State of Maine v. Thomas A. Proia , 2017 ME 169 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 169Docket: Yor-16-490
Argued: May 10, 2017
Decided: July 27, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
THOMAS A. PROIA
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Thomas A. Proia appeals from a judgment entered in the trial court
(York County, Douglas, J.) after a jury-waived trial, convicting him of a number
of charges, including crimes of violence, arising from an incident where he
engaged in conduct while affected by a distorted view of reality. Proia
contends that the court erred in its application of the statutory principle of
abnormal condition of the mind, see 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2016), and that the
evidence was insufficient for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
he acted with the culpable states of mind necessary to commit the crimes for
which he was convicted.1 Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
1 The State separately argues that the court erred when it declined to order Proia to produce a
copy of a report prepared by one of his psychological expert witnesses. The plain terms of M.R.U.
Crim. P. 16A(b)(2)(B) entitle the State to obtain a copy of a defense expert’s report only when the
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts found by the court bear on the issues relevant
to this appeal and are supported by the evidence. See State v. Jones, 2012 ME
88, ¶ 6, 46 A.3d 1125.
[¶3] On October 19, 2015, while running an errand, Proia developed
increasingly paranoid and delusional beliefs that he was being followed and
was in danger. He returned to his residence, where another family member
was present, and he retrieved two assault rifles from the attic. He gave one
firearm to the family member, kept the other, and proceeded to fire
approximately thirty rounds in various directions from both inside and
outside the home. When he left the house to search in the nearby woods for
“demons” that he thought he may have shot, the family member remained
inside and, after retreating to an upstairs bathroom, called 9-1-1.
[¶4] Still in an agitated state, Proia returned to the house, entered the
bathroom without the firearm, and told the family member that they were
both being threatened by people outside. The 9-1-1 call was terminated at
some point, but a dispatcher called back when Proia was lying on top of the
defendant possesses the report and “intends to introduce [it] as evidence in any proceeding.”
Because Proia made clear before trial that he did not intend to—and in fact did not—offer the
report in evidence, the State’s argument is without merit.
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family member in the bathroom, ostensibly as protection from the perceived
threat. The recording of the return call from the dispatcher captured the
sounds of a struggle and of Proia yelling as he prepared to commit sexual
assault on the family member. The family member was able to escape by
running outside and was eventually taken to safety by a responding police
officer.
[¶5] Proia then went to a neighbor’s property, where he and the
occupants of the neighbor’s house saw each other through a window. Proia
threw a rock through the window, resulting in a laceration to the chest and
shoulder of one of the residents. Another neighbor called the police because
Proia had also broken one of the windows in that neighbor’s house. Police
arrived at the scene and ordered Proia to the ground, but he did not comply.
Officers twice used a Taser in an attempt to subdue Proia. Even then and after
being handcuffed, Proia continued to struggle. He was speaking rapidly and
had a frothy substance around his mouth. The officers took Proia to a
hospital, where he remained agitated until he was sedated.
[¶6] After being charged initially by complaint, Proia was indicted for
the ten counts described below and pleaded not guilty to all charges. At a
two-day bench trial held in August 2016, the evidence included the testimony
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of two expert psychological witnesses presented by Proia and Proia’s own
testimony. Proia did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity, see 17-A M.R.S.
§ 39 (2016), but instead challenged the State’s proof of his mens rea. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court made extensive oral findings of fact and found
Proia guilty of seven of the ten charges: domestic violence reckless conduct
with a dangerous weapon, namely, a firearm, (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§§ 211-A(1)(A), 1252(4) (2016); aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 208(1)(B) (2016); two counts of attempted gross sexual assault (Class B),
17-A M.R.S. §§ 152(1)(B), 253(1)(B) (2016);2 domestic violence assault
(Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2016); endangering the welfare of a
child (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 554(1)(C), 1201(1)(A-1)(2) (2016); and
criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2016). For reasons
unrelated to Proia’s state of mind, the court acquitted Proia of the remaining
three charges: reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous weapon (Class C),
17-A M.R.S. §§ 211(1), 1252(4) (2016); unlawful trafficking in scheduled
drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(E) (2016); and refusing to submit to
arrest (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B(1)(B) (2016).
2 Because the two charges of attempted gross sexual assault arose from the same criminal act,
the court correctly merged the counts so that Proia ultimately was convicted of only one count. See
State v. Murphy, 2015 ME 62, ¶ 28, 124 A.3d 647.
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[¶7] In its findings, the court stated that “[t]here is clearly evidence in
this case that is relevant to the defense of abnormal condition of the mind
. . . including [Proia’s] extreme anxiety, paranoia, delusions, agitated speech,
[and] so forth, [which] reflect that he was experiencing some sort of agitated
condition and a distorted perception of reality.” Framing the legal issue, the
court stated that
even though an individual may be operating under an impaired or
altered perception of reality or other irrational mode of thinking
at the time of an incident, the question is whether that condition,
the abnormal condition of the mind, the mental disease or defect,
however it’s termed, whether that condition negated, prevented
the formation of the required culpable state of mind, and it is the
State’s obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
required state of mind even though a defendant may be
experiencing an abnormal condition of the mind.
[¶8] Addressing the pending counts, the court made findings regarding
the charge of domestic violence reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon,
which was based on Proia’s discharge of a firearm within the house where the
family member was present. Those findings provided context for the findings
relating to a number of the other charges on which the court found Proia
guilty. The court stated:
[I]t is clear that [Proia] was experiencing some sort of
abnormal condition, distortion of reality[;] however, within
whatever he was experiencing in that moment he made some
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decisions, he took some actions, he was aware I believe of the
consequences of those actions.
He believed he was being followed, he believed people were
out to get him, he wanted to defend himself, he did what a person
might do in a situation where they feel threatened and that is to
go get something to defend themselves with and that’s what he
did, he went and got a gun.
[¶9] The court found that the State had proved that during the incident,
Proia acted with knowledge that a firearm could “dispel a threat” and could
injure or kill someone, and that he discharged the weapon for the purpose of
eliminating what he perceived as a threat. The court similarly found that the
State had proven the culpable states of mind that constituted elements of the
other charges of which the court ultimately found Proia guilty.
[¶10] At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a series of
concurrent sentences that resulted in five years’ imprisonment, with all but
twenty-one months suspended, to be followed by four years of probation.
Proia appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] Each of the charges for which Proia was convicted includes a
particular culpable state of mind that the State was required to prove beyond
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a reasonable doubt.3 Proia argues on appeal that the court incorrectly
interpreted section 38 as that statute applies to the evidence of his mental
condition, and that the evidence of Proia’s mental abnormality foreclosed any
determination that he acted with the culpability necessary to be found guilty
of any of the charges.
[¶12] We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of a statute.
State v. Kendall, 2016 ME 147, ¶ 14, 148 A.3d 1230. Then, “[w]hen
determining whether the record contained enough evidence to support a
criminal defendant’s conviction, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally
find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Sanchez, 2014 ME 50, ¶ 8, 89 A.3d 1084 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 38 provides, “Evidence of an abnormal
condition of the mind may raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a
required culpable state of mind.” As the court correctly observed in its
analysis, the existence of an abnormal state of mind is not itself determinative
of any legal issue governed by section 38. See State v. Graham, 2015 ME 35,
3 The crime of gross sexual assault does not contain a mens rea element. See 17-A M.R.S. § 253
(2016); State v. Stewart, 2007 ME 115, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1031. Because Proia was charged with
attempted gross sexual assault, however, the State was required to prove, among other things, that
Proia acted “with the intent to complete the commission of the crime,” 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1) (2016),
thus introducing a mens rea element into the charge.
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¶ 20, 113 A.3d 1102. Rather, when evidence of an abnormal condition of the
mind is presented, the court is called upon to determine whether, based on
the record as a whole—including evidence of the defendant’s mental
condition—the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
acted with the culpable state of mind necessary to commit the crime charged.
See id. ¶¶ 20, 22. With respect to each of the counts on which the court found
Proia guilty, the court concluded that the State had met that burden of proof,
and the court did not commit any error in its findings of fact or application of
the law to those facts.
[¶14] We have observed that evidence of a mental abnormality that
results in a distortion of reality may actually demonstrate that a defendant
acted with the alleged culpable state of mind. See id. ¶ 25 (“Evidence of
Graham’s distorted perception that the child was in danger also tended to
confirm the court’s finding that Graham acted with the conscious object of
removing the child from danger by taking him home.”); State v. Mishne,
427 A.2d 450, 455 (Me. 1981) (stating that “evidence of a compelling need
[associated with an abnormal condition of the mind] tends to confirm the
conclusion that defendant acted with awareness and with the conscious object
of fulfilling that need”).
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[¶15] Here, after making the predicate finding that Proia’s perception
of reality was distorted during the episode, the court determined that he acted
in a way that was responsive to his delusions. For example, Proia believed he
was in danger and therefore acted as if to defend himself and a member of his
family from that perceived danger. In this way, the evidence entitled the court
to find that Proia’s conduct—when gauged through the lens of his delusional
apprehension of reality—was directly responsive to his perception of the
circumstances. The court did not err in concluding that Proia’s decisions and
conduct were explained by his delusional mental state, and thus that Proia’s
mental abnormality did not prevent him from acting with the required
culpable states of mind that are elements of the charges of which the court
found him guilty.
[¶16] We therefore conclude that the court’s application of section 38
was not erroneous, and that the evidence presented at trial supported the
court’s factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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Valerie A. Randall, Esq. (orally), and Patrick H. Gordon, Esq., Fairfield &
Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellant Thomas A. Proia
Kathryn L. Slattery, District Attorney, and Shira S. Burns, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District 1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-445
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY