Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust v. Joseph J. Fantini , 2020 ME 77 ( 2020 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 77Docket: Yor-19-408
Submitted
On Briefs: May 12, 2020
Decided: May 28, 2020
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
INGRID DOYON, TRUSTEE OF THE OSCAR OLSON JR. TRUST
v.
JOSEPH J. FANTINI et al.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Joseph J. Fantini; Ann J. Fantini; John J. Dubois, Trustee of the John
J. Dubois Revocable Trust; and Maureen A. Dubois, Trustee of the Maureen
A. Dubois Revocable Trust (collectively, the Fantinis) appeal from a declaratory
judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, O’Neil, J.) in favor of
Ingrid Doyon, Trustee of the Oscar Olson Jr. Trust. In its declaratory judgment,
the trial court concluded that (1) the language of the restrictive covenant
governing use of a lot owned by Doyon is ambiguous and (2) the ambiguities
should be resolved in Doyon’s favor to allow for the construction of structures
other than a garage. The Fantinis contend that the court erred in its
interpretation of the deed. We agree and vacate the judgment.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In 1912, Charles A. Donovan acquired a thirty-acre parcel of land in
York. In 1913, Donovan drafted a subdivision plan (recorded in 1915) for
“Nubble Point,” apportioning the property into ninety-three lots and later
conveying all or a portion of approximately thirty lots as depicted on the plan.
For nearly all of the lots conveyed, the deeds established specific development
restrictions. In 1936, he drafted a revised subdivision plan (recorded in 1937)
for Nubble Point and later conveyed all or a portion of approximately sixteen
lots as depicted on the revised plan, subject to development restrictions.
[¶3] In a 1941 plan, Donovan again revised the subdivision, enlarging
Lot 71 and creating Lot 72, the vacant lot at issue in this appeal. The same year,
Donovan conveyed Lots 3, 5, and 72 to Elwood and Marion Hennessy in a single
deed (the “Hennessy Deed”) that is the deed at issue here and that contained
the following language restricting development of the three lots:
The foregoing described and conveyed lots or parcels of land
are conveyed subject to various restrictions, all of which shall run
with the land, to wit:
(a) No building of any kind whatever shall be erected upon
said Lot Number Five (5).
(b) No building, other than a new, one-family house shall be
erected on said Lot Number Three (3). Said house shall cost not
less than fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00). It shall not be nearer
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Lot Number Two (2), nor “Marycliff Avenue”,[1] than twenty (20)
feet in either case. A private garage may be erected, however, upon
said lot.
(c) A private garage, for use with said Lot Number Three (3),
may be erected upon said Lot Number Seventy-Two (72). It shall
not be nearer “Marycliff Avenue” than forty (40) feet, and not
nearer Lot Seventy-One (71) than twenty (20) feet, and it shall not
be used for dwelling purposes of any kind.
[¶4] In two 1979 deeds, the Hennessys conveyed Lots 3, 5, and 72 to
Oscar Olson Jr.2 Doyon, Olson’s daughter, acquired Lots 3, 5, and 72 as trustee
of her father’s trust through a quitclaim deed executed shortly before her
father’s death in 2012. In 2013, Doyon conveyed Lots 3 and 5 together to
individuals unrelated to this action, but she retained her interest in Lot 72,
marking the first time since the creation of Lots 3, 5, and 72 that the three lots
were not in common ownership.
[¶5] In 2014, Doyon initiated a declaratory judgment action in the
Superior Court seeking a determination that the restrictive covenant burdening
Lot 72 permitted her to construct a single-family home and garage on the
property. See 14 M.R.S. § 5954 (2020). In 2015, the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment, and the court concluded, inter alia, that summary
1 The name of “Marycliff Avenue” has since been changed to “Nubble Road.”
2 More specifically, one deed conveyed Lot 72 to Oscar Olson Jr. and Arthur Perkins as joint
tenants and the other deed conveyed Lots 3 and 5 solely to Oscar Olson Jr.
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judgment was precluded because the restrictive covenant is ambiguous. The
court held a bench trial on June 13, 2019, and issued a judgment in favor of
Doyon on September 9, 2019. The Fantinis, who own lots neighboring Doyon’s,
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] The parties contest the interpretation of the restrictive covenant
contained in the Hennessy Deed as it pertains to Lot 72.3 The parties dispute
whether the language of the Hennessy Deed limits permissible construction on
Lot 72 to a non-dwelling garage subject to setback restrictions, as the Fantinis
contend, or whether it permits such a garage and/or other construction, such
as a single-family home and accessory garage, as the trial court concluded in
favor of Doyon.
[¶7] According to well-established principles of interpretation,
[c]onstruction of a deed, including a restrictive covenant, is a
question of law that we review de novo. The language must be
3Doyon also challenges the enforceability of the restriction, advancing two theories. First, she
contends that the Fantinis lack standing to enforce the restrictions because their properties are not
appurtenant to Lot 72. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Fantinis have standing to
oppose Doyon’s interpretation of the restriction because their title descends from land that Donovan
retained at the time of the conveyances made pursuant to the Hennessy Deed. See Herrick v. Marshall,
66 Me. 435, 439 (1877).
Second, Doyon contends that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction because
(1) changed circumstances in the neighborhood make maintaining the restriction unjust and (2) the
restriction constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation. We are unpersuaded by these
equitable arguments and do not address them further.
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given its ordinary meaning, and if there is no ambiguity the plain
meaning controls. If the language is ambiguous, then extrinsic
evidence may be consulted to ascertain the grantor’s intent.
Language is deemed ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible
of different interpretations.
River Dale Ass’n v. Bloss, 2006 ME 86, ¶ 6, 901 A.2d 809 (citations omitted)
(quotation marks omitted). Although the focal point of our interpretation is
restriction c of the Hennessy Deed, the portion pertaining to Lot 72, “we must
look at the instrument as a whole to construe the language of a deed.” Sleeper
v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, ¶ 13, 83 A.3d 769 (quotation marks omitted); see
Kinney v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 403 A.2d 346, 349 (Me. 1979). In addition, where
a deed references a plan, as the Hennessy Deed references Donovan’s
subdivision plans, “the entirety of the plan becomes a part of the deed.” Sleeper,
2013 ME 112, ¶ 13, 83 A.3d 769.
[¶8] The trial court concluded that restriction c is ambiguous and
determined that no extrinsic evidence spoke directly to the intent of the parties
to the Hennessy Deed. The court then applied the rule of construction dictating
that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the interpretation that least
restricts the free use of property. See Matteson v. Batchelder, 2011 ME 134,
¶ 16, 32 A.3d 1059 (“In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the intent of the
parties should be ascertained by resort to the rules of construction of
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deeds . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)); Boehner v. Briggs, 528 A.2d 451, 453
(Me. 1987) (stating the rule of construction that ambiguities are “resolved in
favor of less restrictive uses of the property”). Because we conclude that the
plain language of the deed is not reasonably susceptible of multiple
interpretations, and is therefore not ambiguous, we do not address extrinsic
evidence or rules of construction. See River Dale Ass’n, 2006 ME 86, ¶ 6,
901 A.2d 809.
[¶9] Although the trial court’s constrained interpretation of restriction c
resulted in ambiguity, a reading of the covenant that properly considers
Lot 72’s restrictions in the context of the entire deed leads to the clear
understanding that Donovan intended Lot 72 to be used only for the purpose of
constructing a garage, subject to setback requirements, for use in conjunction
with Lot 3. Although the language of restriction c does not mirror the form used
in restrictions a and b—which expressly prohibit structures using the opening
language of “No building . . . shall . . . .”—its meaning is nonetheless clear. On its
face, the Hennessy Deed evinces Donovan’s intent to convey Lots 3, 5, and 72 as
a unit, with Lot 3 functioning as the centerpiece. The deed dictates that Lot 5, a
small waterfront parcel neighboring the waterfront Lot 3, is to remain vacant,
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and that a garage constructed on Lot 72, which is situated across the street from
Lot 3, is to be “for use with . . . Lot Number Three (3).”
[¶10] Restriction b permits Lot 3 to be used for construction of a
single-family house and a garage. The trial court posited that “the fact that the
deed allows for the construction of a private garage on either Lot 3 or Lot 72
undermines [the Fantinis’] interpretation because the building of a garage on
Lot 3 leaves Lot 72 without a conceivable use.” However, the option to
construct a garage on Lot 3 does not render Lot 72 useless. Even if the grantees
opted to construct a garage on Lot 3, they reasonably may have decided to
construct a second garage for use with Lot 3 on Lot 72. The plain language of
the deed does not, however, give the grantees the option to construct other
types of structures on Lot 72 if they decided not to build a garage there.
[¶11] In addition, Doyon’s interpretation—that Donovan imposed
specific limitations for any future garage on Lot 72, but nevertheless left the
door open, without any specifications whatsoever, for the construction of any
other kind of structure to be built on the lot—is not a reasonable one. It is
hardly conceivable that Donovan, who conveyed nearly all of the lots in the
subdivision subject to deeded restrictions, prohibited a combination
garage/dwelling unit but allowed carte blanche for any other imaginable
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structure, including dwelling units, on Lot 72. In permitting a dwelling on Lot 3
in the subdivision, restriction b carefully sets forth a minimum price ($1,500),
setback specifications, and a limitation that the house be single-family in
nature. Restriction c includes no similar conditions that one would expect had
Donovan intended to permit a dwelling on Lot 72. Further, as the trial court
acknowledged, if Donovan had intended to allow for dwellings on Lot 72—and
only included garage setback specifications out of a driving concern to regulate
garage aesthetics—such an interpretation fails to explain why he did not
include similar specifications regulating a potential garage on Lot 3. In sum, the
Hennessy Deed unambiguously limits the construction that can take place on
Lot 72 to a garage to be used with Lot 3, subject to the setback specifications
described in restriction c.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry of a
judgment consistent with this decision.
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Christopher E. Pazar, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq., Drummond &
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellants Joseph J. Fantini; Ann J. Fantini; John
J. Dubois, Trustee of the John J. Dubois Revocable Trust; and Maureen A. Dubois,
Trustee of the Maureen A. Dubois Revocable Trust
Roy T. Pierce, Esq., Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellee Ingrid
Doyon, trustee of the Oscar Olson, Jr. Trust
York County Superior Court docket number RE-2014-78
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY