have previously held that the time limits contained in the
APA are jurisdictional, see Brown v. State, Dep't of Manpower Affairs, 426 A.2d
880, 888 (Me. 1981) (“We now state expressly that the Act’s time limitations
are jurisdictional.”); see also Reed v. Halperin, 393 A.2d 160, 162 & n.6
(Me. 1978) (explaining that the APA does not permit judicial-enlargement of
time limitations for judicial review). As such, this appeal must be considered
on constitutional grounds.
C. Constitutional Considerations
[¶13] Particularly relevant here, of the twenty-four states that have
adopted the Rule, two states—Florida and Oklahoma—have done so on
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constitutional grounds, holding that failure to adopt the Rule would violate
the principles of fundamental fairness contained in their respective
constitutions. See Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 616-17 (Fla. 1992); Woody v.
State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrs., 833 P.2d 257, 259-60 (Okla. 1992). Indeed, relying
on Houston, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Woody concluded that
pursuant to the provision of its state constitution analogous to our own open
courts provision, “the courts must be open to all on the same terms without
prejudice. The framers of the Constitution intended that all individuals
without partiality could pursue an effective remedy designed to protect their
basic and fundamental rights. . . . The constitutional guarantee of access to the
courts is not an empty formality.” 833 P.2d at 260.
[¶14] The same reasoning applies with equal force in this case, and we
therefore conclude that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Houston rings of the
fundamental fairness required by both the open courts provision and due
process clause of the Maine Constitution. See Me. Const. art. I, §§ 6-A, 19.
[¶15] The open courts provision states that “[e]very person, for an
injury inflicted . . . shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and
justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and without
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denial, promptly and without delay.” Me. Const. art. I, § 19.8 Pursuant to this
provision, courts are required to “be accessible to all persons alike without
discrimination . . . for every wrong recognized by law as remediable in a
court.” Me. Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1990). Although the
Legislature “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for exercising the
right to an adjudication,” Irish v. Gimbel, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 16, 691 A.2d 664, such
requirements may not “absolutely deprive [a citizen] of his remedy under
color of regulating it,” Sampson v. Sampson, 63 Me. 328, 333 (1874). Thus,
“[w]e do not construe section 19 as prohibiting reasonable limits on the time
within which a claimant must seek redress in the courts. . . . The only issue of
constitutional significance is whether such time limits are so unreasonable as
to deny meaningful access to the judicial process.” Cote, 577 A.2d at 1176 (emphasis added).
[¶16] Likewise, the due process clauses of the Maine and United States
Constitutions also establish a right to meaningful access to the judicial
8 This “sweeping guarantee” is derived from Part I, Article XI, of the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780, and “[i]ts roots are in Magna Carta, chapter 29, as interpreted by the great
seventeenth-century jurist Lord Coke.” Marshall Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution 58
(2d ed. 2013) (citing Cary L. Fleisher, Comment, Article 1, Section 19 of the Maine Constitution: The
Forgotten Mandate, 21 Me. L. Rev. 83, 84-85 (1969)). The Magna Carta provides, in pertinent part,
“We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right,” which Lord
Coke interpreted to mean that “every subject of this realm, for injury done to him . . . may take his
remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely
without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay,” 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the
Institutes of the Laws of England 45, 55 (1797).
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process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. 1, § 6-A; see Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 & n.24 (1969). The Maine Constitution’s concept of
due process is identical to that contained in the United States Constitution,
Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 24 n.9
(Me. 1981), and as the Supreme Court has held, “absent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance,” a generally valid statute or rule “may be
held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an
individual of a protected right,” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 379
(1971).
[¶17] As applied to Martin, the filing requirements contained in 5 M.R.S.
§ 11002(1), (3) and M.R. Civ. P. 80C(b)—which do not prohibit prison officials
from determining when, or if, they forwarded his petition to the clerk of
court—are so unreasonable that they effectively deprived him of his right to
“meaningful access to the judicial process.” Cote, 577 A.2d at 1176; see Boddie,
401 U.S. at 379. Martin necessarily lost control over his petition on May 18,
2016, the moment it was delivered to prison authorities, and no matter how
far in advance he delivered the petition, he could never be certain that the
court clerk would receive it by May 25, 2016. Thus, he was denied the
opportunity to contest his disciplinary matter when the petition was received
13
by the clerk of court on May 26, 2016, one day outside of the statutory
window and eight days after he gave it to the prison.
[¶18] “[I]n the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the
State’s action,” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380-81, such ephemeral access to the court
cannot be properly characterized as “meaningful” and therefore does not
comport with the open courts provision and due process clause of the Maine
constitution. See Me. Const. art. I, §§ 6-A, 19. However, this is not to say that
the filing requirements pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11002 and Rule 80C(b) will
always deprive a pro se prisoner of his or her right to meaningful access to the
judicial process. Because it is incumbent upon a pro se prisoner to recognize
that, unlike represented prisoners or nonincarcerated persons, he or she has
no choice but to mail his or her petition, it is not unconstitutionally
unreasonable to require that the petition be delivered to prison authorities at
least three days prior to the thirty-day filing deadline. See M.R. Civ. P. 6(c)
(recognizing that a period of three days is generally sufficient to allow for the
mailing of legal documents).
[¶19] Accordingly, a pro se prisoner’s constitutional rights are only
violated where—as in this case—he or she completes the prison’s procedures
for depositing the petition with the prison for mailing at least three days
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before the last day on which the petition may be timely filed, and the petition
does not reach the clerk of court until after that deadline has passed. Put
simply, the filing deadline created by 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) and Rule 80C(b) has
effectively deprived Martin “of his remedy [against the Department] under
color of regulating it.” Sampson, 63 Me. at 333. This is especially so here,
given that the Department—as the party against whom Martin had attempted
to file his petition—was also the institution he was forced to rely upon to
ensure that his petition was timely filed. See Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 102, 107,
37 A. 864 (1897) (holding a filing statute unconstitutional where it “might put
the citizen at the mercy of his adversary . . . a result abhorrent to the very
nature of constitutional government”); see also Warner, 135 S.W.3d at 685 (recognizing “the unique problem that arises when one party is forced to rely
on his opposing party to ensure pleadings are timely filed” (quotation marks
omitted)).
[¶20] Accordingly, the State’s argument on appeal—that Martin’s
constitutional rights were not violated because he received the “ample time”
of twenty-three days to petition the court—misapprehends the constitutional
interest at stake, as such a standard would nonetheless result in Martin losing
all control over his petition upon delivery to prison authorities and would
15
permit the Department to delay his petition for an indeterminate period in
order to ensure his inability to pursue a claim against it. Moreover, although
the State identifies our previous opinions in cases such as Giberson v. Quinn,
445 A.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Me. 1982), for the proposition that the open courts
provision does not prohibit a reasonable time limit for filing a judicial action,
those cases and the rationale underlying them are inapposite to the situation
at hand. Unlike Martin, the plaintiff in Giberson was not impermissibly forced
to rely on his opposing party to ensure that his pleadings were timely filed.
See generally id.
[¶21] For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the prisoner mailbox rule for
any unrepresented prisoner whose Rule 80C petition, having been delivered
to the Department of Corrections at least three days before the last day on
which the petition may be timely filed, arrives at the clerk of court after that
deadline has expired.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior
Court for reinstatement of the 80C petition.
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E. James Burke, Esq., and Alec Youngblood, Stud. Atty. (orally), Cumberland
Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for appellant Charles M. Martin
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and James E. Fortin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Knox County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-21
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY